CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

119th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

JANUARY 1984

2-13

JAPAN AND KOREA—DISTANT NEIGHBOURS
Brian Bridges

REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA
J. E. Spence

VLADIMIR BUKOVSKY'S CASTLE
Michael Futrell

'THE ROYALISTS AT WAR'
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and other articles together with a twelve-page Literary Supplement

Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

January 1984 Vol. 244 No. 1416 Founded 1866

Contents *Page*

Japan and Korea—Distant Neighbours? Brian Bridges 1

Reform in South Africa—a Tangled Web J. E. Spence 6

The Kampuchean Deadlock Jonathan Luxmoore 16

Vladimir Bukovsky's Castle Michael Futrell 23

'Grenada He Come From' Paul Rose 30

Mexico John Elsom 34

'The Royalists at War': an Exhibition of the Work of William Dobson at the National Gallery, London Ernle Money 39

The GDR—a Country of Books and Readers Waltraud Hannig 43

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT 45

Quarterly Fiction Review Rosalind Wade 45

Non-Fiction Reviews 49
Lord Longford, Esmond Wright, Sir John Biggs-Davison, M.P., John A. Loraine, Rosalind Wade, Molly Tibbs

SHORTER REVIEWS 56

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© 1983 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H. G. Leates Ltd., 45/47 Alexandra St., Southend-on-Sea, Essex. U.S. Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N.Y. 10022. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £14.50, U.S.A. and Canada $47.50. Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U.S. and Canada; extra costs given on request. U.S. Postmaster: please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, New York N.Y. 10022. (ISSN/0010/7565)

CUL-H06340-213-P2813

Contemporary Review

052
1008

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

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JAPAN AND KOREA—DISTANT NEIGHBOURS?

by Brian Bridges

IN January 1983, for the first time since 1945, Japanese flags flew over the old Capitol Building and other government offices in the centre of Seoul. The reason was the first ever official visit by a Japanese prime minister to South Korea. It is debatable whether this visit really marked 'a new and vital stage' in Japan-Korea relations, to use Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's own words, but it certainly has marked a change in the atmosphere of a relationship which has been characterised by strain and discordance throughout the post-war period.

With unfailing regularity public opinion polls in both South Korea and Japan have depicted the other country unfavourably (in South Korean eyes Japan usually rates as the next most hated country after North Korea). The Japanese-Korean antipathy dates back centuries; it was exacerbated by the thirty-five years of harsh Japanese colonial occupation. As the reactions last year to Japanese textbook descriptions of events during that period of subjugation have demonstrated, the legacy of resentment and bitterness amongst the Koreans is still not far below the surface.

Across generations, Koreans find it difficult not to remind Japanese of this unsavoury past, while Japanese are reluctant to admit to the cultural heritage brought over from medieval Korea. One legacy from the colonial era, the presence in Japan of nearly 700,000 ethnic Koreans—subtly discriminated against and in some cases legally stateless—is a continuing source of particular tension. Of the two, it is on the Korean side that post-war generational change has produced the greater impact on attitudes. Not until the strongly anti-Japanese first president of South Korea, Syngman Rhee, was followed by Park Chung-hi, who was Japanese-

trained and an admirer of the Meiji leaders' modernisation model, were diplomatic relations at last established, in 1965, and economic and political links fostered. However, the present president, Chun Tu-hwan, American-trained and critical at the time of the terms of the 1965 treaty, has sought to obtain what he considered to be the necessary due recompense from Japan, primarily through backing demands during 1981-3 for substantial Japanese economic assistance. In Japan, where generational changes have been less important than factional divisions, few knew or could talk confidently to the new, younger and more nationalistic South Korean leadership associated with Chun. Even the traditionally pro-Seoul factions of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party found Chun an unknown quantity, and contacts were only slowly built up. Only after Nakasone, who was critical of the way his relatively inactive predecessor Zenko Suzuki had allowed relations to deteriorate over issues such as economic aid and history textbook revisions, came into office did the impetus to find a way out of the impasse seem to exist.

Under President Chun, South Korean has pursued four objectives with respect to Japan. On the economic level, for all South Korea's economic progress, and its recovery from the crisis of 1980 when negative growth was recorded, the relationship with Japan remains an assymetrical one. A balance of trade solidly in Japan's favour has prompted South Korean demands for greater economic assistance, better market access for Korean manufactures and, most recently, increased technology transfer. Secondly, South Korea expends six per cent of its GNP on defence and has argued that by acting as a 'bulwark' against North Korea it is in effect defending Japan, a role which it feels the latter should properly acknowledge. Linked with this is the intention to obstruct, if possible, any embryonic Japanese moves towards North Korea and to try to neutralise the influence of pro-Pyongyang groups amongst the Korean community inside Japan. Finally, like its predecessors, the Chun government has been sensitive about Japanese criticism of its measures to suppress domestic dissent and has tried to head off governmental-level protests as being undue interference in internal affairs.

The Japanese, although ever conscious of the Korean peninsula as a 'dagger' pointing at them and aware that any large-scale conflict on the peninsula would involve them, at least indirectly, have been reluctant to endorse South Korean security perceptions and to provide additional aid to a country which figures well towards the top of the league of developing countries. Although some members of the Defence Agency do see the North Korean military build-up as a potential threat, the majority of Japanese governmental opinion still tends to play down the North Korean threat, viewing it, in President Chun's words, as 'a fire across the ocean'. Nakasone's comments in Washington—and whatever the exact phraseology the import is clear—only re-emphasised the point that the Japanese concentrate rather on the Soviet Union as the main disruptive factor in Northeast Asia. The Japanese business community has profited from trade and investment with South Korea and so does not want to lose out on opportunities presented by the current South Korean Five Year Economic

Plan, even though fears of Korean competition are also common in certain sectors, notably the steel industry. Additionally, Japanese interests in as settled a regional environment as possible induce a concern for sustained South Korean economic development as a predicate of political stability.

The incoming prime minister, Nakasone, started off on a new footing with his own brand of 'telephone diplomacy', ringing round Asian political leaders, including President Chun, within a few days of taking office. Chun then helped by allowing his leading political opponent, Kim Dae-jung, whose fate has long been considered by Japanese of all political persuasions as the litmus test of human rights in South Korea, to leave prison for medical treatment and exile in the United States. On his subsequent visit to Seoul, speedily arranged prior to the traditional prime ministerial visit to Washington, Nakasone went out of his way to please his hosts. He praised Chun's leadership, expressed his 'deep regret' for the colonial past and acknowledged cultural indebtedness; agreement was reached on the economic aid package and, although security perceptions still remained somewhat at variance, he did proclaim his 'high regard' for South Korean defence efforts.

Nakasone's words and actions in Seoul and, later the same month, in Washington seemed to label him as a 'hawk' and his popularity inside Japan declined in inverse proportion to his standing abroad, though as the results in the June House of Councillors elections showed the electoral impact was limited. His commitment to a more positive defence role for Japan has produced an ambivalence in South Korean (as indeed in some Southeast Asian) opinion. In recent months South Korean leaders have reiterated that while Japan's increased defence efforts were justifiable they should be limited to complementing American defence capabilities. Even though the KAL airliner incident and the Rangoon bomb attack have led to South Korean calls for closer US-Japan-Korea defence co-operation, there is little prospect of change to the situation whereby the main axis of co-operation continues to be the separate bilateral relationships of the two neighbours with the United States. Even were constitutional restraints to be circumvented, it is inconceivable that emotional legacies would permit Japanese forces to undertake joint action with South Korean forces on Korean soil. Japan's contribution has been, and is likely to remain, confined to the provision of bases to allow American forces to carry out their commitment to defend South Korea.

Although they have been supportive in public of South Korean proposals for the reunification of the peninsula, in practice the Japanese have not advanced much beyond statements about creating an environment for dialogue on the peninsula. Indeed, given the potential economic power and latent anti-Japanism of a unified Korea—however unlikely the prospects may be—of whatever political hue, Japan has, if anything, more of an interest in the maintenance of the existing status quo. North Korea's two backers, China and the Soviet Union, have also come to discreetly support the emergent status quo, but North Korea itself remains implacably opposed to any proposals such as cross-recognition by the

four major powers involved and simultaneous entry into the United Nations which it feels would only solidify the present situation to its disadvantage.

The Japanese government has appreciated that its options with regard to North Korea have been further constricted by the Nakasone visit to Seoul. No diplomatic relations exist, but Japan is by far the largest non-communist trading partner of North Korea (though bilateral trade totals are paltry by comparison with Japanese-South Korean trade) and has made use of pro-Pyongyang politicians to maintain unofficial channels of contact. In May 1983, for the first time ever, a Japanese foreign minister talked with the leader of an official North Korean delegation, attending an international conference in Tokyo, but afterwards the South Koreans were quick to extract a commitment from the Japanese that there would be no change in basic policy.

South Korea has been pursuing a diplomatic offensive against North Korea. President Chun's tour of four African countries in 1982 and his prematurely terminated South Asian-Australasian visit in October 1983 were intended to boost South Korea's international standing. The hijacking of a Chinese airliner fortuitously resulted in direct Chinese-South Korean negotiations and prompted the announcement in June of a *nordpolitik*—South Korea's attempt to normalise relations with China and the Soviet Union—but the destruction of the KAL airliner brought an abrupt end to hopes of a thaw in relations with the Soviet Union. Yet, international sympathy over the loss of life and the success of the seventieth conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union held in Seoul in early October, despite a boycott by communist countries at North Korea's insistence, have worked to South Korea's advantage. Nevertheless, South Korea still remains wary of asking Japan to act as an intermediary in its tentative contacts with communist countries. Moreover, it was to the United States, rather than to Japan, that South Korea looked when pressing the Soviet Union for explanations of the fate of the KAL airliner.

However, there are some signs of a dialogue developing between Tokyo and Seoul. As has been made more explicit than ever in the most recent Japanese Diplomatic Bluebook, published last October, Japan has come to see itself as a member of the West with its roots in Asia. Japan has been conscious, indeed rather self-conscious, of its role as the sole Asian representative at the Economic Summits of the industrialised nations and for some years past has consulted with ASEAN countries before and after attending such meetings. Now, under Nakasone, South Korea has been included within this framework of consultation. A special envoy was sent to Seoul prior to the Williamsburg Summit and on his return to Tokyo Nakasone made use of the telephone 'hot line' set up after his January Seoul visit to inform Chun personally of the results of the summit discussions.

The reconvening of the ministerial-level conferences, with the first such meeting for two years being held in Tokyo in August, has added further meat to the skeleton framework of renewed Japanese-Korean

co-operation. By comparison with Nakasone's January talks security aspects were little mentioned and technology transfer was the main issue. It was a sign of a basic improvement in the overall relationship that questions previously considered rather too sensitive for open discussion were raised—the thirty-year old territorial dispute over the Korean-occupied island of Dokto/Takeshima, the repatriation of ethnic Koreans resident in Soviet-held Sakhalin, and the treatment of ethnic Koreans in Japan. A few days later the Japanese authorities co-ordinated with the South Koreans in providing such information as they possessed on the fate of the KAL airliner.

Nevertheless, the debilitating legacy of mistrust and recrimination cannot be easily and quickly ameliorated. In 1981 President Chun propounded the idea of a 'community of destiny' between South Korea and Japan. Nakasone used similar phraseology earlier this year to describe Japan's relationship with the United States, but, for all the symbolic and practical successes of his dramatic visit to Seoul, it is difficult in the foreseeable future to see him or any other Japanese leader endorsing such sentiments about the Japan-Korea relationship.

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The February issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *The Senegambia Federation* by Arnold Hughes, *Britain, Argentina and the Falklands* by Peter Calvert, *The Third Point of the Compass: East-West Relations with China* by Leo Mates and *Quarterly Film Review* by David Shipman.

REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA—A TANGLED WEB

by J. E. Spence

REFORM of the South African constitution in favour of a degree of participation by the black, coloured, and Asian communities has been a major issue of political debate ever since 1974 when the sudden collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique produced a bi-partisan awareness that the Southern African political scene had changed in a fundamental and irrevocable way. Contrary to most expectations—both official and otherwise—two crucially important links in the chain of 'white' buffer states protecting the Republic from dangerous contact with black-ruled Africa had been broken. Rhodesia, open to guerilla infiltration on both its northern and eastern borders, was clearly next in line and hardly capable of withstanding a war of liberation over the long-term without massive South African support. In these circumstances, the late Mr. Vorster, then the South African premier, launched his detente offensive, designed—in collaboration with the neighbouring front-line states—to bring the Smith regime to the conference table and produce a negotiated, relatively peaceful transfer of power from white to black.

At the time, Mr. Vorster's calculations seemed brutally realistic: white rule in Rhodesia was expendable if the price was a breathing space for South Africa to put its own house in order. Detente abroad, therefore, required reform at home, and both the Prime Minister in November 1974 and Mr. Pik Botha, the Foreign Minister (at the United Nations in October 1974) gave expression to this new commitment in unambiguously graphic terms.[1] What was especially significant about this public acknowledgement of the need to move away from the existing structure of race relations in the Republic was the recognition by politicians and commentators alike that foreign and domestic policies were dynamically interacting in a way which had not been true in the 1960s when policymakers had aspired to maintain a degree of separation between the two.[2]

The reformist thrust received further impetus with the outbreak of riots in Soweto in June 1976 and their rapid spread to other major urban areas of South Africa. It has been argued—although impossible to prove conclusively, yet providing another instance of the link between events abroad and developments at home—that the willingness of young blacks to challenge the might of the South African state was, in part, the result of the ill-fated military intervention in Angola some months earlier. It is true that the Republic's forces withdrew in good order without suffering undue humiliation at the hands of their Cuban opponents; but the predominant black perception was very different: for the first time the much-vaunted, seemingly impregnable military arm of the apartheid state had suffered a reverse, and this conceivably encouraged black resistance at home in Soweto and elsewhere.

The last seven years have witnessed a series of developments that have drastically confirmed the need for major reform of the South African political system, but have paradoxically rendered its implementation more difficult and, in the view of many observers, improbable. Simply to list these suggests how complex the task has become:

(i) the growth of a black trade union movement, following the relaxation of the laws which, in the past, had emasculated its capacity to operate effectively on behalf of its membership;
(ii) the continuing discontent of the urban black population manifested in sporadic disturbances in the townships ringing the 'white' cities of South Africa;
(iii) the sporadic, but increasing, infiltration of African National Congress-backed guerillas intent on damaging the symbols of apartheid as represented by, for example, police stations, government buildings, and industrial installations and, in the process, establish the legitimacy of the ANC as the sole and effective liberation move ment representing the interests of the black majority;
(iv) the continuing 'low intensity' war in Namibia against SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) guerillas and the diplomatic stalemate between the Republic and the United Nations in the prolonged discussions over the constitutional future of the territory;
(v) the emergence of a new right wing Conservative Party, led by Dr. Andries Treurnicht, a former cabinet minister and leader of the Transvaal Nationalist Party and spokesman for the *Verkrampte* (hardline) element of Afrikanerdom;
(vi) the growing influence of *verligte* (open-minded) Afrikaner intellecuals in the universities, the churches and the press on the thinking of politicians about reform (though not always acknowledged by the latter);
(vii) the rise of the military to a position of influence in the newly-established State Security Council and the downgrading of the 'cocktail' diplomacy of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information; and, finally
(viii) the granting of independence early in 1980 to Zimbabwe under the leadership of Mr. Robert Mugabe who—in South African eyes—appeared to symbolise the communist threat to the stability of the Southern African region.

It is against this background that the reform package outlined by Mr. Botha, the Prime Minister in July 1982 and approved by Parliament in September 1983 (after some modification) must be assessed. Briefly, the scheme provides for the establishment of a tri-cameral parliament: the white (4.5m), coloured (2.6m) and Asian (.8m) communities will each have their own legislative chamber; executive power is to be exercised for seven years by a president, combining the posts of prime minister and president, elected by an electoral college of 50 whites, 25 coloureds and 13 Asians, chosen by the three chambers from their own ranks. The cabinet will be drawn from the three assemblies and might include 'outsiders' as

well, while the President's Council is to consist of 20 whites, 10 coloureds and 5 Asians elected by the majority parties of the chambers, together with 15 members appointed by the President. (In addition, the opposition parties in the three chambers will nominate 10 members to the President's Council on a proportional basis.) Legislation will be of two kinds: matters of community concern would be the sole responsibility of the chamber directly affected; matters of common concern will be debated by all three chambers and the resulting legislation approved by all the chambers separately. What constitutes a matter of 'common' or 'community' concern is for the President to decide. Conflict between the three chambers on matters of common concern will be decided by the President's Council.[3]

Mr. Botha's critics were quick to point to two features of the constitution: first, the apparent strengthening of the executive arm of government at the expense of parliamentary control—a tendency already visible in the enhanced role given to the State Security Council in recent years, a body with the ultimate responsibility for 'internal and external security planning', and a secretariat which is composed of senior military officers.[4] Secondly, there is the very obvious exclusion of the black majority (16.9m) from participation in the new constitutional structure, although the prime minister has established a cabinet committee to consider the long-term role of the urban blacks in the political system.

Not surprisingly, these proposals have generated passionate debate both within and outside parliament, and this was the case well before their substance was announced in detail. The 1981 General Election was called in the hope that the *verkrampte,* anti-reform wing of Afrikanerdom, would be heavily defeated. It produced instead a sizeable show of support for the right-wing Herstigte Party, which increased its share of the vote by 5½ times, turning some 50 Nationalist seats into marginal ones, while the Progressive Federal Party increased its seats from 17 to 26, obtaining a fifth of all votes cast. In March 1980, Dr. Treurnicht, together with 15 of his parliamentary supporters, was expelled from the party, and the record of by-elections fought since that date suggested a significant degree of hostility to any notion of constitutional reform at grassroots level.

Once announced, the reform package faced a stormy reception from all sides of the political spectrum. In January 1983, the Coloured Labour Party (CLP), despite sharp divisions within its ranks, accepted the scheme, but the Asian community remains divided, while a variety of black organisations, including Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement, has expressed strong condemnation, principally on the grounds that their exclusion suggests a policy of divide and rule on the part of the government. The official opposition, the Progressive Federal Party, also opposes the programme on the grounds that to deny the black majority a voice in determining South Africa's constitutional future, will polarise black/white relations beyond hope of repair and make revolutionary solutions all the more attractive to the unenfranchised. The right-wing Herstigte and Conservative Parties likewise see no merit in Mr. Botha's programme

for a very different reason—that concessions, however limited, to the Asian and coloured minorities will—in their view—simply increase the appetite for more, arguing that once a break has been made in the wall of apartheid, the tide of expectation—especially on the part of the black majority—will prove impossible to stem. Dr. Treurnicht in particular has objected to the multi-racial composition of the cabinet and the President's Council on the grounds that Asian and Coloured representation in each body will get some bargaining power, but more importantly that 'non-Whites will have executive power over Whites.'[5]

A referendum on the issue was held on 2 November, 1983, and the result was a decisive mandate in favour of the new constitution (for details see postscript). Yet the formation of the multi-racial United Democratic Front (UDF) in August 1983, committed to root and branch opposition to the reform proposals, provides further evidence of the ideological gulf between government and governed on the question of what can and should be done to promote peaceful change in the Republic. Black opinion, however, while united in its hostility to Mr. Botha's proposals, has not yet coalesced to produce a common front in organisation terms. Apart from the recently established UDF, there also exists a National Forum established in June 1983 consisting of 'the ideological remnants of Steve Biko's Black Consciousness Movement', decimated by banning orders in 1977.[6] The UDF is alleged to be broadly sympathetic to the multi-racial ideals of the banned African National Congress with its emphasis on class, as distinct from race, as the crucial determinant of the structure and process of South African politics. By contrast, the National Forum is anti-Communist and hostile to co-operation with white radicals, claiming that blacks have to liberate themselves and emphasising the peculiar values of a black social and political culture as a consciousness-raising mechanism. In this respect, the conflict between these two rival organisations is reminiscent of that which occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s between the African National Congress and its splinter movement, the Pan-African Congress—a split which still bedevils their activities in exile.

The wealth of commentary on the motives of the government in promoting the cause of constitutional reform and the benefits that allegedly would accrue to the recipients offers two conflicting interpretations of recent events. (In this respect, as in so many others, South Africa provides a battleground for testing the claims of rival theories of social change.) On the one hand, it is argued that the new dispensation offered to the coloured and Asian minorities in an inevitable prelude to the informal co-optation of those 'middle class' urban blacks who might be expected to accept favourable changes in their social and economic circumstances, even if the ultimate prize of *political* rights exercised in the central organs of the state is denied to them. Thus, a greater participation in the local government of areas like Soweto and the right to purchase houses on a 99-year leasehold basis will be encouraged; similarly, restraints on trade union activity will be progressively relaxed and changes in the traditional

pattern of influx control and job reservation will provide for a greater degree of social and economic mobility. These concessions, it is claimed, are designed for the benefit of those urban blacks with so-called Section 10 Rights (i.e. those who qualify as 'permanent' residents in the 'white' urban areas by virtue of length of residence and employment). Those who do not qualify will be forced to return to their ethnic homelands where their welfare would become the responsibility of the 'independent' governments in power there—a policy which has, in fact, been a traditional feature of apartheid.

Thus—according to this view—a class of relatively content blacks will be created to act as a buffer against pressure from the less content below. Whether this new 'class' would remain content to make economic and social gains without corresponding political ones is crucial for the validity of this interpretation of the probable course of change in the Republic. The Conservative and Herstigte parties believe the contrary, namely, that Mr. Botha's proposals represent the 'thin end of the wedge'. Ultimately, in the long run, some confederal structure might emerge to embrace both the homelands and 'mixed' race member states such as the Witwatersrand urban complex—although it is fair to say that most schemes of this kind tend to be the products of Afrikaner intellectuals rather than politicians. (The one exception to this proposition is the so-called 'constellation of states' thesis put forward some years ago by the government and which envisages a variety of linkages between 'white' South Africa and the homelands.) From the government's point of view, this interpretation has the merits of retaining power firmly in white hands in so far as the structure of the new constitution would not permit a veto for Asian and coloured representatives on executive decision-making.

The second interpretation of the long-term implications of the constitutional package is more optimistic from the point of view of those who want significant change in the status of blacks: it shares the assumption of the first that the government is not engaging in a power-sharing exercise designed to give the two minority communities, let alone the black majority, unfettered access to control over the levers of state power. Where this interpretation parts company with its stated more 'pessimistic' counterpart is in the emphasis placed on the state's *incapacity* to control, let alone halt at a time and in circumstances of its own choosing, the pace of change and reform once the first tentative steps have been taken. It also, by implication, emphasises the 'hidden' impact of economic forces on the process of political change in so far as relaxation in areas such as trade union activity and job reservation 'radicalise' rather than promote conservative attitudes among those who might benefit from economic and social advance.

In other words, supporters of this view argue that even within the highly restrictive and limited parameters of the current reform package, there exists a real possibility that the system will have to respond to new and unexpected pressures as the momentum of change builds up and the black population increases (to 30 million by 2000, according to the latest

projection). With respect to the position of coloureds and Asians, it is claimed, the MPs elected to represent both groups in the new parliament will have to be clearly seen to be 'delivering the goods' to highly vocal and expectant constituents. Their leaders in parliament would be compelled by the logic of their own position as legislative pioneers on trial to press for fundamental modifications of existing discriminatory laws as these affect the education, housing and Group Areas status of their people—to mention only three crucial examples. Failure on the part of the executive to respond to claims of this kind would certainly discredit both the new constitution (and its parliamentary representatives) in the eyes of sympathetic governments in the West and, more immediately, those of local electorates. And the constraint of failure on both these counts is not to be lightly dismissed, especially in view of the fact that the details of the new constitution have received a cautious, though nonetheless encouraging, welcome from both Whitehall and Washington.

Furthermore—so the argument goes—Asian and coloured MPs will at last have a legitimate platform within the central structure of government for advancing not only the claims of their own communities, but also the political demands of the deprived black majority. This is not to be despised, if only because it opens the way for debate and argument of a kind which hitherto has been confined to a sterile exchange between the supporters of Verwoerdian apartheid with its emphasis on separate development as the only 'solution', and those committed to the immediate achievement of majority rule through the principle of one man, one vote. Thus, the 'optimistic' scenario is essentially an evolutionary one, placing its faith in the emergence of a new political dynamic after decades of apparent static and sometimes violent equilibrium in which the scales of power have seemed prominently tipped in favour of the white minority. This 'scenario' is unusual in that it does not attempt to predict the future in detail, but rather places its faith in the role of the 'contingent and unforeseen' in the political life of a nation.

And in this context the reaction of two white South Africans of very different political outlooks are worth quoting: Mr. Alan Paton, former President of the South African Liberal Party (disbanded in the mid-1960s) recommended that Mr. Botha 'scrap his constitution and his referendum and start again.' The proposals were not, however, a 'gigantic swindle . . . [but rather] . . . the attempt of Afrikanerdom and the white man to get off the tiger they had been riding . . . a most impossible thing.'[7]

By contrast, Mr. Otto Krause, a leading Afrikaner journalist, cites the advantages of the 'open-ended nature of constitutional growth' bestowed by a Westminster (*sic*) model of parliamentary democracy, stating that 'when it comes to the Coloureds and Indians we are obviously not at the end of the road. . . . Far more important for the peace of our land is a settlement with the Blacks. This was a matter which one would have preferred to have seen enjoying priority on South Africa's agenda, for political stability in a situation such as ours is only obtained when major forces at play engineer a deal.'[8]

This analysis began with the proposition that external developments in the mid-1970s provoked internal debate in South Africa about the necessity of reforming the apartheid system. The external dimension remains important: both Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 and the continuing conflict in Namibia have been used by supporters and opponents of reform as evidence strengthening their particular cases. For example, Robert Mugabe's victory at the polls after a long and tragically wasteful war has been interpreted as demonstrating the necessity of liberalising the South African system before violence and a repetition of events in Rhodesia results. Similarly, the liquidation of the military and political commitment in Namibia is seen as a necessary preliminary to the task of domestic reconstruction; to allow the war to reach stalemate proportions, wastes valuable human and economic resources, although the electoral risk to Mr. Botha's government in retreating back to the Orange River as the Republic's defensive perimeter is recognised to be considerable.

Arguments of this kind are anathema to right-wing Afrikanerdom. Dr. Treurnicht's supporters, who regard themselves as the true guardians of the Volk's interests, are quick to label any concessions, whether in the domestic or external realms, as appeasement and this reaction, in part, explains why Mr. Botha has increasingly resorted to the tactics of military and economic confrontation with the front-line states and prevaricated over a settlement of the Namibian issue involving United Nations-sponsored elections in the territory and a potential victory for SWAPO at the polls. Hence the importance attached to linkage between South African agreement to a settlement of the Namibian issue and withdrawal of the 25,000 strong Cuban force from Angola.

Withdrawal from Namibia without a *quid pro quo* on the Cuban issue is unacceptable to the majority of the white electorate, who see this presence as clear evidence of Soviet efforts to destabilise the region and advance the cause of international communism; but if Cuban withdrawal were the price of a settlement, this domestic constraint on Mr. Botha would certainly be less severe, although the Angola government might well have reservations about its ability to keep the UNITA faction at bay in the continuing civil war without Cuban support, and even if South Africa were unwilling or unable to maintain its support for Jonas Savimbi's forces. It is considerations of this kind which have prevented any agreement between South Africa and Angola in the series of bilateral discussions that have taken place between the two governments on the Cape Verde Islands during the last twelve months.

Thus, for the moment, a vigorous, thrusting foreign policy in the region has convinced the electorate that the state is still master of its destiny, that the government is not losing sight of its primordial commitment to maintain white supremacy. More optimistically, some interpret the 'new style offensive' diplomacy as designed to create 'a shield of instability' to deter guerrilla incursions and behind which moderate domestic reform can take place.[9]

Certainly, Mr. Botha's current reformist aspirations are not hampered

by such guerrilla activity as has taken place: the sense of outrage, for example, following the Pretoria bomb explosion in May 1983 and the general hostility to those who resort to the tactics of terrorism has not yet produced an ideological climate calling into question the programme of reform, however moderate in scope. But the long term may reveal a major dilemma for the government: increasing threats to the established order arising from guerrilla attacks, increasing trade union activity, and a mounting discontent may compel repressive responses from a government simultaneously embarking on a reformist path. Maintaining a balance between these two imperatives of state behaviour is going to prove profoundly difficult, as the left and the right of the political spectrum combine to criticise any deviation from reform and repression respectively.

Finally, we come to the role of the military in the making of foreign and domestic policy. This has been a topic of increasing interest to commentators in recent years and the reasons are clear enough:

(i) the army's role in Namibia has involved a 'hearts and mind' campaign, the political component of its counter-insurgency strategy in the territory;

(ii) there is some evidence that the Namibian experience led certain high ranking officers, most notably General Magnus Malan, now Minister of Defence in Mr. Botha's cabinet, to press the case for domestic reform on the grounds that military capability alone, however sophisticated, provides an inadequate and incomplete defence against full scale insurgency, promising national liberation. In other words, counter-insurgency in a political vacuum, unable to offer the uncommitted masses a better alternative to that promised by the revolutionary can at best achieve stalemate and certainly not victory of any meaningful kind;

(iii) the knowledge that, over the next twenty years, the black/white population ratio will increasingly disfavour the white minority—a trend which will certainly stretch the bureaucratic and military instruments of social control and make essential, therefore, some modification of the apartheid system;

(iv) an impatience with the failure of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information to improve the Republic's standing abroad and in particular the latter's inability to translate the promise of the detente policy of the 1970s into practice and lock the neighbouring front-line states into a 'constellation' of subservient diplomatic pawns, acknowledging their dependence on the Republic as the guarantor of order and stable economic growth throughout the Southern African region.

That the peripheral states are, in varying degrees, greatly dependent economically on South Africa is not in question. What, one suspects, is resented is the refusal of their governments to subscribe to a peculiarly South African vision of a political community of states bound together by ties of common economic interest and free of ideological bickering. Hence the efforts of these states to escape their economic bondage through the establishment, for example, in 1980 of an alternative constellation of

states, the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) to collaborate in particular on joint energy and communications projects.

It is this cluster of factors which explains the more aggressive military posture adopted by the Republic during the last three years: the raids on guerilla bases in Mozambique (January 1981 and May 1983) and Lesotho (December 1982), together with the support for UNITA in Angola and the Mozambique National Resistance Movement, are ostensibly aimed at weakening the ANC's capability to infiltrate the Republic and attack military and economic targets. But these operations have also been interpreted by South Africa's critics as part of a long-term strategy or 'destabilisation' of the front-line states, to demonstrate who is the master in Southern Africa, weaken their capacity to escape Republican hegemony and 'actively turn back the tide of "foreign" or "marxist" influence seen to be penetrating the continent.'[10] This policy might, however, prove to be counter-productive. It is always difficult to control the use of military force as an instrument of intervention in pursuit of such open-ended political objectives. If the neighbouring states find their political systems stretched to breaking point by such intervention, there is always the risk that 'outsiders' will be called in to redress the local regional balance. Thus the Soviet/Cuban influence might well grow—an outcome which both South Africa and the West would find profoundly disturbing.

But in the short run, the domestic pay-off for external pressure, whether military or economic, is obvious enough. Indeed, the parallel with Israel is often cited by way of analogy: a foreign policy which, for most of the post-war period, was defensive in tone and substance, relying on the traditional instruments of diplomacy and propaganda abroad, slides into one employing military force on a tit-for-tat or increasingly pre-emptive basis as guerilla infiltration mounts. Eventually there is the temptation to engage in Lebanon-style incursions, support for indigenous proxies and perhaps—as a last resort—occupation of border zones.[11] There is substance in this analogy, though scholarly prudence inhibits making too much of it.

What is clear is that the Republic's foreign policy reflects the fact that the state no longer has that complete mastery over the domestic environment that seemed characteristic of its role in the 1960s. The deep divisions within Afrikanerdom, the sporadic, but nonetheless disturbing, activities of ANC-backed guerillas, a growing economic (and, by definition, political) awareness of the urban black community and especially its growing demonstration of industrial 'muscle' through trade union activity, the hard choices facing the government over Namibia's future—all these factors make the task of reform difficult and complex, but—in this writer's view—all the more essential. The new constitution may well be a necessary condition for reform of this kind; whether it is a sufficient one remains—as this paper has tried to show—highly debatable.

POSTSCRIPT

The referendum held on 2 November, 1983 produced a turn-out of 76%

of the White electorate and a two to one majority (1,360,223 votes, i.e., 65.95% of votes cast) in favour of the new constitution. This weight of support surprised many observers and it suggests that many English-speaking South Africans, including those who normally support the Progressive Federal Party, ignored their leaders' advice to vote no in the referendum. Similarly, the Conservative and Herstigte parties failed to persuade the great bulk of Afrikaner Nationalist Party supporters to switch their allegiance.

Mr. Botha now finds himself in a very strong position, with opponents on his left and right retreating in some confusion. Both the British and American governments welcomed the result, but the Black majority still remains outside the constitutional pale. Its opposition to the new constitutional dispensation will no doubt increase, helped along by the increased politicisation which the debate over the constitution and the referendum campaign has engendered.

NOTES

1. See the statement to the Security Council by Mr. R. G. Botha, South African Permanent Representative at the United Nations, on 24 October, 1974: 'Discrimination based solely on the colour of a man's skin cannot be defended. And we shall do everything in our power to move away from discrimination based on race and colour.' Quoted from *Southern African Record* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs), I, March 1975, p.21. For a detailed analysis of the detente exercise, see J. E. Spence, 'Detente in Southern Africa: An Interim Judgement', *International Affairs*, 53, i, (1977), pp.1-14.
2. See J. E. Spence, 'The Outward Movement of South African Foreign Policy' in R. Dale and C. Potholm, *Southern African Perspectives*, Glencoe University Press, 1971, pp.
3. See *South African Digest*, 6 August, 1982, p.3 for further details of the plan.
4. See Simon Jenkins, 'Destabilising Southern Africa', *The Economist*, 16-22nd July, 1983, p.16.
5. *South African Digest, op. cit.*, p.3.
6. See Allister Sparks, 'Black Politics Revived', *The Observer*, 21 August, 1983.
7. 'Hitting the Headlines', *Financial Mail*, 5 August, 1983.
8. 'Westminster is Alive and Well', *Sunday Times*, 12 June, 1983 (quoted in *South African Digest*, 1 July, 1983).
9. Jenkins, *op.cit.*, p.28.
10. John Barratt, 'The outlook for Namibian independence: Some domestic constraints,' *International Affairs Bulletin* (Johannesburg), 7, i, (1983), p.23.
11. See Jenkins, *op.cit.*, for an illuminating discussion of this theme.

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Professor Spence acknowledges the help of Dr. Geoffrey Berridge in preparing the above article.

THE KAMPUCHEAN DEADLOCK

by Jonathan Luxmoore

VIETNAM'S military and diplomatic efforts to secure control over the embattled state of Kampuchea have followed a well-established annual pattern since the Vietnamese invasion of December 1978. During the dry season, which extends from November to May, the vanguard of an occupying army of 200,000 strives to dislodge resistance forces from their strongholds along Kampuchea's western border. For the rest of the year, whilst the monsoons prevent a sustained military campaign, intensive diplomatic efforts are made to gain maximum political advantage in time for the opening session of the United Nations General Assembly in October.

On the military front, the fate of Vietnam's fifth dry season offensive, launched on 31 March 1983, emphasised once again the unlikelihood of any lasting military solution. The capture of several guerrilla bases during the first week of the offensive did succeed in driving 50,000 refugees into Thailand. But the determination of the guerrillas to avoid frontal clashes limited the effects of the Vietnamese action. Lacking sufficient air cover for its ground forces, Vietnam was unable to move decisively against the well-defended bases of the larger guerrilla army of the Khmer Rouge in the Phnum Malai hills, which lie north of the strategic Thai border town of Aranyaprathet.

Without the capture of these principal bases, and the closure of the Thai-Kampuchean border to the passage of supplies to the guerrillas, Vietnam's military efforts can make little effective headway. Frequent military incursions into Thai territory during the 1983 offensive were driven back by air-strikes and artillery barrages, and led to heavy casualties on the Vietnamese side.

China's promises to stand by Thailand in the event of attack were re-affirmed by the Chinese Chief of Staff, Gen Yang Dezhi, in Bangkok the month before the Vietnamese offensive. To back them up, China launched reprisals on Vietnam's northern border, for the first time in two years, during the middle of April. Although several ground skirmishes led, according to Chinese claims, to thirty-seven Vietnamese deaths, China's action was mainly confined to the pounding of Vietnamese positions around Lang Son and Cao Bang. The fact that the reprisals were taken after the main Vietnamese offensive in Kampuchea had ended and did not reflect any clear military objectives suggested that the motives for China's deliberate escalation of its long-simmering border conflict were primarily political, designed as an expression of Peking's ability to respond to possible Vietnamese advances in western Kampuchea, and to pressurise Vietnam on two fronts.

For the meantime, whilst the military deadlock continues, Vietnam finds itself, ironically, at the receiving end of a sustained guerrilla campaign. Despite the undisguised mutual contempt shared by its

principal protagonists, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, set up in Kuala Lumpur in June 1982 as an alliance of convenience between the three resistance parties, remains intact. Its effective military strength is currently estimated at 60,000 and is greatly dominated by the 45,000-strong Khmer Rouge. The smaller armies of the non-communist Khmer People's National Liberation Front and the Moulinaka group of the former head of state, Prince Sihanouk, have nevertheless improved their fighting potential rapidly since the middle of 1982, thanks largely to the humanitarian and military assistance provided by China and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), i.e. Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. During the monsoon season, the Coalition's regular theatre of operations extends well over one hundred miles into Kampuchea. Nine Soviet military advisers died at the hands of the Khmer Rouge at Kompong Cham in early August, 1983.

Although compromised in the eyes of many Kampucheans by his two periods of close association with the Khmer Rouge, the first of which had such disastrous consequences for the country during the later 1970s, the position of the sixty-year-old Sihanouk remains pivotal to any future settlement. Using his international prestige, the prince can bring pressure to bear upon his often-critical Coalition partners. Chief among these are the KPNLF leader and former Kampuchean Premier, Son Sann, and the Khmer Rouge chairman, Khieu Samphan, whose responsibilities as the Coalition's vice-president include the formulation of 'foreign policy'. Sihanouk's high standing was acknowledged on 30 April, when the ambassadors of five nations, including China and Malaysia, presented their credentials at a location inside Kampuchean territory.

The absence of any serious disagreements between the Vietnamese and their Kampuchean clients in Phnom Penh underlines the extent of the dependency of the government of Heng Samrin upon Hanoi. Membership of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, of which Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge zonal chief, serves as secretary-general, still numbers no more than five hundred. The morale of the 30,000-strong, Vietnamese-led Kampuchean army remains low, despite efforts to bolster its potential. The high rate of desertion and infiltration have similarly hindered plans to introduce Kampuchean contingents in place of their Vietnamese counterparts on the western battlefield. One entire Kampuchean infantry division was reputedly disarmed by the Vietnamese after a mutiny in Oddar Meanchey province during June. Kampuchea's economic recovery has also been slow: figures for industrial and agricultural production still stand at 10% of their 1969 equivalent. During its highpoint in the period 1979-82, Soviet aid never exceeded an annual $US 100 million, and this is currently being further reduced. Owing to its failure to establish control, the main weapon in the hands of the Heng Samrin regime—popular fear of the Khmer Rouge—may well be blunted in time by mounting local resentment of the Vietnamese presence.

What may pose an even more substantial threat to Hanoi in the longer

term is the apparently increasing pattern of co-operation between the Kampuchean Coalition and other anti-regime movements operating in Indochina. A new United Front of Laotian guerrillas, said to number at least 4,000, was reported in early June to be harassing Vietnamese transit routes into Kampuchea through southern Laos, using arms provided by the Kampuchean resistance. Several other Laotian organisations, composed principally of former officials and Pathet Lao defectors, have operated training bases inside China's Yunnan province for several years. Any joint front, drawing together the Laotian and Kampuchean guerrillas with various indigenous groups currently resisting Hanoi's control in Vietnam's Central Highlands, could expect additional Chinese support, as a means of exerting long-term economic and psychological pressure upon the Vietnamese regime and denying it the absolute control which it so badly needs. News of guerrilla successes in Laos and Vietnam is regularly carried by two Khmer Rouge radio stations, the *Voice of Democratic Kampuchea* and *Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea,* which broadcast from southern China.

At the diplomatic level, the essential negotiating positions of the respective sides has not altered. For ASEAN and the West the principal starting point for any realistic settlement will remain the formula established at the International Conference on Kampuchea which was staged under UN auspices in July 1981. This made provision for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the holding of a Geneva-style peace conference, to be followed in turn by the establishment of a provisional government of national unity. This would facilitate the disarming of all factions and the staging of internationally-supervised elections to procure a coalition government guaranteed by the major powers. Although ninety-three UN member-states participated, the conference was boycotted by Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

Despite this, the last twelve months have witnessed several diplomatic initiatives, the main purpose of which has been to express flexibility and to indicate that although the principles set out within the ICK formula are central to any future settlement, the precise modalities are open to negotiation.

Not surprisingly, any diplomatic approaches made by the ASEAN member-states must take into account the powerful interests of China. Although Peking's threats to teach Vietnam a 'second lesson' have receded progressively since the Chinese invasion of 1979, China's central strategy of 'bleeding Vietnam white' through the combination of economic and military pressures remains essentially unchanged. Peking has, however, shown a willingness to modify its hitherto uncompromising demand that a total Vietnamese withdrawal must be regarded as the precondition for talks. But its fundamental premise remains that the Vietnamese stance in Indochina must undergo concrete change before any realistic dialogue can be established. A new five-point proposal, first tabled at the opening of Sino-Soviet negotiations in October 1982, was published by the Chinese Foreign Ministry in March, to coincide with the opening of the Seventh Non-Aligned Summit in New Delhi. Whilst

re-affirming the need for an end to the Soviet Union's support of Vietnam's expansionist strategy and a Vietnamese commitment to unconditional withdrawal in principle, China promised to resume talks with Vietnam when the first stage of withdrawal had taken place. As further troops were withdrawn, China would begin to take practical steps to improve relations. Once a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea was complete, Peking undertook to respect the right of Kampucheans to determine their own social and economic way of life.

The offer was designed to offset Hanoi's principal objection in the past—that the withdrawal of its troops would merely facilitate the return of the Khmer Rouge and the extension of Chinese influence in the region. It was, however, turned down by Vietnam during the same month: Hanoi continued to speak of the need for a prior end to the 'Chinese threat' and more solid guarantees that Kampuchea's 'neutrality' would be respected. China, for its part, rejected Hanoi's latest offer of a border ceasefire at the end of August.

Hanoi regards the Kampuchean conflict as being of principal concern to itself and Peking. For this reason, it continues to press for a regional conference, at which general security issues can be discussed, and not simply those relating to its occupation of Kampuchea. Although this, and Hanoi's refusal to contemplate any role for the UN whilst the Coalition holds the Kampuchean seat, still form the basis of its position, Hanoi has, like Peking, revealed a willingness to widen the general ambit of its discussions and has dropped its past assertions about the 'irreversibility' of the Kampuchean situation.

Vietnam accepted in principle a Malaysian proposal, submitted with the backing of Indonesia and Singapore at the New Delhi summit, that an exploratory round of talks be held between ASEAN and Indochina without Kampuchea's direct participation. Although this did signal a departure from Vietnam's previous insistence upon the participation of the Heng Samrin regime, Malaysia's 'five plus three minus one' proposal was rejected by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at a meeting with their EEC counterparts in Bangkok on 24 March. A more genuine Vietnamese commitment to a negotiated settlement was required before any formal talks could take place.

In a second initiative, submitted during the Thai election campaign last April, Thailand's Foreign Minister, Siddhi Savetsila, offered to visit Hanoi for discussions if Vietnam would agree to withdraw its troops thirty kilometres from the Thai-Kampuchean border, as a confidence-building measure to bring Thai territory out of range of the Vietnamese artillery. On the surface, the offer was a reasonable one, and would have been helped, in any case, by Vietnam's annual practice of reducing its border contingents with the onset of the monsoons.

Although Thailand's fellow ASEAN members declared their support for the initiative, the likelihood that Hanoi would use its 'line of contact' with Thailand to drive a wedge between ASEAN and China raised immediate doubts. Many observers also suspected that Hanoi would demand unacceptable concessions in return, such as the withdrawal of

the refugee camps which straddle the border, housing a population of at least 300,000, and a simultaneous suspension of guerrilla activities in the area.

In the event, the Thai initiative was finally rejected by the Indochina Foreign Ministers at Phnom Penh during June. Whilst visiting Bangkok on 30 July, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, warned against any attempts at mediation which were likely to prove divisive, and advised ASEAN against attaching too much weight to Vietnam's offers of dialogue. All of these he described as 'diplomatic tricks', designed to encourage international recognition of the Heng Samrin regime and of Vietnam's permanent presence in the country.

Although Peking has reacted favourably to the growing diplomatic involvement of France as a possible mediator in its conflict with Hanoi, parallel efforts by Australia, whose Foreign Minister visited Hanoi at the end of June, have encountered a less enthusiastic reception. Much of this has been due to the Canberra government's opposition to the Chinese and Western sanctions which were imposed upon Vietnam in 1978. France itself has offered Hanoi a $US 20 million line of credit, the only EEC country to have taken such a step. However this will remain frozen until Hanoi has rescheduled the repayments on its other debts, which France insists, contrary to Vietnam's wishes, must be negotiated multilaterally in conjunction with other governments. French exports to Hanoi have, in any case, declined since 1982 due to Vietnam's lack of hard currency. As a mark of France's even-handed approach, the French Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, visited Hanoi for talks in March, one month before President Mitterrand's state visit to China. Prince Sihanouk was himself received by the French President in Paris during April, his first official visit to a Western country for many years.

This, then, is the shape of the Kampuchean deadlock which has defied a lasting solution. Although Vietnam has shown a tentative willingness to seek new diplomatic openings, the practical significance of its gestures is open to considerable doubt. Part of the reason for Hanoi's confidence may be that it believes—and claims—that time is on its side, and that sooner or later the very exasperation of the international community will impel it to recognise a Vietnamese *fait accompli* in Indochina. A holding operation of this magnitude nevertheless requires major sacrifices, both for Hanoi and for its principal backer, the Soviet Union; and it is in the resulting uncertainty that the prospects for an eventual settlement are most likely to be found.

Accounting for a spectacular 40% of state expenditure, Vietnam's standing army of 1.029 million is the fourth largest in the world. Although a succession of good harvests recently enabled the country to attain a basic self-sufficiency in food production, the suspension of Western aid, the slow progress of integration in the South, and high levels of corruption and misappropriation have rendered Vietnam's economic infrastructure precarious. The result has been a massive dependence upon Soviet support and assistance, which has in turn had inevitable repercus-

sions for the effective exercise of Vietnamese sovereignty and independence.

Central to Moscow's strategy in the region remains its access to the Vietnamese naval ports of Haiphong, Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, the last of which has been developed into a near-permanent base for Soviet naval operations since 1979. Soviet advisers have also been assisting in the development of the Kampuchean deepwater port of Kompong Som and its neighbouring airport, which face the Gulf of Thailand. The theory that Moscow would be able to promote regional peace, by tempering the aggressive instincts of its Vietnamese client in exchange for ASEAN's acceptance of a permanent Soviet presence in the region, formed the basis of President Brezhnev's collective security proposals to the states of South East Asia in 1975. Moscow has worked hard to preserve its lion-taming image. But its effective influence over Vietnamese actions has been in doubt ever since Vietnam's brief military occupation of Thai border territory in June 1980, an event which brought to light several important differences of perception.

Although its use of Vietnam's naval facilities has so far obliged Moscow to endorse Hanoi's line on regional issues, the Soviet Union has not disguised its displeasure with the long drawn-out war of occupation in Kampuchea, a process which has revived traditional national animosities and greatly damaged its diplomatic standing in the region. Doubting that Vietnam was sufficiently advanced along the road of unification to be entrusted with the building of socialism in Laos and Kampuchea, Moscow has also sought direct leverage over Vietnam's client governments in Vientiane and Phnom Penh. Such efforts have been strongly resisted, as was illustrated by the sudden dismissal of the Kampuchean Premier and Party leader, Pen Sovann, and several of his ministerial colleagues in December 1981. Set against the background of other longer-term disagreements—over the administration of Soviet aid, reforms in Vietnam's government and Party structures and long-term economic planning—the existence of this tension suggests that Vietnam's designation as the 'Asian Cuba' may yet be premature.

Even more serious problems have been posed for Hanoi by the resumption of Sino-Soviet negotiations. Whilst Peking refuses any direct contacts with Hanoi, its inclusion of Kampuchea as an issue in its talks with Moscow has been calculated to sow additional doubts in Vietnamese minds about the Soviet Union's reliability as an ally, and to emphasise the untenable nature of Vietnam's position. Any tentative Sino-Soviet rapprochement is certain to damage Hanoi's position. Memories of the diplomatic contacts opened with the United States by China and the Soviet Union in 1972, and of Moscow's highly equivocal stance in the early stages of the Vietnam War, are still fresh.

More particularly, a reduction in tension along the Sino-Soviet border—the most likely initial step towards a Sino-Soviet *modus vivendi*—would enable China to redeploy its troops against Vietnam. Should Peking succeed in tying Moscow's hands with trading, diplomatic and other contacts, the Chinese would be in a far stronger position to launch a

P 2812

decisive military campaign to break the Vietnamese hold over Indochina.

Moscow is unlikely to jeopardise the relationship by attempting to coerce Hanoi over the Kampuchean issue. But recent reports that Vietnamese and Chinese delegations have been conducting low-level talks under the auspices of the Romanian government may well suggest that the Soviet Union is exerting some pressure upon Hanoi to modify its stance. The Soviet Union has also failed so far to announce a full-scale formal aid commitment to Hanoi's crisis-ridden Five Year Plan, which runs until 1985. No official explanation has been given. Although the current Soviet military presence in Vietnam is regarded by China as a threat to its security, the possibility that Peking would consent to a limited Soviet presence in the country once the Kampuchean deadlock has been broken would present a major additional incentive to the Soviet authorities.

As the Kampuchean Foreign Minister, Hun Sen, himself pointed out recently, the former Kampuchean government of Lon Nol lasted for only five years despite substantial American backing, whilst the Khmer Rouge could sustain their reign of terror for only three, despite China's protection. The Indochinese leaders sought to make capital out of ASEAN's failure to reseat the Kampuchean Coalition at the latest summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, from which the Khmer Rouge were expelled in 1979. But all the Non-Aligned member-states are represented in the UN General Assembly, where the Coalition was granted the imprimatur for the Kampuchean seat in October 1982. The original UN resolution of 1979, which called for the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, has been renewed at each subsequent session by an ever-growing majority, contrary to Vietnam's confident predictions. The gradual widening of the Coalition's diplomatic representation to include the two non-communist groups is almost certain to further this process.

Meanwhile ASEAN has displayed an impressive unity of views on regional security issues. Widespread support has been given to a proposed increase in the military presence of Japan and the United States, as a means of restoring the balance of power which the Vietnamese overturned in 1978. Should Vietnam's most fundamental assumptions now be challenged by some change in the Soviet Union's position, Hanoi may yet be compelled to accept the available compromise.

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VLADIMIR BUKOVSKY'S CASTLE

by Michael Futrell

THE substantial body of books by survivors of Soviet prisons and camps that began to form already in the 1920s has been during the last two decades or so not only enlarged but also enriched by several outstanding contributions. Two extremes are represented by Sinyavsky's *A Voice from the Chorus*, a multi-faceted mosaic by an erudite scholar and extremely sophisticated writer, and Marchenko's *My Testimony*, the account of persecution endured by a proletarian, plain, bare, unadorned, and impressive by those very qualities. A highly individual place between these extremes is occupied by Vladimir Bukovsky's *To Build a Castle*.

During several years before Bukovsky's expulsion from the Soviet Union in December 1976 he became increasingly known as an exceptionally courageous champion of civil rights, particularly by documenting the abuse of psychiatry through the confinement in mental hospitals of citizens disliked by the authorities; but his book (published in 1978) has not received its due. It is much more than just another prison story.

When suddenly expelled, Bukovsky was 34. Most of the preceding fourteen years, except for a few periods of a few months each when he was at liberty, he had spent either in prison, or labour camp, or mental hospital (mostly the 'special' mental hospitals which were in fact an especially brutal kind of prison, where sane political prisoners were mixed in with, and ill-treated together with, insane inmates).

Although by 1976 it was common for dissidents to be encouraged or pressured into leaving the Soviet Union, and Bukovsky had received hints from officials to think about leaving, he was resolved to continue his struggle in his native country. Indeed, beginning the story of his life in Russia at the end, on the eve of his expulsion, he explains that he foresaw his future clearly: his present twelve-year term would end in 1983, 'then, at best, a year of the fever called freedom, and then ten more years of jail and five more in exile. By that time I would be 57' (that is, the year 1999). 'All right, time for one more turn of the wheel and back in prison in time to die.'

This was no mere bravado; reading his book, one becomes increasingly aware of the ruthless self-discipline and razor-sharp intelligence that control his energy, tempered by his humane tolerance towards fellow-victims of the system.

A reader is likely to be so absorbed as to pay little attention to the book's composition. Consisting in the English edition of some 350 pages, it has actually two layers. Four short sections—one at the beginning, one at the end, and two in between—totalling twenty pages, are distinguished by being printed in italic type. These four spatially separated but chronologically continuous fragments are devoted to Bukovsky's last hours in Russia. They are gripping pages: Bukovsky's needlelike wariness, sharpened by the years of unequal combat, still clings, through immense

fatigue, alike to legal principle and to his prison sack of precious odds and ends—pens, razorblades, notebooks, trivial everyday objects that in prison had meant survival. The intensity of these few pages frames, charges and articulates the whole book.

The rest is by no means merely a straightforward narrative. The Russian edition is printed continuously, with occasional gaps indicating breaks in sequence. The English edition is divided into ten numbered chapters, which has one advantage: the first chapter, devoted largely to the last months in Vladimir prison, is somewhat different from those that follow. With chapter two, the author begins with his childhood and then continues the story of his life, in following chapters, chronologically. But in chapter one, after grabbing the reader with the opening italicised pages, he seems to be unfolding the mature wisdom, the comprehensive orientation, which he had succeeded in developing. Subsequent chapters record the arduous learning process. The idea perhaps resembles that expressed by Proust: 'We are not provided with wisdom, we must discover it for ourselves, after a journey through the wilderness which no one else can take for us, an effort which no one can spare us . . .'

Here, two possible qualifications should be considered. Bukovsky was not highly educated, nor was he a professional writer. His personal intellectual interest was centred in biology. However, he if anyone would have the right to claim that wisdom may be acquired not only from books; as will be seen, it is not merely ironical when he writes that 'it was clear that there could be no other university for me but Vladimir prison.' At the same time, though, his reading was extensive, and surprising. His repeated sojourns in Lefortovo prison totalled over two-and-a-half years, and Lefortovo, of all places, 'had a wonderful library . . . It had not occurred to anyone to purge the libraries of the KGB prisons . . . Pre-revolutionary editions of Pushkin and Gogol, A. K. Tolstoy and Lermontov, Hamsun and Maeterlinck, Proust and Zamyatin. What didn't they have in here?' And one might well wish to have been able to eavesdrop during the evenings which, he says, he spent discussing Bergson, Nietzsche and Freud with one of his most eminent and formidable psychiatric inquisitors, Professor Lunts, who evidently found him fascinating.

Then, I vividly recall Bukovsky's bitterness when he described to me how (after his expulsion) his Western publishers pressed him to write at breakneck speed, how he nearly killed himself to meet the deadline, and then they dilly-dallied (as it seemed to him) for many months with publication. In his later book of impressions of the West he pours out this resentment over several pages, emphasising also (with regard to the writing of his *Castle*) both the agony of the forced-pace verbalisation of so much harrowing experience and the painful problem of having to decide all the time how specific he could be without harming friends. All in all, it seems clear he is keenly aware of having written hastily and imperfectly. But after all, so, often, was Dostoyevsky.

Obviously, Bukovsky was exceptionally well endowed with courage,

endurance, and intelligence. Clearly, too, he was in a sense fortunate in being a dissident in the 60s and 70s, when there were certain limits to the powers and practices of the KGB; in earlier and more savage years, he might not have lasted long in Stalin's mincing-machine.

Less obvious perhaps, but vital in Bukovsky's constitution was a kind of fruitful openness at the centre of his being. Quite simply, he was utterly free from any rigid or obsessive ideology. Probably this inner freedom more than anything else was a main source of his mastery of the art of the possible.

Unlike many dissidents, Bukovsky spent his childhood and boyhood in the slums of Moscow, where he learnt both toughness and tolerance. Also among his more unusual pages are those where he tells of his participation (at the age of fifteen and sixteen) in one of the clandestine organisations of Moscow schoolboys, thirsting for rebellion, that proliferated after the crushing of the Hungarian revolution. From his experience of this organisation and its leadership, he learned the crucial lessons that ideology, and illegality, were ways of suicide, moral or physical; and that power, inevitably, corrupts, on whichever side it may be exercised.

The next stage had literary origins. Bukovsky graduated from a satirical school magazine to the excitement of the famous poetry readings in Mayakovsky Square around 1960, then to arrests, interrogations, the Lubyanka, Lefortovo, psychiatric examinations, trial in absentia, and at last, in 1963, about the time of his 21st birthday, to the Leningrad Special Mental Hospital. This marked the end of his apprenticeship and the entry into his fourteen-year inferno.

One passage must stand for many as example of the more gruelling kinds of learning situation that for Bukovsky took the place of university. It was his first day in the Leningrad Special Mental Hospital:

> One of my cell-mates started yelling slogans the moment he opened his eyes: 'Enough of this Bolshevik slavery! Liberty and an amnesty for the people! We need to organise a free, independent and autonomous Ukrainian state! Give the people their national costume! ' He went on yelling like this all day long, without pause, until lights out. I learned that he had done seventeen years in Vladimir prison for Ukrainian 'bourgeois nationalism' and had gone mad there. Here he was ruthlessly beaten—the guards were sick of listening to his slogans. Every day they would unlock the door, and half a dozen orderlies would pounce on him like wild dogs. The first day I made an effort to go to his assistance, but was punched so hard that I was sent flying . . .
>
> Our other cell-mate took no interest in anything and merely sat there with a blissful smile on his face. He was in for murdering his children and had a mania for swallowing things. Immediately after murdering his children he had cut off his ears and eaten them . . .
>
> For a time I thought I would never leave the cell alive . . .

However, students of the Soviet Union have long been surfeited with horrors. It may be more useful to look at some of the attitudes and procedures that Bukovsky developed during those years. Certainly, anyone enduring extreme circumstances for a long period must work out ways of coping. It is striking that for both of the distinguished survivors of Kolyma, Yevgeniya Ginzburg and Varlam Shalamov, poetry was essential,

a means of retaining membership in a civilised culture. Solzhenitsyn, with his life-long determination to write, relates in early pages of his *Calf* how in the camp he systematically trained his memory to store the thousands of lines of verse that he composed; and in *The First Circle* he presents in perhaps somewhat idealised form through the dialogues and thoughts of Nerzhin and Sologdin a whole philosophy of learning from and through adversity.

Bukovsky was different. Although reading and studying, whenever possible, were important for him, literature or philosophy as such do not seem to have held such central significance. Bukovsky's initial orientation might be called a non-ideological legalism, or what that great historian of Russian thought, Victor Leontovitsch, called conservative liberalism; in no sense a mere opportunism. One can say that his rejection of totalitarianism of all kinds, personal and intellectual as well as social and political, together with his compassion for fellow-sufferers, made him profoundly conscious of the limited and incomplete nature of each and all of the varied actualities in which he willy-nilly became involved.

In practice, Bukovsky lived those fourteen years not only with intransigence, but also with adaptability. Originally inspired by that remarkable character Alik Yesenin-Volpin, he took his stand on the laws of the Soviet state, taking every chance to study them until every relevant article and paragraph was at his finger-tips. In a society where almost everyone, from topmost boss to lowest underdog, regarded the laws as mere window-dressing, but where at the same time most people at all levels dreaded a return to unbridled Stalinism, this gave Bukovsky a peculiar and powerful moral ascendancy.

Some of the pages where he describes how he organised squads of prisoners to compose and copy enormous quantities of justified formal complaints, inundating, thwarting and even emasculating rival and mutually destructive organs of the bureaucratic juggernaut, are worthy of Gogol or Voinovich. These demonstrations of the constipated confusion in the labyrinthine entrails of Soviet officialdom represent a triumph of calculated exploitation of the potential of a formal legality regarded by almost everyone as not functional and merely nominal.

Much more difficult and dangerous was his predicament in the psychiatric arena. Whether under examination or in a so-called special hospital, however one behaved, with normal reactions, abnormal reactions, or no reactions, all could be labelled 'abnormal'. How, indeed, ensnared by expertly malevolent hostility, can one prove that one is sane? Navigating this maze of ambiguities, Bukovsky was undergoing intensive multi- and inter-disciplinary courses in the convolutions and paradoxes of truth and meaning, with sanity and life at stake, in a context not therapeutic but punitive.

There is some light relief. Taken temporarily to an ordinary mental hospital, Bukovsky's 'greatest recommendation was that I had been brought there on the orders of the KGB—nobody after that had the slightest doubt about my normality.'

Scarcely less educational than Bukovsky's relations with lunatics and psychiatrists were those with criminals. Again, his resilience and his varied skills, legal, psychological and practical, including the lessons of his early years in the hurly-burly of the Moscow slums, stood him in good stead. On his first challenge to a game of cards—in which, of course, he would be fleeced—he gained the upper hand by counter-challenging to a much more complicated card game at which he was a master. Quickly cleaning out the crooks, he clinched his victory by returning his winnings, gained their friendship by sharing all the food he had received from his mother, and soon enjoyed their admiration as legal expert. Here he was again fortunate in the changed climate of the camps; criminals had learned to respect dissidents, in the old days they had murderously terrorised political prisoners. But Bukovsky never presented himself as hero or commander—only as conscious citizen.

During his years with criminals in labour camps, Bukovsky grew to understand and appreciate the complex code of loyalties and prohibitions that governed their behaviour, seeing its connections with the Robin Hood or noble outlaw ethic and at the same time viewing it as a refraction of the operational code of the Party leadership, which in turn produced, in the attitude of the camp authorities, a vicious exploitative caricature of the work ethic, which in turn, with the consequent degradation and humiliation, produced such desperate stratagems as self-mutilation: 'I have seen men break their arms or legs to get off a few days' work. It is difficult to do this for yourself, and in our camp there was a specialist at breaking bones... He would place the arm or leg across two thick pieces of wood and give it a quick blow in the middle with a felt boot stuffed with a log. He could do simple or compound fractures to order.'

Participating fully in the miseries and the intricate comradeship of the claustrophobic underworld of the labour camp, risking terrible punishment to smuggle tobacco to criminal companions in solitary as they would do for him, yet maintaining his own, independent, non-criminal judgment, Bukovsky lived through an encyclopaedia of the problems of a social-science field worker, compelled to resolve day by day the conflicts and dilemmas of involvement, identification and integrity.

One may regret that, among the variously accomplished survivors who have written about Soviet prisons and camps, there does not seem to have been one who was a trained anthropologist. Had Bukovsky been so technically prepared, he might have emerged as a Gregory Bateson or Colin Turnbull of the Gulag. He would probably keenly appreciate Turnbull's affirmations, introducing his recent work *The Human Cycle*, that 'when the anthropologist studies the exotic ways of other peoples... he is really learning the truth about himself,' that 'it is this constant and dynamic interaction between self-awareness and awareness of others that removes us from the realm of dry, lifeless, ivory-tower academia,' and that 'civilisation is very much an immature and ongoing experiment, the success of which is by no means yet proven.'

An epithet totally inapplicable to Bukovsky would be 'quixotic'. Don

Quixote carried his lance, and suffered, for the noble ideals of chivalry; but the adversaries he challenged were phantoms of his mind; he was a prisoner of his ideology. Bukovsky's strength lay precisely in his ability to distinguish various disparate actualities, to participate in, or relate to, all of them, without submersion in any, while avoiding the encapsulation and procrustean homogenisation of manifold actualities into one supposed comprehensive 'reality'.

There remains one more area of Bukovsky's experience that can be called extraordinary, although it directly concerned only himself. The passage devoted to it in the first chapter may be the most memorable in the whole book, for which indeed it provided the English title. Bukovsky says simply 'It saved my life.' He tells how, when sent—as so often happened—to solitary confinement, he would smuggle in a bit of pencil lead, and spend his time drawing castles, visualising the most minute details, spending even whole days deciding one small question of arrangement or furnishing, of garden or library: a castle—unlike the ideal vision of the Castle of the Holy Grail in Solzhenitsyn's *First Circle*—that was also a comfortable habitation, though not just for himself, but for friends, for travellers, a citadel and stronghold of generosity and sanity—an anti-Kremlin, one might say.

This mastery of non-verbal, visual, three-dimensional, concentrated, progressive, open-ended creative imagination is highly remarkable. It is misleadingly described in the index of the English edition as 'Bukovsky's fantasy.' As anyone familiar with traditional spiritual disciplines will realise, his construction was no mere fantasy, it was the alternative reality, or rather the authentic actuality, that he had the rare power to nourish, so as to place in perspective the all-too-tangible but less authentic actualities that physically surrounded him.

Bukovsky's very freedom from fantasy and obsession, his command of the possible, within as well as outside himself, distinguish him sharply from that famous architect of castles in the air, Ibsen's Master Builder Solness, who, as Errol Durbach recently observed in *Ibsen the Romantic*, 'commits himself to that most Romantic of impulses: the lure of the impossible.'

In prison, Bukovsky had rediscovered a human capacity nowadays little used, a skill seldom practised. One might recall such classics of systematic meditation as the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius; however, in view of the dependence of most regularised Christian meditation on the essential historical foundation of Christianity, a closer analogy might be the prodigious feats of creative visualisation cultivated in some Oriental disciplines, particularly in Tibetan Buddhism, as presented by Stephan Beyer in his monumental study *The Cult of Tara*, which unfortunately like much recent Buddhist scholarship has yet to attain wider resonance.[1] To pursue this analogy would however take us very far from Vladimir prison.

Returning to Europe, it appears that Bukovsky's *Castle* shows—strange as it sounds—the benefits of his having learnt his philosophy in such

institutions as Vladimir prison, the Leningrad Special Mental Hospital, and the labour camp near Voronezh, rather than in the bookstacks and study-carrels of a university library. He learned that an almost phenomenological understanding of experience need not entail fragmentation and dehumanisation, neither the paralysing Essayism of Musil's *Man Without Qualities* nor Pirandello's relentless disjunction of contexts. Of the modern masters, it was Proust who saw most clearly the central significance of human creativity: 'The creation of the world did not take place at the beginning, it takes place every day'—in the filth of a solitary confinement cell of Vladimir prison as much as in Proust's legendary cork-lined room.

Bukovsky's *Castle* may have less in common with that of Kafka—'The Castle hill was hidden, veiled in mist and darkness, nor was there even a glimmer of light to show that a castle was there . . . K. stood for a long time gazing into the illusory emptiness above him'—less in common with that enigmatic twentieth-century edifice than with the *Interior Castle* of the sixteenth-century Spanish nun, mystic, saint and (since (1970) doctor of the Church, Teresa of Avila—'I began to think of the soul as if it were a castle made of a single diamond or of very clear crystal, in which there are many rooms, just as in Heaven there are many mansions.'

In his later book about the West, Bukovsky writes that someone in the West asked him: 'How much freer do you feel yourself here?' He comments: 'What a strange question. Easier—yes; safer—yes. But freer? In those cruel enough circumstances, in which I spent 34 years of my life, I was just as free, as I am now.'

His autobiographical book shows just that.

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1. A vivid account of this rigorous discipline occupies the concluding pages of Andrew Harvey's recently published book *A Journey in Ladakh.*

   To Build a Castle by Vladimir Bukovsky was published by André Deutsch in 1978.

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'GRENADA HE COME FROM'

by Paul Rose

IN a witty Caribbean calypso there are two lines that have now become rather poignant:

> If you ask him why he happy so
> Grenada he come from.

Grenadians, by repute, are a happy people on this tiny island, one of a string with populations the size of a single British constituency. The spectacle of the mighty United States invading Grenada is in one sense comical—like the British bobbies intervening to keep the peace in St. Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla or the scenario of the film *Passport to Pimlico.* The loss of life and the naked violation of sovereignty is tragic. The implications are much wider.

These implications for the Alliance and special relationship—the arousal of new fears for our fate as the carriers of Cruise and Pershing missiles after the US brush off: the revelation that we were paying a debt for the Falkland Islands: the destruction of moral credibility in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: the suspicion that pre-election nerves following the horror of the Lebanon played a part: the doctrine that the US had the right to impose 'democracy' out of the barrel of a gun—all these and more contrast with attitudes to vicious and sadistic Latin American States with scant regard for human rights. Will Nicaragua be next? These thoughts come streaming into my consciousness.

I write from a very personal view as one who knows Mrs. Eugenia Charles and stayed at her hotel in Dominica when she was an able opposition politician. I remember standing on the quayside in St. Vincent watching the boat for Grenada depart and kicking myself for having flown from adjacent St. Lucia with only one spare set of underwear and my toothbrush, towel, soap, razor and snorkelling gear. The thought of the Grenadines, Mustique and Bequia remained a dream. If American boats to Grenada carried soldiers and weapons, mine would have carried nothing more than sheer delight at the beauty and compelling charm of the Caribbean.

To the outsider, the Caribbean sounds a uniform description. The reality is that each island has its own distinctive personality—from the US and British Virgin Islands with a Scandinavian character; the integral parts of France, Guadeloupe and Martinique, the very British Barbados or Antigua, the British but French patois-speaking islands of St. Lucia and Dominica, the curious Dutch/French split St. Martin or the 'Irish' Emerald Isle of Montserrat, the cosmopolitan Trinidad and Spanish speaking Dominican Republic, now tragically divided ideologically by their attitudes to the US action.

The Caribbean is now in the big wide world of superpowers' intrigue and strategy. Cuba woke up the world to its importance, not least in a missile crisis when many of us were prepared to have no more than a few hours left on this planet.

During my last visit to the islands I could see a wind of change but the direction was not that which I had predicted. Winds leftward provoked winds rightward and vacuums are quickly filled by great powers. Perhaps the tragedy of these small islands is that federation failed. In the Haiti of Papadoc, Graham Greene's depiction of tyranny in *The Comedians* contrasted with the easy-going ways of my acquaintances in St. Lucia. These were in rival parties but close personal friends had been elected to three of the highest offices in the island. I flew out on impulse to stay with one of them.

Many young men and women from Caribbean educated in the UK returned, carrying doctrines opposed to the *laisser-faire* corruption of existing leaders or fired by a sense of black identity or Marxist ideas. Others merely replaced the attitudes of the former slave owners, inheriting their economic and political power. The patchwork is intricate and fascinating, but the contrast between oppositionist Michael Manley in Jamaica, Forbes Burnham in Guyana and the interventionists from Barbados has polarised their postures.

When Maurice Bishop's coup overthrew Sir Eric Gary's rather discredited regime and George Odlum, late of Oxford, became Deputy Premier of St. Lucia with brother John as Home Secretary and close friend Peter José in charge of Agriculture, it seemed that the pattern of leftward change would sweep the next door under-developed island of St. Vincent where able graduates of British universities seemed posed to emulate their St. Lucian neighbours. Patrick John's pathetic regime in Dominica seemed likely to lose to the left in a country where 60% of youth were unemployed and the attempted framing of one of them on a murder charge was later exposed only after a death penalty reprieve. It didn't happen. The left faction in the St. Lucian Labour Party was impatient. I was privy to a meeting of two of the key figures when they decided not to give police protection to an opposition rally in favour of the defeated Government. The result was a riot—major in St. Lucian eyes—but minor in mine—which caused horror at the scale of damage in this paradise island. My lack of concern, having witnessed worse at football matches in North London, puts into perspective the peacefulness of islands not yet caught up in the world conflict a decade ago.

The impatient leftists destroyed their own power base and the old guard of the very competent Sir John Compton returned to power. This was no Cuba, but now violence is no stranger to the island. The radicals of St. Vincent failed hopelessly. Pro-US Mrs. Charles, not the left, replaced Patrick John. A determined woman, the most able politician in Dominica albeit of the right, inherited the stewardship of an island in which I well recall slipping my armed bodyguard to meet the leader of the dreadlocks who were made scapegoats for the failures of the previous regime. As in Barbados and Jamaica, the wind of change blew right not left.

A state of emergency prevailed—dreadlocks in someone's house could be shot on sight. Six expatriates or tourists had been murdered. The island's economy, the home of Rose's Lime Juice, depended so much on

whims of the Geest banana boats. Clearly the shift from incompetence to a formidable pro-capitalist regime concerned at internal subversion gave the US a natural ally in Mrs. Charles. As Cuban workers cleared an airstrip for Bishop's Marxist regime with its curious 'New Jewel' title, it was clear that so tiny an island was an obvious and easy target for the CIA. That the regime did not fall demonstrated that it must have had substantial internal support. The bloody coup by the left, mirroring the frequent occurrences on the right in Latin America, shocked people in hitherto peaceful 'paradise' islands, however inefficient or corrupt. Cold blooded political murder in the Commonwealth Caribbean was not an accepted tradition; yet, however repulsive, it could not be seen as a danger to the lives of US subjects. In any event, the plan to invade predated the coup by weeks and was a convenient pretext. The lunatic left all too frequently gives the right its opportunity to pounce.

That the US could not destabilise tiny Grenada off its southern pier may in part be due to Cuban power. It shows a singular lack of subtlety and effectiveness of the CIA and US policy. The resort to open brute force shows a lack of sensitivity to the outside world and the views of a major ally of whose Commonwealth Grenada is a member, and whose Head of State is the Queen. It shows President Reagan and his advisers to be living in a closed, fantasy world of goodies and baddies.

The image of a Soviet Government immune to the real world's revulsion of Afghanistan mirrored by a similar contempt for outside opinion by the USA has frightening implications for small nations and their sovereignty. How can one trust the US finger on the Cruise trigger? How can one rule out the cynical use of Europe as a nuclear battleground by the superpowers who refuse to listen to allies and friends and, in the case of the Soviet Union, have sent in their troops to crush the Hungarian uprising and the Prague Spring? Would not those of us who are *not* unilateralists be right to insist only upon an independent deterrent capable of inflicting enough unacceptable damage to prevent Soviet initiatives, but refusing to be an undefendable target for US missiles controlled by paranoid strangers to the world outside? That is the first question I ask after my indignation at the US incursion into one of those Caribbean islands for which I have a very special feeling.

I could turn a blind eye at the obvious corruption of government departments in Antigua by sleazy US businessmen. I could accept the aggressive capitalism of Dominica after years of indolence under so-called Labour administrations, or the return to the status quo in St. Lucia. I could never accept their faults as a pretext for armed intervention, even by a detachment of the Household Cavalry; but the fact is—and many of us have known it since 1956—that to the two superpowers any regime opposed to them and vulnerable is fair game and war by proxy has turned the world into a large chess-board in which bishops are pawns and knights or queens moved at will. Castles like Cuba sometimes have to be tolerated even if they do threaten the king—or should I say president?—and solidarity of pawns can sometimes survive by threatening to over-

turn the whole chess-board. But, by and large, morality has no place in the game.

Meanwhile, back in the Caribbean as I write, the US is mopping up and its own Congress is demanding its withdrawal. Democracy is not something you can force upon people. It grows organically. However, you can give it a chance and the US will rescue a little of their lost credibility if all groups are permitted to take part in genuine free elections in the wake of their attack.

For small islands in the Caribbean, whether belonging to CARICOM or not, there must be the most terrible split in attitudes. However, in the long term it must become aparent that the experiment of federation needs to be tried again, with Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad being enlightened enough to give some weighting of influence to the tiny States of St. Kitts or Antigua, Barbados or St. Vincent. A joint Caribbean peacekeeping force might extinguish forest fires on odd islands in the event of an armed coup without resort to superpower intervention.

The spectacle of the mighty USA sending in the Marines and the five Caribbean States merely following in their wake must be rejected on principle. Indeed, the Security Council has done so and even Sir Geoffrey Howe was forced off the fence after his initially lamentable performance in the House of Commons. One might ask ironically whether we should send a task force to remove the invaders *à la* Falklands. In this case, the invaders are our allies. They have also demonstrated, as at Suez, that Britain is a minor power. The result may be a closing of ranks in Europe as a counterweight to US strength to render the Atlantic Alliance more an alliance of equals than of small individual powers sitting under a US umbrella.

It is comforting at least to know that Mrs. Thatcher was prepared to defy the wishes of Ronald Reagan. If her Government has been slipping on banana skins recently, Grenada's banana crop may yet turn out to be the major contributor to a demand for a dual key on missiles and a more European-conscious Britain. Personally, it seems to me that the Governor-General has been seen as no more than a pawn moved around the board by the USA and certainly without authority to call in the Marines. The lunatic left have been revealed as a mirror image of the military dictatorships so well-known to the southern hemisphere of the Americans. Those concerned with human rights may ask why the US did not intervene to prevent the excesses of Papa Doc and his Ton Ton Macoute in Haiti? Why do they give backing to a regime which permits the murder squads of El Salvador? Why, indeed, are they currently massing their might around Nicaragua and helping the murderous 'contras' in Honduras? Alas, my peaceful vision of the Caribbean paradise has disappeared.

I prefer to remember another couplet from the calypso and forget the realities of power politics on the beaches edged by palm trees, the green mountains and blue seas of my favourite Caribbean island, ravaged by a hurricane two years ago but at least uninvaded and relatively free:

If you ask her why she pretty so
St. Lucia she come from.

MEXICO

by John Elsom

OUR conference took place in an isolated seminar building, surrounded by a park, some ten miles from our hotel in Mexico City.

Every morning at 9.00, though not too precisely, the seventy delegates piled into two large coaches, which then delicately picked their way through the side-streets leading to Reforma, the wide main avenue flanked by tower-blocks and littered with monuments. Our respect for our host and organiser, Juan Miguel de Mora, a Professor in Sanskrit Literature at the Independant University of Mexico, was dramatically enhanced by an incident on the first day.

It was Sunday, the roads were crowded, we were late. The coach drivers wearily peeped and waved their fists more in despair than anger. The family cars were heading in force for the mountains. Flower sellers spilt over from the pavements into the roads in their efforts to take advantage of the Ceremony of the Dead. We came to another unyielding traffic jam. A demonstration was in progress.

Crossing our road was an apparently endless stream of banners and marchers, whose slogans needed interpretation even after they had been translated. Indeed, translation was the easy part. We needed to know the significance of the slogans; and to understand that, we all required a crash course (and I do mean crash) in Mexican politics.

Meanwhile, the actors were waiting somewhere on the other side of the demonstration, haunted professionals with a baying audience to placate, hoping perhaps that our convocation of world critics would give them instant stardom. Theirs was an experimental production, *Hamlet, For Example.* In some green room, three actors were muttering to themselves, 'To be or not to be . . .'

The police vans were open-sided, each young, hard recruit carrying a long heavy phallic baton, to be fingered nervously but not without pleasure.

Professor de Moro rose to the occasion. A man of medium height, stocky, jowled, he assumed an air of impressive authority. Like stort Cortez, who took on the Aztec empire and gazed at the Pacific, he left safety armed with little more than an unshakable faith in the rightness of his cause. He got down from the coach, stopped the demonstration single-handed, bribed or otherwise persuaded the police to carve out a path for us, and waved us on.

Show me another Professor of Sanskrit Literature who could do as much!

After Reforma, our coaches would wind their way by devious means to a motorway, past parks and playgrounds, zoos and university buildings, to a slip road signposted to the Botanical Gardens. This was where we were supposed to blossom into our *colloques* and other signs of erudition,

adding to other rare specimens transplanted from all corners of the earth.

The subject of our conference had been roughly translated from the Spanish: 'Hostility or propitiation towards the theatre', which came to mean 'circumstances favourable or unfavourable for the theatre'—which allowed us to talk more or less about what we liked, from cablevision to censorship.

Through the glass windows, as the day drowzed through the buzz of translation systems, we could see wide, well-watered lawns, continuously brushed free from leaves by lethargic gardeners with besom brooms. '*English* lawns,' commented an Austrian professor for my benefit. 'Not quite English,' corrected an East German, who'd been to Cambridge, 'In England, one employs a harder kind of grass.'

And the lawns were indeed unnaturally spongey, like thick carpets. The rare jogger, who cheated and took a short cut across the grass from one dirt track to another, had to alter the rhythm of his steps. What was more un-English though was the colour of the bushes, deep-green but slashed with savage reds and blues, or of the bright yellow butterflies, as big as two hands. A hawk lazily circled the sky before settling on a branch of a eucalyptus tree outside our windows. He stared imperiously at us through the windows, frightful manners but ah, what a critic!

What established beyond doubt that we were nowhere near England, and that our countries were divided by more than latitude and the Atlantic, were the cacti, outlined in extraordinary postures against the pale sky, a forest frieze of cacti surrounding our little oasis. Cacti are the most human and inhuman of plants. At a distance, with their bulbous limbs at crazy angles to their stems, they seem sometimes to shake their fists at the heavens—or to hang on an unseen cross—or to be cheering on a football match or political demonstration.

Cacti, silhouetted in black, cast cut-out shadows of mankind in agony or riot, chaos incarnate, all decorum lost. Eggs of heads perch on marrow-like bodies. Cacti grow tall in Mexico, ten, fifteen feet and more, standing still as gunfighters in the desert or clinging to hairline cracks in the volcanic rock. They're like human emblems, the cacti, until you get close to them—when you notice that the frenzy of their limbs bears no relationship at all to the blank, expressionless texture of their flesh. And they're inhuman, too, in their immobility. They don't wave in the wind like other plants. They don't shelter nests of birds. In the most arid desert, they still look bland, contented and plump. Their contorted bodies are accompanied by a truly aldermanic placidity of temperament.

Their long thorns are threatening but not aggressive, hostility and propitiation combined, and (without wishing to wander still further into the thicket of pathetic fallacies) I can imagine few countries in which the cacti could seem more truly at home than Mexico. The Mexicans have tamed and domesticated the cactus. Tequila is distilled from it, as is mescalin; and so is that more abstract essence of character, of stoicism and survival, of patience and held-back rage, of poverty and *largesse,* which

can be seen in the blank faces of Indians, squatting with their elaborate trinkets in the dust, amber necklaces for a collar, marble chess sets for a few pounds.

Our oasis (though framed by cacti) was part of a larger one, the Independent (or Autonomous) University of Mexico, a city in itself, whose lavish buildings refute their own opulence with revolutionary slogans. They have been created with a sculptor's or a painter's eye, rather than an architect's. The rock-like library, oblong and massive, is smothered with the huge mosaic murals of Juan O'Gorman. And beyond that city oasis lies an even wider one, Mexico City itself, locked with its seventeen million inhabitants in its plateau high in the mountains.

There are many oases in Mexico City, districts where the private houses rival in splendour those of San Diego, tourist centres like the Pink Zone with its chic boutiques and restaurants, older *hasendas* where in one the multitudinous critics crammed to watch a charming fringe show, *Santa Mia,* in three small rooms, a hill where a former president built himself a palace. But all around Mexico City, far up into the mountains, are the shanty towns, where human cacti, hands outstretched for pesos, cling to the rocks for survival.

The Critics were divided as to whether Hostility, under certain circumstances, might not be a Good Thing.

After all, the Autonomous University of Mexico stood as proof that if you fight for your rights, governments learn to respect you and even guarantee your independence with elaborate safeguards against grants being cut. In the University Theatre, there was a historical documentary play, *The Martyrdom of Morelos,* to which the government had taken exception. Morelos was the second hero, after Hidalgo, of the Mexican War of Independence against Spain; and as the programme note acidly pointed out, he 'has been magnified and treated by certain historians and by successive governments as a man of utter purity, thus engaging in the fabrication of heroes which is a favourite pastime of dictatorial regimes.' This play 'based on irrefutable historical documents' cast doubt on the legend; and 'only the dignity and autonomy of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, whose moral authority is definitive has made it possible for the play to be on the billboards and for it to be a success.'

Brave is the university which claims, against governments, that its moral authority is definitive. Professor de Moro, who wrote it, was stopping another demonstration.

And with fine *panache,* Luis de Tavira, its director, had staged what in Britain would be regarded as a Royal Shakespeare Company job—a spectacular slanting open stage, wooden with a steep rake, where sections of the floor rose up to become gun slits and trial rooms, cells and seduc-
ambers, stables with horses and castles. Amid the thunder of
and smoke, a lone horseman dug in the spurs.

oral authority, alas, has its limits, in the theatre's case, by the

width of the stage, the size of the auditorium and the thought that after all it is just theatre, therefore make-believe, however irrefutable the documents. Within University City, the revolution was safe—or fairly safe. It did not have to be sprayed in slogans on the walls with paint guns. It could be cemented into the mosaic.

But outside in the desert, where it is not so easy to distinguish myth from reality, fact from fiction and faction, Hostility was not to be discounted as just another aid to character. A crack on the head from a baton—and there goes another character.

One of the actors in *Hamlet, For Example* . . . went out and shot himself immediately after the performance, evidently deciding that 'not to be . . .' was better. Family troubles apparently. Drained of compassion after a hard marriage, his wife blamed him for subjecting her and their teenage son (speechless, in a state of shock) to what amounted to another rhetorical gesture. But, ran the rumours, there were two bullets. Could a man shoot himself twice?

Out in the desert the skulls whiten in the sun. The hawks have picked them clean.

Mexicans celebrate death. There are certain times of the year when around the world the dead are released from the deep-freezes of our memories. Late October and early November, the week of our Congress, is one of them, coinciding with Hallowe'en and All Souls Day. The Mexican Ceremony of the Dead pre-dates the arrival of the Spanish with their Catholicism, came before the Aztecs and their ritual slaughters, for in tombs more than two thousand years old, the ceremonial skulls carved from stone can be found.

Nowadays, such skulls are modelled from sugar, and placed with loaves of bread, fruits and *tamales*, on the tombstones in churchyards. The dead are supposed to return to earth to eat with their families; and candles are lit (yellow for children, white for adults) to light their ways back to heaven when the feast is over. To the outsider, the impact is extraordinary—a mixture of harvest festival, Hallowe'en and a pre-Christmas party, with the children dressed in skeleton suits and the undertakers' windows lit up at night, displaying black coffins with ornate handles as if no home should be without one.

On November 2, we left the seminar room early to join the coaches for a trip to Mixquic, about sixty miles away, where the Day of the Dead was a major festival. It was late at night when we arrived, through narrow roads thronged with crowds, as if hell or heaven had indeed opened up its gates. Mixquic is a small town of some ten thousand souls, but it received a million visitors, packed into the town square, jostling, lamenting, sightseeing. There were no *gringos* but for us. The churchyard was ablaze with lights from tens of thousands of candles; and on the town hall steps, there were puppet shows, some modishly mimicing TV series, where life took on the battle with death and won. Outside the church, a platform had been raised for tribal dancers, loin-clothed, bodies painted;

and the cobble stones seemed to throb with the drums and the low hooting of ceramic flutes. They danced a battle with the corpses and death itself was depicted as a macabre clown, forever getting itself and other people into trouble. And on the walls of the church were the political slogans, translating this ageless struggle into contemporary terms—with Yanks waving missiles and political martyrs remembered.

The town hall was decorated with paper chains, skeletons cut out and dancing together, while on the walls were ballads preserved from earlier times, whose themes provided a running commentary on Mexico's history—as if their social journey could be described in terms of life's struggle with death or, alternatively, propitiation and hostility.

That mad French critic, Antonin Artaud, said long ago that 'the theatre will never truly find itself again... except by furnishing the spectator with the truthful precipitates of dreams, in which his taste for crime, his erotic obsessions, his savagery, his chimeras, his utopian sense of life and matter, even his cannibalism, pour out on a level not counterfeit and illusory, but interior.' Artaud had Mexican ceremonies as well as Balinese dancers in mind when he wrote those words, for until Western theatre, in his view, robbed itself of those accretions of intellect, the little marital comedies and the snob witticisms, it could never return to those desperate struggles which the Mexican indians know so well and we pretend to ignore.

The Day of the Dead at Mixquic provided a salutary shock to the assembled theatre critics, in danger of drowning in the crowds, for it reminded us that mass theatre on a scale unknown in Europe still existed, that it could concern itself with primary themes beyond our rationalisation of them and that it had its origins in a religious fervour, not definable in terms of dogma but simply in its capacity to render life endurable to those for whom it was also highly precarious.

But, ah, the relief when we all could huddle back in our seminar room, surrounded by the well-watered lawns, to discuss subsidies, Brecht, cablevision and Shakespeare in terms to which we have become accustomed—and with only a distant frieze of cacti to remind us of the world elsewhere.

'THE ROYALISTS AT WAR'

An Exhibition of the Work of William Dobson at the National Portrait Gallery, London

by Ernle Money

ALIVE though they were, *pace* Camden, John Aubrey and Anthony à Wood, to the significance of their historical tradition and conscious of the special peculiarities of their race, the English were curiously slow in developing a native school of portraiture. During the sixteenth century, at a time when the individual easel portrait was becoming fashionable in Courts throughout Europe, the major artists to practise here in this field were men of foreign origin like Holbein, Moro and Eworth. Even with the Stuarts, a period of greatly enhanced artistic patronage, the most important commissions went to such figures as Van Dyck, Mytens, Lely and Kneller not to speak of the interest shown in Rubens, Bernini and Orazio Gentileschi. The Holborn born William Dobson, who came to prominence as favourite painter of the Royalist court during their brief sojourn at Oxford between 1642 and 1646, is, therefore, something of a *rara avis*. Before Hogarth in the following century, among native artists only Robert Walker, whose work was popular with the Parliamentary leaders, held anything like a comparable position. As Aubrey put it, Dobson was 'the most excellent painter that England hath yet bred'.

His career is the more remarkable because of its comparative brevity. Only about sixty or so surviving pictures are known from his hand and a mere handful of these can be dated from before the outbreak of the Civil War. His death took place in London, where he came 'together with many of the King's party', only a matter of months after the garrison at Oxford surrendered to Parliament. He was thirty-five years of age at the time and was referred to as being 'very poor'. Although he is, rightly, closely identified with the fortunes of the Royalist cause between Edgehill and Naseby, it is not clear whether he ever held an official position, such as Sergeant-painter, during the last brilliant but tragic stages of the Caroline court.

Dobson himself probably trained with Continental artists working in London like Daniel Mytens and the German painter Francis Cleyn, though he was apparently actually apprenticed to William Peake, son of Robert Peake, Sergeant-painter to James I. Mr. Malcolm Rogers, organiser of the current exhibition, suggests that a considerable influence on him must have been his acquaintance with the surveyor of Charles I's collection, Abraham van der Doort, a neighbour in St. Martin's Lane, through whom he would have had access to the incomparable collection of works of art formed by the King. In Mr. Rogers' words 'he was the first and, sadly, the last native artist of any stature to benefit from a first-hand study of the masterpieces which filled the palaces of Whitehall

and St. James's—above all the superlative works by Van Dyck and the great Venetians, Titian, Tintoretto and Veronese, to which Charles was especially devoted'. In addition, Mr. Rogers cites the significance for Dobson's work of the remarkable collections created by Arundel, Buckingham and other Whitehall connoisseurs who shared the King's tastes.

Whether this country ever formed a full-blown baroque style, as proposed by Dr. Judith Hook in her interesting book *The Baroque Age in England* (Thames and Hudson, 1976) is a matter of contention. She herself, strangely, does not put Dobson forward as a protagonist of this, though there are examples by his contemporaries such as the sculptor Nicholas Stone, who was responsible for the Salomonic columns on the porch of St. Mary the Virgin in Oxford and the monument to John Donne, now in St. Pauls, and the designs of Inigo Jones, whom Dobson painted (portrait presently at Chiswick House, which is No. 27 in the present exhibition) that find echoes in his work.

What is undoubtedly baroque in the context and feeling of his pictures is both their full-bodied approach and the often striking quality of their colouring, though, as Mr. Rogers suggests, there is a ghostly insubstantiality about his last portraits, rendered almost in a monochrome, which gives an impression of the artist ekeing out his very limited resources as conditions grew worse in Oxford. What is certainly baroque in his idiom is the use of deliberately interpolated imagery; the pile of skulls, for instance, in the background of the *Family Group*, possibly of the Streatfield family (Paul Mellon Foundation for British Art. No. 28 in this catalogue), inserted to suggest the existence of a number of preceding deaths, probably of other children, in the family, and the use of a broken column as an emblem for fortitude in adversity and his application of specific motives, often rendered in grisaille, to suggest particular qualities in a sitter, such as the bust of Seneca, implying wisdom in the background to a *Portrait of a Man, probably Sir Thomas Aylesbury* (National Portrait Gallery, No. 7 in the catalogue) or the *Portrait of an Unknown Naval Commander* (National Maritime Museum, No. 16), where the symbolism consists of a sculpted female figure with globe, triangle and globe-dividers, representing navigation or geography.

It would have been impossible, of course, for a younger artist working in the ambit of Rubens and Van Dyck not to show indications of the implications of their mature baroque style. With Dobson, however, there were underlying influences which account for a certain individuality in his portraits. As an English painter he was, after all, though working on a different scale, conversant with the Limner tradition and its link, through Nicholas Hilliard and Isaac Oliver, with the mannerist influences of the School of Fontainbleau, and there are aspects of Dobson's work, e nervous tension of the full length picture of *Sir William Compton* s of Northampton Collection, No. 19), and the double portrait *s II as Prince of Wales with a Page* (Scottish National Portrait No. 9), which hark back to this. In addition, he was obviously

conversant with the new implications of tenebrism, popularised by the Caravaggisti and the Utrecht School. An early copy by Dobson of the painting by Matthias Stomer in the collection of Mr. Denis Mahon, *The Executioner with St. John the Baptist's Head*, (lent by the Walker Art Galley, Liverpool, No. 4) gives an indication of this. Some of his portraits also bear resemblance, not altogether surprising in terms of the current alliance between the Orange and the Rose, to other Dutch painters of the period such as Gerhard Terboch and, in particular, to the little-known Hasselt master Nicholas van Galen and serve as a reminder that there were trends in Holland at this time, particularly at the Stadholder's Court in The Hague, which followed a different course from the more familiar evolution of bourgeois painting in the golden age.

A comparison of Dobson's portrait of the well-known Caroline courtier, *Sir Endymion Porter*, (Tate Gallery, No. 8), with Van Dyck's picture in the Pennington—Mellor—Munthe Inheritance and with the same artist's chalk drawing of this sitter with his young son (British Museum, exhibited, as No. 70, in the National Portrait Gallery's *Van Dyck in England* exhibition last year), is a case in point. There can be no contention that Dobson, as a painter, reaches anything like the heights of subtlety and elegance achieved by the great Flemish master but, faced with this formidable example, he was able to maintain an individual stylistic approach of his own. That Dobson was willing to learn from Van Dyck his method of presenting a great formal portrait is seen in his pictures of *Sir Thomas Chicheley* (private collection, No. 17) and the full length of *James Compton, 3rd Earl of Northampton* (Marquess of Northampton Collection, No. 23), as he was also willing to adopt for pictorial effect the characteristics of a particular subject (compare the livid scar on the left cheek of his *John, 1st Baron Byron* from the Tabley Collection in the University of Manchester (No. 11), with the similar disfigurement in Van Dyck's portrait of Henry Danvers, Earl of Darnley, in The Hermitage (No. 20 in the NPG *Van Dyck in England* catalogue). At times, such resemblance, as between Dobson's portrait of *Montrose* (private collection, No. 14) and Van Dyck's of the *10th Earl of Northumberland* (Duke of Northumberland Collection, *Van Dyck in England*, No. 25) is marked to a degree. But there remains a difference between the two painters, characterised by Sir Oliver Millar in regard to Dobson's *Prince Rupert, Colonel Murray and Colonel Russell* (private collection, No. 25) as showing 'a force in the scene which is strengthened by the almost complete absence of anything approaching Van Dyck's elegance', all the more remarkable when one considers the obvious stylistic pressures to which the younger artist was exposed. Indeed, in some pictures, like the *Portrait of an Unknown Musician, possibly Henry Lawes* (Ferens Art Gallery, Hull No. 41), Dobson seems to be breaking away quite deliberately, subject to their common heritage in Titian, from the more sophisticated approach of Van Dyck and trying to establish an almost deliberate independence of his own.

Van Dyck died in December 1641, a few months after the execution of

Strafford and only a short time before Charles raised his standard at Nottingham. This left Dobson less than four years in which to establish himself as a figure of independent significance. It is inevitable, for historical reasons, that the latter's work should have come to be so strongly identified with one short and particularly romantic part of the Stuart tradition. What he might have done if he had lived beyond the year of the downfall of the Royalist cause, is impossible to say. A late group picture, *The Artist with Nicholas Lanier and Sir Charles Cottrell* (Duke of Northumberland Collection, No. 46) painted probably after his return to London—though Mr. Rogers describes this as being heavily dependent on the example of Van Dyck—indicates a self-confidence and a rhythmic sense of movement which suggests that he could have been capable of going on to produce even more remarkable works. If he had lived to the full span of a further thirty-five years, it is possible that his position could have eclipsed Lely's. Certainly, some of his pictures as for instance the portrait of his second wife, *Judith Dobson* (private collection, No. 2) suggest a freshness of conception and execution which anticipates Hogarth, who eventually broke through the stranglehold of the foreign painters in England. Though it was Van Dyck to whom both Gainsborough and Reynolds paid homage it is possible to trace back the native qualities in Hogarth to the example of his predecessor, 'the most excellent painter that England (had) yet bred'.

The National Portrait Gallery's exhibition (open until early in 1984), is an admirable example of this gallery's policy of exposing particular painters to a detailed survey in terms of their historical context, serving both to identify Dobson's work in terms of the present state of our historical knowledge and to separate him, as far as possible, from his existing legend. Following so soon on the Victoria and Albert's *Artists of the Tudor Court, The Portrait Miniature Rediscovered, 1520-1620,* it highlights certain aspects of our own art which the late Sir Nicholas Pevsner indicated over thirty years ago in his *Englishness of English Art.*

THE GDR—A COUNTRY OF BOOKS AND READERS

by Waltraud Hannig

THE variety of literature offered by the book trade and in libraries in the GDR is truly enormous. One in three citizens uses one of the 32,000 libraries regularly. In 1982, books were borrowed from libraries 105 million times—there are about 17 million inhabitants in our country. In addition to books, booklets and periodicals, an increasing number of records, cassettes, slides and other visual material can be borrowed.

To use libraries and to borrow the material mentioned above is free of charge generally. Nevertheless, many friends of literature go to bookshops in order to buy books for their own permanent use or for giving away as presents. Every year, our book trade sells books worth more than half a thousand million marks and it should be noted in this context that books as well as records are not expensive in the German Democratic Republic.

More than 340,000 books are printed in the GDR every day. Annually, about 6,000 titles with an overall circulation of approximately 140 million copies are published. The number written by GDR writers is 500 to 600 titles for adults and about 500 titles for children. In 1982, the circulation of their books amounted to more than 28 million copies.

Book production is undertaken by 78 publishing houses for books and periodicals. There are 25 publishing houses in the fields of politics, social science, natural sciences and medicine; 15 for specialised literature, 16 for belles-lettres, six for literature and for children and young people. There are also firms specialising in art, as well as works on religion. Most of the 78 publishing houses—the majority of them were established after 1945—are nationally-owned enterprises or in the possession of social organisations.

In that year, 1945, the objective was to eliminate all fascist ideas from our publications. New textbooks and school-books had to be produced so that the new democratic schools could get to work. Famous German literature that had been prohibited and burnt by the fascists were re-issued. Last not least, the working population had to obtain new textbooks and specialised literature in the fields of technology and natural sciences.

One in seven books published in the GDR is a translation. Continuously, 1,000 titles of the overall number of 6,000 published every year come from other countries; their overall circulation of 17.8 million copies in 1978 increased to 22 million copies in 1982. On an average, two thirds of foreign titles are works of belles-lettres. Every year, translations from approximately 40 languages are published, mostly from Russian, English, American English and French. Thus, the publishing activities of the GDR reflect a considerable variety. As to the exchange of literature with non-socialist countries, there still exists an imbalance. The number of licences the GDR takes out from the western European countries is far bigger than vice versa.

The GDR publishing houses work according to plans of themes that have to be approved by the Ministry of Culture after discussions of staff members and members of the readers' departments. In the ministry, there are teams of advisers. These teams are composed of experienced managers of publishing houses, heads of readers' departments, representatives of state and scientific institutions, associations of artists—especially the writers union—and other social organisations. They discuss basic problems of the development of literature and broad lines of themes as well as prospects for the respective field.

The publishing houses make every effort to satisfy high scientific and cultural demands. In this context, they are rapidly developing co-operation with publishing houses in other countries. For example, there exist working groups from publishers in the GDR and the Soviet Union that publish literature of social science and belles-lettres. The most impressive example is the Marx-Engels-edition MEGA published jointly.

The highlight of meetings and talks about 'the book' is the Week of the Book. It is organised at the beginning of May every year and is to remind us of the fascist book burning on 10 May, 1933. In 1983, one of the most impressive events was a reading given by eleven writers from six countries. It took place on the August-Bebel-place in Berlin, capital of the GDR, at the historic scene of the book burning. 50,000 inhabitants of Berlin came to demonstrate their determination to prevent book burning and genocide ever taking place again.

Days of Literature for Children and Young People are organised annually in the GDR. Such events include discussions on literature, book exhibitions, talks with writers, the presentation of the Alex-Wedding-Prize by the Academy of Art of the GDR for services to literature for children and conferences on all aspects of writing for children.

In this respect, the GDR, a member of the UNESCO, is acting in line with the decisions and demands of that organisation; that is, to consolidate the habit of reading, and to make books available to the public.

[Waltraud Hannig, a journalist specialising in cultural affairs, is a member of the staff of *Panorama GDR*.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

Act of Darkness. Francis King. Hutchinson. £8.50. *Shame.* Salman Rushdie. Cape. £7.95. *Scandal.* A. N. Wilson. Hamish Hamilton. £8.95. *Scenes from Later Life.* William Cooper. Macmillan. £7.95. *The Season.* Anne Faulconer. Blond & Briggs. £7.95. *Johnnie Cross.* Terence de Vere White. Gollancz. £7.95.

It sometimes happens that the background of a story becomes its most important aspect. This is the case with Francis King's *Act of Darkness.* The frustrated, devious members of the Thompson family would have made an absorbing study in Clapham or Cornwall. The setting in the Indian foothills. during the last years of the Raj, bestows on them a deeper significance.

There have been many novels about the decline of the Anglo-Indian way of life. In *Act of Darkness* the problems which torment and divide the Thompsons are not political. The *paterfamilias,* Toby, runs a hotel business and money and his love life are his main concerns. His is a singularly unattractive set-up, with employees earning less than they should and sexual affairs continually going wrong. Toby had married a woman older than himself, who brought with her a useful dowry. Alas, she was already riddled with tuberculosis. After her death, it was not surprising that Toby should have married their daughter's governess, Isabel: or that she became a disappointment and a liability. At the opening of the novel Helen, only child of the first marriage, is arriving for an indefinite visit. This sets a match to the tinder, for Helen detests Isabel and is not much more *en rapport* with her five-year-old half-brother, Peter, a child with an alarmingly high IQ, yet irritating to those adults who have chosen not to adore him. One of these is the beautiful Eurasian, Clare, employed as a companion and teacher for the child. Also in the household is old Mrs. Thompson, a courageous geriatric, Toby's mother, who keeps mainly to her bedroom yet by her very presence creates an additional problem. Overall is a pervading unease, for Isabel's twin brother has only recently been savagely assassinated. Ironically, the tragedy which eventually destroys the Thompson family stems not from rebellious or marauding hordes but from within the very heart of the domestic circle—a crime of murder, almost too bestial in its obscenity to contemplate, perpetrated against the youngest and most vulnerable member of the clan.

Toby's over-insistent assertions that his son's death was an act of terrorism have a hollow ring which fails to convince the local police officer. Investigations follow the approved formula of a detection thriller. Yet it is one of the novel's many strengths that it does not remain tethered either to the scene or solution of the crime. So powerful is the force unleashed that the protagonists are flung far and wide, across continents and into different ways of life, which even the onset of World War II cannot neutralise. The final shift to Australia for the ultimate and totally unexpected solution of the mystery proves to be a masterstroke for the finale of a gripping and wholly satisfying novel, enhanced by vivid detail and profound understanding of human passion and frailty.

Background also plays a prominent part in Salman Rushdi's new novel,

Shame. Here, the setting is the dismembered territory now known as Pakistan. An inordinately large number of characters flood the narrative, while the bizarre events which engulf most of them have a bludgeoning effect although, despite its undoubted veracity, the cruel and muddled world of an 'emerging' nation is not intended to be taken too seriously; for many of its scenes and incidents, even when sadistic, are hilariously funny. The central character is Omar Khayyam Shakil, born of three mothers who are sisters. Legend had it that after the death of their autocratic father, Chhini, Munnee and Bunny Shakil gave an enormous party during which one of them was seduced. In a gesture of family solidarity all three claimed parentage of the child; even contriving phantom pregnancies.

In later years, the over-weight, somewhat eccentric Omar waddled his way through a succession of devasting national events as a fully qualified doctor, eventually aspiring to marriage with Sufiya Zinobia Hyder, the mentally handicapped daughter of Raza Hyder, political rival to Iskander Harappa. From that point onwards the pace quickens and events diversify to expose the main protagonists continually at a disadvantage. *Shame* has been described as a fairy tale; in which case it is of the Hansel and Gretel variety. The fudged conception of an imposed democracy where no democracy has existed proves to be little more than a dangerous pipedream. Chaos and mindless brutality of an adolescent kind are generally accepted as the order of the day. The reader would be lost in a maze of conflicting sub-plots but for the author's witty interventions, often the only cohesive link. This very audacious, fast-moving novel, rightly a runner-up for the Booker prize, demands a high level of concentration which will prove to be infinitely rewarding.

A. N. Wilson's characters also inhabit the charmed world of the political power struggle. At the beginning of *Scandal* the MP Derek Blore is closely in line for Cabinet rank following the death of the Leader. An extremely capable man, though with some irritating mannerisms, he is sufficiently popular to make his way to the top: particularly as his elegant wife, Priscilla, is willing to support him at the hustings.

Unfortunately for himself and his family Derek Blore is concealing a perversion which takes the form of a craving to be whipped on the bare buttocks while dressed in school uniform. The beating is carried out in a flat in Hackney by a meek, nondescript woman named Bernadette Wooley, pressured by economic necessity into a life of prostitution. For a while all goes smoothly and fears of exposure are lulled away. But then the latent danger catches up on him. Exposure is threatened, backed by tapes and photographs, with the alternative of betraying government secrets to a 'foreign power'. As the noose tightens Derek Blore becomes increasingly desperate and even considers murdering Bernadette to cover his tracks. Sadly, the stance of the novel shifts from the absorbing study of a flawed politician to a conventional spy-drama, although not entirely so. One of the most poignant and realistic scenes comes near to the end when, after his disgrace is made public, Derek Blore's young son suffers bullying and ostracism at boarding school.

Devotees of William Cooper's 'Scenes' will be relieved to know that Joe Lunn of the earlier books is still alive, if not well, and facing retirement. In *Scenes from Later Life* the amiable, unambitious novelist is mulling over past failures and achievements, preparing to face an impoverished future. Understandably, he sets his sights low, with book sales falling despite critical approval and financial problems owing to miscalculations about his civil service pension.

Fortunately, he is urged by his practical and devoted wife, Elspeth, to sell their pleasant surburban home and buy a mansion flat, thus paving the way for a humorous dissertation on the trauma of 'moving'. But the move is only a part of Joe's problem. Coinciding with a retreat from the work-a-day world are his health problems, necessitating two major operations, both in a National Health hospital. The first is on one of his eyes, revolting in its close detail; the second a hip replacement which nearly goes wrong. The reader squirms and suffers in sympathy with the helpless patient. Joe recovers—almost—but is predictably scarred by his experience. But for the robust Elspeth, still in a well-paid job, and the return of an old crony, Tom, from New York, Joe's prospects would be bleak indeed. Tom is wealthy and successful and schemes to improve the modest lot of his old friends. He is also a trouble-maker and comes near to wrecking the Lunn marriage through subtle mis-representation. Yet all is saved and we seem set for a comfortable, if not an entirely happy conclusion, when the death is announced of Joe's octogenarian mother. Her deterioration is monitored by private medicine and the two systems are contrasted with much caustic humour, as are many of Joe's observations on life's funny little quirks and inequalities, so that it is a pity if Joe himself comes across as an inadequate, rather tedious little man. It is just one of the hazards of attempting to capture a creative writer on the printed page.

With her first novel, *The Season*, Anne Faulconer moves into a far more sensational situation—drug addiction among the very young. Here are no mere drop-outs or paupers but a group of people in the higher echelons of English society. Nicola, narrator for two-thirds of the novel, is only partly 'hooked' although her fiancé, Lord Edward Bridgwater, is a case almost beyond recall, kept going merely by remarkable physical stamina. In the palatial country home of Ned's parents, the Duke and Duchess ignore or accept the traffic going on in the remote areas of their vast mansion, where the resulting illnesses are handled discreetly by privately engaged nurses and doctors. Nicola is half-hearted in her attempts to reclaim her future husband, yet welcomes an opportunity to get him away to New York where he has the opportunity to run a picture gallery; even though their boon companion, the outrageous Katie, is to accompany them.

Alas, in America very little is different, apart from a switch of narrator for from that point onwards the situation is conveyed through the eyes and ears of Dan Riley, son of the President of the United States. Dan is supposedly in love with Nicola, although he already has a very possessive mistress installed in his flat. As a cunning, ruthless exhibitionist, Dan is happy to pedal drugs to those who can pay for them and to torment those who can't, as for example the twitching, half-crazed Katie, by withholding the much-needed 'fix'. It should all be deeply disturbing, yet told in jerky, slang-ridden thought sequences, whether by the crude Dan or unintelligent Nicola, it fails to arouse pity either for the victims or indignation with those who make narcotics available.

And lastly, something altogether different. Although much time and attention has been devoted in recent years to the relationship between George Eliot and her life-partner, George Henry Lewes, little or no analysis has been offered of the Victorian novelist's late marriage to a man twenty years her junior, John Walter Cross. It was left to the biographer and editor of George Eliot's Letters, Professor Gordon Haight, to uncover evidence of the strange illness suffered by Cross on the honeymoon in Venice and his unexplained leap from a hotel balcony into the canal below. Now, in *Johnnie Cross*, Terence de Vere

White offers an ingenious and generally acceptable explanation, blending already published material with his own fictionalised interpretations of what actually took place in private between the ill-assorted pair. This is that when the prematurely aging George Eliot revealed her consuming physical passion for the previously unmarried Adonis, he refused to respond, thus humiliating her to the point when she lost the will to live.

John Walter Cross survived her death by forty-four years, haunting his Club as a disconsolate, solitary figure, burdened by retrospective guilt. It is on a young man's imaginary conversations with 'George Eliot's widow' that the present novel is based.

Also received:

The Black Seraphim. Michael Gilbert. Hodder. £7.95. Crime writer Michael Gilbert's ingenious if rather too complicated murder mystery, *The Black Seraphim*, is set in Cathedral precincts. Characters indigenous to the setting are much in evidence. The central personality, Dr. James Scotland, revisits the scene which he had known in boyhood as a means of obtaining respite from his medical routine. Soon, predictably, he is embroiled both emotionally and intellectually as he gets down to the task of solving a seemingly insoluble mystery.

Monsieur Pamplemousse. Michael Bond. Hodder. £7.95. This light-hearted, if macabre romp, will be eagerly seized upon by adherents of 'Paddington Bear', for Michael Bond, creator of the well-loved nursery character, has here turned his attention to crime. In *Monsieur Pamplemousse* we have a new-style detective, one who combines gourmanderie with the uncovering of a bizarre misdemeanour. In this he is aided by his dog, Pomme Frites, who samples delicious dishes while furthering the cause of justice.

Cherokee Roses. Revel Kennedy. Bachman & Turner. £8.50. A warm-hearted personality and very positive approach to the narrative form is apparent in Revel Kennedy's unusual story, *Cherokee Roses.* This study of an unsettled and often disturbing period of American history at the turn of the century concerns the near extinction of an Indian tribe, the Cherokee.

Pennine Tales. Henry Livings. Methuen. £4.95. This attractive collection of 15 short stories, *Pennine Tales*, shows the well-known author and playwright, Henry Livings, in varied mood, ranging from an amusing sketch of 'fit-up' touring to the dark humour of 'Hanging Party', enhanced by neat line drawings by Maria Livings.

The Escaped Cock. D. H. Lawrence. Aquilla Press, Isle of Skye. £2.95. The 50-page novella, orginally titled *The Man Who Died*, was published in Paris but widely circulated elsewhere. A strange, unlikely story of Christ's resurrection, it has the Lawrence hallmark and well justifies re-reading in this excellently produced small volume, containing additions confirmed in the Lawrence MSS although not included in the first printing.

The Historical Novel prize in memory of Georgette Heyer, administered by The Bodley Head and Transworld Publishers (Corgi Books) has been awarded to Kathleen Herbert for *Queen of the Lightning*, a story of Britain in the seventh century. (The Bodley Head. £7.95.)

From a closely contested 'short list' the winner of the £10,000 Booker Fiction prize is J. M. Gotzee for his *Life and Times of Mr. K*, a study of life in South Africa seen through the eyes of a credulous, peace-loving individual. (Secker and Warburg. £7.95.)

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

A GREAT FOREIGN SECRETARY

Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary. (Volume 3). Alan Bullock. Heinemann. £30.

Fine coronat opus. Lord Bullock concludes his mighty Bevin trilogy with a volume on Ernest Bevin's foreign policy (1945/51) which is in every way worthy of a great theme. The whole Atlantic system of defence against Soviet imperialism, on which we have depended from that day to this owes more to Ernest Bevin than to any one man, British or otherwise. Attlee was indispensable to Bevin, as Kenneth Harris has brought out in another fine biography. Attlee was a far more accomplished parliamentarian and as strong as Bevin in regard to the defensive strategy. But Bevin had a quality of architectonic imagination which has not been equalled in the international politics of the twentieth century.

His foreign policy was admittedly so elaborate that he could not always remember all the details of it offhand. 'You must wait till William Strang comes back from America. He's got my foreign policy at 'is fingertips', he said to me once in the year 1947/8 when I worked under him as Minister for Germany. But the creation was always his, not that of the Foreign Office. They admired and came to love him. He had a deep respect for their integrity and their professional knowledge. But he was always the master even if they had to translate his far-reaching thoughts into official prose. Lord Bullock's book may be seen as a justification of Ernest Bevin's foreign policy. And so it is—in the sense that Bullock concludes after tremendous research that Bevin was right, or at least not wrong, on all the main issues. Bevin's attitude on Palestine has been widely condemned. I will not venture to enter that controversy. Was he anti-semitic? He sometimes sounded like it. The truth is that he was anti-anyone who criticised him consistently and he encountered plenty of criticism from the Jews and their friends. He gladly accepted an arrangement under which he took on a seat in Parliament from a friend of his and mine, the late Lord Nathan, the latter passing to the Lords. That did not prevent him saying at a moment when his Palestine policy was under heavy fire, 'What I like about you, Frank, (I was Pakenham when he was less pleased with me) is that you are an Englishman first and a Catholic second. Now Harry is a Jew first and an Englishman second'. I protested that Harry Nathan had had a much better war record than I had and in any case I was Irish. He ignored the comment. It is often argued that Bevin landed Britain in a series of commitments that were beyond our post-war capacity. Bullock defends Bevin powerfully here. I feel myself that we would never have exercised the influence we did over the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Treaty, for example, if we had not insisted for the time being on a status which could not be preserved indefinitely.

Bullock discusses interestingly the refusal of Britain to join in negotiating the Schuman plan in 1950. He quotes Dean Acheson as calling it 'The great mistake of the post-war period'—a verdict which he himself is reluctant to



accept. Personally I go along with Acheson, influenced, no doubt, by an experience at the crucial moment in 1950. I chanced to be visiting Dr. Adenauer the German Chancellor in my capacity, by that time, of Minister of Civil Aviation. Adenauer begged me to beg Attlee and Bevin to bring Britain into the negotiations. My efforts in that direction were laughed to scorn.

Looking back I realise afresh the strong anti-German feelings of Attlee, Bevin and Dalton. Dalton's antipathy to the Germans was pathological. It was not till much later that I understood that Attlee in his quiet way felt almost as strongly about them. I asked him one day in the House of Lords whether he would become a patron of the Anglo-German Association of which I was Chairman. He hesitated and then replied, 'I don't want to hurt your feelings but I ought to tell you that I have never liked the Germans—except a maid that Vi and I got very fond of'.

Bullock makes no secret of Bevin's feelings about the Germans. He quotes him as saying, 'I 'ates them'. He mentions Bevin's reluctance to visit Germany or meet German politicians. He goes on, however, to quote two high officials as saying that Bevin did not allow 'his feelings to influence his policy towards Germany'. But this in spite of my high regard for the officials named (Sir Brian Robertson and Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick) is nonsensical—in my view. Readers should, however, be aware of what Bullock has to say about my own attitude at this time. 'Pakenham's views on the Germans, much influenced by his Christian beliefs, were very different from Bevin's'. As Bevin said to me towards the end of our time together, 'The trouble about you is that you may be Chancellor of the Duchy (he pronounced it ducky) but you don't agree with my German policy'.

No one can say what would have happened if the Potsdam policy of holding down the Germans for many years had been persevered with. The hostility of the Russian Government produced the result which I pleaded for impotently on Christian principles. But setting that aside, Bevin stands out in my mind as one of the few great British statesmen of the twentieth century. Churchill and Attlee I rank along with him, but no one else. He is fortunate in having obtained a top class reflective historian like Alan Bullock to produce such a splendid memorial.

FRANK LONGFORD

THE YOUNG MAYNARD KEYNES

John Maynard Keynes, Hopes Betrayed 1883-1920. Robert Skidelsky. Macmillan. £14.95.

Until now, Roy Harrod's study of Keynes (published in 1951) has been seen as 'the standard work' on this major economist and *guru*. Robert Skidelsky's first volume—his 400-page, thoroughly-researched volume covers only the first 37 years of a long and crowded life—now replaces Harrod, and constitutes indeed a major rebuttal of Harrod's admiring view. He charges that Harrod did a 'clean-up' job on Keynes, whom he had known for 25 years, that he minimised his near-pacifism in the First World War, when Keynes worked at the Treasury (and thought the country was governed by a 'crook'), and omitted his homosexuality. In a study as detailed as this on his early and formative years the homosexual theme becomes almost the major topic—and it is certainly a disturbing and thoroughly-proven one. Nor in other respects does Keynes emerge as 'the great man' of contemporary legend.

John Maynard Keynes was the son of a Cambridge don who became a

University administrator, and who devoted most of his life to the coaching and directing of his son's education. He planned for him his programme to secure a Cambridge Fellowship before he had even won an undergraduate entrance scholarship. Maynard went to Eton as a scholar, and Skidelsky's is a brilliant description of the academic strength, the 'hot-house' atmosphere and thorough intellectual snobbery of Eton College in his day; the scholars were, he says, 'an intellectual élite thrust into the heart of a social élite.' Keynes won every prize he sought in a piece of brilliant, sustained—and in the end appalling—academic gamesmanship; and yet he managed to be accepted by masters and boys as an otherwise 'decent chap', gaining entry to Pop and making those friendships that were to be so useful to the man later—with, among others, Daniel MacMillan, R. A. Butler and Lytton Strachey. Entry to King's, Cambridge, followed almost automatically, with a similar record of unremitting successes and triumphs. The glittering prizes were his, but it was a product of that form of genius that is an infinite capacity for taking pains. Father and son, stirred by a Non-conformist work-ethic, abetted by a do-gooder and driving Mother, mowed down all who got in the young man's way. And with a legion of Kingsmen he was 'in love' also. His main source of pleasure was the Cambridge Conversazione Society or Apostles founded in 1820 and still going strong, in form a philosophy seminar where the great names were the philosophers Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, but in reality a place, it seems, where beautiful young men were appraised and cultivated. As described here, in sharp details, it all becomes a condemnation of one-sex boarding school or college education. And it was not pure or idealistic. 'His conversation', wrote Lytton Strachey, who was a great admirer of Keynes, 'does appear to me inordinately filthy. I felt as if I was walking in a drain'. And of the Bloomsbury group, of which Keynes became at once a pillar and an ornament, it is equally an indictment. At last, the 'Bloomsbury myth' is being thoroughly deflated.

The training was long and thorough. Keynes was a brilliant mathematician and logician, with an astonishingly wide intellectual range, who taught economics without any formal training in it. Indeed, he refused Alfred Marshall's invitation to study it as an undergraduate; he was more preoccupied with questions of logic and moral philosophy and with work on what became his 'Treatise on Probability'. For him, cocooned in middle-class academic comfort, life seemed an 'economic Utopia', with servants cheap and country-houses galore whose doors swung open; although in theory a Radical (and approached about contesting the 1918 election as a Labour candidate in Cambridge) he appears as totally ignorant, indeed unaware, of the world outside his own cosy patch: of the emerging militancy in Ireland, of labour unrest and of the suffragettes, and of storm clouds in the Balkans that would in the end destroy his world, and come upon it with total shock.

Keynes in fact turned to economics in part as a result of his years at the India Office as a civil servant, then in the Treasury during World War I, ('I work for a Government I despise for ends I think criminal') and not least as the author of *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, published in 1919, which made him a reputation: Germany was being made responsible for reparations far beyond her capacity to pay. That it was a remarkably accurate picture did not become clear for another decade. But it made its author a powerful public figure. From this brilliant portrayal of him, warts and all, his wide interests, his speed and precision of thought and capacity for work emerge; so do his frailties, his pampered and sheltered youth, and his transcendent drives. As a biography, as a study of Eton and King's, and as a piece of intellectual and

Edwardian history, this is a most readable, scholarly, and disturbing analysis of a brilliant, but flawed, man.

ESMOND WRIGHT

MACARTNEY OF LISANOURE: EMPIRE BUILDER

Macartney of Lisanoure 1737-1806: Essays in Biography. Edited by Peter Roebuck. Contributors: Thomas Bartlett, J. L. Cranmer-Byng, T. G. Fraser, W. R. Fryer, E. M. Johnston, J. L. McCracken, Michael Roberts, Peter Roebuck. Ulster Historical Foundation. £16.50.

A nation's or an empire's strategic frontiers are commonly the nurseries of its commanders. For France's Kléber or Foch, Britain has her Ulstermen: Montgomery (admittedly from just across the Border with Eire's Ulster County of Donegal); Alexander; and Alanbrooke (both from Border Counties).

To Ulster (but other provinces too) the British Empire and Commonwealth and indeed the United States owe many of their builders and defenders (not to mention the man who burnt the White House in 1814!). Of the pen rather than the sword the service to British imperium and influence of George, Earl Macartney of Lisanoure in Co. Antrim also deserves to be remembered. Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of Catherine the Great in 1764, when he was twenty-seven, Macartney became Chief Secretary for Ireland. He later held overseas posts in Grenada, whose importance is again apparent, India—he governed the Madras Presidency for John Company in some friction with the Governor General, Warren Hastings, in Calcutta—and then China, as our first Ambassador. Received in imperial audience in Peking, he was expected to kowtow, which led to an amusing diplomatic compromise. Macartney finally governed the Cape of Good Hope.

Of modest origins, which may in measure explain his arrogance, Macartney's intellectual powers shone at Trinity, Dublin. He was, however, more able than successful as a public servant. His mission to China was a failure. His life and career and personality are here well explored by a distinguished bevy of Professors of, and Lecturers in, History, who together give valuable insight into the affairs of a growing world power—they include a dispute with Spain over the Falklands—and the landed society of Georgian Ireland.

SIR JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON, M.P.

THE POPULATION THREAT

Environment and Population: Problems of Adaptation. John B. Calhoun (Editor). Praeger, New York.

As the world approaches the Orwellian year of 1984 the population bomb ticks on inexorably. It has been a century of well nigh frenetic reproductive activity. In 1900 the earth contained only 1,500 million people and was reasonably well in tune with its resources and environment. By 1950 the total had climbed to 2,500 million, by 1983 to 4,700 million. In the absence of a nuclear war the century will end with over 6,000 million people and because there is little if any immediate likelihood of population stabilisation at the two child norm per family, 10,000 million people could be inhabiting this fragile and mutilated planet by the middle of the 22nd century.

This book, edited by US biologist John B. Calhoun, is welcome in reminding us of this omnipresent threat to human survival. The interests of the environmentalist movement over the past two decades have ebbed and flowed. In the

early 1970s in the wake of the Stockholm Conference pollution was the main interest; later population, catalysed by the International Conference in Bucharest, occupied the centre of the stage; subsequently food with an international conference in Rome became central and more recently the threat posed by a nuclear holocaust has been dominant.

But population has been with us all the time and however much we tend to ignore it, it will certainly not go away. It is a cancer on the face of the earth; it is all pervasive and no aspect of human activity in developed and developing countries remains unaffected by it. It has political ramifications of a gargantuan character nowhere better illustrated than in the world's two population giants, India and China. In the former compulsory sterilisation was a major factor in toppling the Indira Gandhi government in 1977. In China, obsessed by its one child programme, draconian measures including abortion at 8 months of pregnancy and the use of the so called 'granny police' redolent of the Stalin era at its worst, are now in operation.

In Calhoun's book 162 contributors co-operate to paint the canvas with a broad brush. Numerous topics are considered. They include the complexity of global ecosystems and social systems, world policies in relation to survival and health and—more directly germane to the population issue—the effects of overcrowding, population density and the relevance of the family unit.

The editor is to be congratulated on assembling such a wealth of detail on a very complex theme. As one might imagine the quality of individual contributions tends to vary and there are some which can only be described as substandard. Nevertheless, the corpus of knowledge presented is formidable and the book is to be recommended to all concerned global citizens.

JOHN A. LORAINE

MI6—1909–1945

MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909-45. Nigel West. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £9.95.

Nigel West has already a considerable reputation as a result of his studies of MI5. Indeed, when the second volume of this earlier study was published in 1982, attempts were made to suppress it on the grounds that the information it contained could only have come from within the Security Service itself. A similar charge could be made against this parallel study of British clandestine operations and intelligence-gathering abroad, since the book is a roll-call of key names, and could only have been compiled from the accounts and recollections of former members of 'the firm.' It pays tribute to the importance of Bletchley and its code-breakers, but this is not its prime concern. It is an account of who did what and at what station from the beginnings of the service, in the aftermath of the intelligence failures of the Boer War, until after 1945; by that time it was, yet again, information about Russia not about Germany that mattered. This is first and last a 'cloak and dagger' survey of World War II, and names names. Indeed, as names like Philby, Maclean and Blunt appear, the reader almost feels that the wheel has turned full circle, from the failures and frustrations of the early days to the revelation that would by 1950 destroy the reputation of the Service, and with it the reputation of its war-time head, Major-General Sir Stewart Menzies. But this is a piece of straight detailed description, and it has its triumphs as well as its failures.

The fall of France, of course, and the Venlo kidnapping left British intelligence as shattered as its European army: with the fall of so many countries, many of the stations and their local networks disappeared, and had

laboriously to be re-created. West's description of the early years of the War is very vivid, and reveals the shattering losses involved in the exercise code-named Victoire and in the consequences of the Abwehr obtaining control of the Inter-allied network. Again, the British failure—at high cost in lives—to destroy Germany's 'heavy-water' plant at Vemork in Norway is told here in detail, and in stirring fashion. So with operation Cicero in Istanbul ('a unique German success') and many more. In Holland the losses were probably *pro-rata* the heaviest of all: in the period between May 1940 and September 1944, only 28 Allied agents survived of 144 agents infiltrated into Holland: belying the wartime Service gamble that if you were dropped there it was a survival rate of 50:50.

For all who were in the Service, or the War, or who wish to recall it from an armchair, this is authentic history more vivid than most fiction. It proves—though it is not written to a thesis—that we were better at co-operating and working with Americans than anybody else—though they were not enemies! And there are some stories here of quite remarkable successes: of the skill in handling the Swedish secret police; of the matching skill in Spain, not greatly aided by the attitudes of the British diplomatic mission; and not least how Operation Torch in North Africa was ensured of success by a tricky sabotage operation in neutral Tangier. Successes and failures become the stories of individuals, and so they are stories of many heroes, of some cowards and traitors, and of quite a few who, as in all wars, played each side against the other—perhaps because they were not really sure whose side they were on or because on capture it was worth their while to become double agents. And there is even a bracing reminder here that, for those who were captured and feared torture, it was important to take the poison-pill 'L' (L is for lethal) not with soup or coffee but with whisky.

ESMOND WRIGHT

A NEW STUDY ON THOMAS HARDY

Hardy's Wessex. Desmond Hawkins. Macmillan. £9.95.

With the proliferation of books on Thomas Hardy, it might have been thought that everything relevant about his work, background and private life had already been said. Fortunately, this is not so. Desmond Hawkins has on several occasions presented completely new material as well as fresh comment on what is already known. In *Hardy's Wessex* he has focused attention on the topographical aspect of Hardy's writing, with the result that a number of different points emerge. Divorced from the mainstream discussion of the characters and their destinies, the passages relating to history and architecture take on an added importance and underline Hardy's practical understanding of such matters as well as his sensitivity to the moods and variations of Nature.

Hardy's creation of 'Wessex' as a semi-imaginary kingdom was in a sense fortuitous. It served him well in that readers discovered an added interest in exploring the territory of the 'six counties' which was, however, mainly to be found in Dorset. Happily, many of the scenes described in the novels, poems and short stories remain largely unaltered.

Desmond Hawkins is deeply knowledgable about the early owners of these lands and the methods of maintenance, as for instance irrigation and conservation. Thomas Hardy also thoroughly understood such requirements over a wide area although, during his early years, he lacked the travel facilities

which we now take for granted. Fortunately, his birthplace in the Dorchester region provided the main sources of his information.

While it is something of a respite to leave aside the role of his two wives, even in this connection their influence on Hardy cannot be entirely ignored. The Cornish love poems acquire a new perspective seen against the majestic Cornish coast, where he encountered his first wife, Emma Lavinia Gifford. The assignment to rebuild St. Juliot Parish Church must indeed be recognised as a turning point in his life.

It makes credible the return of the octogenarian poet to the scene of the romantic encounter forty years later and the spate of poems which followed, possibly the finest love sequence in our language. Also, it does much to explain the second Mrs. Hardy's retrospective jealousy.

Hardy's Wessex, illustrated with outstanding photographs by Anthony Kersting, is presented in a form that is equally valuable to pilgrims in search of familiar landmarks and serious students of Thomas Hardy's origins and work.

ROSALIND WADE

A HANDBOOK ON PROUST

A Guide to Proust. Terence Kilmartin. Chatto & Windus. The Hogarth Press. £8.95.

It was Terence Kilmartin himself who, in 1981, produced his revision, based on the 1954 Pléiade text, of C. K. Scott Moncrieff's translation of *A la Recherche du Temps Perdu.* He is, therefore, the ideal, reliable compiler of this Proustian concordance, which now, together, above all, of course, with Painter, serves to buttress the sprawling oeuvre. Mr. Kilmartin acknowledges his debt to his precursors in this particular field, notably to P. A. Spalding's *Reader's Handbook to Proust* (1952) and to his French predecessors, Charles Daudet (Répertoire des Personnages de 'A la recherche du temps perdu'), Raoul Celly (Répertoire des Thèmes de Marcel Proust), and Jacques Nathan (Citations, références et allusions de Proust). Even more exhaustively, the editors of the Pléiade edition provided a detailed index of 150 pages in double column of small type.

Mr. Kilmartin's guide is not monumental—a handbook rather than a history. Among the missing is le nom de Cambronne. He drives a four-in-hand: an index of characters which will be the most drawn upon for immediate, even desperate, reference, an index of real persons, an index of places (those fictional marked with an f) and finally an index of themes. Now, themes beyond certain obvious signposts such as memory, names, language, Dreyfus, sexual inversion, and so on, would seem to be an arbitrary area of selection from the clotted, labyrinthine mass, but on the whole one can rely upon Mr. Kilmartin's instincts. This is the section of the guide which most lends itself to its maker's expressed suggestion that it might serve as 'a sort of Proustian anthology or bedside companion'. *Flowers,* for example, effortlessly evokes the flavour of the original with 'Albertine's hair like black violets . . . Poppies and cornflowers in the fields beyond Tansonville . . . Gilberte and Odette like a white lilac beside a purple. Or *Food*: 'Tea at la Raspelière—"shortbread, Norman puff pastries, trifles, boat-shaped tartlets . . . " '. Turn to the original and find that those tartlets are 'filled with cherries like coral beads.' More than simply an aide-memoire, Mr. Kilmartin's compilation acts as a taster, or, indeed, a teaser, for its incomparable subject.

MOLLY TIBBS

SHORTER REVIEWS

Opera on Record 2 (Hutchinson, £15). For those who sometimes prefer to read about opera, rather than actually sit and listen to it, the second volume of Alan Blyth's admirable *Opera on Record* has recently appeared as a fine companion to the first volume, published in 1979. This second book moves into somewhat more esoteric realms and thus, as well as dealing with Mozart's *Die Entführung aus dem Serail*, Puccini's *Il Trittico*, and Lehar's *Merry Widow*, also has chapters on the operas of Handel, Gluck and Berlioz, one on Purcell's *Dido and Aeneas*, and most interesting studies of the recorded operas of Stravinsky, Schoenberg and Janacek. This survey is laudably comprehensive, dealing with ancient recordings as well as modern, the scholarship of the various authors is impressive, and the quality of their writing is both stylish and enjoyable. This book, as much as its predecessor if you do not already have it, makes a valuable addition to any opera-lover's library. (D.F.)

SBS in World War Two. (Hale. £9.95). The outstanding operations of the Special Boat Section in intelligence gathering and other work prior to and during the Falklands campaign lends particular interest to this account of 'the original Special Boat Section of the Army Commandos' between 1940 and 1945. This volume is by Lieutenant-Colonel G. B. Courtney who served in the original SBS and is the brother of the late Major Roger Courtney, who formed the original No. 1 SBS in 1940 and the No. 2 SBS in 1941. The author is at pains to point out that they were not connected with the Special Boat Squadron of the SAS formed in September 1942.

The SBS was absorbed into the Royal Services to become part of Combined Operations under Lord Mountbatten. In his preface, Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN, pays tribute to this group of highly trained men 'who operated independently of nation or service. Their activities took them to the most dangerous areas of the war, hostile landing beaches and into enemy territory beyond'. In this book, Colonel Courtney records many of their exploits, including those in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, with the particular help of much material from former serving members of the SBS. It is a very moving record of courage and endurance.

Bermuda Today and Yesterday 1503-1980s (Hale, £7.95. In Bermuda, Baxters). The third edition of this standard work will be widely welcomed. The author, Mrs. Terry Tucker, is recognised as the leading authority on the history of Bermuda, its culture and topography. She is a scholar with a passion for accuracy, at the same time writing with popular appeal. The volume also contains a great deal of practical information for the visitor, as well as for the Bermudian. It has become essential reading for the student of Bermuda.

The World of Uncle Fred (Hutchinson. £9.95). The followers of P. G. Wodehouse will appreciate this volume, which brings together four pieces on the adventures of Uncle Fred, fifth Earl of Ickenham, one of Wodehouse's funniest and eccentric characters. This collection includes 'Uncle Fred Flits By', first published in book form in 1936. This is followed successively by Uncle Fred in the Springtime, Uncle Dynamite, and Cocktail Time, published respectively in book form in 1939, 1948 and 1958.

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18 MAR 1984

Printed by H. G. LEATES LTD., 45-47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 61 Carey Street, London, WC2A 2JG. Tel. 01-242 3215. All business matters should be addressed to the publishers.

Contemporary Review

119th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

FEBRUARY 1984

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Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

February 1984 Vol. 244 No. 1417 Founded 1866

Contents

		Page
The President of Ecuador	Martin C. Needler	**57**
Britain, Argentina and the Falklands	Peter Calvert	**62**
The New Ireland Forum	Hugh Munro	**68**
China and East-West Relations: the Third Point of the Compass	Leo Mates	**73**
The International Monetary Fund	Rudi Weisweiller	**77**
Poem: In Another's Place	Raymond Tong	**82**
The Senegambia Confederation	Arnold Hughes	**83**
A Very English Artist: the Retrospective Exhibition of the Work of John Piper	Ernle Money	**89**
Principles of Political Education	S. G. Shanker	**94**
Cinema: a Quarterly Review	David Shipman	**100**
Correspondence: Geoffrey Whitworth and the Regional Theatre	David R. Morgan	**104**
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		**105**
Lord Longford, Esmond Wright, Ernle Money Molly Tibbs, James Morton		
SHORTER REVIEWS		**112**

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© 1983 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H. G. Leates Ltd., 45/47 Alexandra St., Southend-on-Sea, Essex. U.S. Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N.Y. 10022. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £14.50, U.S.A. and Canada $47.50. Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U.S. and Canada; extra costs given on request. U.S. Postmaster: please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, New York N.Y. 10022. (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

February 1984 Vol. 244 No. 1417

THE PRESIDENT OF ECUADOR

by Martin C. Needler

TEN years ago, a colleague of mine asked me whom we should ask to teach the political science courses at my university branch campus in Quito, after Alfredo Pareja Diezcanseco, who had taught them, had been appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union. The appropriate answer did not require much thought. 'If you can get him, Osvaldo Hurtado. He is the best political scientist in Ecuador.'

Today, that young political scientist is president of Ecuador. Perhaps one should say 'at the time of writing,' since the tenure of an Ecuadorean president is never completely assured. If Hurtado completes the term for which he was originally elected vice-president, which expires in August, 1984, that will be the first completed constitutional term since 1960. Hurtado succeeded to the presidency when President Jaime Roldós Aguilera was killed in an airplane accident on May 24, 1981.

In the run-off election, held because no candidate received more than 50% of the votes in the first round, the Roldós-Hurtado ticket had won in a landslide, polling more votes than any previous candidates. Hurtado was picked for the vice-presidency because he came from the sierra, the highland interior of the country, while Roldós came from the coast; and because he was leader of a minor party, Democracia Popular, formed out of a coalition between his own Christian Democrats and a 'Progressive Conservative' splinter group, which could have no prospect of outweighing in the governing coalition the Concentration of Popular Forces, *Concentración de Fuerzas Populares*, or CFP, the populist party of Roldós. Yet Roldós himself was in some ways an accidental president. He had not been the leader of the CFP, but a very distant No. 2 to its leader, his wife's uncle, Assad Bucaram, a powerful orator and effective organiser and manager. Bucaram's candidacy for president had been vetoed by the incumbent military regime, ostensibly because of his incomplete citizenship—both his parents had not been born in Ecuador, but in Lebanon—but in reality because of distaste for his ethnic origins and lower-class background, and because of fear that his populist oratory would stir the lower classes to disorder and violence that might threaten the established social and economic order of things.

Of course, it was inevitable that Roldós as president would break with his mentor and benefactor, Bucaram, as he tried to establish his own independent position of leadership. Foreseeing this eventuality, in fact, Bucaram had wanted Roldós to take second place on the ticket to Hur-

tado, but Roldós had been backed in his refusal by other party leaders. Hurtado, at 41, was not the youngest president in Ecuador's history; Roldós had been only 38 at his inauguration. During his 20 months in office, Roldós's energies had been absorbed principally in the struggle with Bucaram over control of the CFP and thus of the national legislature. He was eventually victorious, but secured allies from other parties in the struggle against Bucaram at the cost of compromising his freedom of action. Bucaram himself died within six months of Roldós's fatal accident. As a result, the political situation has been unclear and unstable, while the economic picture has been gloomy—as it has for almost all countries during the same period. Under the circumstances, Hurtado's performance has been creditable.

The economic situation inherited by Hurtado was roughly as follows. Ecuador had, in recent years, become dependent on petroleum exports, a happy enough situation when both production and prices were rising. By 1981, however, there was an excess of petroleum on the world market and prices began to decline; moreover, Ecuador's production was not increasing while domestic consumption grew, leaving less for export. Like other petroleum producing countries, Ecuador had drifted into easy spending ways and had accumulated a foreign debt, the servicing of which became onerous. This was due in part to the petroleum producers' familiar scenario in which the substantial revenues from petroleum balanced the country's international payments at a point reflecting a much higher value for the national currency than it would otherwise have, leading to a greater inflow of imports and a decline in domestic production of non-petroleum items. This set of circumstances meant that sooner or later the government would have to devalue the national currency unit, the sucre, and attempt to reduce domestic consumption of petroleum by allowing domestic prices to rise, both extremely unpopular acts which Roldós had postponed taking.

Politically, Hurtado's position on taking office was tenuous. His own party held fewer than 20% of the seats in the single-house legislature. The majority party, the CFP, was irretrievably split, with those who had followed Jaime Roldós excoriated as traitors by those who had remained loyal to Bucaram. By a narrow margin, the Roldosistas managed to elect as vice-president the defunct president's younger brother, León, who promptly tried to undermine Hurtado and establish himself as a national leader. Business and landholding elements, sensing the new president's weakness, attacked in the Congress and the media Hurtado's supposed secret leftism and 'crypto-Marxism.'

Politically, Hurtado handled this difficult situation well. He kept a low profile and let his cabinet ministers and the party chairman dominate the media, drawing the fire of the opposition. Thus he retained his reputation as an intellectual moderniser who dealt with matters on their merits and did not descend to partisan invective. León Roldós was given enough rope to hang himself, which he did, trying even harder to involve Hurtado in a public mud-slinging battle. Even the Roldosistas backed away from

León, and Hurtado was able to cobble together a parliamentary majority from the Roldosistas and the CFP, together with his own Democracia Popular and the small centre-left Partido Demócrata. Nevertheless, this was a pyrrhic victory. The economic situation led the government to impose stringent budgetary constraints, which was equivalent to yielding to Right-wing demands that land reform and other spending programmes be curtailed.

This political outcome seemed to bear out the critique of Hurtado and his party made by the leader of the major opposition party, Izquierda Democrática (Democratic Left), Rodrigo Borja. In Borja's view, Hurtado is a technocratic elitist, who believes in modern scientific planning of the economy to promote development, chooses technically competent ministers, and is a shrewd and cool, even cold, political strategist. Nevertheless, in this view, the Christian Democratic movement that Hurtado heads is confused in class and ideological terms and thus, in times of crisis, cannot find within itself the strength to resist pressures from the political Right, always powerful in Ecuador.

This is not how the people around Hurtado perceive the situation. A combination of circumstances brought them to power prematurely, perhaps ten years before they would have been ready, in terms of building up the party and creating a mass popular base. Under these circumstances, there could be no realistic prospect of implementing the party's maximum programme. Nevertheless, despite the adverse economic and political circumstances, the party could count itself successful if it were able to achieve its basic aims of expanding social and political participation to create a mass popular base for a future democratic and progressive politics. Thus, although government economic programmes have become reduced to more or less the developmentalism—building dams, exploring for new petroleum fields, and so on—that any competent government would pursue, and the land reform hangs in suspension, there has been no let-up in the programme of which the government is most proud, the attempt to eliminate illiteracy in Ecuador. While the figures announced by the government seem rather exaggerated, there seems little doubt that by the end of Hurtado's administration the number of illiterates will have been reduced by more than half from what it was when Jaime Roldós took office, leaving Ecuador with fewer than 20% of the population illiterate, and possibly as few as 10%.

But, in any case, the constitution adopted by referendum in 1978 gave the vote to illiterates (this may have been a reason why it was possible to mount a substantial literacy programme; if illiterates can vote, the incentive is removed for the Right to oppose a literacy programme in order to keep the country's Indians from voting). The director of the electoral registration programme has predicted that by the presidential election of 1984 there will be 4 million registered voters, double the record number who voted in the presidential election of 1979. There can be no doubt that the literacy programme will be a great success, and will be one of the factors making for the mobilisation of the Ecuadorean rural population,

their increasing integration into national society, and their incorporation into the electorate. This, in turn, should ensure that eventually their voices will be listened to and their interests consulted by national governments. The contribution of the Roldós and Hurtado administrations to this outcome will not have been insignificant.

For the most part, however, an Ecuadorean government has its hands full handling the crises of the moment without making any significant structural changes. Governments are weak, without a strong well-organised or committed mass base; elite economic pressure groups are strong; and economic circumstances are exigent. Given the particular circumstances of political weakness that attend the Hurtado government and the difficulty of the economic situation, it will, in Ecuadorean terms, be a considerable achievement just for the government to survive long enough to conclude its mandate in August of 1984. During the last half-century of Ecuadorean history, elected governments only completed their terms during the 12-year period 1948-1960, an era of general world prosperity which was also a time in which the introduction of banana cultivation on the Ecuadorean coast led to a sustained economic boom for the country. Outside those years, the picture is a dismal one of elected governments overthrown by military *coups* if they came to threaten established oligarchic, military, or United States interests; incompetent civilian and military dictatorships brought to an end by popular resistance; or provisional governments serving out the time between the overthrow of one government and the election of another. In fact, cynical observers both inside and outside of the Hurtado government claim that the president's only goal now is to be able to complete his term.

Ecuadoreans are not sure what to make of Osvaldo Hurtado. He is unlike previous presidents, not only in his professional background and youth, but in his personal style. One of the symbolic indicators of this is that Hurtado appears to be the first president of the country to use the colloquial *ustedes* in addressing his fellow countrymen rather than the archaic oratorical *vosotros*. His speeches are straightforward, matter-of-fact, and crammed with statistics, which infuriate opponents such as the right-wing leader León Febrés Cordero. Hurtado's abilities are recognised, and he is still identified in people's minds with the idea that government action can be planned, a holdover from his vice-presidential role as director of the National Planning Commission, which produced a rather unrealistic document supposed to constitute the guidelines of the Roldós administration's programme. He is also regarded as a Machiavellian behind-the-scenes operator, which is thought consistent with his role in forming the Christian Democratic Party, to profess Christianity in politics being regarded as somewhat sanctimonious and hypocritical. For example, Hurtado has conducted closed-door briefings of top military leaders on the state of the economy. While ostensibly designed to flatter the military with their importance, sophisticated observers suspect that their real purpose is to convince the military that the economic situation is so bad that no one in his right mind would want to seize power and have to deal with the country's economic problems.

Hurtado was born to a comfortable landowning family whose property was located outside Riobamba, in Chimborazo province, one of the country's poorest. After distinguishing himself in his studies in private Catholic schools and the Catholic University, he took a research position with the *Instituto Ecuatoriano para Desarrollo Social* (the Ecuadorean Institute for Social Development, or INEDES), an organisation which received funds from foreign Catholic sources, such as the German Bishops' Fund. Hurtado subsequently taught at the Catholic University, and produced an impressive series of studies of Ecuadorean social, economic, and political reality, the most important of which were *Dos Mundos Superpuestos* (Two Superimposed Worlds), written with Hernán Salgado, whose first edition appeared in June, 1969, and in 1980 went into its third edition; and *El poder político en el Ecuador*, published in 1977 and since translated into English as *Political Power in Ecuador*, an extraordinary book which is, at the same time, the best available history of the country, compiled from primary as well as secondary sources, dealing with economic and intellectual as well as political history, and a subtle and original analysis of the country's recent political life. Perhaps not many Ecuadoreans outside of University students would read such a serious study. As Hurtado himself hinted in an interview with the magazine *Vistazo*, Bucaram would not have been likely to put Hurtado on the CFP presidential ticket if he had read the unflattering things written about him in *El poder político*. In fact, Hurtado has said that he expected the former leader of the Progressive Conservatives, Julio César Trujillo, who had become Secretary-General of Democracia Popular after the merger with the Christian Democrats, to be the vice-presidential candidate on the CFP ticket, and was surprised by his own selection.

Hurtado himself is now a political figure like those he criticised in his books. The criticism Rodrigo Borja made of Hurtado's party, that it lacked clear objectives and ideological content, so, in a crisis, would always bend to pressure from the Right, is precisely the criticism made by Hurtado himself of Bucaram and other populist leaders. Nevertheless, if he survives to complete his term, despite the unpromising circumstances in which he finds himself, political and economic, then when the generation of students that Professor Hurtado trained at the Catholic University come to write their own histories of Ecuador, they may conclude that the Hurtado presidency was a successful one, breaking with many of the nonproductive practices of the past and setting a new direction for the political evolution of Ecuador.

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BRITAIN, ARGENTINA AND THE FALKLANDS

by Peter Calvert

IMPORTANT policy decisions are often made casually, almost inadvertently. Thus the Prime Minister's decision, under close questioning in the House of Commons, to adopt the phrase 'Fortress Falklands' as the description of her Government's post-war policy, was clearly unpremeditated. As politicians do, she picked up a phrase from one of her opponents and turned it round to use against him, saying, characteristically, that there was in fact no alternative.

It is an unfortunate phrase, for many reasons. The first is the most obvious, that it is not and could not be an accurate description of a viable policy. A fortress, as everyone understands the term, is a heavily armed defensive point capable of resisting anything short of the most massive attack the enemy could mount, and thus affording to its defenders the assurance of protection as they go about their everyday business. A small island such as Heligoland may perhaps be turned into a fortress in this sense. The Falkland Islands, however, cover a land area about the size of Yorkshire, with no natural defensive points or redoubts, and a very thinly spread population cannot go about its everyday business without retaining its ability to move freely at great distances from any garrison. Indeed, it has been a consistent theme of many commentators that the presence of any substantial garrison force over a period of time means the permanent alteration of the very social structure that has made the islands attractive to their inhabitants.

A fortress, moreover, can also be seen as a provocation. As the course of the Falklands War itself showed, Latin American states have for many decades been able to enjoy such a degree of isolation from the wars of the rest of the world that they are quite unprepared to fight effectively against a force that is accustomed to doing so. The traditional role of the Argentine army in the internal politics of its own country makes it very unlikely that all the lessons of that war can be effectively learnt. If nothing else, inter-service rivalry will remain a formidable obstacle to effective combined operations. What is important, however, is that British policy should be implemented in such a way as to minimise, not to maximise, the chances of effective regrouping and rearmament in Argentina, and if the former is unlikely, events have shown that the latter is all too probable. To designate the islands as a 'fortress', therefore, is to issue a challenge that may some day be taken up. Such a challenge provides the best possible incentive to the different services of the Argentine military to overcome their mutual hostilities, it constitutes the closest thing to an external threat they might be expected to face. It is a hostage to fortune, and it would have been better if the phrase had never been invented.

What then is the alternative?

At the end of the fighting, on 14 June, 1982, the Argentine Junta

refused to recognise the end of hostilities, and was shortly afterwards displaced in favour of a military regime that continued the same public stance while in practice turning its attention back to the more important issues from which the war had been a diversion. These included the unpopularity of the military government itself, the growing pressure for an explanation of the fate of the 'disappeared', an annual inflation rate that had dipped below 100% only once in the last seven years (and then only as a result of the most brutal monetarist policies being imposed on the population), and a self-assumed burden of foreign debt that could no longer be serviced without some accommodation with Argentina's creditors, and which the Mexican debt crisis in August brought to the forefront of world attention. In theory the economic problems should not be too hard to solve, since Argentina is a rich and fertile country with a large food surplus, and largely free from the sort of extreme poverty that afflicts much of the rest of South America. The same facts, though, act to prompt those who think in terms of economic nationalism to believe that they do not have to take problems of debt payment too seriously, that the rest of the world needs Argentina more than Argentina needs the rest of the world. The permanence of Argentina's most important asset, the land, provides a buttress against fears for the future; and the solid opulence of the capital also reassures the nation that things are not as bad as they may appear on paper. Throughout 1983, as a result, an apparently effective Government team has been trying to negotiate with the world banking community to the accompaniment of the growing noise from the civilian politicians preparing for the elections on 30 October and the return to civilian government that should follow. The most bizarre consequence of this came when a judge in Patagonia ordered and obtained the arrest of the President of the Central Bank for allegedly paying insufficient attention to the national interest in his renegotiations of the debt of Aerolineas Argentinas.

The delicate discussions on the remainder of the public sector debt, for which this deal was supposed to be a model, came to an abrupt halt and the IMF refused to pay up on the next tranche of the loan imminently necessary to meet the government's persistent cash-flow problem. This incident, nevertheless, was only the symbol of the much more deep-rooted problems of the loss of business confidence as the day approached for the hand-over (business interests had welcomed Videla's seizure of power on behalf of the military 7½ years previously, e.g. the Ford Motor Co. saw 1976 as the year in which Argentina rediscovered her proper way), and it was significant that at the same time, the outgoing military government was indicating that it was contemplating a hand-over much earlier than it had originally promised, possibly as early as the 5 December, 1983.

What had led it to set such a long timetable in the first instance was, of course, its desire to safeguard its own position. At the beginning of the year, with the move to civilian government already under way, the military authorities were still trying to obtain two assurances from the politicians. First and foremost was the promise of an amnesty for any deeds done in

the course of the 'dirty war' from 1976 to 1979, in which many people suspected of anti-government activity or simple opposition 'disappeared', never to be seen again. The macabre statistic that some 12,000 graves have been identified of nameless persons in 14 cemeteries alone, as human rights groups announced at the end of April, is as near to the facts that anyone is likely to get, since at the same time the regime tried to end all further speculation in a so-called 'Final Statement' on television, which was denounced both by the President of Italy and the *Osservatore Romano* as inadequate and inhumane in its bald admission that the missing, who included Italians as well as Argentines of Italian descent, could now be presumed dead.

No civilian politician could be found to court political annihilation by agreeing in advance to the amnesty. Scenting that they might not keep their promise, even if they made one, the armed forces had, in any case, in the meanwhile also demanded a permanent Constitutional guarantee of their right to intervene unconstitutionally if they did not like the way things were going, and in the end, on 23 September, they took the precaution of amnestying themselves, though the courts showed themselves unwilling to accept this as valid. To divert attention as far as possible, the announcement coincided with a communique saying that the military inquiry into the Falklands debacle had concluded, and was critical both of the decision to invade and the failure to defend the Falklands.

The armed forces had come to realise, in fact, that the pressure was on, not for the civilians to agree to an amnesty, but to do the exact opposite; to compete with one another as to how far they would be prepared to go in making the armed forces account for their actions. By this time there were only two Presidential candidates to command a substantial following. For the Radicals, Raul Alfonsín and his running mate Victor Martínez were the first to be nominated and to begin campaigning. Alfonsín, somewhat left of centre, had opposed the war, kept his distance from the military and was backed by a united party, but it had got less than 30% last time out (1973) and it was an open question whether he could pick up enough of the urban working-class vote that had since 1945 voted for the Peronistas. The Peronistas, on the other hand, were clearly bitterly divided as they faced their first election since the death of Perón himself. His widow, ex-President María Estela Martínez de Perón (popularly known as 'Isabelita') had been arrested, tried, pardoned, deprived of political rights, detained and eventually allowed to go into exile in Spain by the military government. From Madrid it was daily expected that she would return in triumph to preside over the Peronista convention, but she did not, and when it was held on 4 September the proceedings were thrown into chaos by the disqualification of 273 delegates from the Province of Buenos Aires led by the formidable Herminio Iglesias, who was seeking the gubernatorial nomination. His reluctance to stand aside brought open hostility and left the eventual nominee, ex-President Italo Luder, a 63-year-old lawyer who had served briefly as provisional President in 1974 and stood for the anti-authoritarian wing of the party, in a much

weaker position than his compromise status would otherwise have ensured. He did have the guaranteed support of the ranking member of the party, first Vice-President Deolindo Bittel (who was at least the chosen champion of Isabel), who gained the Vice-Presidential nomination, and whose formidable organising talents had already been clear. As the election approached, massive demonstrations suggested that he would also have considerable, if not overwhelming, popular support, though these were in their traditional strongholds in Buenos Aires and Rosario.

Since it is generally believed—quite erroneously—in Britain that a civilian government is more likely to make peace over the Falklands than a military one, it should be said straight away that, given the long standing military hostility towards the populistic and demagogic Peronistas, they would in any case be watched very carefully for any sign of treason to the fatherland. It was the Peronist paper, *La Crónica*, which had called in the early 1970s for the driving of the 'English pirates' from the Malvinas by force. But of the two leading candidates it was Luder, the lawyer, who opined that the military amnesty, once proclaimed, could not be reversed, and Alfonsín who had held that it was void from the beginning. It must also be recognised that the Peronists, unlike the modern UCR, did have a tradition of co-operation with the military in the form of the dual regime of the Peronato; and in a corporate society such as Argentina, strong fears of a repetition of such sectoral alliance must still lurk in the minds of the populace. And both parties, along with all the lesser ones that made up the opposition front, the *Multipartidaria*, went on record towards the end of August in order to urge the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Chile over the Beagle Channel Islands—a dispute that had in 1977-78 led the military government of the day to the verge of war with its neighbour, and subsequently, when unable to pursue its aims owing to the offer of Papal mediation to turn its attention towards the Falklands instead. For there is no doubt that among the military there was far more enthusiasm for a war with Chile than with Britain, provided it could be fought on land (whilst the Chilean navy commands much respect in Argentine military circles, the Chilean army is little more than a laughing-stock). To make the very close relationship between the two issues quite clear, the civilian political leaders specifically included in the same statement a reaffirmation of Argentina's claim to the Falklands.

In the event, in the Presidential elections on 30 October, the Peronists, who had dominated Argentina politics for a generation, were thrust aside and victory went to the Radicals (UCR) and their candidate Dr. Alfonsín. Luder's relative lack of personality had been a severe disadvantage to the Peronists, and their inability to 'get their act together' in time destroyed their credibility in a way that even the 'gangster' image of their candidate for Governor of Buenos Aires, Herminio Inglesias, failed to do. In a country where political leaders are expected to be colourful, Dr. Alfonsín's charisma carried more of the mantle of Perón than his opponent's drab image. They were not totally defeated, it should be noticed; they won control of the Senate and a number of provincial governorships, but it

was observed that Sra Perón congratulated Dr. Alfonsín on his victory in terms that were a great deal warmer than is customary from the leader of a defeated party to a victor.

Where then does Dr. Alfonsín's victory leave British foreign policy? In one sense it makes matters much simpler, for the scale of the victory means that the new government has a decisive mandate, and there can be no doubt that the armed forces will much prefer to have Alfonsín in power than the Peronists, so they have little incentive for the time being to disturb matters. (It should be noted that they sought to safeguard their position in the event of a Peronist victory by extending the proposed amnesty to cover the later period of Peronist constitutionalism when the 'Triple A' came into being). Argentina, therefore, has for the first time for many years a government from which a permanent settlement could be obtained, and the tragic consequences of the failure of the 1974 Labour Government to press vigorously for a settlement in 1975 could now perhaps be avoided for the future.

British policy has one main objective: to ensure the future security and welfare of the Falkland Islanders. This can only be obtained in the long-term by an international agreement on a viable regime for the South Atlantic area, for several reasons. First of all, such assurances cannot be obtained by military means alone. Britain can certainly maintain an effective garrison on the islands for many years to come at a price that would not be prohibitive by defence standards—but that is not saying much. However, the presence of a garrison, albeit large, does not establish the Falklanders' right to their own islands, and in any case this assessment depends to some extent on the future course of Argentine defence policy, which is quite uncertain. The news that Argentina is increasing its air refuelling capability, fitting the aircraft carrier *25 de Mayo* with Super-Etendard aircraft, and is following up the arrival of the *Almirante Brown* with further warship purchases is in no way reassuring.

Secondly, the uncertainty adversely affects the economic prospects of the islanders. Here again a garrison in itself achieves little; what is needed is legal guarantees for investors to come forward. The islands will, of course, benefit economically as well as militarily from the new airfield—as the case of Grenada shows, airfields may have both uses, but a military airfield is more use to civilians than a civilian one to the military. Other development measures are hampered by the absence of a nearby market, and the second Shackleton report seems already likely to go the way of the first. Its most important recommendation, for the redistribution of land, is being resisted by Mrs. Thatcher's government as firmly as it would be by most other Latin American governments, and without this measure there is no chance that the islands can ever support a reasonable population to be able to defend themselves. Similarly, it is unlikely that peaceful coexistence between the male population of the islands and their new competitors amongst British squaddies can be maintained indefinitely.

If, then, Mrs. Thatcher's government is prepared, despite its previous statements, to enter into negotiations, what will be the response of Dr.

Alfonsín? It is certainly not encouraging that in his public statements of the issue he has again been notably more intransigent than Dr. Luder. Negotiations must, he believes, be on the question of sovereignty, and a precondition is that Britain ends its warlike posture and withdraws its forces from the islands. It does not look as if there is much room for meeting of minds here. Experience has shown many times, however, that it is from such unpromising beginnings that successful negotiations often do start, and that the key to a final settlement lies in whether or not both sides are prepared to make concessions in reaching a final package settlement. Such a settlement could include all the points that Britain was prepared to concede to the Haig mission but, after the war that has ensued, some international guarantee of its continued duration would be a necessary addition, since otherwise there would be no assurance that it would not be thrown aside by a future Argentine military government. And, given Argentina's record since 1930, the prospect of such a government being back in power within ten years must at the moment be a virtual certainty, whatever the optimists say.

There are many precedents in Latin America for such guarantees. One of the most interesting is the 1942 Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, which established a boundary settlement between Peru and Ecuador. The Protocol was guaranteed by Argentina, Chile, Brazil and the United States, and when fighting broke out on the frontier early in 1981 the guarantor powers acted at once to ensure compliance with the ceasefire order, and peace was restored. Since Argentina, too, has interests in obtaining a setlement, it might, in fact, be easier to obtain agreement on how a settlement was to be guaranteed than on how it was to be obtained, but that is what diplomats are paid to work out. Mrs. Thatcher's willingness to comply with leaseback arrangements over the New Territories makes her posturing and intransigence over the Falklands seem a temporary inconsistency.

Unfortunately, Britain is in an extremely weak diplomatic position, as the vote of 87 to 9 against it in the United Nations General Assembly bears witness. Since the United States was one of the governments voting with Argentina, it is absurd to claim, as the British government has done, that the fact that most of the Commonwealth and the European Community have merely abstained is in any way encouraging to its view that Argentina must end hostilities formally before discussions can begin. Diplomacy is never silent in time of war. Only through diplomacy, in fact, can wars be ended.

To sum up, therefore, it is urgent that the opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement be seized, and that such a settlement, if it is to work, must be supported by international guarantees more effective than those which Britain itself has given the Greek community on Cyprus.

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THE NEW IRELAND FORUM

by Hugh Munro

NORTHERN Ireland is unique; but it is important to realise why it is unique. Those in Great Britain or the 26 Counties who want to distance themselves from the province and its turmoils will tend to see its people as uniquely stubborn and contentious; that way they can detach themselves from the province's problems, blaming it all on the local inhabitants. Yet there is no evidence that the Northern Irish are more unreasonable or more bigoted than the people of Scotland or of Holland, where one finds the same sectarian mix.

Whatever may be said about its people, there is no doubt that Northern Ireland's constitutional situation is unique on the face of this earth. The great constant of London's policy towards its Irish possessions is that they will not be integrated with the mainland but must have their own local sub-government. Integration, in the sense of the elimination of Irish governmental institutions, in the way all Scottish governmental institutions were swept away after the Scottish Act of Union, has never been attempted; the Irish Act of Union (like the 1971 Act closing Stormont) left the separate Irish governmental structure completely intact. In 1801 all Ireland came, as Northern Ireland did in 1971, under direct rule. James Prior is the latest in a long line of English/British governors in Ireland which traces back to Prince John. Thus, we may suppose integration will not even be attempted. A policy which has been strictly adhered to since the twelfth century—an example of consistency surely unique in diplomatic history—is hardly going to be abandoned now.

Whatever the reasons for that policy, we have to live with its present consequences, with the fact that, because of mainland British willingness to have it part of the Queen's dominions while at the same time refusing to integrate with it, Northern Ireland is a separate political unit with its own governmental machinery, its own separate statute book, judicial system and police. Whether Northern Ireland has in itself the stuff of a separate political unit or not, a separate political existence is thrust upon it.

This creates immediate identity problems for a Northern Irish person. On paper his nationality is the nationality of one who is a citizen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. We have to use this circumlocution because manifestly he is not strictly British. If he were, his state would simply be called Great Britain. What is the point of London visiting itself with this jawbreaker of a title for its state, if not for the purpose of making clear that Northern Ireland is different from Great Britain? It makes no difference to a mainland Briton's sense of nationality that Northern Ireland has been joined with Great Britain to form the UK: he feels himself to be British, not Great-Britain-and-Northern-Irelandish. To make propaganda for Unionism (Unionism that is in the true sense of wanting to foster links between Northern Ireland

and Great Britain) is an uphill task; for it is a matter of trying to persuade the Northern Irish that they should move closer to a nation which clearly wants to keep them at arm's length.

Genuine Unionism, then, has never had a place in Northern Irish politics. Why should it, when the very establishment of the province as a separate political unit was a defeat for Unionism, just as the establishment of separate political institutions at Edinburgh would be a defeat for Scottish Unionism?

Northern Ireland is in the UK because a majority of its population declares itself to be Unionist; yet the constitutional status visited on it by London is a rebuff to the very political sentiment on which London must rely to justify her presence in the province.

Thus, at the core of the Anglo-Irish problem is the fact that Northern Ireland has been set up as a separate political unit despite the fact that the kind of local patriotism needed to make it work is entirely absent; for there is in the province no patriotism which identifies with all the inhabitants, regardless of creed. Neither Unionism nor Nationalism sees any sense in its being a separate unit at all. The only patriotism which identifies with Northern Ireland as a political unit is political Protestantism —and that manifestly does not cherish all its people equally.

In fact, the only political force in Northern Ireland which is properly motivated to make Northern Ireland work is political Protestantism. We need not be surprised that it flourishes. We should not accuse those who vote for it of bigotry. Most of them, one can be sure, are acting from plain common sense. Britain in 1920-22 created a situation where, if the Unionist majority was to keep the province in the UK, it had to make a local Belfast government work; and only political Protestantism could do that. The sectarian division we all deplore in Northern Ireland is a direct and necessary consequence of the willingness of the British to rule it and her unwillingness to integrate with it. For 10 years now, there has been direct rule; but political Protestantism is still needed. Without it, the majority for the Union could not be marshalled and the province would fall into political incoherence.

One should try to see the Northern problem, not from the point of view of the committed members of this party or that, but from the point of view of the apolitical centre. They see themselves living in a province under threat, with a doubtful future. What stability they have comes from the reassuring British presence; and they know, or sense, that voting for political Protestantism can best deliver that presence. There is a very real sense in which the Alliance Party, and still more movements such as Senator John Robb's, are seen as tending towards chaos.

One central task of the recently created New Ireland Forum is to allay the fears of those in the North who can imagine no stable alternative to the present dispensation; but one can only hope to talk to such people over the heads (or behind the backs) of the Unionist politicians, who are where they are purely because they alone can make sense of Northern Ireland as a political unit. It is no part of their function to discuss how

to abolish it, for in abolishing Northern Ireland, they would abolish themselves.

In a united Ireland, there would no role for political Protestantism. Why should there be? Political Protestantism has nothing to say about social and economic issues. Its sole function is to make sense of Northern Ireland as a political unit under the Crown. If the Forum does nothing else, at least let it pay the Northern Irish the compliment of assuming that in a united Ireland a specifically-Protestant party would be as unthinkable as a specifically-Catholic party would be in the 26 Counties today.

Insofar as Northern Protestants may have worries about what would happen to them in a united Ireland, they will not be discussed at a political level. Those who would claim to speak for Protestants politically will never engage in talks about unity; and those Protestants who incline towards unity will join mixed-religion parties and disqualify themselves from speaking for Protestantism.

As the situation stands today Northern Ireland can only speak with a Protestant voice, and a Protestant voice has no interest in talking to the South. It is idle for the Forum to think in terms of Irish unity being arrived at by way of an agreement between the South and spokesmen qualified to speak for the North. The Forum, after all, does not offer an open dialogue. It would see such discussions as operating in one direction only—the direction of unity. An agreement to acquiesce in disunity is not on offer. There is no point in Northern spokesmen coming to such talks unless they come as men prepared to turn their back on past errors. Whatever Protestant politicians organise for, they will not organise to act out the role of the Prodigal Son to the Southern Taoiseach's forgiving father.

If then a majority for Irish unity is to be found in Northern Ireland it will be a composite one, made up mainly of Catholics with at least a third of the Protestants. It will be a majority to which it will probably be impossible to speak, for lack of leaders; but by its existence it will perform one essential task—it will disintegrate political Protestantism.

Political Protestantism is legitimised by the possession of a majority of the North's political representatives. Take that majority away and it ceases to have point, and will dissolve.

And if it dissolved, it would be replaced by nothing; for there would be no political movement left that saw any point in the North being a separate unit. There is one deeply uncomfortable fact the Forum must face. Irish unity, if it comes about, will come about by way of Northern Ireland lapsing into incoherence. It is a complex and disturbing prospect; but unless we are willing to face it, it is useless to talk of Irish unity.

There is a temptation for seekers after Irish unity to cling to the notion of the continuance of Protestant politics for the same reason that the average Northerner does—because it makes sense of Northern Ireland.

But we want to have done with Northern Ireland, and Protestant politics is the great obstruction to that end. In the meantime it is vital

that the scope for Protestant politics be minimised, and here simple direct rule with no Assembly, with the minimum scope for the divisive politics which is the only kind Northern Ireland can generate, can be of great help.

How are we to see the Northern Irish majority? Clearly, they are not British; the very name of the state they live in proves this. We have to see them as Irish, but obviously not Irish in the sense the 26 Counties is Irish. Perhaps the best shorthand description would be to describe them as the Crown's Irish. It is significant that both James Molyneaux and Martin Smyth have said that a united Ireland under the Crown would be preferable to the present situation. 'Ireland' has a real meaning for the Crown's Irish, even if it has not the same meaning for the South.

There is absolutely no evidence that, if the issues of the Union were not in question, Northern Unionists would wish to be defined politically as Protestant rather than Irish. Their Protestantism certainly influences their views, but not to any great extent their national identity; and there are grave dangers for Irish nationalists in assuming that it does.

If we are to regard the Northern majority's political definition as 'British', or rather as loyal to the Crown, we can see a justification for Britain's presence in the North. It is there to protect its own people, under threat from violent Irish nationalism. But if we see them merely as 'Protestant', what right has Britain to be there? There may be a degree of discrimination against Protestants in the 26 Counties, but it could not by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as so serious as to justify a foreign power (and if the Northern majority is defined solely as Protestant, Britain is a foreign power so far as Northern Ireland is concerned) being in the province to save Northern Protestants from what the South would do to them.

To the extent that the Northern majority is seen as Protestant, then the British presence is an example of quite unwarranted foreign intervention and by implication the IRA is eminently justified in its campaign—and the action of the Dublin government in maintaining friendly relations with London could be seen as a Quislingite betrayal of the nation.

The Forum must at all times make clear that it sees the Irish-British issue as primary and the sectarian issue very much a secondary one. To the extent that it portrays the problem as one of placating Irish Protestants currently under British protection, it betrays the cause of Irish nationalism.

As things stand, the Northern majority have what they would call a liberal society; the proposed 'liberalisation' of Southern society is not a matter of offering them something new. If we assume that Southern liberalisation is an important aid towards Irish unity, it is implicit in that assumption that the Northern majority is not a group who have to be positively attracted towards unity but rather a group which is predisposed to Irish unity but is currently alienated by our society of the South. If they were not predisposed to Irish unity, what would be the point of offering them something they already have?

This is hardly complimentary. If we tell James Molyneaux that he has turned his back on Irish unity because we have turned our back on the Crown, he is complimented; but if we tell him that we know he is really Irish and that all he needs to make him accept his Irishness is continued facilities for divorce, contraception and abortion we insult him. Nationality and allegiance are about bigger issues than these. Are we to say that the men of the RUC risk their lives daily because of their concern with this sordid trinity? To ascribe central importance to the liberalisation of Southern society is to trivialise a tragic issue.

If we are to look for concessions which will really reassure the Northern majority, they should be concessions on the plane at which we are working—the constitutional plane. Acceptance of joint Irish-British citizenship, membership of the Commonwealth; these are the concessions which will count.

To portray the search for unity as a matter of finding the right bait to entice one's prey makes it look like an exercise in Southern imperialism. It will fail. Rather must the Forum be seen to be positive, to make it clear that it sees the Northern majority, not as a peculiar group set apart on whom no burden must be laid, but as an integral part of the nation—as people we need to make the nation complete. The Forum's one great card after all is that it can offer the Northern Irish what Britain consistently refuses to offer them—a nationality in which they are full and equal participants. What we can offer the North and what Britain can never give is an end to the nightmare of sectarian politics. We need to show them not an Ireland in which sectarian politics gets special treatment but an Ireland in which sectarian politics do not exist.

Most of all we need to show the apolitical centre (for it is these, not the hardliners, who will decide the issue) that we can offer what Britain cannot give—stability. A crucial issue, like it or not, is going to be national security. The new united Ireland is going to have to be in NATO or it is not going to be in NATO and the Forum must take a view on this matter. The lesson of post-war history is that the states which cleave willingly to the great power blocs have political stability, while those who opt for neutrality are apt to become battlegrounds for interpower rivalry. It is hard to believe that the Northern majority would not be vastly more reassured about entering an Ireland which was in NATO than one which was not.

[Hugh Munro is a political journalist living and working in Dublin. This article is based on his submission to the New Ireland Forum.]

CHINA AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS: THE THIRD POINT OF THE COMPASS

by Leo Mates

RELATIONS between the world's two great powers are usually referred to as East-West relations, according to these powers' geographical location as viewed from Europe, and this term has become generally accepted in the world. The problems of nuclear armaments and armament control are likewise viewed from this geographical aspect. However, for China this geographical distinction makes no sense as for China the Soviet Union is situated in the north, or at best in the west, while the United States of America are in the east.

This 'Eurocentrism', however, would not bother us, either geographically or politically, if it were not for the increasingly obvious and powerful connection between overall East-West developments and the reactions, stands and policy of China as the third party involved in the talks which are no longer a dialogue but tripartite discussions. Furthermore, one should not forget that all this equally applies to Japan although little attention is given to that country in the context of East-West relations, for Japan has no nuclear weapons and wants no nuclear weapons.

This triangle of supreme world power was already evident over ten years ago when China began to assert her presence on the world stage as a distinctive world power. At that time her nuclear armaments were on a very modest scale; however, China was a powerful political factor for all that. At least one of the definitions of a world power applied to China: she is capable of pursuing an independent policy and defying openly both the recognised super-powers and at the same time maintain her positions despite attempts to pressure her. China is following this road firmly and steadily.

China (as well as Japan) has been definite and eloquent in the discussions on armaments in general, long range nuclear armaments in Europe in particular. She protested against the deployment in the Eastern regions of the Soviet Union of SS-20 missiles which would become surplus in the case of an agreement being reached on Euromissiles. For a considerable time these plans caused no objections and both the Soviet Union and the West considered the former's eastern regions as a depot where these missiles would be out of circulation and outside any sphere requiring their number to be considered.

This Soviet and Western 'Eurocentrism' is not the only manifestation of their disdain of Asia in general, east Asia in particular. All this went on despite the obvious fact that China had long ceased to be the passive object of European and American policy. And so, albeit belatedly, there followed the declaration that the excess missiles would be destroyed and not deployed in Soviet Asia. However, let us not delude ourselves: the main reason for this change of attitude was the objection of the West,

meaning America, that SS-20 missiles being mobile the Soviet Union could quickly, easily, even unobserved, move them back from East to West.

The argument that the security of both China and Japan would be menaced by the missiles stockpiled in the East, took second place only after these countries' objections. Obviously the main reason remained consideration for America and the possibility that the missiles might be moved back west, for President Reagan promised that possible excess American missiles in Western Europe would be destroyed and not taken back to the United States, even though from there they certainly would endanger no nuclear power or potential enemy.

This particular dispute was settled by mutual declarations that excess missiles would be destroyed. However, many other formidable issues will crop up in the talks on any kind of armament apart from tactical armaments used only on the battle field between the two great powers. We shall have to ignore the bizarre circumstances that now both sides are manufacturing the most costly and up to date missiles, and at the same time they promise to scrap them. An era of madness seems to be approaching during which production will be for the scrap heap while a vast portion of mankind lacks the wherewithal for stark survival.

However, let us leave this aspect of the problem aside and return to the dialogue on armaments. Even without including China in this complexity of problems, there seem to be insuperable difficulties connected with the French and British nuclear arsenals. The Soviet Union wants to include these weapons, termed strategic arms according to SALT (as from the position of one of the parties they can hit targets in the other), in the parity in European armaments.

Though the Soviet arguments are logical, they are unacceptable to the other side. Moscow maintains that targets in the Soviet Union are within range of missiles deployed in Europe, and that these missiles belong to the NATO countries, as do the American missiles deployed in Western Europe. In other words, Moscow refuses to put only American missiles on one pan of the scales and Soviet missiles on the other, including those which should cancel out French and British missiles.

To this the Americans reply that they cannot assume any responsibility for France and Great Britain, who decide independently on their arsenals, and that the American signature to the agreement with the Soviets does not pledge them to do so. On their part France and Britain maintain that these are strategic arms, most of them deployed on nuclear submarines outside European waters and they refuse to admit the right of anyone to discuss these weapons without France and Britain.

This dispute, the greatest obstacle in the way of an agreement on armaments in Europe, has produced problems beyond European confines. As the issue of transferring or destroying excess missiles in Europe was included in the dialogue this raised another question. Though not yet the hub of attention, it is looming and casting a shadow over the dialogue on armaments in Europe. The point is that missiles originally deployed in the east of the Soviet Union, (and this appears to be one third of the SS-20

missiles) could be partially or entirely moved to points within range of targets in Western Europe, meaning the NATO countries.

In view of the 5,000 kilometre range of SS-20 missiles they could be deployed in central Soviet territory bringing in range a number of highly important objectives in both West and East, meaning China. And so it is more and more uncertain whether it will be possible to reach a definitive agreement on arms control, not to mention cutting down or completely ending the process of armament, between the two powers now negotiating, that is between East and West. This at the same time raises the issue of the 'Third Point of the Compass,' which means including China in the armament talks.

One therefore wonders how matters stood before, for French and British nuclear weapons already existed, while China has for several years been building up a nuclear arsenal. The point is how did the two superpowers in their negotiations manage to determine parity without including the other nuclear powers? The answer to this question is the answer to the essence of the negotiations on parity and its true meaning.

In the first place the nuclear potentials of the two world powers at the time the SALT talks began, were so large that the existence of three minor nuclear powers—Britain, France and China—made little difference to the ratio between the two superpowers. Furthermore, the two superpowers were familiar with the quantity and quality of the three other powers' arsenals. They were always able to include them in their equations and parity calculations.

Such a situation was fairly feasible until the issue of deploying SS-20 missiles on Soviet soil cropped up. This was the first time the question arose of including the two West European arsenals in calculations, openly and with corresponding obligations. On the one hand the two superpowers were not willing to include minor nuclear powers in their talks, and on the other there was the possibility of these arsenals being used for political purposes.

Regardless of what the Soviet Union actually hopes to achieve by deploying a major number of SS-20 missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union, this has produced problems in the Western alliance. One should not forget that the West European statesmen first raised the question of these missiles. At that time they decided together with America to deploy American anti-missile defences in some of the NATO countries in Europe.

Any decision not to deploy missiles in the West would jeopardise the trustworthiness of the West, while their deployment would aggravate relations with the Soviet Union. The European NATO countries could not make up their minds one way or the other and this has produced differences among them. There are two political tendencies: for and against the deployment of American weapons. These two currents were never able to agree, nor was it possible to expect either one of them to prevail with sufficient assurance to reach consensus. In other words these countries are torn between the danger of rising East-West tension which

would be a heavy blow to them, not only in the military-political sense, but economically as well, and the prospects of the alliance with America weakening to the extent of their trustworthiness being problematical.

The most serious consequence of the present state of affairs is that it will be very hard to find a way out. There can be no return to the situation before the existence of SS-20 missiles and NATO's decision to deploy American missiles. The only solution seems to be parity discussions from scratch, between the three Western powers on one side and the Soviet Union on the other. This might open up completely new prospects and in this case one might be able frankly to discuss the core of the problem, namely to what extent limiting the number of these or other missiles would affect mutual security.

However, even this is no sure way to break the deadlock in talks on nuclear armaments. For, now there is the 'Third Point of the Compass'—China is referred to openly. This element has become part of the talks and can no longer be eliminated, among other things because the Chinese arsenal is gaining in importance as a major nuclear potential. This again means that the two powers alone can no longer discuss how to switch seriously from talks on armament control to talks on cutting down and and finally abolishing these weapons.

Including new partners in the talks and starting a multilateral debate on armaments has numerous political implications which neither of the two superpowers is willing to accept. In practice they are giving increasing consideration to China as the third factor among the most powerful states and in their mutual relations they are definitely taking into account China's present and future position and potential. However, they are certainly not willing to share their position of superpower with a new partner. At first this would be China, establishing a triangle of power instead of the present two, but inevitably this would result in the most sensitive questions of peace being discussed on an ever wider scale.

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THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

by Rudi Weisweiller

IN 1675 the Frenchman Theophile de Pineau proposed to the Town Council of Geneva an organisation which would enable financially hard-pressed princes to get both advice and loans from other princes. His suggestions were ignored for the next 150 years, but in the time between 1825 and World War I lending by Central Banks to Central Banks began.[1] It is worth remembering how recently this practice grew up. Nowadays such help is given frequently and in huge amounts.

The first known instance of a 'prince' giving financial advice to another 'prince' was that given by the Swiss National Bank to the American Monetary Commission early in this century to help them in the setting-up of the Federal Reserve System as we now know it.

The next development was the establishment in 1930 of the Bank for International Settlements (the BIS) in Basle. The purpose of this new institution was to facilitate collaboration between central banks, enabling both advice and money to be made available to countries with temporary financial problems. Some private funds were collected but most of the money came from governments and only they had voting rights. The originators of this novel venture were France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Japan and the UK. It is interesting to note that the chief architects of the BIS were Sir Josiah Stamp (later the first Lord Stamp) of the Bank of England and Dr. Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank in Berlin.

While the BIS proved useful to newly set-up central banks and performed complex and important accounting and fund transfer functions, it had both insufficient money and insufficient authority to act as the proper lender to major governments with balance-of-payment difficulties. This side of its work, therefore, passed to the International Monetary Fund (the IMF) after it was set up by a conference held in July 1944 at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire, USA. The BIS continues as the meeting place of central bankers for consultation, as the compiler of valuable international statistics and commentator on monetary developments and as the administrator of various supra-national payments systems.

The International Monetary Fund (the IMF)[2] differs from all previous efforts at world-wide financial co-operation in three respects.

Firstly, it controls enormous sums of money, which are mainly though not entirely used to help countries which are for a limited period short of foreign currency needed to pay bills from abroad.

Secondly, it represents almost all the sovereign governments in the world, many of which control new and developing countries with special and complex economic problems.

Thirdly, it wields great authority and is increasingly listened to with respect, although it has, of course, very limited powers to force governments to pursue the economic policies it recommends.



Before attempting to assess the usefulness or to delineate the likely future role of the IMF, we need to look at a number of its inherited beliefs, some of which are in danger of becoming hang-ups.

The founding fathers at Bretton Woods had already witnessed the collapse of the old order in the years after World War I and had lived through the Great Depression. They may well be forgiven for concluding that the abandonment of the rigidity of the Gold Standard and replacing it by an apparently wholly uncontrolled and uncontrollable system of floating exchange rates had been the main causes of catastrophe. Uncertainty about foreign prices had curtailed both investment and trade. Unemployment, added to mistrust of national money, had caused political extremism on top of economic and social misery. War had been the result.

The plan for the post-war world as laid down at Bretton Woods therefore included a scheme for stable exchange rates. Its key features were on the one hand the central position of the US dollar as the best example of good national money and on the other hand a set of rules which fixed all currencies at a price in dollar terms which could not be changed easily. This worked well for nearly 25 years, but it created a set of false beliefs. It made us believe that stable prices for currencies were the cause and not the result of stable economic conditions and in particular of steady and relatively uniform economic growth in industrialised countries.

The post-war philosophy took roughly the following form: if changes in exchange rates are disturbing and bad, then they must be avoided. Politicians who allow a devaluation of the currency against other currencies are unsuccessful politicians, which means bad politicians. They will, therefore, avoid adjustments even when they are necessary or desirable.

The unwillingness to devalue, and to do so at the right time, was neither foreseen nor encouraged by the Founding Fathers. The statutes embodied clear guidance in this area: if you are in real and permanent trouble, for example because your traditional crops or minerals are less eagerly sought in world markets, you must devalue your currency and lower your living standards. If, however, your difficulties are due to temporary overspending or a particular climatic or industrial disaster, then you must put things right by domestic economic measures and borrow temporarily from the IMF. The distinction was clear, if slightly artificial because of its theoretical black-and-white contrasts. The impact of democracy on the priority scales of politicians, however, led to frequent instances of the wrong remedy being adopted.

Another problem for the IMF resulted from the unshakeable belief of the Founding Fathers in the US dollar as the supercurrency of the 20th Century. This view was justified for the first 20 years after World War II, but became uncomfortable for the United States in the late Sixties. Because the dollar was seen by the wise men of Bretton Woods as permanently strong, the system they devised treated the United States

currency as the pivot currency: other currencies were measured against it and could, with IMF permission, change their dollar parity and thus their purchasing power in world markets. The USA was the only country which could not do this and was, therefore, at the mercy of the economic policies of others: this was bearable in good times, but not when the competition of other industrialised countries like Germany and Japan became fierce and effective.

Neither the political unwillingness to devalue or revalue at the right economic time, nor the American role of immobile idol in the currency heaven were truly essential parts of the Bretton Woods System. After a painful decade of adjustment and amendment we now see this.

It is a pity that the concept of fixed exchange rates was blamed for these difficulties, leading us to abandon fixed parities and to embrace floating exchange rates. Whether inevitable in the circumstances of the oil price explosion and high inflation and heavy unemployment or not, the new devotion to freely floating exchange rates did more harm than good. As we return from clean floating via managed floating and currency groupings like the European Monetary System (the EMS) to a slightly more flexible version of the fixed parity system of Bretton Woods, we cannot avoid a feeling of awesome respect for the wisdom of the Founding Fathers.

While the last decade has seen an almost complete though temporary abandoning of the IMF's pattern of fixed exchange rates, the other side of its work has developed steadily and at an alarming pace.

Let us briefly look at these other functions of the International Monetary Fund. Its members, who subscribe capital in accordance with their share in world trade, can borrow from the Fund several times their subscribed quota when their balance of payments is temporarily in deficit, in other words when they are for a short period spending abroad more than they are earning abroad. The money available for this is considerable. Some commentators even suggest that it is now too easy to borrow very large amounts. This does not in fact seem fair. What is true is that the funds available to the IMF (unlike those available to the BIS before the war) are sufficient, but that the conditions attached to such lending (which the BIS was unable to enforce) are still largely unenforceable: there are Letters of Intent and similar intergovernmental undertakings, but the super-bank which lends the money has no 'teeth'. It can speak with plausibility, with persuasiveness, from experience, fairly, reasonably, with great authority. It has no real power to enforce. The withholding of credit to undeserving borrowers invariably does more economic harm world-wide than the extending or increasing of loans which are not being repaid on time.

The big loans to large countries often hit the headlines. Much of the best work of the IMF is however done, often on a longer-term basis, by its affiliates. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) lends long-term to the less industrialised nations of the world for periods up to 30 years. The International Finance Corporation

(IFC) lends to private industry in developing countries. The International Development Corporation (IDA) lends very long-term and free of interest to the poorest countries, in circumstances where aid rather than investment seems to be the real motivation.

In the absence of sufficient long-term loans to finance all the schemes which interest developing countries, many governments resort to straightforward self-help. While this is probably in many cases commendable and corresponds to most people's view about the rights and duties of the properly chosen governments of sovereign nations, it has had some alarming financial consequences. Governments and institutions in the larger countries of the Third World have borrowed extensively from the banks in other countries. In the last 10 years the price of certain raw materials such as oil rose faster than expected, while demand for other raw materials and for manufactured goods has been reduced during the present recession. Many of the borrowers, therefore, now find their income reduced to such an extent that they are unable to repay these borrowings on time. Even the payment of interest, with high rates ruling for major currencies like the US dollar, creates difficulties. We are by now familiar with the solvency crisis which brought Brazil and Mexico and Argentina to the brink of bankruptcy and necessitated an international recycling operation of unprecedented magnitude.

One of the questions posed by this recent exercise in debt-rescheduling is whether financial operations of such size can be left to the commercial banks or should be handled by governments. The Eurocurrency market provided a very large part of the funds which are now, at least temporarily, unavailable because invested in projects which are not yet, and in some cases never will be, profitable in the financial sense. Is this an area where the International Monetary Fund ought to take the decisions, make the choices, lay down the rules, enforce the conditions, deal with the difficulties and mastermind the rescue operations? Many of us hesitate to advocate central governmental activity in preference to the commercial activities of the market place. We need nevertheless to face the facts. It may be that economic development in the vast regions where people are numerous but poor is now, like transportation, defence, health or education, of such scope and complexity that it can only be handled by national governments and their supranational agencies like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Bearing in mind the doubts and problems referred to so far, the future role of the International Monetary Fund deserves serious and widespread discussion.

It is certain that the IMF and its affiliates need to be active and effective in three areas. It is less certain that the IMF will in fact be successful in these areas unless clearer thinking and greater consensus leads to the moral support and the financial backing which are necessary if growing needs are to be matched by adequate resources.

We must look to the International Monetary Fund for continued and improved activity in the following directions:

1) The IMF must work actively to encourage a system of stable though not rigid exchange rates. This involves research into the various causes which tend to lead to reduced investment and sluggish world trade. Among these causes, uncertainty about exchange rate movements and fears of huge and unpredictable changes is certainly one. The wisdom which accumulates about these difficulties needs to be applied to the actual situation and to be made both intelligible and compelling to governments and to voters all over the world.

2) The IMF must continue to improve its quick rescue mechanism to alleviate temporary cash crises which affect the balance of payments of member countries and therefore the livelihood of its citizens. It needs to become more concerned with the disadvantages as well as the advantages of nearly unlimited credit. Therefore, it must seek ways of increasing the effectiveness of conditions imposed in line with the growth in the amounts available. This calls for an urgent appraisal of two matters of principle: one is how far private as opposed to government lending on that scale should still play a part in meeting the needs of today's world; the other is to what extent the credit-givers may legitimately, through the conditions they impose and enforce, override the wishes of the democratically elected governments who are the borrowers.

3) The IMF through its existing agencies and mechanisms must either perform or encourage effectively a much greater contribution to the economic growth of the Third World. This requires clearer distinctions between aid and loans, between research, education and technical know-how on the one hand and financial help on the other, between lending and investing, and between national aspirations and global needs.

It is not fanciful to see the International Monetary Fund as the proper vehicle to put into operation all the initiatives which individual people, individual companies and even individual countries are too small to pursue successfully, but which they nevertheless wish to see pursued effectively in their name and with their support.

NOTES:

1. In 1825 the central banks of France and the Netherlands lent money to the Bank of England. In 1860 the central banks of Russia, England and Turin bought silver from the Banque de France. The Banque de France lent money to the Bank of England during the Baring Crisis of 1890 and again in 1906. Austria-Hungary lent money to Prussia in 1908.
2. The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, adopted in 1944 and amended in 1969 and 1978, can be obtained from the IMF, 19th Street, Washington D.C. 20431, USA.

[Rudi Weisweiller joined the Merchant Banking firm of Schroders in 1948. He was their Chief Foreign Exchange Dealer from 1953 until 1960 and then became a Manager with Philip Hill, Higginson, Erlangers. Since 1964 he has been a Currency Consultant, running seminars and lecturing, writing and broadcasting on money matters.]

POEM

IN ANOTHER'S PLACE

As the train left Waterbeach I glanced
at the book the Japanese next to me
was reading. Perhaps I expected a book on Zen
or maybe a guide to Ely Cathedral.
What I saw was a technical study
of recent developments in local agriculture.

Of course I soon realised that I had put
myself in his place. If I were travelling
by train in Japan I would probably be reading
a guide to whatever I intended to visit
or perhaps a book on some aspect of Zen,
not a study of local agriculture.

It is easy to put oneself in another's place
and so difficult to achieve understanding,
especially for people with a different culture
and history, different values and aspirations.
Even with one's compatriots understanding
each other is not always easy.

Come to think of it, if we had been
in Japan and he had observed me studying
local agriculture he might have taken
me for an imperialist dreaming of future dominion.
And who knows, perhaps that Japanese
was dreaming of something rather similar.

RAYMOND TONG

THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION

by Arnold Hughes

TWO years ago the tiny West African republic of The Gambia suffered world-wide and unwelcome publicity following an attempted left-wing insurrection that left hundreds of people dead and the country's political reputation in tatters. Since then the country has lapsed into a more customary obscurity as the government has gone about its business of restoring political confidence and promoting economic recovery. Much has been achieved in the past two years: the president, Sir Dawda Jawara, and his ruling People's Progressive Party won convincing victories in the elections of 1982-83; most of those detained after the coup, including the leader of the opposition, have been released; and there is a good chance that those condemned to death for their part in the rebellion will not face execution, now that the political crisis has receded. The economy has also enjoyed a measure of recovery following a welcome upturn in agricultural output and tourism to the levels of previous years. Foreign confidence in The Gambia has also been restored, judging by the diplomatic and economic support which it has received since the rebellion. Even so, all is not back to normal in The Gambia: a small Senegalese garrison remains in the country; a state of emergency continues in force and the economic outlook remains difficult despite good news on that front.

But the most important change which The Gambia has undergone since 1981 has been the decision to enter into a political confederation with its neighbour and military protector—Senegal. The confederal union came into effect on 1st February, 1982 and provides for the integration of the defence forces of the two countries; the development of an economic and monetary union; co-ordination of policy in the areas of foreign policy and technical co-operation; and the creation of a set of political institutions comprising an indirectly elected Confederal Assembly, a Council of Ministers, and a President and Vice-President of the Confederation. At the same time as the two countries have agreed to form a new state, Senegal and The Gambia remain as distinct and sovereign states continuing to enjoy separate international recognition.

Reactions to the creation of the Confederation have been mixed. Most countries have welcomed it; in particular the western powers, but also all African countries with the exception of Libya. The two governments insist also that the majority of their citizens approve but their unwillingness to conduct a referendum on the issue makes it difficult to measure public support with any precision. Opposition to confederation undoubtedly exists: in Senegal most opposition parties have objected to the manner of its creation rather than to the confederation per se; in The Gambia outright denunciation has been more muted though doubts and opposition to the union are commonly expressed on the streets of the capital, Banjul. The most virulent opposition to confederation has come from those radical elements involved in the abortive coup and who are

now, as a result of Senegalese military action, driven into exile. They reject the union as a sell-out of national independence in return for Senegalese military support for the Gambian government.

Although the decision to confederate the two countries must be seen against a background of common geography, culture and history of the Senegambian peoples, and of twenty years of increasing co-operation on the part of their governments, defence and security factors have provided the immediate stimulus for union. Senegal has always feared that The Gambia could become a base for its own political dissidents if a radical regime came to power there. In recent years the growth in radical-Muslim and Marxist opposition in Banjul has caused increasing anxiety to the Senegalese authorities as well as to the Gambian government and one suspects the former felt that the Gambian security forces were beginning to lose control of the situation. The two Senegalese military incursions into The Gambia in October 1980 and August 1981 would appear to confirm such fears. These interventions, in response to requests by the Gambian government under the 1965 defence agreement between the two countries, were politically embarrassing and militarily nail-biting occasions. From the Senegalese point of view it is preferable to place the responsibility for Senegambian security incontrovertibly in the hands of their own armed forces and to station some of these permanently on Gambian soil, rather than have them rush in surrounded by a blaze of adverse publicity. An additional military advantage to Senegal of having its troops on Gambian territory is that they ensure speedy and uncomplicated access to the turbulent Casamance region, that part of Senegal which lies to the south of The Gambia.

For The Gambia, confederation provides an effective security net while the country purges and reconstitutes its own military forces. Apparently, only those elements of the Gambian armed forces attached to the confederal defence forces will come under the control of President Diouf of Senegal, as Confederal President; the remainder stays under the command of the Gambian head-of-state. For the present these arrangements work to the satisfaction of both partners for, although the Gambian president's reliance on a Senegalese bodyguard may be an affront to national pride, there is little evidence to back the claim of those who oppose confederation that his country is a puppet-state of Senegal.

Confederation is also seen by both sides as a spur to economic development through the pooling of common resources centred on joint possession of the Gambia river basin. Guinea, a third riparian power, is also involved in plans to harness the waters of the Gambia. In common with other attempts at inter-state unification, much is made of the economic irrationality of colonial boundaries and of the gains to be obtained by creating larger domestic markets and sharing development overheads. Senegal has long sought an economic and monetary union with The Gambia and its inclusion in the treaty of confederation must be regarded as a concession to the Senegalese in view of persistent Gambian opposition to it in the past. The gains to Senegal are apparent; those to The Gambia

are less clear. As a semi-industrial country with an export-orientated manufacturing sector, Senegal hopes to increase further its penetration of the Gambian market. A fiscal union will mean The Gambia adopting the high tariff and protectionist measures found in Senegal, which would principally benefit Senegalese exports and discourage the smuggling of goods from Banjul into Senegal. In the past the Senegalese authorities have often complained, not with great conviction, that such contraband traffic causes serious problems to their economy.

Gambian gains from economic integration are more problematic. In the short run it will involve painful adjustment to the high cost economy of its partner, as there is no likelihood of the Senegalese lowering their tariffs and taxation levels. An increase of as much as fifty per cent in the cost-of-living in Banjul has been estimated. The reduction in the cross-border trade with Senegal will also deprive the Gambian exchequer of some of its customs earnings. It is possible that Senegalese business will invest in the relatively cheaper Gambia but on what scale and for how long (as the cost-of-living increases) it is impossible to predict. Much will depend on the compensatory mechanisms to be worked out. There are hopes that Banjul will pick up more trade from the Senegalese interior but no detailed statistical data exist on this. It may be assumed that the proliferation of technical agreements between the two countries, anticipated in the treaty of confederation, will be of mutual economic benefit, though these, and the harnessing of the river's resources, can take place outside of the framework of confederation. Indeed, in as much as Guinea is involved in the latter activity, this has to be so. The abolition of the Gambian dalasi and its replacement by the franc CFA, tied to the French currency, will provide both drawbacks and advantages. In view of the uncertainties and adjustments presented or required neither partner is in a hurry to sign the economic protocols of confederation. An added complication is that a protectionist tariff policy could clash with the free trade objectives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to which both Senegal and The Gambia belong.

Least controversy surrounds the foreign policy protocols of confederation. For years the two countries have seen eye-to-eye on most foreign policy issues: they are both moderate, pro-western states sharing a fear of being destabilised by Libya and the communist world. Both countries remain free to enter into separate international agreements and they retain their independent status. The protocol merely enjoins them to 'endeavour to adopt a common position' in foreign policy matters and to reduce the costs of overseas representation by providing assistance to each other.

The political arrangements of the Senegambia Confederation would appear to have been carefully worked out to conform strictly to the principle of confederation—the coming together of sovereign states which agree to surrender only a part of their sovereignty for common ends. Given Senegal's insistence in the sixties on a total political merger, the present arrangements reflect the Gambian position and suggest a sensitivity

on the Senegalese part to Gambian fears and an unwillingness to take advantage of their partner's military weaknesses during the negotiations. Such tact and restraint must be considered as encouraging for future relations. The concern to respect national sovereignty and Gambian sensibilities is seen in several ways. President Diouf of Senegal, as head of the confederation, must only exercise his executive power with the 'approval' of his Gambian Vice-President. The powers and composition of the Federal Assembly and Council of Ministers are also consistent with confederal principles. Neither body can intervene in the domestic matters of the member countries and, bearing in mind its much smaller population—about one-tenth of that of Senegal—The Gambia is over-represented in both. It has one-third of the membership of the Assembly and four of the nine ministerial posts. An effective vote in the Assembly must include the support of at least five Gambian MPs.

Two final safeguards in the treaty are a panel of arbitration to handle disputes between the two partners and the necessity for both members to approve of any changes to the treaty. Interestingly, there is no clause allowing a member to withdraw from the confederation! The reason for this is that such an inclusion might prove discouraging. Gambians regard the right of unilateral withdrawal as implicit in a confederal agreement, though whether the Senegalese would agree in the event of a major clash between them remains to be seen.

What are the prospects for this latest venture in African inter-state unification? Looking at the experience of other attempts of this kind over the past quarter-century, none too good. Apart from the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar (Tanzania) in 1964—also the product of historical antecedents and contemporary security needs—no other conjunction of independent Africans states has survived. Territorial nationalism and the self-interest of leadership groups prevented such colonial federations as French West and Equatorial Africa and the British Central African Federation from surviving into the post-colonial era. Despite extensive functional and economic co-operation in the colonial period Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda were unable to create an East African Federation in 1963. In West Africa, Senegal pulled out of a short-lived federal union with its neighbour Soudan (now Mali) in 1960 and Ghana's union with Guinea and Mali in the same period proved to be little more than a paper agreement. The Arab states of North Africa have fared no better: both in the Maghreb and the Nile Valley efforts at union have succumbed to personal, national and ideological rivalries. It is true that Cameroun and Somalia remain united but they were unions of colonial dependencies not independent states. Ethiopia's incorporation of Eritrea continues to be violently resisted by Eritrean nationalists as does Morocco's attempt to merge with the former Spanish Sahara.

It need not follow that Senegambia must fail because of these earlier set-backs, but in as much as it shares some of the weaknesses of these earlier unions, the confident predictions of its founders must be viewed with caution. Some of the strengths of the Senegambia union have been

discussed already: the limited loss of sovereignty on the part of its members; the present willingness of Senegalese leaders to act with restraint and abide by the 'federal spirit'; historical and functional ties between the peoples and institutions of the two countries; some notion of economic advantage through union; an unsual 'match' in the political systems and ideologies of the partners; an excellent relationship between the two heads-of-state; and a shared need for security. The absence of one or more of these attributes contributed in great part to the collapse of earlier attempts at political unification.

But we must also review the negative factors which tend to work against inter-state union. One difficulty is the great disparity in the political and economic size of the partners. The Gambia is undoubtedly the smaller and weaker partner and there is an almost inevitable tendency for Senegal to dominate the relationship. This is compounded by the absence of additional members of the confederation; a third or additional partner can prevent the polarisation of differences and act as a counter-weight where one member is so dominant. Self-restraint on the part of Senegal may not always be possible; likewise, Gambian fears may not be containable. Future leaders of the confederation may lack the authority and the capacity to work together of Diouf and Jawara. Drawing closer together may reveal areas of friction as well as co-operation: certainly, Gambians are known to resent some of the attitudes and attributes of their neighbours. The absence of unequivocal mass support for confederation is also a cause of concern; African unions brought about by a handful of leaders, rather than by genuine popular demand, fail to survive a breakdown in relations among the leaders. Senegal's experience in the Mali Federation and the aborted East African Federation bear this out. Demonstrations in favour of union, organised by ruling parties, are uncertain proofs of mass support.

Arguably, the most serious threat to the survival of the Senegambia Confederation is economic union. Not only does Senegal derive more from it but the erosion of economic autonomy, implicit in such an arrangement, may have a knock-on effect on political sovereignty. The Gambia has relatively little to gain, and a great deal to lose, from a monetary and economic union. Functional co-operation and shared development of the river basin have, and can continue to be achieved without such sacrifices. Economies of scale are hardly relevant given the smallness of the combined economies and, where they do exist, they tend to favour the economically more advanced Senegalese. The Gambia's principal exports are raw materials to the developed world and its infant industries may not be able to compete with those of Senegal in a shared market. Pooling of financial resources may provide the Gambian state with fiscal compensation but it is more difficult to compensate individuals and business enterprises who will be adversely affected by high tariffs and competition. In as much as the confederation is being 'sold' to the Gambian public as a promoter of prosperity as much as security, then any failure to bring about such economic improvement must affect its

credibility and popularity. Delaying the negotiations on economic union and implementing the protocols over a number of years will give the public time to get used to confederation and ease the pangs of fiscal change.

Confederations, by their very nature, are unstable. Past experience suggests either of two courses—a break-up into their constituent parts once the need for alliance subsides, or the absorption of the weaker partners by the stronger. Perhaps a combination of Gambian political astuteness and Senegalese restraint will save The Gambia from the fate of Athens' lesser allies in the Athenian League and will enable this most recent confederation to survive. But there may be another future for these countries as part of an expanded Senegambian confederation which would include Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Mali, all countries with strong geographical, cultural and economic ties with the present Senegambia. In the past President Jawara has spoken in favour of such a larger regional federation; it is a proposal that may find favour again if the presently-constituted confederation runs into serious difficulties. Beyond that there remains the fainter and more grandiose prospect of West African unity held out by ECOWAS.

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The March issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *United States Policy in the Middle East: the Dilemma of the Arab Israeli Conflict* by Artin H. Arslanian, *Metropolitan and District* by K. P. Poole, *Kampuchea: Between Conflict and Compromise* by Justus M. van der Kroef and *The Buddha: His Democratic and Basic Human Rights* by Buddhadasa P. Kirthisinghe.

A VERY ENGLISH ARTIST: THE RETROSPECTIVE EXHIBITION OF THE WORK OF JOHN PIPER

by Ernle Money

WHEN some artists reach the age of eighty this event becomes the occasion for major reassessment, scholarly reappraisal or some form of canonisation. With John Piper none of this is necessary. His career has been involved with the regular production of a marvellous flow of work in various mediums, generally concerned with consistent themes and images. All we need feel now is considerable gratitude, not least for the fact that he appears to be creating finer things at present than at almost any previous stage.

Piper's achievement as a whole is entirely individual but it is also part of a specifically English tradition. Take, for example, the vivid stained glass panel of *The Nativity* (1982) which is based on an Elizabethan wall painting at Shulbrede Priory, Sussex. In age-old onomatopaeic form, the animals pronounce the birth of Christ; *Christus natus est,* the cock crows, *quando?* asks the duck, *in nac nocte* replies the raven, *ubi?* demands the owl and the Lamb answers triumphantly, *Bethlem! Bethlem!* The linear style is completely Piper's own but the spirit of the piece is more closely aligned to English mediaeval glass like the lily-crucifixion in the Church of Long Melford, Suffolk, than it is to more obvious influences on Piper such as Bourges and Chartres or even to his acknowledged precursor, Georges Rouault. Piper's work is an acknowledgement of the unity of creation as much as it is an affirmation of the sensitivity of the human spirit.

So far as the development of his visual vocabulary is concerned, three elements stand out. Except for a brief involvement with abstraction during the 1930s, his work has evolved mainly within a specifically figurative and topographical idiom. Much of this is part of an English idiom that can be identified with Girtin and Cotman as well as such romantic painters as Turner and Samuel Palmer.

The oil painting of *Newcastle Emblyn* (1983) glows with the ecstasy of a Shoreham period Palmer. In another of his remarkable pieces of stained glass, the memorial window to Benjamin Britten for Aldeburgh Parish Church (1979), the glistening stream representing *Curlew River* harks back to Piper's North Wales landscapes of the 1940s which, in turn, have a connection with the landscapes of the Cozens family, the design for the figures in *The Burning Fiery Furnace* bears a resemblance to Blake. It needs to be stressed, however, that while Piper remains conscious of his roots he is never at any stage responsible for any form of deliberate pastiche or unaware of his own situation as a contemporary painter. In fact he has made probably the most consistent use of his talents of any of the brilliant group who were identified with the Penguin Modern Painters series of the 1940s which included Henry Moore, Pasmore, Paul Nash, Graham Sutherland and David Jones or the members

of what Sir John Rothenstein has identified as the Marlborough Gallery 'team' which comprised, as well as Piper, such artists as Moore, Pasmore, Francis Bacon, Ceri Richards and Ben Nicholson. To indicate this is to give some idea of Piper's very high standing as a contemporary painter.

Of the artists mentioned the strongest comparison probably lies with David Jones and Ceri Richards, both painters who evoke a similar feeling of individual lyricism. Piper is probably a more controlled painter than either of these masters, working more in the world than the former and in a more deliberate frame of reference than the latter. Like both, music plays an important part in the context of his work but so, in Piper's case, does not only landscape but also architecture. No other English painter working in the present century has rendered the particularly English scene, ranging from the battered townscapes of the blitz to the peaceful pastures of East Anglia, with more insight and affection. The Tate Gallery exhibition brilliantly underlines the important part played in his development both by his involvement with the Shell-Murray guides and his collaboration with John Betjeman but also of the series of watercolour drawings that he did during the war for the Pilgrim Trust's *Recording Britain* series and as an official war artist. Equally productive was his connection with the Sitwell family which led not only to the remarkable pictures which he painted at Renishaw and later at Montequfoni but also to the 1943 costumes and backdrops for Walton's *The Quest,* one of which has been reproduced as a striking centrepiece for the section on his work as a stage designer.

Piper's work for the theatre has not only been an outstanding feature of British design for the last forty years but has also played an important part in his personal expression. John Russell has stressed his natural gift for this field in 'the reunion of the arts but had found momentary apotheosis under Diaghilev', but also that Piper seemed pre-destined to be the natural partner of everyone who was out to do something new in the theatre, in the opera house, in ballet, in book illustrations and in print-making. 'What was the first great achievement of the post-war theatre in England', he writes, 'if not the Old Vic production of *Oedipus Rex,* in which Piper's classical city stood up even to the outsize playing of Laurence Olivier and Sybil Thorndike?' Who that was there will forget the stage picture when the curtain went up on Britten's *The Rape of Lucretia*? As what Mr. Russell refers to as 'a veteran of the period' I count myself particularly lucky to have seen both these productions and, if Anthony West is right in the suggestion made in his biography of the artist, published in 1979, that the trend during the 1960s away from the use of painters in the theatre and towards professional stage designers meant that Piper found himself out in the cold for a period, the English stage was very much the loser.

The continuing association with Benjamin Britten, just as his wife's collaboration with the composer as the librettist for several of his operas, played a fruitful role in Piper's form of expression as a designer. Anyone who has seen, for instance, Piper's settings for *The Rape of Lucretia* (1946), *Albert Herring,* (1947), *Billy Budd,* (1951), *Gloriana,* (1958), *The*

Turn of the Screw, (1954), *A Midsummer Night's Dream,* (1960), *Owen Wingrave,* (1972) and *Death in Venice,* (1973), and can compare them with later productions of these works will recognise that there was a special magic about the original performances which has not always been captured by subsequent designers. Equally beautiful was his scenery for Britten's only ballet, *The Prince of the Pagodas,* first produced in 1954, also important in that it brought the artist into collaboration with the choreographer John Cranko, which was to provide exciting stimulus for both of them. If Piper is a natural man of the theatre as his work in a varied range of *milieu* from Covent Garden, Glyndebourne and Aldeburgh to Cranko's little theatre at Henley-on-Thames and subsequent West End review *Cranks* demonstrated, his designs, as Mr. Russell has suggested, were never 'stagey': 'it is a matter of timing and placement, lighting and concentration, ellipsis and the subliminal hint!'

Part of his success as a designer lies undoubtedly in the deeply romantic side of his nature. As early as 1942 he wrote one of the most naturally sympathetic studies of British romantic painters for Collins' excellent *Britain in Pictures* series. It was a sympathy which was increasingly to show itself in his own work. Together with his pictures of Seaton Delaval, Renishaw and Knole, his picturesque views of Gondale Scar, with its recollections of James Ward, and of Snowdonia, some of his most striking paintings of this period are the watercolours of Windsor, commissioned by Her Majesty the Queen Mother in 1942 which gave rise to the delightful but probably *bien trovato* remark attributed to King George VI: 'I say, Mr. Piper, you had awfully bad weather when you came to stay with us, didn't you?'

Piper's knowledge of architecture, his deep feeling for houses, gardens and the countryside, made him a natural exponent of this type of scene. As Sir Osbert Sitwell put it in his introduction to the catalogue of the artist's 1945 exhibition at the Leicester Galleries:

> At the very moment when the great English houses, the chief architectural expression of their country, are passing, being wrecked by happy and eager planners, or becoming the sterilised and scionless possessions of the National Trust, a painter has appeared, to hand them on to future ages, as Canaletto or Guardi handed on the dying Venice of their day, and with an equally inimitable art.

Allowing for the characteristic vigour with which the first part of this statement was expressed, there is a great deal of truth in the recognition of the importance of Piper's potential as the recorder of a particular world. The evolution of his particular graphic technique led to his being typecast as a 'neo-romantic', or a 'new romantic', appellations which have served to produce a certain amount of subsequent critical misunderstanding regarding his overall development as an artist. There is much more to Piper than the desire simply to evoke a vanishing world. 'I hope to be a painter', he wrote himself in 1948, 'who reacts in favour of early loves, without being a reactionary, and who paints churches, both medieval and Victorian, mountains, beaches, downs and valleys, without for a moment forgetting that on most downs there is an aerodrome, from most mountains you can see factories in the valleys, that many churches

are nearly empty on Sundays and that on any English beach there may be an unexploded mine'. A couple of years later he reiterated this feeling, for the *Painter's Progress* exhibition, at the Whitechapel Art Gallery, in the following terms: 'my aims in painting are to express a personal love of country and architecture, and the humanity that inhabits them, and to increase my own understanding and nourish my own love of the work of other painters of the past and present'. Perhaps the important parts of this statement are his deliberate inclusion of the words 'and the humanity that inhabits them', and his allusion to his involvement with work from the present as well as the past.

It is this basic humility in Piper's attitude, an attribute not always shared by great artists, which has added ineffably to the impression his work creates. No feature of the scenes that he depicts, no aspect of the world as a whole is considered too trivial to catch his attentive eye. One of the most attractive characteristics of his approach as an artist is a seemingly endless curiosity, not only about the places which he paints but about the people who built them and those who live in them still. The Shell guides to Oxfordshire which he edited (first in 1938 and later revised), Shropshire (together with John Betjeman, 1951), and Wiltshire (1958), and the Murray's Architectural Guides which he produced with John Betjeman for Buckinghamshire (in 1948) and Berkshire (in 1949), are full of all kinds of curious details or otherwise possibly overlooked examples of life in these counties which this has evoked. The architectural historian who revels in the grandeur of Vanbrugh and Kew and has had a lifelong love affair with the glories of Stowe can also communicate just as easily the pleasure which he takes in the flint work in the tower of the simplest of East Anglian churches.

One of the most attractive books which he has written and illustrated is the small volume for Penguin on Romney Marsh (1950) in which he lovingly recreated the special attraction which drew him to this part of the world.

Even without the accompanying watercolour drawings of Lydd and Appledore and Lympne (not as well reproduced twenty years ago as they would be today), we scarcely need to be reminded that we are dealing here with one of the most consummate colourists of the age.

Piper's approach, however is very far from being one of impressionism. Like his friend Ivor Hitchens, his pictures are carefully weighed and balanced and often simplified to a considerable degree to attack a central truth. Unlike Hitchens, the majority of his landscapes remain basically representational in technique although there have been occasions like the *Garn Fawr* of 1962 and the *Pembrokeshire Plough* of 1977, when he has again made impressive use of near abstract blocks of colour to capture a particular landscape. Of particular interest in this regard are the *Eye and Camera* collages and the screen prints made from them, which are placed beside photographs in the same model, transferring from one medium to the other. Piper himself, as the present exhibition shows, is an excellent and extremely sensitive photographer, and on occasions he had made skilful use of his resources to reaffirm the impact

of an image on his mind's eye, along with sketches made of the same place. Unlike some landscape painters such as Atkinson Grimshaw he has made very little use of the process of squaring up photographs and transferring these into drawings, on the whole these being treated either as creative pieces on their own account or as an *aide memoire.*

Like many of the great English landscape painters, Piper has also worked extensively in France and Italy. Venice, to which he paid a first working visit in 1958, has obviously been a special delight and his paintings of the city and his evocation of it for Britten's *Death in Venice* are among the most beautiful things that he has done. In France his subjects have extended over a wide selection of architecture, Brittany, the Loire, the Dordogne and Charente, Macon, Savoy, Gothic and Romanesque facades or simple farm buildings, providing him with an extraordinary range of stimulus. 'Topography at its best', he wrote in 1963, 'is the interpretation of the world as a vision of the place. The best topographical paintings have the spirit of the place in the time'. It is this spirit which he has set out to express in relation to a wide selection of scenes.

Piper has proved to be a catholic and highly stimulating artist not only in this sense but also in the extremely varied range of media in which he has actually worked, always with a similar sense of professionalism and personal commitment. He is one of the best living illustrators, a designer of furnishing fabrics and a major contributor to the revival of tapestry and stained glass. In the last two fields, in particular, he has found an occasion to express his strong Christian faith in some of the most original and beautiful work which has been created for religious buildings in our lifetime, including the tapestries for Chichester and Hereford Cathedrals, vestments for the new Cathedral at Coventry, his remarkable baptistery window for the same building, and other outstanding and very different examples of stained glass design, often executed in collaboration with Patrick Reyntiens, a remarkable craftsman in this field, for such buildings as the Roman Catholic Cathedral in Liverpool, Eton College Chapel, St. Margaret's, Westminster, and the Chapel for the new Robinson College at Cambridge.

Piper is a prolific artist and this has probably worked to his disadvantage in an age when art criticism has tended to focus increasingly on the idiosyncratic and the specialist. Unlike some painters whose work has tended to have popular appeal in recent years, his approach to whatever field he has applied himself to has tended to be a quiet, very personal and very craftsmanlike one. Because his work never shouts at one it might be very easy to underestimate its real significance. It is something, nevertheless, in this country of which we can be immensely proud.

[The exhibition of John Piper's work at The Tate Gallery, London, continues until early March.]

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL EDUCATION

by S. G. Shanker

'KNOWLEDGE of human nature,' declared Henry Adams, 'is the beginning and end of political education.' This has become an increasingly prevalent assumption today, and a potentially dangerous one. For what passes itself off as the discovery of the innate character of human nature is invariably nothing more than the dissemination of ideological prejudice. The understanding of political concepts and events is the real 'beginning and end' of political education. But that, unfortunately, is becoming an increasingly archaic thought.

Political education is a far more taxing accomplishment than political manipulation, and the understanding of political concepts is a far more arduous task than moral conditioning. 'Human nature' inevitably becomes whatever the theorist chooses to make it, and what he chooses is governed by what he believes is socially desirable. To shape the substance of these values is to control the development of a nation. As far as the party theorist is concerned, therefore, what Adams really meant is that the ideologue's conception of human nature is the beginning and end of political behaviour. And this is a principle which Labour and Conservative polemicists alike have all too firmly embraced.

The present Conservative Government is acutely aware of the fact that it cannot hope to crown its electoral successes with a sweeping cultural transformation unless it inculcates the perception of human nature which lies at the heart of conservative political theory. The core of this doctrine is the Hobbesian apprehension of man's iniquity. It might not, perhaps, be too difficult to cultivate a pervasive atmosphere of social anxiety, given the economic turbulence we are currently experiencing. Still, the attitudes which we naïvely describe as conservative and liberal are far more complex than the crude 'noble savage/savage brute' dichotomy which underpins modern political theory. Equally important are the interpretations of the well-being of society and the individual's relation to the State (construed in terms of the responsibilities and restrictions incurred by each). Moreover, every political theory rests on a perception of how its proselytisation should best be conducted. In this last respect, *Weltanschauungen* can be very dangerous phenomena indeed.

We must be extremely careful that we do not confuse political education with any such training in a political theory. For the former does not fluctuate in the manner of the latter according to the dictates of the ruling party. Political education is essentially a non-normative discipline; or, at least, it strives to minimise the presence of any ideological perspective which would undermine its social as well as subjective purpose. In simplest terms, this is to consolidate the development of the national identity by furthering the understanding of the country's social, political, and economic reality: the problems confronting it and the benefits it enjoys. Whether or not direct involvement in the political process is always feasible, under-

standing of the political process is the fundamental prerequisite for the consciousness of citizenship.

This sense of national identity must be interpreted as the enhancement of social self-awareness, which is not to be confused with public demonstrations of chauvinism. It may strike one that this constitutes a distinctly liberal definition of political education insofar as it stresses the importance of the individual's personal development. Indeed, this element no doubt accounts for the ubiquitous presence of this theme in liberal writings. Nevertheless, we must not suppose that, although the value of political education was first recognised (or, rather, rediscovered) by enlightened liberals, subsequent liberal theorists have been any less guilty than socialists and conservatives of confusing political education with political indoctrination.

There are a myriad of familiar social goals that have been championed by modern Liberals, and it was perhaps natural for them to assume that the purpose of political education is just to encourage the growth of these values. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that contemporary Conservatives should seek to replace those goals with conservative principles. The danger in all of this, however, is that political education proper might be entirely abandoned. And lest this danger should be swept aside as too unlikely to occasion widespread alarm, it should be borne in mind that the conservative's attitude to political education has always been equivocal, to say the least. In the hierarchy of conservative values, understanding falls a long way behind obedience.

The anguished cries from teaching federations throughout the country should certainly alert us to the burgeoning encroachment of the Government on post-war educational policy. It is not just a matter of their trying to discourage the pursuit of the liberal arts with punitive funding measures. More worryingly, Sir Keith Joseph's directives at the DES are seen as presaging an attempt to restructure the actual syllabuses of liberal arts subjects in order to cultivate conservatism among the nation's youth. For example, Lord Hugh Thomas has been given the task of 'ensuring that everyone at school is given a real sense of the history of our nation'; a euphemism for the introduction of a Conservative-controlled British National History Scheme. It speaks volumes about the *Weltanschauung* of a political party that it believes that one of the spoils of electoral victory is the right to imprint its ideological stamp on the next generation of voters.

There are several sources of opinion, however, which together effectively constrain a government's ideological hegemony. Certainly, philosophy is capable of contributing to this process, but it is essential that we recognise that the philosopher possesses no logical vantage point from which to pronounce upon the moral superiority of one set of values over another. In this respect, all that he can do is, like any other dogmatist, point to previous or possible cultures and hope to persuade by example or projection. Nevertheless, he can play an essential role in the logical clarification of the various concepts generated by the political theorists spanning the

system. But in so doing, his contributions perforce lie solely in the realm of political education as opposed to political training: in the development of political understanding rather than ideological consciousness. Philosophy may be powerless to halt the advance of the latter, but at least it has some hope of preserving the commitment to the former.

In his seminal article 'Does Political Theory Still Exist?', Isaiah Berlin developed his famous principle that 'political philosophy is only possible in a world where ends collide.' This idea contains both an important insight and a serious misconception. It is profoundly interesting that political theory might only be possible in a world where ends collide; but the role of political philosophy is entirely divorced from this condition. The relation between political theory and political philosophy—between system-construction and the logical clarification of political concepts—is subtle, and in many ways incestuous. For the fundamental concepts with which political philosophers have traditionally been concerned are those created by the political theorists; and these rarely bear much resemblance to the actual language spoken by politicians or the electorate. But philosophy has a responsibility to examine the actual as well as the rarefied language of politics and, if possible, to try to relate each to the other.

Political theorists have generally assumed that the internal struggles in which they are engaged reflect the actual battles being waged in the public forum. But politics is much more about class and interest-group conflicts than about the elucidation of abstract theoretical concepts. Granted, political arguments may often be clothed in the grandiloquent phrases of classical political theory, still one wonders whether many voters will pore over the *Discours* and *Leviathan* before deciding on how to cast their ballot. Unfortunately, because of its own obsession with political theory, political philosophy has also been blind to the extent of its estrangement from the opinions of the body politic, and the only sector left speaking a language which is intelligible to the public has been the politicians.

It is curious, if not worrying, that political theorists and philosophers alike can be enthralled by principles which are either vacuous or plainly false. How, for example, could so many generations of intellectuals be captivated by Aristotle's dictum that 'man is a political animal,' when it is clear that, far from uniquely characterising mankind, this merely groups us together with all those species which construct social organisations? (For a fascinating account of the complexity of political behaviour among primates cf. Franz de Waal's *Chimpanzee Politics*.) What distinguishes man as a political creature from the brutes is his ability to develop and speak the language of politics. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, it may make sense to say that the primate obeys his leader, but not that he does so because he thinks that his leader's decisions will lead to a certain form of society. But while the primate is logically prohibited from participating in human political practices, mankind is certainly capable of descending to the level of the primates.

Political education stands as the fundamental bulwark against this danger; political manipulation as the fundamental avenue. The primary result of

political education is to create choice by promoting understanding, whereas the purpose of political training is to limit choice by reducing the horizons of thought. Of course, very different types of society will result, depending on the scope of the choices offered or the form of the training pursued. But at a deeper level we can see that the very act of expanding or contracting choice will have a profound effect on the social behaviour that subsequently evolves. A liberal education will not produce a Spartan power, and likewise, if efficiency and productivity are our ultimate objectives, it is doubtful that we should encourage the individual to think and question for himself. Rather, he must be trained to grasp the overall goals towards which society as a whole is aspiring, and conditioned to accept gladly his position in the machinery. But we cannot seriously expect such a state of affairs without ensuring that the individual has embraced those values and rewards which the system has to offer. Whether this be military glory or video recorders, the methods employed will be roughly the same. For this type of political training it is no good allowing our students to read the Victorians indiscriminately; Carlyle must be our paradigm.

The secret of the Conservative Party's success in the past two elections is that they have managed to define the central themes in a debate in which the Labour Party is temperamentally disqualified from participating. How could Labour seriously hope to convince the electorate that it is capable of rationalising the economy when it is so clearly incapable of containing the fratricidal (let alone Militant) tendencies of its own members? But should productivity cease to be the primary concern of the electorate in the near future, then Labour's internal turmoil may no longer prove so crippling a political liability. The limits to psephology are caused as much by the unpredictable intellectual tides that sweep a country as by demographic shifts. But with this very point in mind, it is clear that no more telling indication of the Conservative Party's current ideological power could be found than the fact that nearly all political controversy has centred on Government methods, but not on Government objectives.

Not surprisingly, the Government is struggling to foster this atmosphere. The fundamental theme of their domestic platform is that monetarism is a valueless theory, a purely mechanical approach to economic management. This encourages the impression that no genuine discussion exists on the matter of the goals that the country desires, but only on the best method for realising them. Perhaps the homogenisation of society—considered solely in terms of living standards—has proceeded to such an extent that we are actually witnessing the fulfilment of Berlin's prediction that the survival of political theory depends on the collision of ends. At any rate, what better strategy than to encourage such an impression by treating fiscal policy as a purely technical problem?

Despite this statistical façade, however, the motivational premise underlying monetarism is simply that economic growth is a more important criterion than any possible social deprivation, and that in the realm of domestic policy, at least, the movements of the markets are more effective than the leadership afforded by a Parliament. Not only has the Government

turned a deaf ear to any suggestions of alternative reflationary strategies, but more significantly, they have attempted to discourage any discussion of the ends which they have defined. It is these very elements of political debate which are being stifled by the scorn heaped on any 'wets' who may seek to broaden the parameters of the debate. But the advent of Post-Industrialism has changed these parameters irrevocably, and it is folly to suppose that market forces could resolve the problems wrought by conceptual change.

The 'Perils of Post-Industrialism' all come down to this: our deep-seated inability—particularly at the conceptual level—to adapt to revolutionary economic changes. Paradoxically, the new forms of technology that are created are seized upon as weapons to maintain the old social order. The new technology lends an added danger to this response, for the techniques of political manipulation and coercion have become alarmingly sophisticated. But let us never suppose that the danger lies in the technology itself.

Post-Industrialism has rendered the primary conditions which are necessary for a revolution in the quality of the nation's political education: the leisure-time for mass participation, and the technology to receive and transmit information efficiently. But by the very same token, these conditions could also lead to a state of unparalleled political subjugation. There need be no recourse to force if the values and objectives of society have been manipulated; for once these have been determined, behaviour can safely be expected to conform to whatever pattern is best suited to realise those goals. Clearly, it would be disastrous to allow some power elite to gain control of the media.

It is surprising, however, how often this obvious principle is ignored in favour of the sophisticated thesis that it is the medium itself which is the source of the danger. Perhaps this is all part of man's innate inability to respond effectively to new technology; to alienate himself from technological changes in order to transfer the responsibility for his failure to grasp the conceptual changes that have occurred onto the technology itself. But just as there is no such thing as the perfect vehicle of political education, so, too, it is unintelligible to speak of the technological forces of political manipulation. The role which television or computer technology will play will be decided solely by our employment of their potential to present either one or a myriad of points of view.

How the technology is used, therefore, will determine how we describe its function. For the medium can be the bearer of any number of messages, and we alone are responsible for its service as a complement or a threat to political education. Indeed, when combined with modern information technology, television is entirely capable of ushering in a new era of political understanding. This is not only made feasible by the speed and comprehensiveness with which events and ideas can be transmitted but, also, will be a consequence of the dynamic participation in the political process which post-industrial technology will permit. Only the Government's ideological fervour, manifested in such enterprises as the National History Scheme, threatens to impede this development.

Not that this reflects at all adversely on the study of history *per se*. In *The Educated Imagination*, Northrop Frye explored the question of how educational authority can best develop the individual's aesthetic faculties. Frye's answer was that the Bible provides a unique tool with which to cultivate the blossoming imagination. So, too, there are many political theorists who believe that the study of a nation's history provides the perfect instrument for developing political understanding. And yet, just as in the hands of certain sects, the Bible has virtually become a vehicle of tyranny, all but destroying the withering imagination, so, too, the study of history in the hands of the ideologue can crush understanding under the full weight of prejudice. No printed text, however exalted, can produce the splendid results of imagination or understanding independently of the manner in which it is approached. And herein lies the great secret of Britain's democratic strength.

Many attempts have been made to seize control of the nation's ideological consciousness, yet all have collapsed in the face of the breadth and depth of the institutions committed to political education which have refused to succumb to political interference. Whatever the course of the post-industrial future, Britain enjoys, because of the quality of these educational and intellectual resources, a unique opportunity of remaining a liberal society. The colonial structure may have disappeared, but so long as Britain preserves these institutions it will remain a great imperial power, in the deepest sense of that term. For the understanding of political concepts which western societies have achieved has been overwhelmingly influenced by British political education.

[The next article in the current series of S. G. Shanker will be 'The Enduring Role of Government', in the April issue.]

CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

by David Shipman

WHEN in my last article I mentioned the reception at Radio City Music Hall of George Cukor's 1954 *A Star is Born* I hardly suspected that it would be one of the high spots of the 1983 London Film Festival. Like many people, including the star, James Mason, I have a soft spot for the film. The story was always schmaltz, but it was handled with loving care by Cukor and the writer, Moss Hart; and it was used on this occasion (there were two other versions, in 1937 and 1976) as a showcase for the every-which-way talents of Judy Garland—and great and sympathetic though they were, she does strain at times. It is interesting to reflect that in life the roles were reversed: that she, in the film wise and loving, was a self-destructive, demanding star monster while Mason, playing one in the movie, continues—all these years later —to handle his career with assurance. What strikes one most about this restored version was how barbaric were the cuts which reduced the running-time from just under three hours to two-and-a-half. The latter was the only version seen hitherto in this country, so British admirers of Cukor, Garland and Mason have always wondered wistfully what had gone. Whole sequences were ripped out by Warner Bros. in response to American exhibitors who claimed that they could make more money if it played for three shows a day instead of two. The restored portions do not counterbalance the soap opera aspects of the tale, but they emphasise what is good about it—Los Angeles as a city and the setting for the movie industry; the way that industry works; and the central relationship, which becomes much more effective once we know that the Garland character knows that the man who proposes to her is a drunk.

One reason why this movie stood out among the films offered by the Festival was the poor quality of many of the others. That seems a harsh verdict when over one hundred were programmed, and is no reflection on Ken Wlaschin, who organised matters for the last time (before taking up a similar position for the Los Angeles Filmex). There was no fault in the selection, but some major directors were not seen at their best. Perhaps the biggest disappointment was Ermanno Olmi's *Cammina-Cammina,* a retelling of the Journey of the Magi in terms of Italian peasants at some undefined time in the past. Olmi, who is to me one of the world's half-dozen best movie-makers, has said that he could no longer make films like *Il Posto* or *The Tree of Wooden Clogs;* he thinks that the world has become such a wretched place that we must return to basics, re-examine our spiritual values. Certainly in those terms *CamminaCammina* is a rich film, but it has no dramatic shape. We watch the Magi and the accompanying pilgrims as we might watch protest marchers in Whitehall or hikers: they plod on, mildly interesting us from time to time, but for far too long.

Another great director, Shohei Imamura, also faltered. *The Ballad of Narayama* caused consternation among some critics by winning the

Grand Prix at last year's Cannes Film Festival. I was pleased, since I don't think that Imamura has had the international recognition he deserves: but I don't think that this movie, if it goes into distribution in this country, will do much for that cause. Like Olmi, he feels that our society has lost its values, so he also has turned to the past—to a primitive rural community of a hundred years ago when the aged were taken to a neighbouring hillside and left to die. His source is a novel by Shichiro Fukazawa, published in 1956 and memorably filmed by Kinoshita two years later. Or, rather, that was one of two sources: the other was another novel by the same author (and that was filmed by Ichikawa in 1957). Certainly the two stories blend quite seamlessly, building into an impressive portrait of these benighted village people: but those parts of the film from the second book, with their explicit sexuality, are of the 'grunt and groan' school of peasant drama, by definition rather tiresome. They are also supposed to be funny, but they are not—at least, not to these Occidental eyes. Those parts of the film dealing with the family of the woman who will be left to die are much superior, and the last, long section of the piece, as her son carries her across to her last cruel resting-place, is one of the most haunting sequences in the history of the cinema. It might have been moving, too, had our attention not been so often diverted from the unfortunate lady.

I was disturbed to find myself so unappreciative of two directors whose work I usually admire, wondering whether my inability to respond was due to some failure to identify with any of the myriad characters set before me—but they were not characters of any complexity, and I was soon reassured by Yilmaz Güney's *The Wall*, another group portrait. He made this in France, with French Government aid, after fleeing imprisonment in his native Turkey. Like the two films he wrote and supervised from gaol, *The Herd* and *Yol*, he begins by offering a broad canvas: in *The Herd*, vignettes of life among the tribesmen and in *Yol* and *The Wall* incidents in the daily routines of prisoners. Everything in *The Wall* is based on first or second-hand experience. Its subject is ignorance. Those imprisoned—men, women and boys, all segregated, may not be bright, but those in authority over them abuse their power because they are stupid: that is the system, they know no better. Since the prisoners are viewed with compassion, we may suppose their crimes to have been political, but virtually the only crime of which we're told is an axe-murder committed by an adulterous couple who are perhaps the mildest, most likeable people in the whole movie. Güney's skill—and he shares it with Antonioni—is to constantly make us question both what he shows us and our own attitudes: he also presents us with a warder who is sacked, and it is not till much later in the film that we are made aware that this is the one guard that the prisoners liked. Elsewhere he is not so subtle, but overall this is a major work on the underprivileged and deprived of this world by a master director. If you decided after *Midnight Express* not so see another movie set in a Turkish prison I wouldn't blame you; one of the most important attributes of *The Wall* is that it will make you forget that *Midnight Express* was ever made.



The Wall was one of the few films that I saw in the Festival which is assured of British distribution; and it may be that you will be able to see *The South,* since it was made by Victor Erice, whose *Spirit of the Beehive* remains an art-house favourite. *The South* is the first film he has directed since then, but it comes to us in an unfinished state since he left the project after quarrelling with the producer, who has assembled what was shot in an acceptable state—but at ninety minutes one considerably shorter than that envisaged by Erice. The same themes reoccur: a girl growing up some years ago in a small town in Castille, the fascination with her father, the local movie-house, some curiosity about the Civil War. This is a pleasing, civilised entertainment, but—for evident reasons —a somewhat insubstantial one. I liked only mildly *Demons in the Garden,* which has been a big success in Spain. It begins in 1942, with the Civil War still fresh in everyone's mind. Once again we are in a small provincial town dominated by one family, which runs the local provisions store. One son, after a quarrel with his brother, has run off to Madrid where he is supposed to be someone important in Franco's entourage; the mother of his child is exiled to the mountains but the boy has been brought down to be looked after when he becomes ill; and there are various passions which recall *Cold Comfort Farm.* The humour herein is different from that of Stella Gibbons and we are glad to find it; but yet again the director, Manuel Gutiérrez Aragón, fails to find the dense ironic form of *Black Brood.* His writer on that occasion was Jose-Luis Borau, who made *The Poachers,* and it increasingly looks as though Borau was responsible for its quality.

Another disappointment was *Alsino and the Condor,* a co-production between Nicaragua, Cuba, Mexico and Costa Rica, directed by the Chilean exile, Miguel Littin, best known for *The Jackal of Nahueltoro.* Alsino is the twelve-year-old protagonist and the condor is the ubiquitous helicopter, used by the local militia to prevent the rebel guerillas from sweeping down from the wooded mountains across the valley. Littin attempts to chart both the events of Alsino's life as affected by the evacuation of the village and the mentality of the servicemen, who include a Dutch mercenary and an American (Dean Stockwell), probably sent by the CIA. These two aspects of the film jar upon each other, and the message is all too simple-minded when the Communist guerillas turn out to be brave, strong and much more likeable than the other soldiers. I cannot understand how this movie managed to get nominated for last year's Best Foreign Language award at Hollywood's Oscar ceremonies; I can see why, when shown in New York, it was execrated by the critics. At the same time, I have little sympathy: if movie-makers South of the Border wish to say something about military intervention in those countries we should listen, however confused the statement made.

Without Witnesses seemed to me to be saying nothing at all. Nikia Mikhalkov made *A Slave of Love* and *Oblomov,* both seen here, as well as a muddled adaptation of Tchekov, *Unfinished Piece for a Mechanical Piano.* His best film is a charming, funny piece about life in Moscow in

the Fifties, *Five Evenings,* so perhaps my expectations were too high for *Without Witnesses,* which is also based on a popular contemporary play. It's about a woman visited by her ex-husband, who taunts her, reminisces, boasts about his new family and attempts to seduce her: there is marginally more action than in *My Dinner with André,* but the two have put me off two-character movies for life. It's not that I want a cast of thousands, but I would like the conversation to be amusing or intelligent. These are minimal cinema with a vengeance.

The Makioka Sisters is all conversation; it is far too verbose. Junichiro's novel has been filmed twice before, in 1950 by Yutaka Abe and in 1959 by Koji Shima. I have seen the first of these, and on that evidence (and others) Abe is not the master that is Kon Ichikawa, who has made the new version. Ichikawa directed *The Burmese Harp, An Actor's Revenge, Tokyo Olympiad* and some other of the greatest films ever made. I gather he has been off-form in recent years, so it is rewarding to find his work once more on the international scene. The Makioka sisters are four in number, two who are married, one with a husband managing the family's once-prosperous business, one who is seeking a husband, via an arranged match, and the youngest, who is involved in a series of affairs. The fascination of the book, and Abe's film, was in the way feudalism had lingered on—the piece is set in 1938, in Osaka. Ichikawa seems to have decided that was now of less interest and seems to have tried to make a movie, albeit in colour, in the manner of that period. With the reservation noted, this is a pleasing entertainment.

Since I didn't see all the works programmed in the Festival I cannot say that *Daniel* was the best film, but it was assuredly the most stimulating of those I saw. Sidney Lumet directed this screenplay by E. L. Doctorow, wrought from his own *Book of Daniel,* which I haven't read. I knew that it had something to do with Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, who were electrocuted for treason in 1953; and since there were always doubts about their guilt, the case had inflamed passions from that day to this. Doctorow examines the fate of two children of such a couple—both as they are as grown-ups and as children, both during the period when their parents were active Communists and at the time of their disgrace. My admiration for the film received a blow when Lumet came on stage at the end to admit that everything in it is fictitious except the details of the execution. He still seemed in a state of shock from the dreadful reviews the film received in the US: as he said, the critics came into the cinema with their 'baggage' and then went on to castigate him and Doctorow for not confronting the guilt or otherwise of the Rosenbergs head on. Those critics, in my opinion, have a point; but I had found the piece constantly absorbing and beautifully made—almost devoid of the small vulgarities which often mar Lumet's work.

CORRESPONDENCE

GEOFFREY WHITWORTH AND THE REGIONAL THEATRE

Dear Madam,

I found the radio programme about Geoffrey Whitworth (*We Danced Upon His Strings* BBC Radio 4, November 20th) incredibly interesting, particularly following on John Elsom's article in the March issue (No. 1406, Vol. 242) and the letter by Edward Grist in the September issue (No. 1412, Vol. 243) of *Contemporary Review*.

Like Mr. Grist, I had never heard of Geoffrey Whitworth before *Contemporary Review* brought him to my attention, and knowing now of his supreme modesty concerning his considerable achievements I realise why. However, because of his founding of the British Drama League in 1919 (re-named in 1972 the British Theatre Association) and his books like *The Theatre Of My Heart* and *The Making Of A National Theatre* and his urging for the creation of a National Theatre, I agree that the Theatre Establishment should much more publicly acknowledge their debt to him. One way of doing this would be to support, rather than impinge upon, our Regional Theatres; to allow Drama as a social activity to flourish throughout Britain and fully realise the importance of its individuality of spirit and its independence from commercial theatre.

The Theatre in Britain must twist around the country of its own accord, providing entertainment and information with each little turn, instead of simply being straightened out by commercial considerations; commercial considerations that Geoffrey Whitworth thought often put Theatre's 'souls integrity in danger'.

With the aid of 'Eastern Arts Association' I have had quite a lot of experience of Regional and Community activities and know what energy and enjoyment the simplest theatrical event can bring, from a script written either by a young child or an old age pensioner. Money lavished on productions has never equalled quality or enjoyment, but money wisely distributed along with much more support from other Media would enhance Regional and Community Theatre's life blood; whose heart is not in the mixed-up, out-of-touch West End, but is composed of the many small communities whose energy pumps life into their performances.

Geoffrey Whitworth who, we are told, grew to a height of only 5ft 4ins and whose earliest recollection was that of acute pain in his shoulder and spine, seems to me to have been a man of wonderful optimism, drowning out the surrounding octaves of despair, and I am grateful that you have made him known to me. 'The great thing is to take as little action as possible... life will push you on,' could be taken as a phrase of complacency but, coming from Geoffrey Whitworth, it is not, although it might be ironical. He knew that to get Theatre truly National needed constant action.

Flamstead, St. Albans,
Herts.

Yours faithfully,
DAVID R. MORGAN

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

A NEW ASSESSMENT OF F. E. SMITH

F. E. Smith, First Earl of Birkenhead. John Campbell. Jonathan Cape. £30.

'Ah me', wrote Harold Nicolson, of his idolised chief, Lord Curzon. 'Ah me, those Curzonian dissertations! Something has gone out of my life, now that they are no more.' Something went out of my life, though it had only entered it two years earlier, with the death of F. E. Smith, first Earl of Birkenhead, the former Lord Chancellor, in 1930, at the age of fifty-eight.

I am one of the few survivors of the band of Oxford undergraduates whom F.E.'s son, my great friend, later the 2nd Lord Birkenhead, used to take over to Charlton week-end after week-end. Golf in the morning; tennis in the afternoon; riding between tea and dinner. Entrancing dinner table arguments and debates, with F.E. far excelling his guests, old and young, in elaborate wit and simple humour.

Against such a background of memory, it would be an affectation to pretend that I approach a new biography of F. E. Smith with an unbiased mind. Mr. Campbell's book has solid virtues. It has taken him seven years to write. He tells us that his wife was 'the family bread-winner' during the whole time that he was writing the book. Happy the man who can retain the fidelity of such a consort. He has laboured hard and honestly. No devotee of F. E. Smith will complain that the book runs to over eight hundred pages. Mr. Campbell cannot be accused of not taking his subject seriously.

Much evidence is quoted here to prove that Birkenhead was not only one of the most brilliant, but one of the most loved men of his time. At a special meeting of The Other Club, founded many years before across the party divide by F. E. Smith and Winston Churchill, Churchill broke the unwritten rules and delivered a speech from which a few sentences may be extracted: 'We miss his wisdom, his gaiety, the broad human companionship and comradeship which he always displayed and excited from his friends. We admired his grand intellect and massive good sense.... I do not think anyone knew him better than I did and he was, after all, my dearest friend.'

One who worked with him closely in his early days at the Bar in Liverpool looked back on his time with F.E. as the happiest in his life. J. C. Masterman, a tennis partner and frequent visitor at Charlton and later Provost of Worcester College, Oxford, recorded a solemn opinion that 'his was the most powerful mind with which I have ever been brought into contact'. 'I can well believe', wrote Austen Chamberlain, 'that if I had not known him intimately, I should have detested him. As it was, I had a great affection for him and shall never find a truer, or more affectionate friend.'

And yet the reviews which I have read so far have, generally speaking, conveyed a far less pleasant impression. Mr. Campbell can hardly be regarded as innocent here, if by inadvertence he has produced a result which was in no way part of his intention.

Where does he go wrong, if he does go wrong? I have little doubt myself of the answer to that question. F. E. Smith drank more than was wise. His son, Freddy, in no way conceals that fact in his filial, yet brilliantly discerning biography. But Mr. Campbell having got this bone between his teeth cannot

let it go for an instant. He seems to linger obsessively on any alleged examples of excess. I can only say in reply to him that in countless lunches and dinners at Lord Birkenhead's home, I never saw him the worse for liquor. He was amazingly fit for a man in his fifties.

I am left with the hope that students now and later will read this very thorough biography with proper care from start to finish, putting any frailties in an adequate perspective. I shall be surprised when they have done so, if they do not share the feelings of Birkenhead's long-standing admirers that he was one of the great men of his era. As Churchill surmised in the speech quoted from, he would be sadly missed after his death.

FRANK LONGFORD

GENERAL MONTGOMERY: THE BATTLE COMMANDER

Monty: Master of the Battlefield 1942-44. Nigel Hamilton. Hamish Hamilton. £12.95.

It was on 5 November 1942 at his Tactical H.Q. that Lt. General Bernard Montgomery, wearing a tank beret and grey pullover, told the Allied War correspondents:

> 'It has been a fine battle. There is no doubt of the result. Two nights ago I drove two armoured wedges into the enemy and I passed three armoured divisions through those places. They are now operating in enemy's rear... The enemy is completely smashed... But we must not think that the party is over... We intend to hit this chap for six out of North Africa.'

The language, the casual dress, the TAC HQ up front with his troops: all saw the beginning of a legend, and indeed Alamein if not the beginning of the end, was certainly the end of the beginning. Six days later, the man himself became a full General and a Knight of the realm—and he was, it is worth remembering, a small lean widower no less than 55 years of age. Less than two years later, he would be a Field Marshal. For a soldier, he was a late developer.

Nigel Hamilton has been privileged, since he has used the Field Marshal's private papers entrusted to his father's care. They have given him an opportunity for detail (all 860 pages of it) and for intimate re-telling which he has turned to very good account. He draws on a close friendship with Monty, and on many interviews with his staff-officers and associates of the war years. This is at once a splendid recapturing of that crucial battle and of the (somewhat chaotic and amateur) follow-up that was the turning point of the desert war; and it is also an equally splendid recapturing of the ascetic, cocksure, eccentric and egotistic man who was almost certainly the best, because the most combative British battle-commander, and, along with his equally tetchy rival and colleague Patton, one of the best two battle leaders of World War II.

One of the striking features of Nigel Hamilton's analysis is his capacity, because of the detail he allows himself, to probe Monty himself, warts and all. The ruthlessness, the careful planning, the theatricality, along with the simplicity, are familiar. But what emerges here more clearly than in previous studies is his 'pedagogic quality,' his keenness to learn and to teach. As soon as he entertained General Von Thoma, the Commander of the Afrika Korps, to dinner on capturing him (and 30,000 Axis prisoners), he went over with him every stage of the battle to ensure why he had won; he made nightly notes on each day's engagement and was drawing up an analysis of Alamein six days after the victory. He held a study week at Tripoli, to which Home Commanders and Americans were invited, to draw out the lessons of Alamein. Patton's comment on it was crisp: 'I may be old, I may be deaf, and I may

be stoopid, but it just don't mean a thing to me.'

If the 'pedagogic quality' was the reason for his own slow climb, he made it the source from which his fellow generals and, as Field Marshal Alanbrooke discovered, even the CIGS might learn how battles were won. And it included the importance of determined leadership—quite a few of his corps commanders were sacked;—of tactical surprise though he never was as good as Rommel at improvisation; of the key role of the artillery—as all who were there could testify through their ear drums; and, not least, of morale. Monty learned more quickly than most how difficult but how rewarding is 'men-management,' in the Army phrase, the psychology of leading a people's army and giving it, as he did, the will to win. His Intelligence chief, Bill Williams (later the distinguished Warden of Rhodes House), aptly said that his vanity was indeed 'the dynamo of the Eighth Army.' He realised that battles are won not with tanks and guns but in the mind. 'In battle', he wrote, 'it is the man that counts.' There was almost a Wesleyan or Cromwellian note. 'The soldier should know what he fights for, and love what he knows.' Although it should be added that his talks to the troops when he went out, in his phrase, to 'binge up' the troops, could go wrong. Once, when addressing a group of Americans preparing for Operation Overlord in January 1944, saying genially that he had never visited the U.S. and that he didn't know whether, when he went there, he should start in the North or in the South, a black soldier at the back said, 'What the hell are you trying to do? Start another war?'

But then, in all his stagey folksiness, there were difficulties with Ike and Patton (though rarely, it seems, with Omar Bradley). His was a style and a panache that Americans could easily fail to comprehend. With Ike there was no real closeness. And Tedder, the nearest to him in stature, was a bitter critic.

The quarrelsomeness and the arrogance were parts of the man. So too was his curious and unyielding churlishness to those in his own family circle. The explanation is not just in the man's training and background, his near-megalomania, or the searing tensions of the campaigns and battles. He became totally involved in the creation of his real legend, the Eighth Army. It became—though on a giant scale—his own private army, with its own mystique and its own 'uniform' of corduroys, thick scarves and pullovers. His immediate staff became his zealots, as with every successful battle-commander, (and hardly any of them, be it said, were regular officers); so, in all their grumbling over their desert brews, did the Desert Rats and those who drove Rommel out of Africa. When Monty left them at the Sangro to plan and lead the biggest campaign of all, Overlord, the legend went with him. But this was a great man, and this is a vivid, gripping and superbly-told tale.

ESMOND WRIGHT

THE ART OF THE LIMNERS

The English Renaissance Miniature. Sir Roy Strong. Thames and Hudson. £18.00.

Ever since Dr. Karl Winter's book on Tudor miniatures appeared, nearly forty years ago, in the excellent King Penguin series, there has been increased public awareness of the charm of these works, based to a considerable degree on the improved quality of colour photography, which has enabled the general reader to appreciate their delicate force in a way not easily achieved by ordinary black and white reproduction or in the overcrowded context of most museum showcases. The publication of the text of Nicholas Hilliard's *The Arte*

of Limning, in several recent editions, together with various scholarly appraisals on the subject, has proved a useful context for this. Now, in conjunction with the showing of the 1983 Victoria and Albert exhibition *Artists of the Tudor Court, The Portrait Miniature Rediscovered, 1520–1620*, Sir Roy Strong has published a comprehensive background study to this field, which constitutes a special English contribution to Renaissance art. This is a period on which Sir Roy's expertise is already well-known and on which he has written impressive books on *The Cult of Elizabeth* and *The Renaissance Garden in England*. His latest survey, as might be expected, coming from such a source, is immensely authoritative, beautifully presented, but, sadly, not always as readable as some of his other writings might lead us to expect. Nevertheless, it is a volume which will give immense pleasure both to the particular student of English art and to anyone who takes delight in beautiful and unusual things. A particular value in his researches is that, since becoming director of the V. and A. in 1974, he has been able to make a comprehensive examination, under laboratory conditions, of the remarkable collection of surviving miniatures in that institution's collections. As a result, much of what he has to say is based not only on an interpretation of existing research, but on the application of a keen eye to the art of limning, the actual process involved in the creation of the miniatures themselves.

As described by Hilliard, this involved three different stages. At the first sitting, the painter established an outline and likeness, usually on the base of a rectangular surface of vellum glued to a piece of card. This constituted quite a short process and master versions could be established to enable further examples of the same subject to be painted.

The painting itself began with the laying in of what the limners referred to as 'carnation,' an underlying ground base which made up the flesh tints for the face. Delineation of form was achieved with 'little light touches with colour very thin, and like hatches as we call it with the pen.' The second sitting took longer and could last sometimes for as long as six hours. The area of the features was delineated in greater detail, by hatching in stronger colours like red or brown and by the application of transparent washes for such areas as the hair over the carnation. At this stage, the portrait started to take on its own specific character. The final sitting enabled the artist to complete the features and the dress and add highlights, thus fulfilling the process which Sir Roy describes as 'the final explosion that was to bring the brilliance and the sparkle, including the shimmering highlights of gold and silver,' and which lends so much decorative quality to the completed product. The picture concerned would then be trimmed into oval form in order to enable it to be fitted into its frame, often for displaying upon the person of the actual recipient, as with the ikon-like images of the queen, which were intended to constitute a gift or mark of particular favour. Such a method of production, according to Sir Roy, captured 'the essential divide that separates the miniatures from the large-scale painting of the period. . . Oil painting was not only a long process, much of which was done away from the sitter in between sittings, often by studio assistants, but its results, painted on wood, have suffered appallingly over the centuries, so that we are lucky in the case of the majority of Elizabethan portraits if we have as much as sixty per cent of the original surface left. In sharp contrast, most miniatures, in spite of a degree of repainting, flaking and fading and oxidising of the silver highlights to black, survive down to our own age as they left the studio. What we contemplate are the results of three sittings of a few hours with perhaps the jewels and dress lent and worked on in between. Not

until the time of Van Dyck was that quality of liveliness to be transferred from the miniature onto the canvas of large-scale paintings.'

It was this characteristic liveliness in the miniatures that was especially cherished by both the artists themselves and their sitters. 'The party sitting,' wrote Edward Norgate, who wrote a *Miniatura* in about 1620 and rewrote this towards the end of the Civil War, 'is by occasion of discourse to be sometimes in motion and to regard you with a merry, jovial and friendly aspect, wherein you must be ready and sudden to catch at and steal your observations and to express them with a quick and constant hand.' That the end result was not always intended to be expressed in such a 'merry, jovial and friendly aspect' can be seen from the underlying melancholy of such astonishing *tours de force* as Nicholas Hilliard's *Henry Percy, 9th Earl of Northumberland*, showing the 'wizard earl' in philosophic recline in a garden on top of a mountain, and Isaac Oliver's *Unknown Melancholy Man* and his unidentified *Man Enveloped in the Flames of his Passion*. Like other forms of Renaissance art, limning was subject to fluctuations in the fantastic conceptions of Mannerism and the conceits of metaphysical thought. But these extravaganzas tended to be the exception. For the most part, the attractive likenesses and lively colours of the miniatures were intended to please the eye rather than the mind. Particularly important in this regard was establishment of a tradition of exhalting iconography, looked for by both the Tudor and Stuart monarchs in the search for their approved images.

The origin of this particular tradition and, in particular, the expression of a cult of the Crown, lay principally in the desire of the early Tudor monarchs to legitimise their standing in both national and international terms. A connection with the workshops of the Ghent-Bruges school of illuminators went back at least as far as Edward IV, who had spent part of his years of exile at the Burgundian court. On his return to England as king in 1471, this monarch began to assemble a library of illuminated manuscripts, many of which were sent to him by his sister, Margaret of York, Duchess of Burgundy, and wife of Charles the Bold. When the first Tudor sovereign, Henry VII, wanted to impress his rivals and contemporaries, it was once more to this Flemish school, one of the artistic glories of northern Europe, that he turned, with the importation of the Hornebolte family some of the most prestigious practitioners in this field, to take over the running of a manuscript scriptorium for the royal library. It is from their achievements, in particular those of Lucas Hornebolte, for whose work as a miniaturist Sir Roy provides a detailed analysis, that he traces the origins of the Tree of Limning. As he is at pains to point out, throughout the whole period concerned, the depiction of 'portraits in little' constituted only a small part of the functions which these painters engaged in. Holbein, one of the most remarkable masters to work in this field, was already far better known as a painter of easel portraits before he embarked on miniatures at the behest of Thomas Cromwell during the early 1530s. Levina Teerlinc, who became celebrated for her 'small likenesses' of Elizabeth I, was the daughter of Simmon Benninck, one of the leading members of the Flemish school of illuminating, and herself an illuminator and a designer of indentures, woodcuts and seals, among other objects, including probably the first great seal of Elizabeth I, which was actually executed by Dericke Anthony. Nicholas Hilliard, the son of an Exeter goldsmith, was concerned in a multiplicity of different activities as a jeweller, engraver, a designer of seals, medals and decorative accoutrements such as heraldic devices, a painter of decorative emblems and *impresa*, as well as of decorative title pages and borders, rail and headpieces, both for manuscripts and painted books, and possibly even of metalwork and tomb sculpture.

Isaac Oliver, who was Hilliard's chief follower and his principal rival during the later part of his career, was engaged in an extensive range of 'curious painting' as well as various other activities. Oliver, writes Sir Roy, emerges as the greatest painter to work in England between Holbein and Van Dyck, the first painter that we know who executed drawings as works of art in their own right and who drew from the nude model a mysterious figure of some intellect and learning. During the period of a hundred or more years covered in the present book, the limners certainly established a remarkable innovatory process in the art of the miniature itself, but they also continued to work within the broad general context of Renaissance art.

In making clear this point, however, it would be wrong to underestimate the revolutionary role played by the English miniature in the development of European art. That the English Renaissance miniature was an object of extraordinary quality we have now become increasingly aware. How this manifestation fits into the broad pattern of our historical and artistic heritage is something which Sir Roy Strong's book goes a considerable way to explain.

ERNLE MONEY

A FULL BIOGRAPHY OF ARTHUR RANSOME

The Life of Arthur Ransome. Hugh Brogan. Jonathan Cape. £10.95.

There is a great deal more to Arthur Ransome (1884-1967) than *Swallows and Amazons,* even if it were in that childhood territory of lake and island, boats and pirates that, late, he found his true voice. Many of those readers who missed the *Autobiography* (1976), edited by Rupert Hart-Davis, will merely, with an effort, remember that Lord Alfred Douglas unsuccessfully sued him for libel (in 1913), or, if they are of sailing bent, *Racundra's First Cruise* (1923). Now, Mr. Hugh Brogan has constructed a lengthy biography, richly crammed with new material, which is sympathetic, enlightening and enjoyable.

Arthur Ransome's life fell into three broad phases: the struggling Bohemian in Chelsea, reared in Leeds, the Lake District and at Rugby, who could have been any young writer from Gissing to Le Gallienne, followed by matrimonial disharmony in the sticks; the war correspondent in Russia from 1913, right through the Revolution and its aftermath—and here he departed from any stereotype; and finally, with a new wife in tow (Trotsky's secretary, no less) a second literary phase during which he achieved fame, if not fortune.

Mr. Brogan is an academic historian, and he has accordingly brought his authority to bear upon the Russian adventure, whose delineation might have deterred a biographer less well equipped. His analysis of the events of the Revolution and the Russian Front, and of their relation to Ransome and his interpretations, forms a solid block, almost a separate book, in the centre of the biography and is responsible for much of its length. One can imagine how Mr. Brogan resisted inner promptings and outer pressures to curtail, but he is determined to give due weight to this important part of his subject's career, to demonstrate exactly how it was that Ransome became a suspect Bolshevik sympathiser. Perhaps when all is said and done there *is* a little too much detail here, in a literary biography—if that is what it is—but certainly Mr. Brogan's research deserved not to be wasted. He does indicate that pruning there must have been, since there was a *ruthless* knocking into shape by two hands. That adjective says much.

The burden of information has not, however, in any way taken sharpness or depth from Mr. Brogan's touching evocation of the whole man, or,

particularly, those circumstances which shaped his imagination. A complex individual, whose corduroyed, pipe-smoking, fisherman's persona, none too keen on children (sic) should have fooled no one, his actual and considerable frailty, both emotional and physical, was founded upon the opposition of others. His father, Professor of History, thought him lacking in resolution, his mother resisted his chosen way as a writer, and his two marriages failed to encourage him; the first was Strindbergian in its hysterical horror, and the second, sadly, was marred by his Russian wife's rages and, worse, by her denigration of even his best work. Arthur Ransome, a thoroughly blameless character, was thus constantly tacking against strong winds of disapproval, as, indeed, during his correct readings of the Russian situation, and he did not thrive upon disapprobation. There is no feeling that being put upon his mettle honed his talent and fertilised his creativity. Writing, and illustrating, came hard to him. Frustration rewarded his best efforts. It is typical of his life-pattern that he longed for the Lake District, that seedbed of his most deeply felt story-telling, but was continually uprooted from his refuges therein. No wonder that his small pleasures gave him the cloak of the 'overgrown Schoolboy'—a useful myth. Mr. Brogan shows us all this in a clever and unconventional book.

MOLLY TIBBS

A GREAT SPANISH FILM DIRECTOR

My Last Breath. Luis Bunuel. Jonathan Cape. £8.95.

Luis Bunuel, surrealist and opposer of the Franco regime, is also the only Spanish film director with world-wide recognition. The films he has made, particularly towards the end of his career when he had returned from exile in the United States and Mexico, can be compared with the finest of any other major director. His autobiography, published in England posthumously, for he died last year, is a witty and urbane account of the career of a hard working dilettante, if the two are not mutually exclusive.

He was born into the upper middle classes at the turn of the century, in Saragossa, the arid hinterland of Spain, and catalogues as a result rain and moss as two of his particular likes. These also include rats, Wagner and the films of Fritz Lang. Bunuel has nothing if not eclectic taste. The early part of the book, which is perhaps the most engaging, is taken up with his recollections, and those of his sister, of life in pre First World War Spain. As with all good surrealists it is not a documented account but one of impressions, recollections, dreams and very probably inventions and fantasies as well.

The middle period is his travels in France and his association with the surrealists, Dali, Breton and the other peripheral characters of le tout Paris, and le tout Madrid as well. It is only in the last quarter of the book that Bunuel really gets down to the films he made, often on amazingly low budgets and mostly in Mexico. Damned as anti-clerical and unpatriotic this goblin of a man probably could not create a school of film-makers as did the French and German directors of his period. He was far too uncommercial, certainly in his earlier days, and far too innovative, in the abstract rather than technical sense for that.

Whether speculating on who stole a dead man's copy of de Sade, dressing up for a Paris Ball, visiting Charles Chaplin, destroying his hosts Christmas tree or merely making films, Bunuel's recollections, whether wholly accurate or as Bunuel says 'certain false memories have undoubtedly remained,' the book is a delight.

JAMES MORTON

SHORTER REVIEWS

Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament. (Butterworth Law Publishers. £52.50). Erskine May's great work was first published shortly after the Reform Bill of 1832 and has now reached its twentieth edition, under the editorship of Sir Charles Gordon, Clerk of the House of Commons, assisted by nine assistant editors. It is, of course, the acknowledged authority upon all aspects of practice in our Parliament at Westminister. It also carries great weight in the parliaments of the Commonwealth. It covers within its 2,000 pages the various developments since the last edition was published in 1976. These include the administrative reorganisation following the House of Commons (Administration) Act, 1978, changes in the voting of funds, a new chapter dealing exclusively with the organisation and conduct of business in the House of Lords; and a new section on the practice of sound broadcasting in the two Houses has been included. The decision of the Lords to introduce television was too late for inclusion. Many will regret the omission, after four editions, of the Appendix of Unparliamentary Expressions. 'Such a list,' explains Sir Charles, 'can never be exhaustive and its value to the Chair appears increasingly doubtful'. There is a section on contempt of parliament. This really deserves much more detailed treatment, particularly as it bears on the general public as well as members. Probably the most important constitutional development since 1976, and quite rightly described by the Editor as 'momentous', has been the institution in 1979 of the fourteen select committees with the function of probing and reporting upon the work of government departments, with very considerable powers of investigation. This volume deals with the practice of these committees, primarily. The general purpose must be to restore the authority of Parliament over the Executive; and experience of the last four years shows that progress is being made.

Edwardian Children (Hutchinson. £9.95). This book, superbly produced, is a fascinating account by Joanna Smith of the family life of prosperous upper and middle class families after the death of Queen Victoria in 1901 until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. 'It was a life of unsophisticated treats and pleasures, calm and secure', with spacious houses, and numerous domestic servants. The children were brought up strictly, usually in their early years under the loving but dominating care of the nanny. In this account, Joanna Smith, herself a product of this age, has brought together tape recordings of numerous conversations with people who grew up during this period. 'Some inaccuracy and distortion,' she writes, 'there must be in the spoken word but in compensation there is the freshness of memories which have risen naturally to the surface of the mind and which have not been checked, labelled and arranged for a written memoir'. There is in the result a vitality and realism in this story of social and family behaviour which has inevitably passed away. The book is greatly enhanced by the contemporary photographs.

Light Thickens. (Collins. £1.50). Ngaio Marsh's last and best selling novel is now conveniently reprinted in the Fontana paperback edition. It was written shortly before her death in February 1982. Her autobiography is also now published in this paperback edition.

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Contemporary Review

119th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

MARCH 1984

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Contents *Page*

United States Policy in the Middle East: the Dilemma of the Arab-Israeli Conflict	Artin H. Arslanian	113
Cyprus: a Final Partition?	Hari Stajner	120
Chile's Problem of the Three Thirds	Roland Dallas	125
Wastelands in Amazonia	Thomas Land	131
Metropolitan and District	K. P. Poole	133
The Orwell in Suffolk	John Elsom	138
Private Enterprise in West Germany	Alfred Landor	143
The Buddha, his Democratic and Basic Human Rights	Buddhadasa Kirthisinghe	145
The Genius of Venice 1500-1600 at the Royal Academy, London	Cyril Fradan	151
Quarterly Record Review	David Fingleton	155
Correspondence: Health Hazards Abroad	William S. Butler	159
The Computer or the Pen	B. Narpati	160
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		161
Lord Longford, Esmond Wright, Kenneth Lindsay, Mark Cook, Betty Abel		
SHORTER REVIEWS		167

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© 1983 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H. G. Leates Ltd., 45/47 Alexandra St., Southend-on-Sea, Essex. U.S. Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N.Y. 10022. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £14.50, U.S.A. and Canada $47.50. Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U.S. and Canada; extra costs given on request. U.S. Postmaster: please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, New York N.Y. 10022. (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

March 1984 Vol. 244 No. 1418

UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE DILEMMA OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

by Artin H. Arslanian

UNTIL the Second World War, missionary, educational and philanthropic activities were the most striking aspects of the American involvement in the Middle East. These pursuits, coupled with the legacy of President Woodrow Wilson's espousal of the principle of national self-determination, created for the US a reservoir of good-will. This was squandered, in spite of liberal economic and military assistance to various states, by the introduction of strategic and political ends primarily shaped by the Cold War ethos and commitments to Israel. American prestige declined precipitously because of the conflicting goals of this new policy and the false assumptions which informed it. Some of the most glaring of problems with US post-war policy appeared in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict—problems that continue to bedevil the Reagan administration.

American entry into the Middle Eastern politcial arena after the Potsdam Conference was a response, in the first instance, to British inability to counter Soviet efforts to spread their power and influence into the warm waters of the Mediterranean. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 aimed to neutralise both Soviet involvement in the Greek civil war and threats to Turkey. Truman's goal was to contain Russia within its existing borders in order to secure for the West the strategic assets and oil resources of the Middle East. This Policy of Containment became the major thrust of the US post-war involvement. It was premised on the assumption that, unlike the western nations, the Soviet Union had no legitimate interests in this region and thus should keep out of it. A corollary to this assumption was that the US was not merely attempting to frustrate the ambitions of its rival but, rather, waging a crusade for 'Christianity versus communism, spirituality versus atheism,' and freedom versus tyranny.[1]

Soon another goal was added to the United States policy, that of maintaining the security and integrity of the newly-established state of Israel. This commitment mirrored the moral obligation felt by the US public to the Jews. It was also reflected in the platforms of the two major political parties. By undertaking this task, the US placed itself in the same predicament in which the Balfour Declaration had placed the British: how could a constructive relationship be maintained with two irreconcilable

antagonists? The British failed to resolve this dilemma—the US is still struggling with it.

Successive US administrations postulated that military and economic aid would facilitate the success of US policy Such assistance would enable the Middle Eastern countries to strengthen their defences, presumably against Russia, and 'modernise' their economies thereby improving the standard of living of their citizens. Such accomplishments would stabilise these regimes, halt the march of world communism, usher in the age of prosperity and rising expectations, and make the Arab states reluctant to risk newly-acquired economic gains by fighting Israel.[2]

Thus, for the US, foreign aid became a dimension of foreign policy, a relationship which has remained relatively unchanged.[3] Aid was given for both military and economic projects. Economic assistance was administered under a variety of programmes such as the Point IV, Public Law 480, AID, etc. The preponderance of US assistance, however, was earmarked for military purposes. Thus, in the years 1947 to 1959 US military assistance to the Middle East was $1.93 billion of which about 90% went to Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan—countries either sharing borders with Soviet Russia or very close to it. Of the $540 million in aid to the Middle East in 1953, $410 million was given in military aid mainly to Turkey, Greece and Iran.[4] It is estimated that in the years 1946 to 1968 one half of the total US economic aid to the Third World went to twelve countries 'contiguous to the Communist bloc of countries.'[5] The Soviet Union too followed a similar policy and matched the US 'project for project,' and arms sale for arms sale in pursuit of comparable political and strategic goals.[6] By the end of 1963 the US had allocated to the Arab countries $795 million in grants and $584 million in loans for technical and economic assistance while in the same period the Soviet Union granted or loaned about $1.2 billion.[7]

In several Middle Eastern countries US aid helped to accelerate developments unanticipated by the US government. Assistance was channelled through established governments several of which were monarchies or conservative oligarchies representing extremely narrow socio-economic interests. In many cases those in power appropriated large portions of the US aid, or used part of it to float projects which did not serve the needs of the majority but the interests of those in power. The already existing gap between the ruling elites and the ruled widened, and the US became perceived as the ally of these in power and as such the oppressor of the masses. Thus, the US economic aid to Iraq, Iran and Lebanon helped accentuate the existing economic and political inequities which in the long run resulted in the fall of those in power or in civil war. Iraq and Iran, along with Turkey the pillars of US Policy of Containment, changed their political orientation following popular military revolutions which brought into office governments less inclined to identify themselves with US policy.

In the long run, US policy in the Middle East proved to be a qualified failure. The policy of counteracting the growth of communism or socialism

(interchangeable words in the Cold War parlance) and dampening internal unrest by the infusion of economic aid was patterned after the Marshall Plan. But the Middle East is not Western Europe. The larger segment of the population of this region did not share the background, skills, education, economic wherewithal and the aspirations of Western Europeans. For many Middle Easteners the desire to become fully independent from the military or economic imperialism of the West was far more important than the state of the quality of their life if only because they had no means of envisioning a life much different from their Hobbesian circumstances. For others the Cold War ideology made no sense at all as they failed to see any material indication of sinister Soviet plans to overtake their countries. The only foreign armies roaming the Middle East belonged to 'freedom loving' France, Britain (the Suez crisis of 1956) and the United States (the Lebanese civil war of 1958).

A great number of Arabs did not feel they were part of a 'free world,' and it is not surprising that they were uninterested in spending their energies to protect this illusory freedom from, as far as they were concerned, an equally imaginary threat. For the majority of Arabs the enemy was closer home—in Palestine.[8] Their great obsession was to avenge the humiliation they suffered at the hands of Western Powers which helped to establish the state of Israel and overtly or covertly supported its expansionist policies. Although the Palestinian Problem is not the main priority of all Arab states it is a major problem for all. Life would be less complicated for all if a Palestinian entity could be brought into being in the West Bank and in Gaza. It is not Lebanon alone that shelters a strong Palestinian community which has the capacity to destabilise the whole country; Syria and especially Jordan share the same predicament.

Syria, Egypt and Jordan have fought four unsuccessful wars against Israel and, ironically, happen to be among the poorest countries in the Middle East. All three need to adopt new methods of technology in farming, a task which requires the investment of significant amounts of capital. Only about 3% to 5% of Egypt's land is arable; there are serious problems with salination of the soil and a tremendous population growth that cannot be sustained by local resources. In Syria and Jordan (without the West Bank) marginal lands are under cultivation, half of the land lies fallow every year, and only 10% of arable land is irrigated.[9]

The badly needed capital for agriculture and the industrial sector, however, is being diverted to military purposes. Data regarding national product and income is inadequate for most Middle Eastern countries. Only in the case of Israel and Egypt can calculations be attempted with a semblance of accuracy. In both cases it is incontestable that military expenditures have caused irreparable harm to the economies.

Egypt failed to make up for the loss of economic growth caused by its military expenditures in 1967. Similar spendings in the following years were diverted from capital originally earmarked for gross capital formation. Egypt spent 7.4% of its GNP on defence in the years 1961 to 1965, 13% of its GNP in the years 1969 to 1970, and has been allocating 30%

of its GNP for this purpose since 1974. While in early 1960s national income rose at the rate of 6% yearly, this growth rate fell by half during the years 1965 to 1970—a rate roughly equal to the population increase. Since 1973 Egypt has been receiving over $1 billion a year from the US in economic assistance—the price paid to get Egypt to sign a separate agreement for peace with Israel. In Israel the percentage of the GNP devoted to defence rose from 6.9% to 20.6% in the years 1960 to 1970. This was paid for partly by reduced gross capital investment but mostly by cuts in private and public consumption and increased reliance on US aid.[10] The US 'Chequebook Diplomacy' continues to whet the appetite of Israeli and Egyptian leaders for a greater degree of US economic support to enable them to patch up their shattered economies and continue their military build-up. Thus, the US, besides increasing the dependence of both the Israeli and Egyptian economies on foreign aid and fuelling the arms race in the Middle East, has seriously curtailed the flexibility and effectiveness of its policy in other parts of the globe. The US administration plans to allocate to Egypt and Israel about 75 per cent of its foreign military sales and 60 per cent of its economic assistance in 1983. This leaves relatively little for US friends and allies elsewhere.[11]

The US Government's Middle East policy has been largely shaped by the fear of a growing Soviet influence—even dominance—in this region. The Middle Eastern countries situated on or near the borders of Russia—Turkey, Iraq, and Iran—have received most of the attention and aid of the US. A strong Israel has usually been considered the best instrument for keeping the stability of the rest of the region.[12] Moreover, the US seems to have adopted the policy of arms sales to all parties in the Middle East as the easiest way to make friends and the most efficient means for paying for the increasing price of its oil imports. In 1978 alone the US sold Saudi Arabia over $5 billion worth of military hardware. However, the Iranian experience has revealed the possible disastrous long-term effects of such a policy to US interests.[13] The petrodollars which are accumulating in the oil-rich Arab countries can be invested with great productivity in the Middle East once the explosive political and military situation in this region is defused. These long-term investments, coupled with US technology and expertise, can easily trigger an economic miracle in the Middle East. Once invested in this manner the Arab petrodollars will no longer pose the threat they do now as liquid reserves which, if moved away from the US dollar, might wreak havoc on the US economy and the world monetary system.[14]

The Arab-Israeli conflict frustrated successive US administrations. It was this conflict that provided the Soviet Union with its *entrée* into the Middle East as the champion of the Arab cause—and Moscow hopes to increase its leverage by perpetuating and exploiting the turmoil in the region. But Soviet successes have been limited. Moscow's role has primarily been that of the spoiler of US plans or the provider of regimes with anti-Western orientations. However, as the tribulations of the PLO in Lebanon in the past year have proved, the Soviet Union is unable (or

unwilling) to play a positive role in the Middle Eastern arena or take risks for the sake of its allies. Even the leaders of radical Arab governments clearly recognise the serious limitations of Soviet material, military and political support.

The shortcomings of Soviet policy coupled with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 provided new opportunities for the United States. The absolute impunity and ease with which Israel invaded and occupied southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut irrevocably dispelled the myth of Israeli vulnerability to the attacks of its Arab neighbours. These events proved that it will take more than guerilla incursions into Israeli borders and individual or collective threats from Arab leaders to threaten Israel's territorial integrity—let alone its survival. Moreover, Israel destroyed its own assiduously-cultivated image of the innocent victim of international terrorism. The lives of the helpless civilian victims of ruthless Israeli bombardment of southern Lebanese cities and Beirut were not qualitatively inferior to those of harmless Israelis who perished at the hands of Palestinian guerillas. Israel finally came to be perceived as just another state, shorn of its mystical and moral mantle, displaying traits of aggression and ruthlessness which astonished many of its supporters in America.

The unfailing commitment of the American public opinion to Israel's independence and territorial integrity has never been in question. However, past US administrations consistently refused to define the nature and boundaries of this commitment. On the contrary, they practically gave a blank cheque of support to Israel by refusing or failing to restrain its most extreme actions. Thus, the US was perceived by international public opinion as the ally—and the collaborator—of an Israel that treats its Arab residents as second-class citizens and pursues a policy of expansionism and oppression in the West Bank, Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip. The failure of US governments to establish the semblance of an even-handed Middle Eastern policy damaged US prestige and interests abroad. Added to this was the growing unwillingness of US taxpayers, themselves caught in the grips of an economic recession, to subsidise Israel's military adventures at a time when they were suffering curtailment of essential social services at home. These developments abroad and at home played an important role in bringing about the significant, if long overdue, clarifications of the nature and extent of US commitment to Israel in President Reagan's 'Fresh Start for Peace in the Middle East' address of 1 September, 1982.

The Reagan administration's new initiative in the Middle East indicated an important shift in US policy. Although the Camp David agreement recognised the resolution of the Palestinian Question in the context of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza as a precondition for peace between Arab countries and Israel, President Carter assumed the role of a moderator. A solution was to evolve out of Israeli-Egyptian-Jordanian negotiations with the indirect participation of Palestinians. President Reagan has transformed the US role to that of an active

participant by setting down a US peace plan—an open admission of the bankruptcy of the Camp David approach. Commitments to Israel were clearly defined: the US reiterated its 'ironclad' guarantee to the security, independence and territorial integrity of Israel, and made its recognition by its Arab neighbours the *sine qua non* for the peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The US government, however, clearly disassociated itself from former Premier Begin's expansionist policies by explicitly refusing to recognise the extensions of Israeli sovereignty over the occupied territories and by opposing new additions to Israeli settlements. In spite of US assertions that Palestinian autonomy should be exercised in association with Jordan, rather than in an independent Palestinian state, the new premise informing US policy was crucially important. The US government finally acknowledged that peace could not be achieved without its active and even-handed participation and without the satisfaction of the basic national aspirations of both the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs. The most crucial of the requirements of both groups has been the right for national self-determination within the context of a homeland. Undoubtedly, some degree of compromise was required to satisfy some or part of the other demands of both parties—but such a resolution could not take place if the basic demand for national self-determination within a territorial context (whether it is called a state, homeland or something else) was denied. President Reagan's emphatic and unambiguous assertion that this basic Palestinian claim should not be overshadowed by Israeli counterclaims removed the major stumbling block to the success of US policy.

Less than a year after its announcement, however, 'Fresh Start' became just another mirage in the heat of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Reagan administration killed its own policy-initiative by failing to back it with the economic and military leverage at its disposal. Deeds were needed to convince the Israeli government and the public, as well as the Palestinians and King Hussain, of the seriousness of US commitments and intentions. Israel's support was the key to the success of Reagan's policy. This might have brought King Hussain to the negotiation table with the support of the majority of Palestinians who—the public stance of most PLO leaders notwithstanding—have given up on military solution and see political compromise as the only way to resolve their differences with Israel. Syria, even with the support of the Soviet Union, could not have prevented the implementation of an agreement enjoying the support of Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the leaders of Palestinian communities in the West Bank and Gaza.

The Reagan administration, preoccupied with Central America and the East-West conflict, turned its back to the Palestinian Question after the initial setbacks suffered by 'Fresh Start.' No attempts were made to coax the Begin government into serious negotiations on Palestinian autonomy and stop the creation of new settlements in the West Bank by making such concessions the condition for future US military and economic assistance. Only such a resolute and forceful policy could have influenced

the Israeli government.[15] The US failed to 'stay the course'—and used the lame excuse that the policy of putting pressure on Israel would simply backfire.

The ever-growing numbers of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, the failure of the Reagan administration to 'stay' its course, and the open season for US Presidential primaries with its myriad candidates outdoing each other in their outpourings of unconditional support of Israel seem to have made 'Fresh Start' as dead as Camp David. As a consequence all parties stand to lose much in the long run. An Israeli state recognised by its Arab neighbours would have brought to fruition the Zionist dream. A homeland for Palestinians would have removed the major cause of strife in the Middle East, alleviated the internal Palestinian pressure on several Arab regimes, opened up great opportunities for regional economic co-operation, and enabled the local governments to redirect their energies to badly needed internal reforms, reconstruction and economic growth. Finally, a prosperous and relatively peaceful Middle East, besides being a blessing to its beleaguered inhabitants, would have provided the strongest defence of US national interests in that region.

NOTES:

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6. *Ibid.* p. 24.
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13. Polk, p. 376.
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CYPRUS: A FINAL PARTITION?

by Hari Stajner

'WHAT was done today was simply to confirm the existing situation and give our state a new name'.

This is the substance of the Declaration proclaiming the 'Turkish State of Northern Cyprus'. And however much the present writer, like a great majority of people throughout the world, may disapprove of this unilateral action, one must admit that what Rauf Denktash did on November 15, 1983, was in fact to formalise a state of affairs that had existed for years.

First of all, for almost ten years, alongside the legitimate Republic of Cyprus, internationally recognised, there existed on Cyprus a 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus'. The Turkish 'state' in the northern part of the island even had a president, (Rauf Denktash), an elected parliament and an acting government. This part of Cyprus, inhabited by Cypriot Turks, did not recognise the other part, the legal Cypriot government, parliament or president. Practically speaking, the jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus did not extend to this part of the island. The conclusion, therefore, might be that the proclamation of a new Cypriot 'state' was just a slight change of name and a formalisation of a state of affairs that was actually in being.

This is one possible interpretation. But immediately a whole set of questions arises, refuting a formal approach of this kind. If, for example, the aim was to create an independent state, why was it not promptly announced that foreign (Turkish) troops would be asked to withdraw from this part of the island? Is this because neither the previous 'state' nor the present one could exist without the presence of approximately 25,000 Turkish soldiers? One inevitably sees a parallel with the Hengh Samrin regime in Kampuchea which, once having come to power on the bayonets of Vietnamese soldiers, likewise proclaimed an 'independent state', maintained today solely by their presence.

The following question might also be asked: if the international community—that is to say, the United Nations and virtually all the countries of the world—has recognised one Cypriot state and government even if this may seem generally unsatisfactory, by what right can a part of that state, despite an existing constitution and laws, separate and unilaterally proclaim a new 'state'? This is simply secession, separation from an existing, legitimate state, which the international community, and especially multinational states, cannot accept.

Thus it is obvious that an unsatisfactory state of affairs is not justification for what happened on November 15 in the Turkish section of Nicosia. This is further supported by the fact that a whole month and a half after the proclamation of the new 'state' in northern Cyprus it has been recognised by only one country (Turkey). This is in all probability Rauf Denktash's greatest disappointment.

The United Nations, namely the Security Council, the Commonwealth Conference, the European Economic Community, the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and finally the Islamic Conference in Dacca have all withheld recognition from the new Cypriot creation. In some resolutions like the one adopted by the Security Council with 13 voting in favour, one against (Pakistan) and one abstention (Jordan), the secession of the Turkish Cypriots has been declared invalid and its retraction called for.

Therefore, there is no doubt whatsoever that the international community will not accept a unilateral action of this kind and cannot condone a policy based on a *fait accompli.* But one must not deceive oneself. Just as the proclamation of the new 'state' of the Cypriot Turks has changed nothing vital in the existing situation, likewise withholding recognition will probably not change the situation essentially in this part of the island, nor the decision of November 15.

The Security Council resolution, like many decisions of the UN General Assembly pertaining to Cyprus, may very easily remain a dead letter. This is very likely what Rauf Denktash was counting on; and also on the fact that certain events in world history, even when based on illegal action or the use of armed force, have their own specific logic and dynamics. 'If not today, then tomorrow'—this mode of reasoning and acting has unfortunately been gaining ground recently, occasionally even eventually producing the desired result.

Yet this in no way means that the international community can and should reconcile itself to a policy of *fait accompli.* It is precisely because recognition of the 'state' of the Cypriot Turks would mean a final and lasting partition of the island, its state and two peoples that the international community did not accept this unilateral act of proclaiming a Cypriot Turkish 'state'. If nothing else, it has expressed a forceful moral condemnation of Denktash's action.

If one begins with the fairly realistic assumption that in view of his experience with the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' the leader of the Cypriot Turks must have expected this reaction from international opinion, the question necessarily arises as to why he embarked upon such a hazardous adventure. It appears to be a gross oversimplification to accept the answer—also voiced these days—that it was merely a question of the old, unfulfilled ambitions of Rauf Denktash to found a state and be its president. Judging by historical facts and events, especially in recent years, this would not be the right answer. Let us, therefore, recall a few of the more important facts connected with Cyprus's brief history as a state.

When in 1960 British colonial rule on the island was abolished and the independent Republic of Cyprus proclaimed, neither the Greek majority nor the Turkish minority was completely satisfied. The former because they had not obtained *Enosis,* unification with Greece; the latter because they had not achieved *Taksim,* division of the island. The solution with a Cypriot Greek, Archbishop Makarios, as president, and a Cypriot Turk, Kucuk, as vice-president, and a corresponding division of other offices,

only temporarily appeased the centuries-old mistrust of the two communities. In 1963 when President Makarios proposed constitutional changes that greatly favoured the Cypriot Greeks, serious conflicts ensued, continuing into the following year. The United Nations then sent peace-keeping forces. Three years later fighting flared up again, and Greece and Turkey were at the brink of war. In their region the Cypriot Turks set up a parallel administration, and the capital of Nicosia was divided into Greek and Turkish sectors.

The actual partition of the island state dates from 1974. The Greek National Guard on the island, under the influence or even following instructions from the military junta in Athens, carried out a coup d'etat in July of that year. Makarios fled Cyprus. Nikos Sampson took over, persecuting with equal zeal Makarios' supporters, left-wingers and the Cypriot Turks. To prevent, probably, an intended unification of Cyprus with Greece and the expulsion of the Cypriot Turks, Turkish prime minister Ecevit ordered an invasion. About 30,000 Turkish troops invaded Cyprus. From a distance of 800 kilometres the Greek military junta was unable to undertake military intervention. Sampson resigned, and the junta in Greece was overthrown.

The United Nations obtained a truce in Cyprus. But in August Turkish forces started a new offensive. The tanks came to a halt at the 'Attila', or 'Green Line'. This became the real border, the division of the two Cypriot communities, since in the meantime nearly all the Cypriot Turks living in the south had moved to the northern part, and about 200,000 Cypriot Greeks had abandoned their homes and all their property, fleeing south. During the following year, 1975, the Cypriot Turks proclaimed the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus', and since then every year the General Assembly has in vain called for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island.

Although there have been periods when the members of the two communities lived in peace and as good neighbours, it is certain that mutual distrust regarding the real intentions of the other side continued to smoulder. Here, we will not go into the reciprocal accusations of the Cypriot Greeks and Turks regarding brutal acts, persecution and abuse, committed by one side or the other. There were no substantial changes during the period of accession to independence in 1960, when the Cypriot Turks claimed that they were not on an equal footing, that they were neglected, looked down upon, while the Cypriot Greeks accused the other side of preventing effective administration of the country.

Even after the Turkish occupation of over one-third of the territory in the northern part of the island in 1974—and it is estimated that at least 20,000 Turkish soldiers remain on Cyprus under the aegis of the United Nations and the protection of the UN peace-keeping forces—representatives of the two communities occasionally met for talks. The present secretary-general of the world organisation, who had been a UN representative in Cyprus, announced in 1983 new proposals for a federative settlement for Cyprus. A meeting was set up for President Kyprianou and

the leader of the Turkish community, Denktash. Then instead of negotiations, Rauf Denktash proclaimed a new 'state'.

Why did he do this at that particular moment? The real and full truth will naturally emerge later. Now, one can only surmise.

There is a fairly widespread opinion, which does not lack a certain logic, that Denktash wanted, among other things, to take advantage of a certain *interregnum* in Turkey. There the parliamentary elections held after long years of military rule were won by Ozal, leader of the Motherland Party. A new government, however, was not formed immediately, so there was a period during which the army was handing over the reins, and the civilian government, i.e. Ozal, had not yet assumed power. Neither the former government, nor the present one can be accused of complicity in the Cypriot secession.

Officially therefore Turkey, like everyone else, was surprised by Denktash's decision. Many, however, claim that as far as Ankara is concerned, it was well directed acting, and that the leader of the Cypriot Turks would not have dared to take such a step without the knowledge, even approval of the Turkish ruling circles. Yet others mention the constant difficulties that Turkey has had with the West, particularly over accusations of violating human rights at the time of the military regime, and they assert that Turkey cannot afford the luxury of new accusations of participation in the partitioning of Cyprus. But if it is true that the Turkish leaders do not agree with Denktash's decision, if the army was really surprised, why do they allow their protegé to dictate the rules of the game? Regardless of who is right, Denktash and the whole world knew that if the leader of the Cypriot Turks finally carried out the long-threatened secession of the northern part of the island, Turkey would in any case recognise the new state.

This is precisely what Ankara did the very next day but, as we have seen, Turkey is the only country to have done so. In selecting the moment for proclaiming the new 'state' of the Cypriot Turks, Rauf Denktash, an experienced politician, surely had also in mind the general international situation, particularly in the neighbouring region—the Near East. Cyprus is situated in a region rocked by the tragedy of Lebanon, exposed to conflicts spreading from the Near East to the Persian Gulf. When viewing the problem of Cyprus in general, and particularly in the present circumstances, one must not forget the vital geo-political and strategic importance of the island in the eastern Mediterranean.

It is, for instance, no secret that the US has been trying for years to make Turkey a springboard for eventual military operations in the Gulf region and the Arabian peninsula. The events in Iran and Afghanistan, the war between Iran and Iraq, the civil war in Lebanon, have only strengthened the Pentagon's desire to secure bases in the vicinity for its Rapid Deployment Forces. Turkey is a member of NATO and to a large extent depends on economic aid from the West.

If some day, as a return favour (say, for recognising the state of the

Cypriot Turks) the Americans were to obtain the right to use Geçitkale, it would be an important gain for NATO. In the Greek sector of Cyprus, the British still have two military bases (Akrotiri and Dhekelia) and the Americans have radar installations in the Troodos Mountains. For the Cypriot Greeks these bases were trump cards which they used from time to time in negotiations with the British and Americans, threatening to shut down the bases. But if Geçitkale were equipped and placed at the disposal of the Americans and NATO, then the Cypriot Greeks would lose their advantage.

For the time being, however, these are merely assumptions. Yet in the present-day world, where bloc interests are shown so frequently and so unscrupulously, this geo-political aspect of the latest Cypriot crisis cannot be overlooked.

What is absolutely certain is the fact that the proclamation of the 'state' of the Cypriot Turks, despite allegations to the contrary from Denktash and his supporters, has created new tensions, not just on the island but over a wider area. This affects, above all, relations between Greece and Turkey, two NATO members, which in any case have been—and not just because of Cyprus—exceedingly strained for several years.

For some time, unfortunately, Cyprus has not furnished the idyllic picture of Aphrodite's island described in travel leaflets. The sombre political picture of the divided island contrasts sharply with the unquestioned beauty of the country where the pine and cedar-covered Troodos Mountains rise above the blue expanse of the Mediterranean. With armed soldiers, barbed wire and man-made barriers dividing the country and towns along the 'Attila', or 'Green Line', and the sound of gunfire, not infrequent and claiming an occasional victim, the vision of Aphrodite becomes increasingly obscure.

At the same time there are diminishing prospects of the two Cypriot communities reaching an agreement to live together as good neighbours in a single state. There is, however, a paradoxical side to the situation.

Rauf Denktash, a lawyer by profession and a very skilful politician who speaks Greek fluently, despite his separatist leanings, belongs to the generation of Cypriot Turks who once lived in a united Cyprus, together with their Greek neighbours. As time passes, the longer the two communities remain separated, there are fewer people around of this generation. The separation and alienation of the Cypriot Greeks and Turks are a further encouragement to those—both on the island and elsewhere—who desire and might eventually sanction the partition of the island. But could a Cyprus divided forever survive? Would this improve the quality of life for both Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks?

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CHILE'S PROBLEM OF THE THREE THIRDS

by Roland Dallas

CHILE is a sad, sad place these days. Along the elegant shopping malls in the city centre of Santiago vendors offer their wares: a handful of ball-point pens, a half-dozen brown socks or a set of car tools, laid out on sheets of brown paper. They look hungry. Executives, made redundant in the slump, drive taxis; but there are too many taxis in Santiago and the tariff is too low to yield a living without working inhumanly long hours. In the shanty-towns outside the capital, there are no jobs; and the welfare state has been abolished by the 'Chicago boys' who rule Chile's economy. The easiest way out is through theft and prostitution. In the 'tent cities', where many thousands of homeless have seized land in hopes of one day building a shanty-town, the atmosphere is one of desperation.

This is a land in a deep slump. The gross national product fell by about 14% in 1982. It fell again slightly last year. At least 30% of the workforce is unemployed.

For the past ten years Chile has been ruled by General Augusto Pinochet, whose rating in a public opinion poll late last year was 35%. Although most Chileans want him to leave office, there is little prospect that he will. The opposition is disorganised; the middle classes have not decided which way to turn; and there is no obvious way out. A dramatic change, like the one which sent the army back to its barracks in Argentina and led to the election of Raul Alfonsin as president, is not on the cards. This lack of direction has added to the sadness in Chile.

Change is possible, in two ways: through a speeded-up transition from military to civilian rule over the next three years; or by the collapse of the Pinochet government caused by the desertion of the Chilean establishment and the middle classes (most of whom see the general still as a source of stability). Vigorous efforts are being made by the proponents of both lines of action. But success would come as a surprise.

For the foreseeable future, Chile will remain in the hands of the armed forces. The mayor of Santiago will be a general. Around General Pinochet's office in the Moneda palace, staff officers will continue to rule supreme, clicking heels to each other and to visitors. Yet there is no obvious alternative. In Argentina, there were two known quantities rivalling each other to replace the generals: the Peronists, with their ugly reputation for political gangsterism, and the mainly middle-class Radicals. In Chile, politics is divided three ways: conservatives, mainly belonging to the National party; centre-left Christian Democrats; and assorted parties of the Marxist left including the Communists and faction-ridden Socialists. This three-way division makes for much uncertainty. It worries the United States, which wants to be sure that the democratic two-thirds of the population has its candidate in the presidency.

In the last presidential election, the candidate of the left, Salvador

Allende, scraped in with 36% of the vote. This was mainly because the Christian Democratic candidate, Radomiro Tomic, was a garrulous leftist whose platform parroted much of Allende's; he turned the middle-class voter off. In the previous election, in 1964, the opposite happened: the Christian Democratic candidate, Eduardo Frei, attracted all of the moderate vote of the political centre and the conservatives grudgingly decided to swing their vote to him in order to keep out Allende. The situation now is confused. Frei gave Chile six years of modest economic growth in a peaceful and open society. He sought a middle way between the Marxism of Allende and the conservatism of Jorge Alessandri, the previous president and standard-bearer of the National party. It was not a perfect government. Inflation ran at 25% or more, a high level in those days, and the balance of payments was regularly in deficit. But growth of the gross domestic product was never much under 5% a year. Frei promised a 'revolution in liberty' and produced some substantial reforms. He promised to redistribute half of the country's irrigable land to 100,000 families; he managed to take over one-third of the large estates' irrigable land and distributed it and other non-irrigable land to 21,000 families.

Frei carried this out legally, through parliament, while subject to all of the usual pressures. His Marxist successor, Allende, did more in 18 months than Frei did in six careful years, expropriating land and turning it over to collective ownership. But Allende's drastic action was one of many which led to General Pinochet's coup.

Chile remained an open society under Allende, but the ground was clearly being prepared for a Marxist dictatorship. Private enterprise was steadily being taken over. Congress was regularly bypassed by Allende's appointment of 'interventors' who ran companies that had been bankrupted by the government's controls on the prices of their products and inflationary wage increases.

Allende's support among the poor and the left did not diminish. In March, 1973, congressional elections gave him 43% of the vote against 55% for the combined centre and conservative opposition. This result has been challenged by the opposition on the grounds that some rigging took place. Nonetheless, even assuming that 10% was rigged, Allende's policies clearly won the support of the left-wing third of the electorate.

General Pinochet evidently believed that this left-wing third had to be purged. Many Chileans were expelled from their own country. The cruelty of much that took place is all the more shocking for having happened in a quite cultured and civilised society. Torture was still being reported last year by Amnesty International.

One of the saddest aspects of what happened was that decent Chileans, delighted to see the end of an unmistakable Communist threat, enthusiastically collaborated with one of the world's most violently repressive regimes. They will remain marked by their mistake.

Their best justification is that, despite all its cruelty, the Pinochet dictatorship won the support of 35% of those questioned in a public

opinion poll, published by the magazine *Hoy* last October. As with Allende's one-third of the electorate on the left, Pinochet's one-third on the right remained faithful.

Until last year, the opposition was subdued and repressed, occasionally venturing to raise its voice and usually slapped down hard. Since 1983, it has felt confident enough to challenge the regime, mainly because of the slump.

After Pinochet seized power in 1973, he conducted a ruthless purge of the economy to cut state spending and brake runaway inflation, which is said to have reached 400% under Allende. This caused widespread unemployment and hardship but was tolerated because Pinochet's grip on Chile was total. Savage cuts in government spending produced balanced, or nearly balanced, budgets. The 'Chicago boys' took over and applied their free-market ideology. Foreigners were actively encouraged to invest in Chile, and some did so. In latter years, the currency was tied to the dollar, although Chilean inflation was much higher than American inflation. This meant that the peso was over-valued. It was more difficult to export Chilean products and make money. It was also easy for foreign imports to undercut local manufactures. The Chicago boys, contemptuous of the high tariffs which had protected Chile's small and poorly developed industry, slashed most of them to 10%. The result: a flood of imports and the bankruptcy of much of Chilean industry.

Foreign banks found Chile's ideologists to their liking and poured loans into the banks and big corporations of Santiago. Since industry was a bad bet, the money went mostly into property—office and apartment blocks. Little thought was given to how the loans would be paid back. From 1980 to 1982, Chile's total external debt rose by 55.7% to reach $17.3 billion by the end of 1982. Payments have been renegotiated and an IMF load has been obtained.

The Chicago boys betrayed themselves: the free-market ideology assumes a free market for currencies. Had the peso been allowed to float, it would have lost value. Imports would have become more expensive and the flood might have been held back. By pegging the peso to the dollar from 1979 to 1982, however, the regime kept prices down by attracting low-cost imports. That brought lower inflation as well as a wide variety of cheap imported goods to choose from. It looked like a bonanza. The price, however, was high: the devastation of local industry brought high unemployment and the pervasive sadness.

This is how the National Statistics Institute reports the slump from 1972 to 1982 in some of its indices of industrial production (1968 equals 100): Textiles from 113.1 to 40.5; footwear 123.5-44.1; wood products 146.7-71.0; printing 126.4-77.5; leather products 90.0-29.9; rubber manufactures 138.8-56.1; chemicals 150.4-117.9; machinery non-electric 151.5-30.6; electric machinery 104.2-58.8; plastic manufactures 131.7-44.1. The total change was from 122.6 to 87.6.

Chileans paid other prices for the policies of the Chicago boys, for whom

there is no 'free lunch' and charity is admissible only grudgingly. To balance the budget, cuts were made in public health services. Free hospital attention was limited to pregnant women, children and accident victims. Drugs had to be paid for. Working people had to take out their own medical insurance through groups or individually. The indigent could receive charity, but they must produce all the necessary documentation to prove their incapacity to pay. Hospitals are now said to turn away people who do not have the correct documentation or money, American-style.

The 'Chicago boys' damaged Chilean agriculture. After the chaos of Allende, the Pinochet regime distributed state-controlled lands to smallholders—but then left them to sink or swim. In 1978, it removed restrictions on the size of land holding and allowed private corporations to hold farmland. State subsidies for agriculture were abolished and tariffs on imports reduced. State purchasing agencies were withdrawn. Many co-operatives collapsed. Farmers who could not repay dollar-denominated loans sold out. As *The Economist* Intelligence Unit reports:

> A number of private corporations, linked to the conglomerates controlled by the financial clans, now control the purchase, pricing and imports of traditional and non-traditional products... Concentration of landholdings is encouraged. Credit costs at commercial rates have crippled traditional producers and new smallholders alike... The three main fruit exporting companies have all gone bankrupt.

More trouble was caused by the ending of the fixed exchange rate in 1982. It was devalued from 39 to 46 pesos to the dollar, fell later to 66 and is now about 90. This collapse drastically increased the cost of all imports, necessary or unnecessary, and it made the cost of paying back dollar debts astronomically expensive in peso terms. Hence many of the bankruptcies.

Banks have been in trouble, too. The government has taken over five and liquidated two. Several finance houses, whose establishment was encouraged by the regime, have been liquidated. Some of the banks had lent large sums to the conglomerates which owned them, in the free-wheeling atmosphere created by the 'Chicago boys'. The conglomerates then misspent the money. The most impressive economic achievement of the Pinochet regime must be mentioned: production of copper, the country's main export and mainstay of the economy, increased by 67.4% between 1973 and 1982. Unfortunately, the price has been low because of the world recession. It should be pulled upwards by the current economic revival in the United States.

It was in this situation, of economic shambles, human misery and political bitterness, that the events of last year unfolded. The politicians (whose parties are banned but nonetheless are allowed to exist unofficially) felt emboldened by the regime's evident failures, especially because unemployment had reached horrific proportions. Monthly demonstrations began, at first with women banging their pots and pans, later taking the form of marches, disorder and the burning of tyres.

At first, the middle classes took part enthusiastically. Then, seeing the extremists of the Allende era trying to take over, they recoiled. The demonstrations lasted until November, when the summer holidays started. The early ones were unauthorised; the last, a formal one in O'Higgins Park, took place with the approval of the military mayor.

General Pinochet, a student of Clausewitz, realised last year that it was time to make a tactical retreat. He appointed an astute new interior minister, Sergio Onofre Jarpa, a former president of the (conservative) National party and proponent of Pinochet's coup, who had been serving as ambassador in Buenos Aires. (Many National party politicians have held office under Pinochet.) Jarpa's brief was to open a dialogue with the opposition about a slow return to democracy, and to liberalise Chilean society.

He made some notable changes. A great deal of censorship was lifted (though not all, and television was unaffected). The political world seemed to come to life. Jarpa held meetings with the opposition and hopes rose for a return to democracy before 1989. Some strikes were held and the regime, after traditionally brutal first reactions, took a softer line.

But it soon became clear that the dialogue was getting nowhere. Pinochet continued to talk in terms of remaining in power until 1989 and the opposition doubted that he would willingly give up before then.

Jarpa seemed much more determined to restore democracy than Pinochet, but only on the basis of Pinochet's constitution (which allows him to keep office until 1989) and a slow-moving procedure leading to an election of congress, not of a new president. This procedure involved a new law establishing (non-Marxist) political parties, then an electoral law, a law for the new congress, a new voter's roll, and finally an election, perhaps in 1977.

To a conservative like Jarpa, this timetable seemed perfectly reasonable. It was too slow for the opposition. They wanted Pinochet's immediate resignation, an interim military government for 18 months, and an election for congress under the old constitution.

Efforts were made by the archbishop of Santiago, Juan Francisco Fresno, to bring government and opposition together. But both sides were uneasy. Jarpa did not want to sit down and negotiate with Marxists, who belonged to the opposition's democratic alliance. And some of the opposition leaders did not want to seem to be collaborating with the regime, which in any event they did not think was being serious. The opposition suspended the dialogue and set itself the goal of hastening the collapse of the Pinochet regime. It hopes to take over the ruins, Alfonsin-style. But bearing in mind the three-way split of Chilean politics, it is far from clear which direction the opposition will take. This depends not on the conservative third or the leftist third but the one in the middle, belonging to the Christian Democrats.

Under Frei, the Christian Democrats were men and women of the centre and centre-left, strongly anti-conservative and anti-communist. But

there was a leftward drift at the end of Frei's term which led to the nomination of the leftist Tomic as the party's candidate in 1970. Now, the Christian Democrats are working with the (Marxist) Socialist party in the democratic alliance, alone with some small centre parties. The head of the alliance in December was, by monthly rotation, a Socialist who proclaimed himself to be a Marxist. (The Communists are not accepted by the alliance.)

This sort of alliance is unlikely ever to win the support of the centre and the grudging endorsement of the conservatives in the National party, as Frei did. If the present party president, Gabriel Valdes, continues in his post, there will be no chance at all. Valdes, Frei's foreign minister, is a prickly representative of the upper bourgeoisie who belongs to the left of the party. He does not have a great deal of support in the party itself; outside it, his abrasive speeches win few new adherents.

There is one Christian Democratic leader who could achieve a consensus around the political centre: Andres Zaldivar, Frei's finance minister, who was party president until he was expelled from the country by Pinochet. Zaldivar was elected as president of the world association of Christian Democratic parties and still holds the post. He is in his 40s, has a warm and attractive personality, and is a pragmatic man of the centre. He is not a Marxist or a Chicago boy.

The problem of the 'three thirds' persists. In the *Hoy* opinion poll, the most favoured formula for a future government was one of the opposition without Communists (24.2%) followed by the opposition with the Communists (22.7%), the Pinochet regime (21.6%) and the regime led by Jarpa, not Pinochet (12.3%). The poll also showed that 49.6% thought the economy was badly run and 54.1% thought unemployment was the most urgent problem. Nonetheless, 58.9% wanted democracy restored by 1984.

If the Christian Democrats, under Zaldivar, could establish themselves firmly as the party of the centre, as they did under Frei, break their contacts with the Marxist left, and seek the support of the centre-right and centre-left, they might find that the Chilean establishment's backing for Pinochet drains away. Until the Christian Democrats do so, however, the establishment will be cautious about taking a leap in the dark. As things stand, the Christian Democrats are likely to stay in an alliance which includes the Socialists—and out of power. By returning to the tradition of Frei, Zaldivar could lay claim to becoming the Alfonsin of Chile—and replace his country's sadness with some of Argentina's newly found optimism.

[Roland Dallas is editor of *The Economist's Foreign Report.*]

WASTELANDS IN AMAZONIA

by Thomas Land

ALTERNATIONS in the water balance of the upper Amazon basin indicate that the long-feared climatic changes resulting from relentless deforestation in the tropical belt have now begun. The effects of large-scale tree felling in Africa, Asia and Latin America are the subject of a global study involving many research institutions coordinated by the United Nations University. Over the long term, these changes may endanger the agricultural potential of the foremost wheat-yielding areas.

Stretching across nine Latin American countries and comprising the globe's largest tropical forest, the Amazon still holds sufficient timber reserves to supply the world for two decades at its present rate of consumption. But large and uncoordinated forest clearing operations have already created numerous bald patches of wasteland spreading in the once continuous dark woodland—as, indeed, in the tropical forests of Central Africa and the Himalayan foothills. During the past 30 years, about half the world's forests have disappeared.

Increased flooding and a basic change in the Amazonia water balance —recorded by research workers of the Peru Proyeoto Pari Jenaro Herrera and the Missouri Botanical Garden—seem to point towards disastrous long-term consequences. The scientists believe that these phenomena are probably 'the result of increased runoff due to deforestation' and if so, 'the long-predicted regional climatic and hydrological changes that would be the expected result of Amazonian deforestation may already be beginning'.

This could be the start of a self-perpetuating process leading to a rapid degradation of land and the conversion of much of Amazonia to near-desert, the scientists warn. Many climatologists believe that a secondary effect of the destruction of the dark forest carpet might be a 'shinier' globe, shifting rainfall patterns and permanent drought affecting the great breadbasket regions of the northern hemisphere.

Roughly half the rainfall received by the Amazonian basin comprises water recycled into the atmosphere by trees. A massive removal of trees from the area would thus break the transpiration cycle which supports the incomparably rich biosphere including millions of species of plants and animals which occur only locally.

Despite the rapid global deforestation process, commercial demand is catching up with supply even in the timber-rich northern hemisphere. Sweden is expected to run out of export supplies in the 1980s, Canada in the 1990s and the Soviet Union by the end of the century. Two-thirds of the Amazonian forest is still untouched; but the wilderness consistently retreats from a relentless expansion of industrial enterprise.

Peru alone intends to settle two million people in the forest within

five years. Equador and Colombia hope to exploit several oil and gas fields in the jungle, necessitating new pipelines, supply routes and various other ancillary development.

Studies conducted during the past decade in the deforested areas of upper Amazonia along the edges of mountains in Equador and Peru show a consistently increased runoff—in the absence of a significant change so far in the regional rainfall pattern. The high water levels of the Amazon have also increased constantly since 1970 without, however, a corresponding change in the low water levels. The research workers say that the magnitude of the damage is potentially great already since the existing population and agricultural centres of the region tend to lie near the seasonally flooded river margins.

The long-term effects of the change, which could well be self-accelerating and which may apply to the entire tropical belt, are yet beyond comprehension. But the scientists have remarked on 'the rapidity with which relatively limited forest destruction appears to have altered the Amazon water balance'.

[Thomas Land is an author and foreign correspondent who writes on global affairs.]

METROPOLITAN AND DISTRICT

by K. P. Poole

MOST dictionaries define 'metropolis' as the capital city of a country, but now in England there are seven metropolises. It may seem odd that London is the only one that does not incorporate metropolitan boroughs so called. The former metropolitan boroughs of London were partners of the London County Council from the turn of the century until 1965. They were very much the junior partners. Their successors, the London boroughs, are much larger in area and command wider resources and functions. But the notion that they should be all-purpose authorities—that no Greater London Council was necessary—carried little conviction in the early sixties. Arguments about the proposals which became the London Government Act 1963 turned rather on the division of powers between boroughs and GLC and the extent of the areas each should cover.

How different is the situation outside London. Until reorganisation in 1974 the urbanised counties, Lancashire and the West Riding in particular, were punctured by autonomous county boroughs—provincial centres such as Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds and Sheffield and many other proud cities. All were jealous of their independence, and their reluctant acceptance as metropolitan boroughs of co-existing metropolitan counties under the Local Government Act 1972 was made tolerable only by retention of education and personal social service functions.

But the outcome in Greater London and in the six provincial conurbations is now much the same in terms of division of powers and responsibilities; and current rumour that the structure of metropolitan local government is under threat does not usually distinguish between London and the provinces. The tendency for the Labour Party to draw its support from the cities, and to be strongly represented in metropolitan local government, gives rise to the assertion that pressure for change arises solely from the 'Livingstone factor'. It may indeed be that unusual features of the present GLC administration have aroused passions that rarely intrude upon the level pastures of public administration, and that the stimulus to reform is more often outrage than cool reason, but it does not follow that there is not a rational case to be made.

Among those who have made it is Mr. Toby Jessel, M.P. In a letter to *The Times* on 8th January he listed the erosion of functions of the GLC since that council were first elected. They have lost most of their houses and parks to the London boroughs, as well as health and sewerage services; so that their functions (he might have added) now closely resemble those which were from the beginning conferred on metropolitan counties. Unlike them the GLC are involved in education through the Inner London Education Authority, but as counter-balance they do not (despite their appointment of a police committee) share provincial involvement in the police service.

The case for abolishing the GLC—and by implication metropolitan counties—rests upon the belief that their functions can be transferred elsewhere and that the cost of maintaining an elaborate representative body and administrative machine is quite disproportionate to its product. Abolitionists can also pray in aid of the claims of sentiment and tradition: let Huntingdonshire, (with, one may hope, its celebrated register of cabmen), the Ridings of Yorkshire, Middlesex and Rutland arise once more and metropolitan counties and the GLC, along with Avon, Humberside and Cleveland, cease to tarnish the map. More to the point perhaps are the contrived boundaries of the new counties—both metropolitan and non-metropolitan—and their difficulty in capturing the sense of loyalty and local patriotism that ancient boroughs and cities can engender. 'Tyne and Wear' is an abstraction—not so Newcastle, Sunderland and its other component towns.

The present government of metropolises was, however, based on the largely unanimous recommendations of two royal commissions: Herbert (London) 1960 and Redcliffe-Maud (provinces) 1969. Party differences have, at least until recently, focused not on the need for the existence of metropolis-encompassing authorities but rather on their boundaries—Labour favouring more, Conservatives less, extensive confines. Since both reorganisations took place under Conservative governments, some of the leafy suburbs have been retained in adjacent non-metropolitan counties. The other major difference is that the Labour Party would have made the metropolitan counties rather than the boroughs responsible for education.

So it is not surprising that the retentionists have a strong case. Even the most ardent advocates of the revived county borough are hard put to it to argue persuasively that, for example, the police and fire services in the provinces should be handed back to the individual towns in a conurbation, or that land use strategy or public transport arrangements can sensibly be decided separately in, say, the city of Manchester and in Salford and adjacent boroughs. And yet this sort of argument has been heard. It seems perhaps most persuasive when associated with the idea that functions which cannot satisfactorily be performed by districts (i.e. metropolitan or London boroughs) should be exercised not by metropolitan counties but by new regional authorities. By no means all abolitionists advocate a move towards regionalism however, and Conservatives rebut the suggestion that they seek an enlarged GLC so as to enhance their chances of capturing it. Their election success record within its present boundaries is very respectable.

For a variety of reasons elected regional bodies are anyway probably a pipe dream, so Mr. Jessel is surely realistic in acknowledging that if the GLC (and, we may add, metropolitan counties) were to be abolished some ad hoc arrangements would have to be made outside the local government structure. Abolition is often opposed for the very reason that it would be certain to entail what seem even less satisfactory alternatives: extension of central government administration, new ad hoc bodies (stigmatised

as quangos) or joint committees of district councils. All these expedients are habitually reprobated in the local government world as bureaucratic, anti-democratic and as reducing efficiency and the accountability of the administration to those whom it serves.

It is also alleged that alternatives to metropolitan counties necessarily raise the cost of administration. This allegation can probably be discounted. Who can weigh the diseconomies against the economies of scale or prove that quangos are more extravagant than elected bodies? All that is certain about costing alternative institutional systems is that forecasts invariably turn out wrong. Moreover by far the greatest single element in costs—labour—is only marginally affected by changes in administrative superstructure. Government incomes policy—or lack of it—and the vagaries of 'free collective bargaining' are the significant elements in public expenditure, not the pattern of institutions.

The 'democratic accountability' arguments are resorted to by both metropolitan county abolitionists (who claim that district administration is more responsive to local needs) and, as already mentioned, by the retentionists. A model of accountability would presumably place district councils in prime position followed in order by county councils, central government (accountable to M.P.s) and finally quangos and joint committees comprising 'faceless men' appointed by ministers or by local authorities. (Some would put central government—even with local departmental offices—lower down the list). But the accountability argument leans far too heavily on the belief that local authorities are in fact responsive to local needs and wishes. The process of election, it seems sometimes to be implied, has almost sacramental qualities, clothing the elected in 'representativeness'. In practice the poor turnout at local government elections and the composition and blinkered tendencies of councils raise doubts about the working of local democracy. It is plausible, therefore, to suggest that other considerations should be given greater weight in decisions about allocating responsibilities to institutions.

The other considerations are functional: what matters to the public are adequate services, economically provided. Although generalisations about costs are suspect it is possible to offer some tentative conclusions on an institutional structure best suited to these ends. Some services need to be organised so as to respond to the particular needs of different communities (however 'community' is interpreted). Housing and care for the local environment come to mind. Local decision-making seems right. By contrast there are services where minimum standards of provision or uniformity may count for more than local diversity. Protection against fire, refuse disposal and transport planning are examples within this second category, and there seems little reason on 'democratic' grounds to resist professional (and commonsense) opinion that a wide operational area is best. But not all services can readily be categorised in this way. Operational considerations suggest police areas of county or larger dimensions, but as Lord Scarman has recently indicated, and government has now recognised, it is necessary to find means of local consultation to help

temper police practices to the circumstances of particular communities. It is not necessary to endorse the expedient of appointed local liaison committees to believe that diversity in service provision can be reconciled with large operational or administrative areas.

An important functional consideration is the need for co-operation, and, resources being limited, the settlement of priorities, between different services. A new housing estate needs a variety of services of which buses, schools and sewers are a few. A miscellany of separate single-purpose quangos, or the decentralised agencies of government departments, perhaps jealous of their autonomy, seems ill-suited to sort out the problems of provision and reconciliation, just as does a local government pattern under which functions are divided between two tiers.

It is by no means certain that the case for changing the pattern of metropolitan government outweighs the costs of administrative upheaval. But if change really is requisite the arguments rehearsed point towards a multi-purpose, integrating, authority responsible for an area large enough to meet the operational requirements of existing local government (and perhaps other) services but which, by sensitive local administration, recognises and responds to particular local needs. This conclusion recalls the unitary local authorities commended by the Redcliffe-Maud Commission for the whole of England outside major conurbations. It implies ending the division of functions between metropolitan districts and metropolitan county councils which that commission successfully prescribed and, contrary to current advocacy of change, retaining the latter rather than the former, with or without some extension of their boundaries.

Redcliffe-Maud concluded that a unitary authority for a metropolitan area 'would run into difficult managerial problems; democratic control would be hard to achieve; and there would be a serious risk that people would feel remote from their local government'. It is not self-evident that the 'managerial problems' are overwhelming if sufficient delegated authority is given to generalist officers in the field—the equivalent of town clerks without borough councils—to school governors and perhaps to other bodies appointed to oversee the running of institutions. Also, provided that the local office in Barnet, Rochdale or Solihull is accessible, and has power to act on local preferences and complaints, the 'remoteness' of county hall in London, Manchester and Birmingham need count for little; and indeed can never be as great as the remoteness of Barnstaple from the administrative centre of Exeter in the county of Devon.

As for 'democratic control', already alluded to, it is reasonable to hope that local opinion could be better ascertained directly by local government officers put under instruction to seek it out, with the growing aid of information technology; and local administration can be policed both by developing the local government ombudsmen system and by the value-for-money audits that the new Audit Commission is to undertake. In such ways might it be possible to alleviate the problems of scale that the Redcliffe-Maud Commission believed would be endemic in unitary metropolitan government. And the civic pride of boroughs and cities

within a metropolis, it may be thought, needs no bolstering by ballotted big-wiggery.

The conclusion, no longer fashionable, that bigger may mean better in terms of services delivered, may also mean better councils in terms of attractiveness to potential councillors. But it would be foolhardy to end on a note of unqualified optimism: larger and more comprehensive administrations have the potential to commit more comprehensive and far-reaching blunders.

Since this article was prepared, a re-elected Conservative government have proposed abolishing the Greater London Council and the six metropolitan county councils.[1] A White Paper[2] asserts that boroughs are big enough to administer most local services and that the top-tier authorities have had too few real functions, were led to seek a wider role, and overspent by comparison with other local authorities.

Some functions the White Paper acknowledges should still be administered countywide. So there are to be joint boards for public transport, police and fire services. The successful administration of others, e.g. highways and traffic management, refuse disposal and structure planning, is to depend on co-operation between borough councils, with ministers taking new powers to 'help them co-operate'. Ministers are to take other new powers, notably to approve the precepts issued by the joint boards for three years; and there are to be new quangos.

Too much reliance is placed on the readiness of authorities to sacrifice their particular interests and, even where the will exists, on the practicability of bringing separate authorities into unison in the interests of the wider area they severally serve. As things stand, the functions of all local authorities are restricted by the *ultra vires* rule, spending can be limited by specific controls, and the operation of local democracy, wayward as it is, does ensure that the electorate can dismiss high-spending councils.

Dismissing all this, an autocratic government have turned a blind eye to how most local government expenditure is allocated, and have let a short-sighted and narrowly-focused gaze on seeming profligacy by the trendy/woolly headed/militant left justify the destruction of institutions established by previous Conservative governments on the foundation of Royal Commission reports. If the administration of the cities is really to be streamlined, it is boroughs and not counties that should fall.

NOTES

1. Greater Manchester, Merseyside, South Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear, West Midlands and West Yorkshire.
2. Streamlining the Cities (Cmnd. 9063) HMSO October 1983, £3.60.

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THE ORWELL IN SUFFOLK

by John Elsom

RUMOURS of 1984 were much exaggerated. The year is still young, and currently unremarkable, but if anything can be said with total confidence from the vantage point of an attic room in Shepherds Bush, it is that Big Brother is not watching me.

I think.

Of course, one of us could be sleeping.

No, George Orwell was wrong, preaching hell-fire to the uncommitted, typical of the second-rate writer, anything for attention, scaring us rigid just to prove he could write, so that even now, when 1984 has quite innocuously begun, I still have the sneaking suspicion that behind the blandnesses of breakfast television, there may not be some other Presence staring out...

... which might, on reflection, explain a lot!

Who after all would want to go through the trouble of being Frank Bough and wearing those cardigans if he were not concealing an ulterior motive, either on his own behalf or for others? Fashions change, after all, in dictatorships. Last year the staring eyes and the brillo-pad moustache, this year the cardigan and the cheerful 'What-has-the-weather-in-store-for-us-today?' at 7.0 in the morning...

... for Orwell, if I have understood him correctly and bearing in mind that Orwell was not his real name and so he never as Orwell existed except as a river in Suffolk, was concerned with the manipulation of the Citizen in Society... and not the cheerfully extrovert manipulation of the Spanish Inquisition, all racks and thumbscrews, but the devious, underhand and shamelessly modern method of manipulation from within, the thumbscrews on the mind, or Rats as the case may be, in which case the manipulation might very well be unknown, hidden and unrecognised or, in short, as likely to appear in the apparently harmless disguise of a Frank Bough as in leather and jackboots...

In which case...

How would we know?

We might very well be living in *1984* while believing that we were simply passing the time amiably with Bough in 1984!

And Selina Scott!

Is she in on the racket?

... for while I have nothing against them personally and certainly nothing which could stand up in court and give evidence (if our courts any longer require evidence, which I doubt), the fact remains that I am *here*, so to speak, in this attic room, dreading the little buff envelope with Greetings from Gwent and the attention-grabbing letter marked CONFIDENTIAL from my bank manager, while they are *there*...

With Russell Grant, rather over the cusp, if you ask my opinion...

... lounging around at 7.15 in the morning on a huge leather settee which some of us must have paid for out of our licence fees (and I can guess whom), chatting to interesting people and asking stimulating questions—as if there were no such thing as 9.00 and the start of a new working day, God help us!

One has grown accustomed to many injustices in life but not such flaunting of privilege over breakfast.

While Selina is probing Karl Marx about how he actually started to write *Das Kapital* and did it come in a flash?, the rest of us, faceless in our attic rooms, are running around trying to get some order into our lives and some boiled eggs into our stomachs...

Or, to put it even more bluntly, while Frank Bough is thanking Sigmund Freud for coming on their little show and proving what a Renaissance man he really is, the rest of us are grappling with buff envelopes from Gwent in which some official, as faceless as we are, makes quite unreasonable demands on our overdrafts...

For, while I would not go so far as to state that breakfast television is the acceptable face of the Inland Revenue, or of anything else, nevertheless this concatenation of circumstances at 7.30 in the morning might lead one to suspect that Orwell, whoever he was, was right and that there is a certain amount of manipulation going on, in one direction or another...

First the breakfast bouquets, and then the boot!

Or vice-versa.

... and with Russell asserting that it could be a happy day for Scorpios if only you Scorpios can watch your nasty tongues but Aries should sail through the day like the air sign it is, adding auspice to injury!

It is, after all, only the unsubtle regime that resorts to terror and demogogy and knee-jerk patriotism to get its own way and keep itself the right way up, power-wise, on the top and not on the bottom, the rulers and not the ruled. In Britain, as they say, we do things differently. After all, we are a democracy.

Yes, contrary to that hell-fire preacher Orwell, it's one of the first things tourists actually notice about Britain, coming on their package tours from the Lubianka, how free we are, how radiantly free, walking about the streets as if we owned them, not hesitating as we briskly walk to the Underground ticket offices, not a glance over our shoulders as we buy tickets to the Barbican as if the authorities in their permissiveness really don't care who buys tickets to the Barbican, provided we buy them, and how we exercise that freedom by not buying return tickets from the Barbican in case, things being what they are, we lose ourselves when we get there...

... in that labyrinth of civic concrete!

Yes, we Britons, as they say in the tourist brochures, never, never,

never will be slaves. It's just not in the national character, whatever that may mean, we do what we're told of our own free will, which proves the strength and resilience of the British system (which has stood the test of time) over all other systems in the world, thank God...

...despite the charming, old-world vagaries of our voting methods, which ensure that our rulers since the war have been elected on a minority of the votes cast and not, as in other countries without our experience, on some specious majority, which may look more democratic on paper but in practice... Well!

What our system has proved—and I would like our dissident and now dead river in Suffolk to take notice of this—is that it is not necessary to have a mathematically fair voting system in order to live in a democracy. What we really need, and what undoubtedly we possibly achieve, is a National Consensus, so that around election time, that is, every other week, we can feel confident that, despite the evidence of the votes, Parliament represents the general will of the British people, give or take a few party differences, and it obviously *must* represent the general will, because otherwise we wouldn't panic at the sight of a buff envelope from Gwent and resolve, like Boxer, to work harder and give up eating and two-way trips to the Barbican in order to pay the unreasonable demands of a faceless official who continually asks the impossible of the invisible...

...millions!

Otherwise... if we didn't feel that the faceless official carried with him the mandate and imprimatur of a National Consensus of the British People, some of us would be sorely tempted to return that buff envelope to whence it came, namely Gwent, with the brief response, 'Get knotted!'

...for it is a matter of considerable puzzlement to me, in my attic room in Shepherds Bush (or is it mine any longer?) that year after year the National Consensus, which I non-slavishly obey, includes me out...

...and no government gets elected even on a minority of votes to which I would give attic room...

Year after year!

...and that somewhere national consensuses all over the world are deciding that we really do need Cruise missiles and SS20s and similar gadgets of a teasingly apocalyptic nature and that we shouldn't bother about world famine just yet...

Year after year!

...and that nobody I've met actually belongs to a national consensus, if you dig beneath the surface...

...which makes one wonder what constitutes a quorum for a National Consensus, is it one million? or 100,000? or 100? or 10? And is there an Hon. Sec. who takes apologies for absence, and counts the heads, and says, 'Right, lads, we have a National Consensus!'?

(And there's Selina, still unmarried, they tell me, dimpling provoca-

tively, as she asks Benjamin Disraeli when he actually hit upon his One Nation theory and has it made any difference to his family life?)

And should I be writing to this Hon. Sec. to apologise for not turning up to the National Consensus today and would he therefore table an amendment to the Steering Committee of the National Consensus to the effect that this year I do not actually want to work from dawn to midnight to pay for apocalyptic gadgets and Fortress Falklands and Cumbrian Contamination and other people's redundancy benefits, caused by last year's National Consensus, when I would really be quite happy pottering about in Southwold, where the great river Orwell sweeps down to the sea?

And how, to degenerate to details, does one actually address the Hon. Sec. of the National Consensus? Is he a Right Hon., or a lord, or a Permanent Civil Servant, or an equerry to the Prince of Wales? Or Comrade? Or Brother? In which case how can one indicate the exceptional significance of his role as convenor and spokesperson of the National Consensus without infringing upon the true egalitarianism of his function?

Except by some epaulette like Big.

And would he let me off anyway?

Would he accept the general tenor and burden of my argument that, since I cannot in all honesty belong to his National Consensus, and have sent formal apologies for my absence, I should not be expected to pay the membership fees, namely taxes?

Or would he dismiss my arguments as irrelevant?

Particularly if I addressed the letter wrongly, in which case it might never arrive.

Would he argue that since the National Consensus exists, however arbitrarily conceived, I cannot opt out of my obedience to it without becoming some kind of non-person? In which case, he might demonstrate his disapproval of non-people by putting me in a special reserve for those who opt out of their social duties unilaterally, so to speak, such as a prison or a hospital or a half-way house where I can learn the full extent of my civic responsibilities to the very heart of the apocalypse in time to be released for the grand incineration...

In which case...

...no wonder I cut myself shaving at 8.15 in the morning, half-way between the boiled egg and the cheerful crush to the Barbican, no wonder the wrist unlocks itself and the sinews slacken, no wonder the arm rebels and holds itself aloof from the effort of making myself presentable, no wonder the blade hovers irresolutely over that area of the neck which harbours a half-way house for the jugular...

...a two-edged blade as well...

...in case I miss myself first time...

No wonder I look to the big screen for reassurance, to see how normal

people behave at 8.20 in the morning, exorcising aerobically and consulting their stars, no wonder the cosy cardigan of Frank Bough intrigues me with its sheer absence of loose threads, no wonder that a kind of dependency grows on these people who can thus fearlessly ask penetrating questions of the mighty over marmalade and toast, no wonder that a kind of gratitude (if oblique) warms towards the BBC who have thus thoughtfully offered an image of democracy in action and how it copes with excess fat and the weather and traffic jams on the M1 because...

Otherwise...

...we would have no picture of the National Consensus at all and would be paying for our toys of armeggedon in a vacuum as it were...

...without rhyme or reason...

...like zombies trailing through the unfinished sentences of our lives...

...which would indeed be *1984* in action, not fiction.

But Eric Blair, the faceless paranoid with social democratic tendencies, who took the name of Orwell from that sluggish river which winds its way through the fens of Suffolk to meet the great grey sea at Southwold, had no idea as to how 1984 might actually turn out, in reality, as it were, after the sparkle and sludge of the sixties and seventies. He was guessing.

And similar paranoids should bear that in mind.

We have been warned.

The April issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Kampuchea Between Conflict and Compromise* by Justus M. van der Kroef (held over from the March issue), *Is Poland a Catholic Country?* by Keith Sword, *Conservative Democracy and Union Power: the Trade Union Bill 1983* by Roy Gregory and *Olive Shreiner Today* by Colin Style.

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN WEST GERMANY

by Alfred Landor

THERE is some justification in saying that the June 1983 general election was won by the Conservative Party by making use of certain slogans which are based on deliberately vague and dated notions. The visions they invoke are inherited from 19th century concepts: personal responsibility and private property (free will and family cells). The currently resurgent faith in 'free enterprise' originates from these historic roots. Nevertheless, a more critical examination may disclose that private enterprise cannot offer an infallible prescription for guaranteed commercial success or basically remedy wide-spread economic trends.

An enlightening situation is provided at this very moment by the Federal Republic of Germany which challenges and sometimes contradicts these election-winning doctrines. To take West Germany as an example is especially interesting because no other country is better placed for an analysis of the success or failure of family firms seen in the context of history following the end of the Second World War.

No one will dispute the great contribution of private firms to the economic rehabilitation of West Germany. Somehow, despite devastation and military defeat Germany instinctively held on to a nucleus of well managed and determined private firms. This was in contrast to Britain in the late forties where in many cases private enterprise had already capitulated to publicly owned companies—a clear sign that profits for our firms had already eroded at an earlier stage due to industrial growth and aggressiveness by foreign competition, assisted by often bitter and prolonged trade conflicts at home.

However, what gives West German firms greater advantages and momentum is a traditionally rooted paternalism which is carefully fostered between workforce and owners (symbolised by the individual acting head—*der Chef*). The traditional class barriers are never provocatively erected on the shop floor. Moreover, in South Germany there is a special number of firms which concentrate on high technology products. They work with a small personnel and the chief technician is the boss himself (an inveterate hobbyist—*der ewige Bastler*). To some extent these factors explain the astonishing German recovery in the fifties.

Inevitably, the general world recession which recently affected the Western World also settled with an apparent permanence of doom on Germany. Suddenly many great and small enterprises were encountering serious problems. Once they were proud names but today they represent ominous news. The lucky ones who manage to escape bankruptcies and complete oblivion survive only by the grace of creditors' optimism and some amicable settlement of outstanding debts (*Vergleich*).

During recent months the number of insolvencies has grown alarmingly. High interest rates, generally shrinking markets, thinner working capital have combined to bring about financial disasters. The situation is parallel

to our own. The rationale of global economy is its interdependent structure. So why should anyone be surprised if we see this also happening in prosperous Germany?

Unfortunately, the economic crisis in Germany coincides with the change-over from one generation to another. The founders of post-war years—men of the quality of Max Grundig, Konrad Henkel, Rudolf August Oetker—have gone. Sons to take their places are not always available. Often the bosses make insufficient preparations for their exit.

The original founders of private German firms were tough, self-made (*vom Fach*), energetic and survived the Nazi and war period. As one must expect, their sons are academically educated and more polished. Having followed their famous fathers' foot-steps they rush into expansion and tend to lose control. Eventually only new heads and a fresh injection of capital can save the business. It is constantly happening here, of course, in the UK but there are as yet more private firms in Germany and therefore there are suddenly more private headaches.

Some different problems which regularly emerge are illustrated by the fate of Kreidler (manufacturers of mopeds) or Anker (makers of cash registers) or Neckermann (stores). Either they modernise too late or they are simply squeezed out by a natural process of selection in a competitive world which is particularly insistent and low-priced when it originates from the direction of the Far East. Others expand too hastily or too late. In such circumstances particularly unfortunate is the absence of close connections with one's own house-bank which could temporarily at least sustain old clients under critical strain.

Very common and exceptionally damaging during this very painful period are family disputes over money. If acting heads of families are forced by greedy relatives into unfavourable share deals, this may well spell the end of a once famous enterprise. No serious-minded board of directors is keen on throwing away share packets for the sake of avoiding major family breaches. However, it happens all over the world all the time.

Some people in West Germany familiar with the current situation of private firms believe that at least a third of all family businesses have become suspect. A few even argue that the period of private enterprise belongs to the past. It is pointed out that the great business dynasties of the 19th century have not been under family control for a long time although some famous names like Siemens and Stinnes und Thyssen are still retained. Yet it is a mistake to think one is seeing the end of all private business in Germany. Cheap administration costs, labour-intensive emphasis and unrestricted personal responsibility are the supports on which small firms are based. They maintain their natural appeal to German temperament.

On the other hand the present fashionable theory which declares private enterprise alone will constitute the escape route from economic difficulties is clearly a convenient political fable. As a serious statement of fact it is disproved and invalidated by a sad spectacle of financial ruin and wreckage —the littered field of daily bankruptcies.

THE BUDDHA, HIS DEMOCRATIC AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS

by Buddhadasa P. Kirthisinghe

THE basic principle of a democratic form of government is the freedom and dignity of the individual with equality before the law. This embodies a Basic Code of human rights. No man can be called free unless he is able to pursue his calling unhampered by barriers of caste, class or special privilege. In a deeper sense, no man is truly free until he can, without fear or pressure from authoritarian coercion, unfold his innate potentialities and perfect himself by shaping his own kamma or destiny. It was the Buddha who, for the first time, realised these values through his Dhamma, the sum total of his teachings. It has led to an out-flowering of a civilisation that, to this day, stands as a marvel in the history of mankind.

Three centuries later it led, for the first time in the annals of mankind, to establishing hospitals for both men and animals and organising universal education which culminated in creating international centres of learning, known today as universities. With the spread of Buddhism through greater Asia from the 3rd Century B.C. onward, it stimulated the formation of new civilisations depending on the national genius of the citizens of each State. These civilisations produced a fascinating array of art and dance forms, literature, and social and economic institutions based on the Dhamma.

Democratic Values

The recognised prerequisites of democratic cultures are:

(1) A productive economy to raise man above the level of poverty and misery.
(2) A progressive society with security and opportunity for all.
(3) A literate society with universal education.
(4) Personal liberty and self-reliance.
(5) A system of ethics based on moral law.
(6) Deep-rooted respect for the system of values and institutions that helped each culture evolve into great civilisations.

These values were respected in the ancient Buddhist civilisation of Asia, particularly in the Asokan period beginning with the 3rd Century BC—the golden period of Indian history. These conditions exist today in a highly industrialised Japan where there is a predominantly Buddhist civilisation, and in the newly-emerged Buddhist states of Asia. These technologically not fully-developed nations are rebuilding their economies to raise the standard of living of their people. Among these, Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon, has an almost fully literate society with free education from kindergarten to university.

Buddhism has given each man or woman sturdy independence, rather than dependence on the mercy of a Creator-God, to better themselves.

The Buddha taught man the gospel of self-help in his efforts to lead a noble life. To achieve the highest conditions of mind and heart, the Buddha said man must work out his own way. He asserted that man's own deeds would make him noble and advised him to guard against deeds that would bring him low.

The Buddha's message to mankind was for man's spiritual and social ascendancy. He called on man for cheerful service to others, love for all life and restraint for all irrational desires. His path is both intellectual and spiritual. The goal can be attained by self-discipline, plain living and noble thinking. The Buddha stood for human justice; therefore, it is not surprising that the basic codes of Human Rights are incorporated in his teachings.

Further, the Buddha stated that all beings, including man, are suffering, and in His Noble Eight-fold Path gave an efficacious prescription of how to put an end to that suffering. Since that Path is a road of gradual progress it is intelligible and practicable for all men, even those on the lowest rungs of human development. None is excluded from reaching final deliverance if only he will take resolutely one step after another on that road. Thus we see that the Buddha conceded equality to all human beings—a cardinal principle in a democratic society.

Hence the Buddha sounded the clarion call of human liberty. He said: 'Take ye refuge unto yourself; be ye your own salvation. With earnestness and high resolve work out your own salvation'.

The women in Indian society in the Buddha's time did not receive such recognition. It was the Buddha who raised the status of women. The Buddha foresaw the danger of admitting women to the Sangha or monastic Order, refusing three times Mahapajapati Cotami's request to admit women to the Order as Bhikkhunis. But later, observing the zeal of both Pajapati and Yasodhara in leading a religious life, he could no longer resist their wishes and consented to their joining the Sangha. When the Venerable Ananda asked the Buddha whether women were competent to lead a Bhikkhuni's or Nun's life, he declared them to be so and capable of being released from the wearisome repetition of rebirths and to attain sainthood. The equality in social, economic and political life of women with men in Buddhist lands is not at all surprising. India and Sri Lanka have even produced women Prime Ministers in our time.

The caste system was becoming rigidly established in India in the Buddha's time. He revolted against its injustices and welcomed to the Sangha people of low and high castes. Thus he admitted into his order Sunita, the outcast; Sati, the son of a fisherman; Nanda, a cowherd; Ambapali, a courtesan; and Punna and Punnika, who were slave girls.

The story of the ordination of Upali, the barber, is an outstanding example of how the Buddha tried to abolish the caste system. Once, six Sakyan princes closely related to the Buddha came to seek admission to the Sangha. Upali, their barber, followed them and asked the Buddha for ordination. The ordination was arranged so as to give Upali the place of seniority in the Order. The princes, who also became monks,

had to pay homage to Upali, who later joined the highest authority on monastic discipline.

Some members of the nobility were upset by these actions of the Buddha, and one of them challenged him to define a nobleman. It was then that he declared:

> No man is noble by birth,
> No man is ignoble by birth.
> Man is noble by his own deeds,
> Man is ignoble by his own deeds.
> (1) Suttanipata, Balasutta

Another fascinating example of denigrating caste is the case of a certain girl. Ananda, the favourite disciple of the Buddha, sent by him on a mission, was passing by a well near a village. On seeing Pakati, a girl of low caste, he asked for water to drink. The girl hesitated, protesting: 'O, nobleman, I am too humble and mean to give you water, for I am of the Matanga caste.' Thereupon the Venerable Ananda replied: 'Sister, I asked not for caste, but for water'.

It is not surprising that there was no caste system in Buddhist India beginning with the 3rd Century BC under the influence of the great Emperor Asoka, who ruled India then, until about the 10th Century AD. This is true even today of all Buddhist nations from Sri Lanka to Japan. However, when Brahmanism replaced Buddhism in India from the 10th Century AD onwards the caste system re-established itself. In the process, the Indian elite became parasitic and lost its creativity. Thereafter the great Indian civilisation declined rapidly.

The Buddha also condemned slavery in every shape and form. It was not William Wilberforce (UK) and Abraham Lincoln (USA) who were pioneers in the abolition of slavery, as is often claimed in the West. According to the United Nations Organisation reports, slavery is scarcely practised in any part of the world today. The Buddha led the anti-slavery movement by laying down a rule that no one should engage in any form of trafficking in human beings. Human beings might be engaged for domestic service, but it was enjoined that they be treated with as much consideration as a member of the family regarding their personal rights.

Commenting on one of the Buddha's discourses,[2] the Siglovada Sutta, which deals with social ethics, the world-famous British scholar, Professor Rhys-Davis, erstwhile Chairman of the Department of Comparative Religion, Manchester University, England, said: 'Happy would have been the village or the clan on the banks of the Ganges, when the people were full of kindly spirit of fellow feelings, the noble spirit of justice, which breathes through these naive and simple sayings'. He added: 'Not less happy would be the village on the banks of the Thames, today, of which this could be said'.

He continued: 'The Buddha's doctrine of love and goodwill between man and man is here set forth in domestic and social ethics with more comprehensive details than elsewhere. And truly we may say even now of this *Vinaya,* or code of discipline, so fundamental are the human in-

terests involved, so sane and wide is the wisdom that envisages them that the utterances are as fresh and practically as binding today as they were then, at Rajagaha (India).'

The Buddha strongly disapproved of all sacrifices performed in the name of religion, particularly those involving animal sacrifices. It was believed at that time that sacrifices atoned for past misdeeds and were a protection against evil spirits. The Buddha said that these sacrifices were cruel and useless. Only through a noble life can man elevate himself and be safe from evil.

The Buddha's compassion extended also to those who were ailing. Once he said to his disciples: 'Whoever nurses the sick will nurse me'. And in that spirit, hospitals for both animals and men were later established during the reign of Asoka in the 3rd Century BC.

In the practice of Buddhism, knowledge and wisdom are stressed. During the reign of Asoka educational institutions sprang up in every temple in the land. Thus every Buddhist temple became a veritable centre of learning. Some of these temples later grew into world-famous universities, from the 2nd Century AD onwards, as Nalanda, Taxila and Vikramashila.

The Buddhist civilisations of India, Burma and Sri Lanka were among the first in the annals of mankind to have a university education. Admission was based on competence, not on wealth, race or creed. Students from Afghanistan to China resided in these centres of learning. The universities flourished up to around the 13th Century AD. They were totally destroyed by the invading Mogul armies coming from the north, beginning with the 14th Century, onwards.

During the 3rd Century BC, both India and Sri Lanka had hospitals for both humans and animals. These facts are noted in *The Outline of World History* by H. G. Wells,[3] Emperor Asoka was the first to establish hospitals in India and to encourage, in the 3rd Century BC, the cultivation of medical herbs. No wonder Wells described Asoka as 'the noblest king in the history of mankind'.

The Buddha laid the foundation for his movement. It is said that once an old Bhikkhu of a surly disposition was afflicted with a loathsome disease, the sight and smell of which was so nauseating that no one would go near him. It is said that the Buddha came to the Vihara where this unfortunate man lay and, on hearing of his case, ordered warm water and went to the sick-room to nurse him. He ministered unto this sick Bhikkhu daily and declared; 'Whoever nurses the sick will be serving me.'

Religious freedom is one of the greatest virtues stressed by the Buddha. He preached the gospel of tolerance, compassion, loving-kindness and non-violence. He also taught man not to despise other religions.

In his day, Asoka practised the golden principle of tolerance. Under his patronage Buddhism flourished splendidly. As a Buddhist, he himself was tolerant of other religions. One of his edicts[4] reads:

> All religions deserve reverence for some reason or other. By thus acting, a man exalts his own religion and at the same time does service to the religion of other people.

In the *Mahamangala Gatha*,[5] which is highly cherished in all Buddhist lands, we find a comprehensive summary of Buddhist ethics. The support of mother and father, wife and children, is greatly stressed.

The temperance movement owes its beginnings to the Buddha who asked his followers to abstain from selling liquor and other intoxicants.

The Buddha further declared, according to the *Kalama-Sutta*,[6] that one should not accept anyone's teachings, including his own, unless one found them to be in accord with one's own personal reasoning.

During the Buddha's time there were a number of great kingdoms in India such as Magadha and Kosala, and some of them were established with a democratic government. The Buddha favoured the democratic over the oligarchical form of government.

The Buddha showed great admiration for the Vajjis or Licchavis. In the Maha Parinibbana Sutta he likens the Licchavis to the Thirty-three Gods (Tavatimsa-*devas*). He also warned Vassakara, Minister of the parricidal King Ajatasattu, that the Vajjis would remain invincible as long as they adhered to the seven rules of a nation's welfare *(aparihaniya dhamma)*, namely: (1) frequent meetings for consultations, (2) concord in action, (3) adherence to old injunctions and traditions, (4) respecting elders, (5) respecting women, who should never be molested, (6) reverence for places of worshop within and outside the territory, and (7) protection of worthy saints in the territory.

The Buddha continued: 'So long as the Vajjis meet frequently in council, assemble and disperse in harmony (and observe the other rules of welfare), their prosperity is to be expected, not their decline.'

The Emperor Asoka worked with unceasing energy for the propagation of Buddhism and transformed it into a world religion. The Asokan period from 325 to 288 BC had, therefore, become of special significance in civilisation, as it was one of the most illustrious liberal democratic periods of history.

Quoting Wells again from his *Outline of History:*

> Amidst the tens of thousands of names of monarchs that crowd the columns of history, their majesties and graciousnesses, and serenities and Royal Highnesses and the like, the name of Asoka shines and shines almost alone—a star. From the Volga to Japan, his name is still honoured. China, Tibet and even India, though it has left his doctrine, preserve the traditions of his greatness. More living men cherish his memory today than ever heard the names of Constantine and Charlemagne.

It is claimed that Asoka was one of the first to grant sex equality, by sending his own son and daughter to Sri Lanka on missionary work. In this vast empire, Asoka treated all his subjects with equal justice and admitted no privileges of caste or class.

The promotion of democratic thought in ancient India was powerfully aided by the spread of Buddhism from the 3rd Century BC onwards.

In his introduction to *Legacy of India*,[8] Lord Zetland, former Viceroy of India, writes:

> And it may come as a surprise to many to learn that in assemblies of Buddhists in India, two thousand or more years ago, are to be found rudiments of our own parliamentary system as practised today.
>
> Professor G. P. Malalasekera, in the same vein, says: The spread of Buddhism from country to country in greater Asia was without bloodshed and it is by itself a great democratic process never witnessed by any other world religion. And, in the words of Dr. Gunasela Vitange: Twenty centuries before revolutionary France raised the standard 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity', the Buddha had enunciated these very values as essentials of good government.

To summarise, for the first time in the history of India or perhaps the whole world, the Buddha proclaimed equality between man and man and between the sexes. He stressed security of man in sickness and old age, as well as his right to an education. The right to work is embodied in the Buddha's Noble Eight-fold Path, where he enjoins men to select the right (noble and useful) livelihood. Thereby he prohibits the practice of slavery, including 'white slavery', that is, the exploitation of men or women for financial gain.

The Buddha further fortified man in his self-reliance and independence by advocating human liberty, religious tolerance and free speech. Not surprisingly, according to the *Maha Parinibbana Sutta*,[9] he even preferred the representative form of government over autocratic rule which was common in his day.

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THE GENIUS OF VENICE 1500-1600
at the Royal Academy, London
by Cyril Fradan

THE sixteenth century embraces the active years of all the painters and sculptors represented on the exhibition as well as the years of the maximum expansion of the Serenissima into the northern Italian mainland. In the present exhibition, the painters are grouped according to the areas in which they worked. They reflect the influences radiating principally from Venice but also from other sources. Elsewhere in Italy, over the same century, their contemporaries would have been Perugino, Leonardo, Michelangelo, Raffaello, Rosso Fiorentino, Bronzino, Parmigianino, Barroccio, the Caracci, Caravaggio and, right at the end, Rubens in the Netherlands.

The works are catalogued and, mostly, hung in chronological order. Thus the changes and developments of the artists and their responses to the cultural pressures of the day are easier to grasp. Inevitably such juxtapositions will show up the weaknesses as well as the strengths in the works not only of those considered the most original but also those who, like their modern equivalents, were derivative and followed the current fashions.

One of the greatnesses of Titian is that he was not given to following fashions but worked his own manner through until old age brought about the unresolved disproportions in his canvasses, and the palsied and dim paintwork which marked his declining years. It seems that, in general, aesthetic value-judgements dissipate before the awesomeness of an authenticated artefact created by a GREAT NAME. Comparative assessment is stifled as though everything made by the GREAT NAME (and his studio) is beyond criticism. Geraldine Norman (the Saleroom Correspondent of *The Times*) wrote of the coming sale of a relief by 'Donatello': 'It is clearly from the school of Donatello but, if they decide that the piece was modelled by Donatello himself and the polychrome decoration is contemporary the sky is the limit as far as potential bidding goes.' The aesthetic content of the relief doesn't change according to the ascription but that is of no importance to the market-place: the operative concept is 'Donatello'.

Of Titian's *Flaying of Marsyas* (132) and *Boy with Dogs* (128) as with Lotto's *Presentation in the Temple* (55) the catalogue is in doubt about whether the works are finished. Pietro Zampetti says of the latter that it is 'widely believed' that it is 'partly unfinished'.

The sketchy, 'impressionistic' presentation is clearly at variance with the 'finished' work of either of these two painters and with the idea that their own period would have had of what was 'finished'. It could only imply that the work had been abandoned or that the painter's Muse had forsaken him in his senility. The developments in Art over the last 100 years have accustomed us to the concept of 'impressionism' in a wide

sense and created an inherent uncertainty about interpreting the intentions of the artist—a process of mistification. But there can be no doubt that a term which might nowadays be applied to a Magnasco would not have been in the minds of the contemporaries of Titian and Lotto. A glance at the difference between a drawing and a painting based on it would illustrate this.

Where the ideals of artists are closely associated with figurative representation—even where the resulting images may vary according to time and place—we are provided with the yardstick of our own experience and can compare elements within the *oeuvre* of a single painter and then, again, compare him with his peers. We might even arrive at a comparative value-judgement.

The internal logic of a portrait such as that of the *Santo da Pesaro Boys* by Titian (120) would mark it as a work of genius even if the authorship were not authenticated. On the other hand, the *St. John* (119), rigidly centralised on the canvas, crowds the extended right arm, making it look as though it were not quite in proportion. The figure of Apollo(?) in the *Flaying of Marsyas* (132) is so distorted that one can only hope that further work was intended but never completed. Irrespective of authorship I would rather have the portrait than the other two.

Jacopo Bassano was one who followed the fashions and his work displays the styles he passed from post-Bellini through Mannerism to the Tintorettesque. In his early *Flight into Egypt* (1) note how the Virgin's head, her scarf and the Child's head coincide in design and tonality with the tree-trunk which should be spatially behind them but which the composition links to them. (Not to mention the tree which grows out of the head of the attendant on the left.)

And is it possible that Schiavone, composing the *Angel of the Annunciation* (92) on a surface 272 x 156 cm still couldn't quite fit in the toes and fingers? In his Mannerist *Adoration* (89) everything is sacrificed to the swirling surface pattern. The profiles of the Madonna and of the one Magus follow the curve of the column and seem attached to it, while the pneumatically inflated leg of the Child seems to kick another magus in the mouth! The painting is confused and has little of the consistency of the distortions in Parmigianino's *Madonna dal Collo Lungo* in the Uffizzi.

In his *Resurrection* (28) Cariani so jams the head of Christ and the banderole beside him under the upper horizontal of the frame that he destroys all sense of ascension. Even Veronese, dealing more successfully with the same subject (143) gives the figure of Christ the space in which to rise but then pins him visually to the foliage sprouting from the ruins, which should be in the background, by seemingly attaching Christ's cloak to them. A slight modification in composition and/or tonality would have avoided this.

Drawing with the brush, an intrinsic part of the concept of *colorito* as against *disegno*, accounts for both the weakness and vitality of Venetian painting. Michelangelo said of Titian that 'His colours and his style please me, but what a pity that, in Venice, one doesn't learn to draw well from

the very beginning.'

Of Veronese and Tintoretto Joshua Reynolds says in his fourth *Discourse:*

> These are the persons who may be said to have exhausted all the powers of florid eloquence, to debauch the young and inexperienced, and have, without doubt, been the cause of turning off the connoisseur and the patron of art, as well as that of the painter, from those high excellencies of which the art is capable, and which ought to be required in every considerable production.

The wide stylistic variations that occurred in the works of a Tintoretto would have shocked Sir Joshua even more. And what of a man like Lotto who was capable of such moving, atmospheric and evocative portraits as those of Odoni (46) and Laura da Pola (54) and also the vacuous conventionality of the *Visitation* (50) and the self-conscious and affected *Annunciation* (47)?

While referring to Lotto I cannot resist mentioning the hairy bare leg of St. Roch in the painting of him with St. Christopher and St. Sebastian (52). I can recall no other painting of this period in which hair on limbs and body is represented. The care with which each follicle has been painted adds an unexpectedly sensuous element to the work and seems unique. Even the St. Sebastian is of the conventional smoothness of the statues from which the Renaissance sought inspiration.

Of course, sensuality is always present in any nude or semi-nude representation and Venetian painters produced many of those reclining Venus-figures, ranging from those of Titian to those of Palma Vecchio (77), Sustris (98) and the very uncomfortable *Sleeping Venus* of Girolamo da Treviso (40). Even the shame-faced purchasers of these works didn't really believe that calling them 'Venus' or Nymphs' fooled anyone. One of their collectors, quoted in the catalogue on page 36, apologised for owning so lascivious a painting—justifying his choice by saying it was by Titian. This is very close to the contemporary justification of what our own puritans consider to be obscene by proving artistic value.

Judeo-Christian prudery, while accepting nakedness in classical subjects, was wary of it in Christian iconography. There were two notable exceptions: the crucified Christ, where nakedness adds to shame, and St. Sebastian, always an excuse for an attractive male nude.

Of course, God was with the Serene Republic—as He is still considered to be among all warring states in the west. I wonder to whom the Communist states appeal? Lenin? Anyway He appeared frequently by proxy of his saints, ministers and the Virgin in Venetian art. I need only note the *Battle of Lepanto* (142) and *Santa Giustina and the Treasurers* (110).

Whether Pagan, Christian or Genre (in which I include portraits) it is interesting to note how an almost fixed compositional pattern dominated. The scene is portrayed against a dark backdrop which is divided vertically from top to bottom (usually on the left) while the remaining area is divided horizontally by a receding landscape and a luminous sky. In portraits or interiors this opening may be expressed as a door or window. The effect of the latter is to create both a visual and psychological escape from what could be a claustrophobic atmosphere. The lack of such an element is to

be seen in the multilated *Mystic Marriage of St. Catherine* by Lotto (43) where the grey area where this window once was now weighs like menacing lead over the heads of the personages.

The shallow stage on which the participants play out their drama could be drastically reduced in some Mannerist works by filling most of the surface with figures and indicating little more than a strip of sky. Tintoretto used the drama of exaggerated linear perspective in such works as *The Washing of the Feet* (101) and *Christ among the Doctors* (99).

Savoldo's dramatic and intriguing nocturn. the *Shepherd with a Flute,* is one of the few in which there is an almost continuous space from foreground to background.

Against a sombre landscape or interior the sky is always a luminous element no matter what time of day or night is portrayed. But the source of light which falls on the protagonists always comes from somewhere within the painting and near the foreground. Generally, it enters from the left and is never as strong in its contrasts as that falling on the landscape. Cast shadows exist only insofar as they do not conceal the forms—*chiaroscuro* in Caravaggio's terms was still to evolve. The combination of evenly-lit figures in a crepuscular setting helps to give that pervading and enthralling feeling of evening calm, of a dying fall even in a summer landscape. This is the power of Venice, expressing prescience of decline in the 16th century, filling the city with nostalgia in our times.

The human figures in these paintings very seldom yield to the temptation of engaging the spectator's eye directly. They are generally distant or involved with each other. In Titian's *Salome* (114) the servant gazes at her mistress and Salome looks at the head of the Baptist whose eyes will never see again. Bordone's *Family Group* (22) is only concerned with itself, while Licinio's portrait (44) shows a family group in which no one looks directly at anyone else; they seem alienated from each other. One little boy catches the eye of the spectator in the real world outside.

The technical and philosophical demands made upon all these painters were greater than anything imposed on contemporary artists. Because they sought to express both the sublime and the banal in terms of the physical, figurative world their success or failure could be measured against the spectators' assessment of the same world from their own viewpoints.

Because their skills were so fine and their parameters so defined one can bring searching criticism to bear, for when they do succeed—as they often do—their works are surpassing.

[Cyril Fradan has lectured on History of Art at the University of Witwatersrand, London College of Printing, Guildford Art School, and Sir John Cass Art School; he has taught at the Overseas School of Rome. He has for the past five years combined music recitals with 'one-man' exhibitions of his work in his Kensington studio.]

The Genius of Venice continues at the Royal Academy until March.

QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW

by David Fingleton

JANACEK. *Jenufa.* Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra/Sir Charles Mackerras. (3 records) Decca D276D 3.
VERDI. *Ernani.* Orchestra & Chorus of La Scala, Milan/Riccardo Muti. (3 records) EMI SLS 1435843.
PUCCINI. *La Rondine.* London Symphony Orchestra/Lorin Maazel. (2 records) CBS D2 37852.
MASSENET. *Manon.* Orchestra & Chorus of Le Capitole du Toulouse/Michel Plasson. (3 records) EMI SLS 1731413.
BRITTEN. War Requiem. City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra & Chorus Simon Rattle. (2 records) EMI SLS 1077573.
JANACEK. Sinfonietta & Taras Bulba Rhapsody. Philharmonia Orchestra/Simon Rattle. EMI ASD 1435221.
SCHUMANN. Etudes Symphoniques Op.13/BRAHMS. Variations on a Theme By Paganini Op. 35. Dimitris Sgouros (Piano) EMI ASD 1436271.
MONTEVERDI. Balli e Balletti. Monteverdi Choir & English Baroque Soloists/John Eliot Gardiner. Erato NUM 75068.
MOZART. Opera Arias. Lucia Popp/Munich Radio Orchestra/Leonard Slatkin. EMI (Cassette) TC-ASD 1467874.
SPIRITUALS. Barbara Hendricks, with Dmitri Alexeev (Piano) EMI (Cassette) TC-ASD 1731684.

ONE massive advantage of the record industry is that it makes available for the opera-lover works which, though well worth hearing, can all too rarely expect to be seen on the stages of our opera houses. Foremost in this respect has been Decca's truly remarkable series of Janacek operas, recorded in Vienna with the great Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra conducted by that pre-eminent Janacek authority Sir Charles Mackerras. That series has now reached what we gather is to be its conclusion with the superlative recording of *Jenufa*, which of all Janacek's operas has the advantage of being the least rarely performed in the world's opera houses. It can rarely, however, be as convincingly and powerfully performed as here. Sir Charles draws playing of the utmost brilliance and sensitivity from the Vienna Philharmonic, and not only builds up the drama to an almost insupportable pitch, but also emphasises the wonderfully lyrical, yearning quality of this immensely great work. His cast could not be bettered. Elisabeth Soderstrom, though the sheer power of her voice may be beginning to dwindle on the stage, certainly demonstrates no diminution whatever of her power here, and presents Jenufa as a searingly tragic, noble, unaffected, yet epic figure. This is indeed one of the great interpretations on record. She is supported by Wieslav Ochmann and Petr Dvorsky, both admirable as the two men in her life, Lucia Popp as a sweetly sung Karolka, and by Eva Randova as an authoritative, intensely dramatic, and more youthful than usual Kostelnicka, Jenufa's step-mother and fulcrum of the tragic drama. This three record set has the advantage of Janacek's original, but now seldom heard, overture to the opera, and both available versions of its final scene. Decca's digital recording, made in Vienna's Sofiensaal, is superbly vivid and atmospheric, and the booklet as well as containing a fine new translation also has an admirably authoritative essay on the opera by that great Janacek authority

John Tyrrell. Do without fail acquire this indispensable recording.

A Verdi opera that is comparatively rarely heard, especially in this country, is his early, but strikingly dramatic *Ernani.* It did, however, receive a production at La Scala Milan at the end of 1982 which was not only seen last autumn on BBC television, but was also recorded 'live' by EMI. That recording has now been released and no lover of Verdi's music should be without it—it's a winner all the way. There really seems little doubt that the advantages in terms of sheer dramatic electricity that stem from the live recording of opera far outweigh any defects in sound that may be caused by extraneous stage noises. Certainly this recording, digital once again, has enormous clarity and presence and blessedly few 'noises off'. The cast assembled for La Scala's *Ernani* was almost as strong as could be wished for. I say 'almost' because, committedly though she sings, Mirella Freni's voice lacks the sheer lyric power that I would hope to find in my ideal Elvira; but who is there around today to offer it? The men are superb: Placido Domingo in top form and with honeyed beauty of tone as Ernani, Renato Bruson demonstrating that he has today the most burnished baritone in the business as Don Carlo, and Nicolai Ghiaurov, if vocally just a fraction past his best, an immensely authoritative De Silva. The La Scala forces are magnificently conducted by Riccardo Muti who demonstrates an unerring grasp of early Verdi, and the opera house chorus produce a golden flood of Italianate sound that is a far cry indeed from the 'scratch' choruses that are usually procured for opera recordings made in the studio. This again is a recording that gives unmitigated pleasure.

I obtained less pleasure myself from listening to Puccini's *La Rondine* in the new CBS recording, but that I fear is because this is an altogether more justly neglected opera than some one could name. It matters not the high quality of the performance if the musical raw material is sub-standard, and I regard Puccini's attempt to write a Viennese operetta to be distinctly that. Nothing daunted, however, CBS have assembled as persuasive a team of advocates for the work as one could desire, and in Lorin Maazel have found somebody to conduct it for all, and rather more than, it is worth, with commensurate response from the London Symphony Orchestra. But I could not help noticing, playing *La Rondine* straight after *Ernani,* the wide gap in achievement between the full-throated La Scala Chorus and the reedy, anaemic-sounding group that are the Ambrosian Opera Chorus. The two principals in this recording are both on top form. Neither Kiri Te Kanawa nor Placido Domingo leave any aspect of the rather nebulous figures of Magda and Ruggero unilluminated, and both are in splendid voice. I only hope, though, that no opera house management will succeed in tempting them to repeat their roles on stage: it would be a waste of their time. Amongst the supporting cast the wooden performances of David Rendall and Mariana Niculescu do little to enhance one's enjoyment, but there's good work to be heard from Leo Nucci, Lillian Watson and Gillian Knight.

Romantic, not to say sentimental, opera of an altogether richer quality

is Massenet's *Manon*, which is, of course, why it is much more frequently performed. Not however all that frequently recorded, and until now there had been no recording to approach Pierre Monteux's classic version, made with the great Victoria de los Angeles, and the forces of the Paris Opéra-Comique in the mid-1950s. Happily that situation has now been changed by EMI's release of their admirable and highly idiomatic new recording, with the orchestra and chorus of the Toulouse Capitole conducted with the utmost persuasiveness by their fine Director Michel Plasson. Not only that but EMI have also succeeded in assembling as a strong a cast as one could hope to find for this opera today. Ileana Cotrubas is Manon par excellence: sensitive, multi-textured, never over-stated, and gloriously sung. Her Des Grieux is Alfredo Kraus, still probably the finest exponent of the role singing today, though I could have wished that he had recorded it five years ago when his voice was even freer and more golden-toned than it is now; but there is certainly nothing lacking in either his style or his ardour. Lescaut is ideally taken by Gino Quilico, as is the Comte des Grieux by José Van Dam, and the smaller parts are in the wholly idiomatic voices of the Toulouse company. The recording, made in Toulouse's Halle aux Grains, is first class, and this greatly to be welcomed set yields the richest of pleasure to any lover of French opera.

EMI's recording contract with the extraordinarily able and exciting young conductor Simon Rattle is continuing to yield very rich dividends. It was a brave enterprise to invite Rattle and his City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra and Chorus to provide a successor, after 20 years, to Benjamin Britten's own recording of his War Requiem. That 1963 recording of this strange, at times slightly self-conscious, but nevertheless powerful and haunting work, with the Missa pro Defunctis interspersed with the poems of Wilfrid Owen, had Peter Pears, Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau and Galina Vishnevskaya as soloists. Rattle's recording has Elisabeth Sodestrom, Robert Tear and Thomas Allen, all admirable, and all just a little more human and down to earth, which in fact makes for a more, rather than less powerfully moving effect. Rattle's grasp of the textures and structure of this highly complex work is astoundingly assured, and he draws consummate playing from his orchestra and singing from his chorus. This new recording may not replace Britten's own, but certainly any admirer of the War Requiem needs to have the one alongside the other.

Another fine new Rattle recording, again demonstrating his almost uncanny grasp of the structure of 20th century music, is of Janacek orchestral music with the Philharmonia. Both the magnificent Sinfonietta and the less frequently performed Taras Bulba rhapsody rejoice in gloriously clear, almost transparent textures so that one can hear right to the heart of the music. Both works are quite superbly played by the Philharmonia, and EMI's digital recording is once again exemplary: another record that is not to be missed.

Another even younger artist to have been taken under contract by EMI is the remarkable 14-year-old Greek pianist Dimitris Sgouros, and here

I believe that the company has possibly been rather less prudent. For much as I have admired the two Festival Hall performances I have heard from this prodigious child—Rachmaninov's 3rd piano concerto and a solo recital that included both the works to be found on this recording—I believe that well-spaced live appearances over the next few years will be far more beneficial for him than the treadmill of a recording contract which at present can only serve to highlight his interpretative immaturity. In both the Brahms Paganini Variations and the Schumann Symphonic Studies his technique is breathtaking—formidable by any standards and at any age. But as young Sgouros unleashes the notes and the pianistic fireworks blaze from one's loudspeakers, one does begin to wonder what, if any, musical thought processes lie behind them. There is all too little variation of dynamics and of light and shade for these to seem in any way finished interpretations of highly complex works. If he is allowed by concert promoters and record companies to develop his art at a sensible pace these recordings should have the benefit in a decade's time of allowing us to hear how Dimitris Sgouros has developed as a pianist, but at present they do little more than exhibit a truly precocious technique.

Those who enjoy baroque music have every reason to be grateful to John Eliot Gardiner and his Monteverdi Choir and English Baroque soloists. For some years now they have been offering us music from the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries which, while approached as authentically as possible and played on original instruments, is not treated in any way as an academic exercise, and thus never loses its ability to entertain. An example of his very best work comes from Erato with this immensely enjoyable new disc 'Balli Balleti' which offers secular choral and balletic music by Monteverdi performed with great polish and enthusiasm by Gardiner's habitual troops, plus a distinguished quartet of vocal soloists: Patrizia Kwella, Anthony Rolfe Johnson, Lawrence Dale, and Alan Woodrow—all young, all extremely able. These works as well as making fascinating listening and enjoying first class performances are also admirably recorded and impeccably presented in a double sleeve with a learned and most informative note by Gardiner himself.

Finally, for sheer enjoyment, come two beautiful cassettes from two beautiful ladies. The development of Lucia Popp's voice from soubrette soprano to something a very great deal more than that over the past two decades had been a source of continuing pleasure. Such has been that development that this highly enjoyable recording offers Miss Popp in Mozart operatic arias that stretch from Cherubino's 'Voi che sapete' to Constanze's 'Traurigkeit' in Seraglio, from Susanna's 'Deh vieni' to Fiordiligi's 'Come scoglio' in Così, with arias from *Il Re Pastore* and *La Clemenza di Tito* thrown in for good measure. If she still sounds more at home in the lighter voiced repertory, Miss Popp nevertheless excels in all she undertakes. So does the delectable Barbara Hendricks, fascinatingly accompanied by top young Russian pianist Dmitri Alexeev.

CORRESPONDENCE

HEALTH HAZARDS ABROAD

Dear Madam,

As the holiday season approaches it seems to me that when travelling abroad we seem to be far too casual in taking steps to protect our health. It is only when we are shocked into action by a typhoid outbreak on a Greek island and several coach accidents on the Continent that we begin to think of taking the most elementary and obvious precautions.

The Department of Health and Social Security provides two most useful pamphlets, SA 30 and SA 35, both of which are available from travel agents, local Social Security offices or, in case of difficulty, from the DHSS Leaflets Unit, P.O. Box 21, Stanmore, Middx. HA7 1AY.

The first, *Medical Costs Abroad—SA 30*, emphasises the need to take out adequate insurance to cover expenses. It also explains your right, at free or at reduced costs, to medical treatment when visiting other European countries, Hong Kong and New Zealand.

The second, *Protect Your Health Abroad—SA 35*, recommends planning well ahead, especially for those requiring vaccinations, as some vaccines need time to become effective. The leaflet provides a check list of those countries around the world for which protection is recommended under four headings—cholera, malaria, typhoid and polio, and yellow fever. There is also an important note about rabies.

As most tourists from Britain holiday in Western Europe, it is worth noting that the leaflet recommends protection against typhoid for those countries bordering the Mediterranean (including Southern France).

Lastly, the leaflet suggests that travellers abroad should take with them a small first aid kit, water sterilisation tablets; and avoid raw foods, under-done meat or fish, uncooked or reheated food. They should avoid excessive exposure of the body to sunshine. Also, sexually transmitted diseases can be a serious threat to health.

A health protection service of major importance is provided by the Medic-Alert Foundation, a trust sponsored by 'Lions International.'

The Foundation has over 105,000 members all of whom wear a distinctive internationally recognised disc around his or her wrist or neck. The disc carries a brief description of the wearer's risk condition and the telephone number of a central information bureau in London where the member's medical details are stored. Once the caller's bona fides have been established, all relevant details of the member's condition are provided, thus ensuring that the correct treatment is prescribed. Membership of the Medic-Alert Foundation only costs £12 plus VAT for life membership. This covers the cost of enrolment, documentation and the provision and engraving of a stainless steel bracelet or necklace carrying the Medic-Alert emblem. Silver necklaces or bracelets are also available. In case of difficulty, contact the Medic-Alert Foundation, 11/13 Clifton Terrace, London N4 3JP (Tel. 01-263 8597) for further details.

Yours faithfully,

Whitley Bay, Tyne & Wear. WILLIAM S. BUTLER

THE COMPUTER OR THE PEN

Dear Madam,

Martyn Goff's article, 'The Video and the Child' (Vol. 1411, No. 243), made some extremely valuable points. May I be permitted to offer a few thoughts and comments of my own on a closely related subject?

I have often wondered whether computer-related technology as an aid to writing can be all that useful. Commercial enterprises do find use for such machines in their production processes, yet the conventional method of pen and paper is best suited for a literary effort.

It is widely held that the use of computers will increase writing output and make it that much easier. Yet one does not write just because a machine is available. A machine by itself will not improve prose. With a self-correcting machine there is no chance of saying anything personal or important.

For a start, one has to learn the mumbo jumbo of its use. Furthermore, the costs entailed and the resultant change of environment and working practices it additionally creates must be taken into account. The space taken by such equipment would turn a room into a workshop, with no work possible when away from the work place.

No one owes writers a living but that holds too for industry, agriculture, and a host of other occupations.

The economics of publishing have brought about changes, imported from other lands, alien to British ethics and practices. Pirating of books and pilfering of copyright create ill-will and legal problems apart from eroding profitability and publishing rights.

Serious papers in Britain are coping adequately with the competition from their American counterparts for circulation in the international market place. Fiercest competition is mainly for business and financial coverage. There, too, British papers meet the challenge in Europe and the Far East in quality presentation coupled with speed. The two presumably can co-exist without much conflict of interest.

Educational systems are getting oriented to an increasing use of machines as a tool for learning. With emerging numbers of those so trained, the pursuit of knowledge and the use of knowledge will probably generate the need for a retrieval system.

What happens to the classics in this context is a matter for concern. A book is read for various reasons and to know that it can be seen on a screen takes away much of the joy and inspirations generated by browsing.

Yours faithfully,

Amsterdam, Holland. B. NARPATI

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

HOW TO BE A PILGRIM

To Be A Pilgrim. A Spiritual Notebook. Basil Hume, O.S.B., Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. Saint Paul Publications/SPCK. £7.50.

This is a book to be eagerly seized on and returned to many times. 'It is the spiritual notebook of a pilgrim.' It is not, as Cardinal Hume is at pains to make clear, a systematic work. 'This book has been made up mainly from formal speeches, addresses, parish homilies and notes prepared for different occasions, but some parts have been specially written.' He emphasises the limitations inevitable in such a work. But there is no contemporary writer whose scattered utterances on spiritual matters means so much to so many of us.

The comparison is bound to be made with his 'Searching For God.' Some will prefer the earlier collection because it was delivered, with no thought of publication, to an intimate circle of Ampleforth monks. Reading the present book, one cannot fail to be aware of the Cardinal's immense responsibilities, national and global. Every word has, no doubt, been weighed in the light of its possible effect on the faithful and on countless others. Nevertheless, in the earlier book and again here, the authority with which the Cardinal speaks is not derived primarily from his official position. It is his closeness to God which gives his words a weight peculiarly their own.

The accent throughout is on the idea of Pilgrimage. We are accustomed, at least since Bunyan, to think of ourselves as possible pilgrims. But Cardinal Hume boldly entitles one part of his book God The Pilgrim, a somewhat disconcerting idea to some of us. 'The whole of the Bible tells the story of how God went in search of man, of how the good shepherd restored the scattered flock to the sheep fold, of how the Creator refashioned that image of himself, for so long disfigured by men, for so long broken into fragments by sin. He remade man in the person of Jesus Christ, offering mankind a new life, a more glorious destiny, a new image of itself, a new model.'

Here, as in the earlier book, he suggests that for most of us it is harder to believe that God loves us than for ourselves to love God. He does all that one man can possibly do to make both things easier. He is conscious at all times of the difficulties which assail us and which he never hesitates to say that he himself shares. 'The Christian Church is the guardian and herald of a revelation from God and so it deals in mysteries. Mysteries are profound truths beyond the grasp of our unaided intellects, yielding their riches to the humble and prayerful.' What he has to say about 'the great mystery of love which we call the redemption', is typical of his ability to say a helpful word in face of a truth 'beyond our grasp'. 'We come closest', he writes, 'to that mystery of the redemption when we offer the sacrifice of the Mass, making the offering of ourselves in union with the supreme and eternal offering of Christ in love and obedience on Calvary'. If anyone feels that he knows that already, well and good. If not, he may find it of lasting value.

It was a former Headmaster of Ampleforth, Father Paul Nevill, before the time when Cardinal Hume was Abbot, who was said to have been asked at a headmasters' conference whether he was training his boys for life. He replied: 'No. For death.' The same thought runs through Cardinal Hume's teaching,

without, however, spreading any trace of alarm or despondency. The last short item is headed The Moment of Ecstasy. 'The ultimate union,' he writes, 'with that which is most lovable, union with God, is the moment of ecstasy, the unending "now" of complete happiness. That vision will draw from us the response of surprise, wonder and joy which will be forever our prayer of praise. We are made for that.'

So the teaching of the famous Headmaster of Ampleforth is faithfully reproduced by Cardinal Hume. But he would be the first to insist that it is not confined to Ampleforth. It is a world-wide message.

FRANK LONGFORD

KISSINGER UNDER ATTACK

Kissinger: The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. Seymour M. Hersh. Faber and Faber. £15.

The publication of this book in the US last summer produced a sharp if unusually inelegant response from Dr. Kissinger: it was, he said, "a slimy lie." It constitutes, in fact, a massive indictment of his conduct of US foreign policy from Nixon's election in November 1968 to 1973. Nor can it be dismissed as mere debunking of a fallen hero. The author is a Pulitzer prize-winning investigative journalist who first revealed the story of the My Lai massacre, and of the secret bombing of the North Vietnamese 'sanctuaries' in Cambodia. He has consulted some 1,000 people, and his research into published and unpublished material is impressive. There are many vividly-sketched studies here of individuals: William Rogers, Nixon's Secretary of State between whom and Kissinger there grew a hate-hate relationship, Mao and Sadat, Haldeman and Ehrlichman, and many more. From Chapter One onwards, however, a portrait is etched of a wily and deceiving operator who 'worked both sides of the street' in the 1968 presidential campaign, allowing both Hubert Humphrey, the Democrat, and Richard Nixon, the Vice-President and Republican candidate, each to believe that he was backing each of them. By his 'leaks' to the Nixon camp Kissinger delayed and may even have sabotaged the Vietnam peace talks of that year and prolonged the war. But on becoming officially Nixon's Security Adviser, he brought to the job wartime experience in Intelligence, a daunting academic reputation, and much Harvard glamour. His National Security team were a well-educated élite, experienced and devoted; Kissinger himself was unusually gifted and bestrode Washington like a god from a mountain.

The charges against him are sustained for the four years of his 'reign', by the end of which, in part because of Watergate, in part because of his dominance over Nixon himself, Kissinger was effectively in charge of the government and seen as one of the great world leaders. He conspired with the CIA in the overthrow and assassination of Allende in Chile; the 'opening up' with Communist China to which he paid five visits, some secret and some whose secrecy became world news were means primarily, says Hersh, for publicity purposes; colleagues were seen as rivals too near the throne, undermined, intrigued against, and their telephones tapped by this maestro in the ways of *coulisses* and backchannels. Ironically, in 1972, when, for the purposes of Nixon's re-election, Kissinger genuinely sought an end to the Vietnam War, perversely his own peace efforts were in turn undermined by Alexander Haig, lest—so, it is claimed, Nixon argues—the image of the President as 'strong man' should be itself destroyed. The Kissinger of these pages is no great designer of world peace, and less a scholar statesman than a jealous, conspiratorial and

power-hungry egotist, not Metternich but Machiavelli—or even Cesare Borgia.

A great many of the accusations here are familiar: thus the 'facts' about Allende were available in the Senate hearings. The research notes are substantial and detailed. Since both Nixon and Kissinger refused to be interviewed by Mr. Hersh, and thus to rebut his charges, they can hardly blame the author, who provides a rich array of evidence and of witnesses. Occasionally, Mr. Hersh slips when he offers descriptions of people distant from the Washington scene: thus Enver Hoxha of Albania can hardly with accuracy be seen as a spokesman for 'the Communist world,' since Albania is now as it was then a lonely and isolated bastion only of its own peculiar variant of Stalinism. Nor will all his readers accept his interpretation of the Kissinger-Nixon 'recklessness' over the Soviet use of Cuba's Cienfuegos base: was it wrong to warn off Russia, as Kennedy had done ten years before? The book, however, has been rapturously welcomed in a Washington that lives on gossip and malice, and in which Dr. Kissinger has a legion of jealous enemies who accuse him of being responsible for the loss of Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam—and Angola, and of much else that was culpable in the Nixon years. And, by yet another irony a month after the book's publication President Reagan appointed Dr. Kissinger to head a bi-partisan commission to advise him on the appropriate policy for Central America. Since he has, if seems, come in again after his eight years out in the cold, however, his style has been less theatrical and televisual than in the past. After reading this book, it is clear that the god has feet of clay!

ESMOND WRIGHT

ABBA EBAN'S EVALUATION OF WORLD AFFAIRS

The New Diplomacy. International Affairs in the Modern Age. Abba Eban. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £15.

In this brilliant book, the author is concerned with the revolution in international affairs during the last forty years. As his writes in the Introduction:

> A book on *International Relations* published in 1940 would not have included the following terms: Nuclear War, Cold War, Detente, United Nations, Warsaw Pact, European Community, Organisation of African Unity, Foreign Aid, Third World, North-South relations, OPEC, Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles. Or again: In the century between Waterloo (1815) and the outbreak of World War I, no more than 2.5 million soldiers had fallen in battle. Then 100 million lost their lives in two eruptions of violence spanning three decades 1914 to 1945 . . . When World War II ended with the atomic explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it seems that traditional statescraft had been discredited beyond recall. The hour called not for piecemeal diplomacy but for a new and grand design.

The blurb accompanying this latest book by Aubrey Eban exhausts the vocabulary of praise. I will therefore content myself with the word *brilliant.* Although the author has held most of the highest offices which his own country (Israel) can offer and although his home and family are in Israel; although at the age of 33 he became Israel's first permanent delegate to the United Nations and combined that post with Ambassador to the United States from 1950 to 1959 and then was Foreign Minister for eight years 1966-74, the fact remains that he was educated in Classics at a South London Grammar School (St. Olave's), achieved a triple First at Cambridge and became Fellow and Tutor in Oriental Languages at Pembroke College. This is why I have recalled his original name, *Aubrey.* Perhaps the nearest comparisons to his career in Britain and the United States would be those of Roy Jenkins and Adlai Stevenson. All three lacked a political power base in their own country and all three were basically liberals in political philosophy. Eban was unique in his practical

experience of world affairs and world statesmen, including the Third World, seen through the eyes of a dynamic small nation; he spoke most European and Middle East languages. He is therefore admirably equipped to write this particular book, which might well become an indispensable volume for university students everywhere.

The book is lucidly planned. Book I deals with America and the World; the Soviet Union in World Politics; the New Europe and the Alliance; the Third World, Africa and Latin America; Unending Conflict in the Middle East. Then comes Book II with International Organisation, Myth and Reality; War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Diplomacy: Old and New, seventy pages of reflection, considered judgement and distilled wisdom.

Throughout the book, Eban ends his chapters on a positive and constructive note, pointing out past mistakes and exposing makeshift and superficial remedies, often summarising a chain of events in a pithy sentence or quotation: sometimes he overdoes the *pith*. Let me give a few examples.

Of Israel: No nation can afford to face liquidation twice in a generation; and again: Arab States unite for rhetoric, but separate for action. And referring to the Six Day War (1967): Israel emerged from the war victorious but vulnerable.

Nothing is more fallacious than to deduce nuclear conclusions from non-nuclear precedents.

If the nuclear problem is capable of solution, it will be a solution broader and deeper than the nuclear issue itself.

The paradox of international organisation is that it has become indispensable before becoming effective or fully beneficial. But it is one of the few human enterprises in which the option of abolition does not exist.

Quoting Professor Quincy Wright: Parliaments are usually more nationalistic and belligerent than executives, people than parliaments, because they are less aware of the risks.

Quoting Raymond Aron: The idea of the nation is still stronger than the idea of Europe.

Raymond Aron again on Europe: The real question was whether this alliance would be borne as a cruel fate or accepted as a challenge to be met by the will to construct.

Quoting Harold Nicolson on Woodrow Wilson: He and his conscience were on terms of such incessant intimacy that any little disagreement between them could be arranged.

The great Lord Salisbury: You should never trust in experts. If you believe the doctors nothing is wholesome; if you believe the theologians nothing is innocent; if you believe the soldiers nothing is safe; they all require their strong wine to be diluted by a very large admixture of insipid common sense.

These quotations are freely strewn among the heavier argument that forms the solid construction of the book.

KENNETH LINDSAY

ECONOMIC PLANNING IN MALAYSIA

The Fourth Malaysia Plan Economic Perspectives. Edited by K. S. Jomo and R. J. G. Wells. Malaysian Economic Association, Kuala Lumpur. M$25.

This volume contains 14 selected papers from a seminar organised by the Malaysian Economic Association on the Fourth Malaysian Plan 1981-85 held in October 1981 in Kola Kinabalu, Sabah. The papers relate solely to Plan issues. Although not comprehensive in scope, they attempt to cover most of the

major concerns raised by the Plan's announcement. The papers are grouped under four headings: Plan Philosophy, Growth and Public Finance, The Primary and Manufacturing Sectors and the Tertiary Sector.

David Lim examines the previous development plans in terms of their strategies, degree of internal consistency, and success in achieving objectives. Malaysia, he concludes, has achieved target levels for economic growth and poverty reduction but, since the 1970s, restructuring objectives have fallen behind target and income distribution worsened.

The second paper analyses the influence of class interests on Malaysian development and suggests that the capitalist approach may be in disharmony with the view of the people. Only partial planning is possible and the integration diffusionist-equilibrium approach, which underpins much Malaysian strategy, appears biased towards those who own the means of production.

Husin Ali focuses on alternative strategies for rural development. Four different agricultural systems are examined, the customary or communal land system, the small-peasant farm system, the smallholding settlement system and the modern plantation system. He proposes that a more radical and multi-dimensional approach be adopted for the first two types and formulates a series of policy decisions for rural development.

The next paper relates to questions of inter-ethnic relations and economic justice. Agrarian reform to help the 'land-hungry' peasants is needed and foreign owned enterprises should be transferred into workers' co-operatives.

The second section looks at the connection between growth issues and public finance. Growth in public expenditure, especially for development, has outstripped earnings and deficit financing. Meyanathan and Salleh are respectively pessimistic and optimistic of the export sector to stimulate planned growth, particularly with reference to poverty. Thillainathan points to potentially conflicting and overly ambitious official development targets, arguing for more modest objectives.

The inter-relationships between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors are investigated under the third heading. Malaysia has long attempted to stimulate the development of its primary industries, including agriculture, rather than going in for 'industrial fundamentalism'.

Mustapha examines the issues arising from agricultural sectoral strategies in terms of the productive allocation of resources through intensification, extensification and diversification.

Malaysia's high dependence on oil and its importance for both agriculture and industry is noted by Wells. He argues for economic energy pricing and a reduction in the level of distortions in energy markets.

The final paper in this section studies the employment impact of tariff protection. Existing policies have given discriminatory protection and a system of tax incentives caused a bias in resource allocation, distortions in the patterns of consumption, production inefficiency, unsatisfactory employment generation and innovation and growth retardation.

Housing, defence and health are the areas surveyed in the Tertiary sector. The opening monograph concentrates on the issues of house prices, housing malpractice and ownership, providing a sharp reminder to the government about its social responsibilities.

Pathmanathan investigates Malaysia's increasing expenditure on defence and brings into the public arena many of the issues involved.

The final paper examines 'health status'. Although improving during successive plans the proportion being spent appears to be declining and biased

toward curative rather than preventative measures.

In conclusion, therefore, for their range and coherence, the articles can be highly recommended both to Malaysian specialists and to scholars interested in government involvement in a rapidly developing economy.

MARK COOK

ROLAND BARTHES: STORY AND DISCOURSE

Roland Barthes: Structuralism and After. Annette Lavers. Methuen. £8.95.

When the French critic and philosopher Roland Barthes died as the result of an accident in a Paris street in March, 1980, the events of his troubled life had already been recorded in his own account, in 1975, called *Roland Barthes on Roland Barthes.* Annette Lavers has placed at the end of her book a useful summary of those events, dating the bouts of tubercular illness which punctuated his several university lectureships in various countries; adding 1976 as the time of his appointment to the Chair of *Sémiology Littéraire* at the Collège de France.

Her main purpose was to examine Barthes's literary criticism in relation to that of other theorists, beginning with Heidegger, of the 'structuralist' school of thought. She shows how his preoccupation with language, ambivalent though he was about its central significance in the science of signs and symbols, caused him to centre every problem on it. She compares the criteria, shifting as they are, used by traditional critics with the devices employed by structuralists to 'deconstruct' a text: and how their 'new' terminology owes conceptual allegiance to specific scientific disciplines. For a time, appealing to chemistry, they talked of 'valency' as if one could judge the propriety of word or sign by its weight or its specific gravity. As the search for scientific respectability intensified, the more violent (and radical) metaphors employed were in the terms of sub-atomic physics: 'deconstruction' was to be carried out by 'exploding' text, as though true 'fission' could occur and reveal its weakest vein. As Richard Rorty tellingly remarks, the structuralists claimed to have discovered 'some whiz-bang device' by which to cause literary judgments to happen to them as though in a physical process. Rorty further points out, however, that the way ahead is usually cleared by the 'irrationalist' thinker who is a genuine iconoclast. He may well have some dotty ideas which will not be remembered; but he has at least disposed effectively of some outworn shibboleths.

Ms. Lavers takes as her theme Barthes's aspirations to both scientific discovery in language and an increasingly subtle theory and practice of the art of reading. It is clear from many of his essays that he was only half convinced of the possibility of an intellectual revolution in literary judgments. Certainly for him neither science nor sociology could provide touchstones. Indeed, the imaginative play of original ideas is characteristic of his theoretical output. But he constantly deployed the tenets held by Lévi-Strauss, based on the first order evidence of speech utterance by non-literary peoples. Lévi-Strauss deplored attempts to transfer his anthropological findings to the second order evaluation of literature. That the attempt proved irresistible is the result of a perceived connection between notions of language as a common heritage, with equalitarian overtones, and structuralist beliefs that no individual may truly be regarded as the author of his work since much of it reflects society's contribution to the shaping of his personality. Contribution, not attribution, is the structuralist interpretation of authorship: and there is an obvious link here with Marxist ideas about public accountability and collective responsibility.

Annette Lavers has made a telling contribution to research in literary theory. She has, too, some good things to say about the history of ideas in the past 50 years, from Marxism and existentialism through structuralism and beyond.

BETTY ABEL

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE UNITED STATES

America and the Americans. Edmund Fawcett and Tony Thomas. Collins Fontana Books.

In this paperback, the two authors put to remarkably successful use sojourns in the United States as correspondents of *The Economist*, a daunting command of statistics and information gathered from a host of sources. They publish here what are in essence essays on almost every aspect of American life: on politics and on Wall Street, on farming and the press, on law and lawyers, on religion and television, on today's American Indians—and on much else. They have read widely; they have valuable statistical information; they have moved everywhere and talked and acquired both informatiton and impressions from Vermont to San Diego: of farmers in Illinois and Kansas, of women assembled in feminist ranks in Houston, of preachers everywhere, and of many schools (though minimising perhaps the role of the best, if the most exclusive, schools in New England).

As a map to the complexities of contemporary America and the lives of its 230 million people this book is hard to fault. The authors have an insider's sureness of foot in their accounts of Wall Street and Universities, but their grasp has equal authenticity elsewhere. If I looked for issues of interpretation, I would hazard the view that they do not fully grasp the total change that the Supreme Court judgment of 1954 brought to the black world in the Deep South. They do not attempt—and admit it—to assess the impact of Hollywood as a cultural force, and perhaps do not grasp the contribution of the South to American letters before and after desegregation. And while they highlight the population growth of the South, the South West and the West, they do not quite catch the flavour of the transformation in a state like Arizona. But this is a readable and well-informed introduction.

ESMOND WRIGHT

SHORTER REVIEWS

A Book of Scottish Verse (Hale. £12.50). This is an admirable anthology, compiled by R. L. Mackie and revised by Maurice Lindsay. Perhaps some may regret that in the enlarged groups of poems by Burns there is still no room for Mary Morison, yet admittedly the selection is broad and representative. In the new contemporary section, again, tastes may differ, but the inclusion of Liz Lochhead seems to me fully justified, if for no other reason than that she will be so popular with the younger readers. Maurice has succeeded in his stated aim to include only memorable poetry. (N.H.A.)

Heritage of The Kaiser's Children. An Autobiography. (Canongate Publishing. £7.50). The Life of Ruth Michaelis-Jena began in 1905 in the Ruritanian gingerbread town of Detmold, the capital of Lippe, a minute German principality where on Gala nights, when coloured lights

swung in the frosty air, 'their Serene Highnesses would descend from the castle to walk up and down the rink to the cheers of their loyal subjects. 'The author vividly recreates the warm, ante-bellum world of pastry cakes and dancing bears. After the war, life in the new Weimar Republic, more astringent and exciting, still seemed good. Ruth Michaelis-Jena entered into a successful career in publishing. However, the future held a cruel sting: by 1934, the Nazis had stamped a 'J' in her passport. Exile in Edinburgh was grateful, if lonely, but marred by an undeserved stint in the Isle of Man as a suspected enemy alien. Contentment returned at last in Scotland, but the sense of loss of the early days has stayed poignantly with her, and born fruit in a delicately evocative and moving autobiography.

(M. T.)

Honourable Member (Patrick Stephens, £6.95). Richard Needham has been Conservative Member of Parliament for a Wiltshire constituency since 1969. With this experience in the House, he has written in this volume 'an inside look at the House of Commons'. This is essentialy a popular book in a light but serious vein, humorous and entertaining. He provides a great deal of information upon the organisation and working of the House, and the life and work of the average backbench M.P. To give life and more impact to his account, he introduces a notional young budding politician who has just been returned to the House. We read all about his frustrations, trials and tribulations when caught in the Parliamentary party machine. The author writes as a Conservative M.P. but he points out that in the parties, 'the practices may differ but the principles are the same. In spite of his criticisms, he 'can think of no more satisfying career for anyone to aspire to.' In a book of this kind, the reader must not expect any discussion in depth of constitutional developments, as, for example, the growing importance since 1979 of select committees in probing the work of the Executive administration.

Amnesty International Report 1983. (Amnesty International Publications). This report contains Amnesty International's official account of its work in 1982, investigating violations of human rights. It 'identifies abuses in more than 115 countries' discussed country by country. This number is not exhaustive. There are other states where information cannot be obtained and is refused by the government concerned. Indeed, secrecy is at the base of most dictatorial regimes. Much of this volume makes horrific reading, of torture, imprisonment without fair or any trial, disappearance and murder of political dissentients. Amnesty's information is rarely misplaced. In 1982 they adopted 5,557 prisoners as prisoners of conscience, or possible such prisoners; 'during 1982 1,743 new cases were taken up, and 1,022 prisoners released'. By the start of 1983, Amnesty had 3,000 groups in 51 countries, with over half a million members and supporters in over 160 territories. This volume provides an impressive summary of the work of this great dynamic organisation in its fight against man's inhumanity to man.

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Contemporary Review

119th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

APRIL 1984

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Gerald Frost

IN THE STRANGLEHOLD OF TEHERAN'S MULLAH REGIME
Alfred Joachim Fischer

CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRACY AND UNION POWER: THE TRADE UNION BILL 1983
Roy Gregory

PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING AND THE ARTS
Alasdair Milne

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incorporating The Fortnightly

April 1984 Vol. 244 No. 1419 Founded 1866

Contents

		Page
Presidential Campaign: the Death of the Liberal Dream	Gerald Frost	**169**
Kampuchea Between Conflict and Compromise	Justus M. van der Kroef	**175**
Conservative Democracy and Union Power: the Trade Union Bill 1983	Roy Gregory	**181**
In the Stranglehold of Teheran's Mullah Regime	Alfred Joachim Fischer	**190**
Public Service Broadcasting and the Arts	Alasdair Milne	**193**
Is Poland a Catholic Country?	Keith Sword	**199**
Olive Schreiner Today	Colin Style	**204**
Correspondence:		
A Controversial Diary	John Elsom	**210**
Reply to John Elsom	Clare Colvin	**211**
Whose Interests?	Brian Look	
The Disabled Plan	*Eurofocus*	**212**
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		**213**
Quarterly Fiction Review	Rosalind Wade	**213**
Non-fiction Reviews Lord Longford, Paul Rose, Esmond Wright, Kenneth Lindsay, Betty Abel		**218**
SHORTER REVIEWS		**223**

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© 1983 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co. Ltd. 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H. G. Leates Ltd., 45/47 Alexandra St., Southend-on-Sea, Essex. U.S. Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N.Y. 10022. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £14.50, U.S.A. and Canada $47.50. Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U.S. and Canada; extra costs given on request. U.S. Postmaster: please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, New York N.Y. 10022. (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

April 1984 Vol. 244 No. 1419

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN: THE DEATH OF THE LIBERAL DREAM

by Gerald Frost

EVEN though in the formal sense the US Presidential campaign has scarcely begun, some of the contenders, the President included, have been running—perhaps 'jogging' would be a more appropriate phrase for a septuagenarian—for some time. Walter Mondale started earlier than most: indeed, it could be said that he has been running for the Presidency from the moment he ceased to be Vice-President, if not actually before that time; and although not declaring himself a candidate until January 29 of this year, President Reagan had obviously adjusted the style of his foreign policy, if not the substance of it, with electoral considerations in mind, some weeks earlier.

The progress of the campaign permits several observations about the changing nature of American politics. The first is that the extent to which the support of special interest groups is now considered essential is now greater than ever before. The attempt to win the endorsement of such groups is not, of course, new. Reagan was conspicuously active in seeking and winning the endorsements of a variety of groups, notably those on the New Right during the 1980 campaign. But the Democratic contenders during the present contest have shown that they regard the wooing of factions as a far more important political art than that of currying favour with state party bosses.

Aided by a political machine which is regarded by many in Washington as the most efficient devised in the history of American politics, Mondale has won endorsements from Blacks, Hispanics, unions, teachers and feminists. Even though his campaign has not neglected political leaders—a Mondale lobbyist has been attached to every member of Congress—his attention to the special interest groups has been more assiduous, methodical and relentless. His rivals for the nomination have employed similar techniques, but not with the same success. A spokesman of one such group, Rachelle Horowitz—political director of the American Federation of Teachers—was recently reported as saying that resentment at Mondale's success at obtaining endorsements was simply a matter of jealousy: 'John Glenn tried to pander. He was just a bad panderer'. Because of his methodical follow-up techniques, when Mondale panders the subject of his attentions evidently stays pandered.

Endorsements are valuable for several reasons: they are a sign that

those who win have the requisite political talents, the tangible symbols of success of a kind which, like good results in the opinion polls, inevitably boosts the momentum of the campaign; most importantly of all, the groups have sophisticated computerised mailing lists which are considered invaluable in mobilising support and 'educating' members about the relative virtues of the candidates.

There is nothing necessarily disturbing about this development; the involvement of factions is an essential part of political pluralism to which the age of the computer has merely given an extra dimension. What has surprised and disappointed some, however, has been the extent to which Mondale has been prepared to pledge himself to the cause of the interest groups whose endorsement he has been seeking, going far beyond the general expression of empathy and common feeling normally thought appropriate. For example, Mondale told the National Organisation of Women that he would be a *feminist* President; he told the Alabama Democratic Conference that he would be the 'best President Black America has ever had'; and he pledged his loyalty to the AFL-CIO (which has 13 million names on its computer mailing list) in even more slavish terms.

Mondale may now be content that he has the votes of black feminist unionised teachers in Alabama absolutely sewn up, but generous promises of loyalty, accompanied in several instances by specific commitments, have inevitably raised doubts about whether Mondale is more than the sum of his endorsements. His programme as it emerges is, as one would expect, liberal in tone and substance, but Mondale's liberalism, devoid of idealism, vision and intellectual vitality, appears to be constructed like pieces of Leggo from commitments made and bargains struck. It may not bother him greatly, but his campaign has not attracted the idealists and intellectuals who imbue a candidacy and campaign with a sense of moral or ideological legitimacy. Indeed, there is no escaping the conclusion that he is the least interesting Presidential candidate in living memory, lacking not only the intellectual flare of a Stevenson, the glamour of a Kennedy, and the prairies populism of a Humphrey, but even the curiosity value of a Carter.

He is a machine politician par excellence: efficient, shrewd, patient, dedicated, highly methodical. As a speaker, however, he is competent only in the sense that every scripted word is finely focused on a targeted group; he is otherwise mediocre and grey in the extreme. For an American he is a curiously stiff figure, never relaxing in public, seldom, if ever, making any off-the-cuff comments, and invariably discouraging questions about his private and family life. He is immensely painstaking about his appearance, and cautious almost to the point of obsession: but his campaign manager has recently barred reporters from the campaign team for fear that an indiscreet remark could damage his prospects ('there is no percentage in it for us').

Senator Gary Hart, who burst upon the national US scene as the candidate of 'new ideas' and a 'new generation of leadership' in three of

the opening primaries, has skilfully exploited what many took to be one of Mondale's greatest assets—his close relationship to the special interest groups. In contrast to Mondale, Hart appears as a free floating and independent spirit. He has also shown an awareness that, while many young American professionals and white collar workers may still regard themselves as liberals, like other voters they do not relish further increases in taxes of a kind to which Mondale's free spending policies would clearly lead. He, it is said, is a neo liberal, whereas Mondale's liberalism is of the traditional variety.

Like Kennedy, Hart is the candidate of modernity and, to quote the oft used phase, he presently enjoys 'momentum'—no mean assets in a land which reveres youth, activity (even for its own sake), and novelty. He also looks good on television. Of his new ideas more could be said if he said more about them himself; his assertion that they *are* new, akin to the claims of a thousand detergent advertisements, is all we have to go on. As far as one can tell, Hart's views are a mix of liberalism, fiscal restraint and isolationism. At the time of writing Hart's support seems too narrowly based, both in regional and possibly in class and generational terms, for him to stop Mondale—although many commentators would disagree with this judgement. Hart, however, might very well make a valuable and attractive running mate for his present arch enemy. Indeed, if Mondale does obtain the nomination most observers expect the former Vice-President to give his campaign message a broader appeal—perhaps by the judicious selection of an appropriate partner. For it is evident—even to occasional visitors to the US, such as this writer—that Mondale's message to special interest groups and to party activists is not necessarily one which has wide popular appeal. Many have found it curious that he has not at this stage attempted to do so, for so far he has not distanced himself from the Carter administration, in which he served, in any significant respect. Such a strategy must inevitably assume that Carter lost in 1980 because of personal deficiencies and errors of judgement, not because of his policies or their underlying philosophy; but there is an alternative and, to my mind, more convincing explanation of what happened in 1980, which is that the Democrats lost office because the liberal programme was deemed to be out of step with present realities as well as with US public opinion. Significantly, according to a recent poll, only 30 per cent of Democratic voters regard themselves as liberals. Putting forward exactly this view of the 1980 outcome, Ben Wattenberg, editor of *Public Opinion*, a Washington-based political quarterly, writes in the current issue:

> Inflation, interest rates and Iran were not accidents; they were symptoms and symbols of something that had turned sour in the way many Democrats thought about many things. Democrats were living in a world as they wished it were, not in the world as it was. It was an unreal world where Democrats could be at once for environmental slow growth and blue collar fast growth; could be for a strong America and yet not be willing to match the Soviet build-up. That could not go on for ever.

On the subject of defence, an area in which, according to the polls, Reagan is markedly ahead of his principal Democratic rival, Mondale

displays an ambivalence typical of his party. He condemns Reagan's 'militarism' and the fierceness of the President's rhetoric but, at the same time, he stresses the need for strong defence. He condemns plans to expand the defence budget, but fails wholly to provide specific details of how he will match the Soviet build-up.

This ambivalence was recently characterised with great acuity by Mark Shields, a veteran political journalist and former campaign manager: 'Democrats insist they favour some weapons system or another, but it's never the one which is before the Congress in any given year. The hypothetic system Democrats favour is usually promised to be smaller, cheaper, and cleaner. But it is never the one Congress is voting on now. The same holds true for wherever the US finds itself in any sort of contretemps or face-off with the Soviets or their retainers. Of course, say the Democrats, there is some place in the world where we should tell the Soviets: "Enough", but it is never the place where we are currently embroiled. Either we can't win there, or if we can, nobody would like us or respect us if we exercised the muscle necessary to win. If the Republicans are promiscuous and compulsive line-drawers . . . the Democrats won't go near the chalk. The inability of the Democrats to agree generally upon any defence expenditure as (a) necessary, or (b) advisable, undermines public confidence in the party's understanding of the world's dangers, and it raises serious doubts about the Democrats' commitment to a strong defence.'

It would be wrong, of course, to suppose that the Democratic nominee will have no advantages at all. In the matter of simple political arithmetic he has one inestimable advantage, for there are simply more of them than there are Republicans. The party is also expected to benefit from recent drives to encourage Hispanic and Black voters, many of whom do not have a high view of the President's economic or social policies. It is widely alleged that Reagan is unpopular with women voters, a conclusion which appears to rest largely on the opposition of feminist groups to his Presidency, which is, of course, not necessarily the same thing.

Again, the party is expected to be helped by the vast Reagan budget deficit. Mondale has alleged that, in permitting the budget to reach such proportions, Reagan has 'broken a covenant with the American people'. He further alleged that the high interest rates which are the practical consequence of the deficit are injuring relations with America's allies. Here, perhaps, Mondale is on less safe territory. As long as the deficits are perceived to be fuelling the domestic economic recovery, there will be little political mileage here. Moreover, voters with memories will recall that when Carter and his Vice-President left office, inflation rates were running at 21 per cent, growth was minimal, and interest rates were even higher than they are now.

For tactical reasons, it is in the interests of both camps to suggest that in the event of a Mondale v. Reagan contest the result will be close; a view widely held by the US media. If, however, the liberal dream is dead or dying, it is difficult to believe that Mondale's unreconstructed liberal

rhetoric will sufficiently raise the American electorate to enable him to mount a serious challenge to the incumbent—which is, no doubt, a bold if not foolhardy prediction, given the uncertain nature of political life. Nevertheless, Reagan does appear to me to be in an exceptionally strong, if not invincible, position. He enjoys the usual benefits of the incumbent, remaining above the hurly-burly of the campaign, able to bestride the world stage while his Vice-President and his re-election team campaign on his behalf, and his rivals appear merely as office seekers.

Although it is not clear how long the economic recovery will last and although quarrels within the administration about to what extent the Federal Reserve should relax its tight money policy to accommodate the boom, the present state of the economy is clearly helping the Reagan candidacy at present. The inflation rate has dipped significantly, economic growth has recently been dramatic, unemployment is now falling; none of the dire forecasts about the consequences of running such a large deficit has so far proved correct.

No less importantly, there is a widespread if not universal belief that after years of foreign policy naïvety, vacillation, Yankee innocence and drift, Reagan has helped America to reassert its world role and more fully accept its international responsibilities. The militarily effective action in Grenada is to many Americans what the Falklands invasion was to many British subjects: confirmation that in the pursuit of a just cause and the national interest the nation was capable of mounting an effective military action. Although for obvious reasons the operation was not as spectacular as the Falklands war, the invasion awakened comparable sentiments of national pride: the fact that the task force had, in effect, thwarted Moscow's designs undoubtedly served to heighten that feeling.

Even if Reagan had not received credit for ordering the Grenada invasion (which, of course, he did) the arousal of such feelings—sentiments that had lain dormant since the trauma of Vietnam—are, in their nature, more likely to help the conservative cause than the liberal. All of which provides further evidence in the mind of the voter that the liberal credo may be out of step with the times. No doubt sensing all this, the Reagan team has proclaimed that the President has helped America 'to walk tall', a key phrase which is likely to be repeated throughout the campaign, one which may grate on some European sensibilities, but has a wholly different effect in Peoria.

The proposed increases in defence spending, the plans for a manned spacecraft, the development of space-based anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology, and the President's New Democracy Project, all reinforce the impression of a confident, outward-looking administration with a strong sense of its own moral and ideological legitimacy, notwithstanding the existence of a great many differences of opinion and perceptions within it.

While there are clearly cross-currents and conflicting strains in intellectual and public opinion, the Reagan administration has clearly been sustained by a strong conservative tide. For while the liberal dream may

have faded, the conservative vision (dream is too Utopian a term to apply to Republicans) remains bright. It is not just that the national mood strikes me as predominantly conservative; this observer is also struck by the vigour and diversity of the conservative movement in the US, which is now better organised and better funded than it has ever been. Conservatives in the universities are more active and politically involved; there is a profusion of conservative publications, pressure groups, single interest groups, research organisations, think tanks.

Arguably the most influential of these has been The Heritage Foundation, a conservative research body which has grown dramatically since its inception ten years ago, and which has enjoyed a substantial influence on the present administration through publications combining intellectual respectability, topicality and a strong prescriptive element.

In this way, the Foundation has achieved a direct impact on Congress and the White House, while at the same time helping to shape the wider political environment through its influence on the opinion-formers in the media and the universities. When President Reagan arrived in office in 1980, The Heritage Foundation presented him with a detailed blueprint designed to help him 'hit the ground running'. Entitled *Mandate for Leadership*, the study contained 2,000 specific recommendations for reform, reorganisation and policy reform. The US President, who subsequently appointed 30 of the 200 contributors to the report to policy positions in his administration, publicly acknowledging the value of its recommendations, can no doubt expect advice from similar sources if re-elected.

The growth of Heritage and other conservative research bodies, foundations and pressure groups, has produced a conservative network in many ways as substantial and influential as the liberal network which dominated Washington intellectual life in earlier decades. Its vitality and industry, together with the predominantly conservative mood of the electorate, prompts the thought that Reaganism will survive whatever happens on the second Tuesday of November 1984 and may very well outlive Reagan the man.

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KAMPUCHEA BETWEEN CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE

by Justus M. van der Kroef

IN June, 1983, authoritative Thai intelligence sources revealed Hanoi's plans to accelerate an extensive programme of so-called 'development villages' by which tens of thousands of Vietnamese would be re-settled in various parts of Kampuchea. Such villages, involving some 60,000 Vietnamese peasant and farm co-operative 'technicians', already have been established in Kampuchea's Battambang and Koh Kong provinces. The programme envisages that eventually about 20% of the Kampuchean population will consist of ethnic Vietnamese. It should be stressed that Hanoi evidently does not intend to limit the 'Vietnamisation' of the population of its Indo-Chinese allies to Kampuchea. Already in 1979 some 100,000 Vietnamese had been settled in the Saravane, Atopeu and Bolovens plateau regions of Laos, and since then a steady trickle of hundreds of Vietnamese farmers have immigrated. In Kampuchea, there also are about 180,000 Vietnamese military and some 6,000 Vietnamese party cadres and civilian 'administrators-technicians,' while in Laos the respective figures are about 45,000 Vietnamese military and 4,000 civilians. Also, in both countries, e.g. in Laos' Savannakhet area, on the Mekong River just across from Thailand, there are several hundred Cuban, Soviet and other East European advisers.

One should add that the solidification of Vietnamese strength and influence in Kampuchea and Laos has been accompanied by development of an extensive logistical network, linking key towns and military installations in northern and central Vietnam, via a network of newly built Laotian roads, with militarily critical areas near or along the Thai-Kampuchean and Thai-Laotian borders. Thus, by mid-1983, a new 'Ho Chi Minh Trail' reportedly had been completed, actually consisting of two roads, the so-called 'Routes 13 and 23,' which respectively run from the Vietnamese cities of Hue and Vinh, through Southern Laos, into north-western Kampuchea. A new 'Highway 9' now links the Vietnamese coastal town of Dong Hoi with the earlier named key Laotian town of Savannakhet. Observers note that military traffic is continuous and heavy on these roads.

Though heavily dependent on the USSR for financial and military aid (said to be running at an annual rate of nearly $2 billion since 1979), Hanoi brooks no interference in Kampuchea from any quarter—not even Moscow. In December, 1981, for example, at Vietnamese insistence, the Kampuchean Communist party's secretary general, Pen Sovan, was removed from office. He was held for some time under house arrest in Hanoi, where he was apparently undergoing 'medical treatment.' The real reason for Pen Sovan's fall from power, however, was that his pro-Soviet sympathies were displeasing to the suspicious Vietnamese, who believed that he might be trying to play them off against the Russians.

These and other dimensions of the consolidation of Vietnam's power are taking place as military clashes along the Thai-Kampuchean border are increasing. At the same time, Vietnam's key Asian neighbours, such as the People's Republic of China and the members of ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations, founded in 1967 and comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines), officially remain unrelenting in their insistence that Hanoi must withdraw its 180,000-man military force now in Kampuchea and permit the Kampucheans freely to determine their own political destiny.

It may be recalled that in January, 1979, after months of border clashes culminating in a massive Vietnamese military invasion, the government of 'Democratic Kampuchea' of Premier Pol Pot was overthrown. The Vietnamese installed in Phnom Penh a 'People's Republic of Kampuchea' (PRK) headed by President Heng Samrin, previously a pro-Hanoi regional Kampuchean Communist party leader. The Vietnamese 'liberation' ended the bloody holocaust of the Pol Pot regime (1975-1979), during which there were numerous mass executions, and maltreatment and wilful neglect of the Kampuchean mass had resulted in serious malnutrition, and lack of medical care. These, together with the drastic severity of Pol Pot's collectivisation schemes, reduced Kampuchea's population from about 7.5 million to about 6 million.

Soon after the Vietnamese 'liberation,' however, ethnic Kampuchean pride and nationalism, mixed with ancient historic anti-Vietnamese suspicion and hostility that are endemic among Kampucheans, began chafing ever more sharply under Hanoi's ubiquitous presence. Extensive food shortages, and crop-ravaging natural calamities since 1979 contributed to a steady stream of tens of thousands of Kampuchean refugees fleeing towards or across the Thai-Kampuchean frontier. In February, 1980, the Bangkok government formally closed its border with Kampuchea. But, surreptitiously, and sometimes on officially approved 'humanitarian' grounds, Kampucheans have continued to come in. Still, as a matter of official Thai policy the 40,000 or so Kampucheans still in refugee camps well inside Thailand today, along with some 60,000 Laotians and about 10,000 Vietnamese, must either repatriate or be taken in by a 'third country.'

However, the nub of the present Kampuchean refugee problem is elsewhere. Just inside the often still fuzzy Thai-Kampuchean border or, in some cases straddling it, there developed primarily since 1979 a kind of semi-permanent, Kampuchean, 'refugee nation' of some 280,000 people. These are housed in more than a dozen camps, most of which hold up to 35,000 inhabitants, and some, with their schools, meeting halls, temples, and makeshift hospitals, give an almost town-like appearance. Government in the camps is makeshift and uncertain, depending on what faction is in control. In the camps a thriving smuggling trade and black market economy soon took root, winked at or even quietly assisted and participated in by Thai and also PRK officials and entrepreneurs. Not least because of their free-wheeling economic opportunities, the camps continue to attract newcomers.

By the beginning of 1981, thanks to massive foreign relief aid, the worst of the hunger and malnutrition threatening Kampuchea was over; indeed, further relief programmes became controversial amidst charges that supplies were not reaching the populace but were being diverted for use by Vietnamese and PRK military or other officials. However, as Kampuchea's economy gradually stabilised, popular discontent soon sharpened again, prompted by the influx of Vietnamese settlers, new forced rural resettlement schemes for Kampuchean peasants, the imposition of conscription, and a deepening, nationalist, anti-Vietnamese resentment generally.

Kampuchean dissidents unwilling to join the underground 35,000-man guerrilla army of the ill-reputed Pol Pot, still battling the Vietnamese occupation forces in Western Kampuchea, soon found other rallying points. Since early 1979 when they had condemned the Vietnamese invasion, ASEAN leaders had been seeking to develop a so-called 'third alternative' government for Kampuchea, i.e. neither the PRK nor Pol Pot. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Kampuchea's long-time ruler but deposed and exiled for more than a decade, as well as Sihanouk's former premier and political antagonist, Son Sann, had each begun to develop an 'alternative' following, both among the refugees and dissidents in the border camps, as well as abroad. China, meanwhile, remained committed to Pol Pot, whose 'Democratic Kampuchea' government it had supported almost from its accession to power in Phnom Penh in 1975, and whose guerrilla army, headquartered today in Western Kampuchea's Cardamom Mountain range, it has continued to supply.

Largely due to ASEAN diplomatic persuasion, and with the quiet endorsement of the US, the three 'alternative' factions ultimately joined in forming a 'Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea' (CGDK) at a conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on June 22, 1982. Headed by Sihanouk as President, and with Son Sann as premier, the CGDK formally gave Khieu Sampan, Pol Pot's colleague, and the present President/Premier of the underground 'Democratic Kampuchea' regime, the title of 'Vice-President in Charge of Foreign Affairs.' Almost from the start personal rivalries and tactical differences among the coalition's three leaders, further aggravated by the mercurial Sihanouk's open criticism of his colleagues and by his periodic threats to resign, robbed the CGDK of its potential. At the June 24, 1983 meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Bangkok, Indonesia's Mokhtar Kusumaatmadja voiced open disappointment with the coalition, saying that the CGDK still had to prove itself to be a 'truly effective force.'

Yet, all the while, in the Thai-Kampuchean border camps the process of recruitment and consolidation of power by the armed followers of the three factions of the coalition was proceeding apace. Some camps became virtual strongholds of Son Sann's 'Kampuchean National Liberation Front.' Others were dominated by Pol Pot's 'National Army', and yet others by Sihanouk's 2,000-man *Moulinaka* ('national liberation' army). Ambushes, raids on Vietnamese garrisons, and demolition of supply depots and communication, continue to be announced by these CGDK

armed factions in their operations against Vietnamese and PRK. By mid-May, 1983, Moulinaka commander In Tam claimed that 2,000 of his forces now controlled a number of 'liberated zones' inside Kampuchean territory. In Vietnamese counteraction and 'hot pursuit', artillery shells have frequently fallen inside Thai territory, causing casualties and brief but intense fire exchanges between Vietnamese and Thai military units. Repeatedly, complaints over these Vietnamese intrusions have been filed at the United Nations by the Bangkok government.

There is little question that the CGDK's operations, from its bases and supply sources in the border 'refugee nations,' and the sanctuary afforded by Thailand to Kampuchean refugees, some of them almost certainly insurgents, increasingly became a nagging political and military embarrassment to and drain on the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea. After a careful logistical preparation in the closing weeks of 1982, including construction of new border roads and military emplacements, the Vietnamese in the first half of 1983 launched a series of devastating attacks on the border camps. Up to 8,000 Vietnamese troops supported by light artillery and tanks all but demolished Nong Chang, Phnom Chat, O Smach (dubbed 'Sihanoukville,' since it was Moulinaka's headquarters), O Bok, and other camps, most of which had served as major staging grounds for CGDK military units. Thousands of Kampucheans were driven into temporary sanctuary in Thailand. Most of these refugees subsequently returned to Kampuchea, staying in the border zone, where they joined one of the CGDK's armed factions, particularly Son Sann's 'Kampuchean National Liberation Front.'

Dissidence, meanwhile, also seemed to be spreading in the Vietnam-supervised PRK government apparatus. In June, 1983, 'mass arrests' reportedly began taking place among PRK military, government officials and village heads in the provinces of Siem Reap, Battambang, and Oddar Meanchey. Among those arrested on grounds of suspected pro-CGDK sympathies were the governor of Siem Reap province and his deputy. A number of refugee reports in early July, 1983 that even PRK President Heng Samrin had been placed under arrest were officially denied by the PRK government's Phnom Penh radio. But there was no denial of Thai army intelligence reports that Vietnamese forces had disarmed the entire 286th division of the PRK army, based in Oddar Meanchey, and had arrested its commander and senior officers.

Meanwhile, the border clashes had raised Thai-Vietnamese tensions, amidst mutual charges of new border intrusions. Bangkok claimed, for example, that during the Vietnamese attack on the Phnom Chat camp in early April, 1983, some 150 Vietnamese military had entrenched themselves in the Phnom Pra hill territory inside Thailand. The alleged Vietnamese intruders were said to have been driven off only after sharp hand-to-hand combat and Thai F-5 jets had been called in. Hanoi accused the Thais of repeated unauthorised intrusions into Kampuchean air space during reconnaissance sorties and of numerous alleged violations of Kampuchean waters 'by armed boats from Thailand.'

Amidst this din of shell and rhetoric it should be stressed that the

pattern of conflict is unlikely to develop into a wider or deeper war. Neither Bangkok nor Hanoi are interested in a major confrontation with each other. And while the CGDK's continuing guerrilla struggle unquestionably saps Vietnamese military strength and continues to be a magnet for all manner of Kampuchean dissidents who cannot abide Hanoi's or the PRK's rule, the coalition, by itself, cannot compel a Vietnamese withdrawal. In a Bangkok press interview on September 1, 1983, Thai's Premier Prem Tinsulanond reiterated that the Vietnamese must pull back their forces from Kampuchea and give the latter's inhabitants a chance to express themselves freely on their political future. But Thailand, like her ASEAN partners, also remains committed to finding a 'political solution' to the Kampuchean problem.

The United Nations General Assembly, with huge majorities, had demanded over the years that Vietnam withdraw. In its vote on October 28, 1982, for example, the Assembly's vote was the largest ever favouring such a resolution (105 for, 23 against and 20 abstentions), and in its May, 1983 session, the UN's Economic and Social Council, during its discussion of various human rights problems around the world, overwhelmingly passed a similar resolution. But all this has done nothing to pursuade Vietnam and its Soviet bloc supporters. And so some ASEAN members, despite People's China's more rigid anti-Vietnamese confrontational policy, have also been looking for compromise. This has included a willingness to have direct bilateral discussions between ASEAN and Hanoi and, in the case of Indonesia and Malaysia, mooting a kind of future 'Finlandised' Kampuchea, from which Vietnamese forces would have withdrawn but in which Hanoi's national security interests will be respected.

Not least because of Hanoi's repeated insistence that the main obstacle to a Vietnamese withdrawal and to a settlement of the Kampuchean problem is the 'Chinese threat,' the course of ASEAN-Vietnamese diplomacy to find a solution has been extraordinarily tortuous in the past three years. But what is perhaps more remarkable about it is that in the constant pushing and hauling of new proposals and nuances of interpretation the desire for compromise clearly is there. One major reason is that ASEAN fears a strong, modernised, resurgent, post-Mao China and views a sturdy but independent Indo-China as a useful barrier to Beijing's traditionally historic interests in the Nanyang (i.e. 'South China Sea') area. The Chinese, because of their common front with ASEAN against Hanoi, are currently underplaying their support for local Communist insurgencies in the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. But ASEAN capitals, either confronting such Communist insurgencies now, or with recent memories of powerful China-oriented Communist parties are doubtful that China's presently benign posture will necessarily last.

ASEAN leaders make no bones about their suspicions. In March, 1982, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmadja in a Dutch press interview declared candidly that 'We (i.e. ASEAN) all see China as a threat: the variation is in the view of Vietnam.' Earlier, in October,

1981, at the Commonwealth Conference in Melbourne, Malaysia's Foreign Minister Ghazali Shafie had warned that China had not given up 'its designs' on South East Asia. He characterised Beijing's policy of trying to 'bleed Vietnam white' as naive, and he urged the Chinese to join ASEAN in finding a negotiated settlement in Kampuchea. Other ASEAN spokesmen, critical of what they perceive as relative US passivity in the Kampuchean conflict crisis, and even of 'tagging along' behind China, have expressed alarm that the Kampuchean embroglio has the effect of driving Hanoi ever more deeply into the arms of Moscow.

And indeed, the Soviets have insisted on their *quid pro quo* for all the military, technical, and financial aid with which they have provided the Vietnamese. For example, according to an announcement by the Thai National Security Council in August, 1983, fifteen Soviet warships, including submarines, now regularly operate out of Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay port. Recently, two floating piers were added to Cam Ranh's facilities. Soviet Bear 95-D reconnaissance aircraft, and 95-F anti-submarine versions of the same plane, also use Cam Ranh Bay for regular missions over the South China Sea. Kampuchea's Kompong Som has become the port of call for up to ten Soviet bloc ships a month. Laotian armed forces are being strengthened and modernised by the USSR. Moscow recently sent thirty-four MIG-21 fighter aircraft to Vientiane—along with Russian instructors and additional advisory personnel.

Perhaps the ultimate tragedy of the ongoing Kampuchean upheaval is that each of the principal superpowers involved still sees more assets than liabilities in the present status quo of the relatively low level of Kampuchean conflict. For the USSR, though the financial cost is high, the Kampuchean fighting and Hanoi's needs offer new strategic abuttments and opportunities for the projection of Soviet military power. For China, the Kampuchean fighting is an opportunity, at little cost to itself, to keep on draining both Hanoi's and Moscow's resources. Washington also perceives the Kampuchean struggle—like Afghanistan—as a quagmire into which Moscow has little choice but to be drawn ever furher.

All this tends to leave the initiative to find a compromise solution to the Kampuchean conflict largely to ASEAN and the Indo-China states. There are indications that in ASEAN capitals as well as Hanoi this is increasingly being realised. Early in September, 1983, ASEAN foreign ministers announced that they would not bring the Kampuchean question once again before the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly. Instead, they would content themselves with delivering a 'joint message,' reminding the world that the issue remained unresolved.

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CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRACY AND UNION POWER: THE TRADE UNION BILL 1983

by Roy Gregory

> And here we must observe that men must either be cajoled or crushed; for they will revenge themselves for slight wrongs, while for grave ones they cannot. The injury, therefore, that you do to a man should be such that you need not fear his revenge. Machiavelli, *The Prince.*

LEGISLATION often fails to achieve its objectives, and sometimes the consequences of an Act of Parliament are anything but what its authors intended. Nowhere has this been more true than in connection with industrial relations law. At last year's Conservative Party conference, Mr. Norman Tebbit, then Secretary of State for Employment, likened the Government's piecemeal, 'step by step' progress in this area of policy to 'tiptoeing through a political minefield'. It was an appropriate figure of speech. Not until the Trade Union Bill 1983—launched by Mr. Tebbit, and now being steered through the House of Commons by Mr. Tom King—has been on the statute book long enough for its impact to become apparent will we be in a position to judge the success or otherwise of this latest instalment in the continuing series of labour relations measures enacted by Mrs. Thatcher's Government.

But whatever view one takes of the Government and its policies, it must be said at once that, on the face of things, this is a shrewd, ambitious and potentially far-reaching piece of legislation. It is clearly intended to kill several birds with one stone, and if (admittedly a big 'if') the assumptions upon which it is based prove well-founded, it may yet succeed in doing so. On the other hand, the Bill could turn out (from the Government's point of view) to be a disappointingly damp squib, fulfilling its nominal purpose of providing for 'a greater measure of democracy in trade unions', but beyond that doing little more than temporarily appease the popular clamour for 'something to be done' about the unions. Conceivably, it may also cause some disconcerting and unwanted explosions.

The Bill is designed, Ministers insist, to 'safeguard the democratic rights of trade unionists'. Behind the rhetoric, however, implicit in the Government's proposals are other designs, too, not unconnected with the changes it would like to secure in the relative bargaining strength of unions and employers, and not unrelated to the diminution it would like to see in trade union influence over the framework of law within which the bargaining takes place.

Specifically, the three aspects of trade union affairs dealt with in the Bill are elections to their governing bodies, strike ballots and their political activities.

Part I of the Bill provides that the governing bodies of trade unions—defined as their 'principal executive committees'—must be directly elected in secret ballots of the entire membership held at least once every five

years. Union presidents and general secretaries will be subject to this provision only if they have a vote or casting vote on their executive.

Under Part II of the Bill unions will lose their immunity from actions in tort unless they hold a secret ballot of all those directly concerned before authorising or endorsing a strike or any other form of industrial action which interferes with or breaks contracts of employment. The Bill does not require unions or strike leaders to hold ballots before unofficial strikes are called; nor does it make immunity conditional upon compliance with the result of the ballot. (Without immunity, unions would, of course, be subject to injunctions preventing them from striking, and their funds would be at risk in actions for damages in respect of the losses inflicted on employers.) This approach—'no ballot, no immunity'—the Government has argued, will provide the unions with a powerful incentive to consult their members before embarking upon strikes, and will significantly reduce the likelihood of irresponsible industrial action.

Part III of the Bill deals with the rights of trade unionists belonging to unions which maintain political funds under the Trade Union Act 1913. Among other things, this Act authorises trade unions, if they choose, to pursue their members' interests through political organisations, to which they may give financial support. Under the 1913 Act the establishment of a political fund for this purpose must be approved in a secret ballot of the membership; but, after an initial affirmative vote, unions are not statutorily required to consult their members again. Individual trade unionists unwilling to contribute to these political funds—which, of course, are used very largely to support the Labour Party—are entitled to 'contract out' of paying the political levy that finances them.

It is not the Government's intention, at the time of writing, to replace 'contracting out' with 'contracting in'—whereby only trade unionists actively volunteering so to do pay the political levy—though this is a possibility that has been much discussed and widely advocated. The Government's view, however, is that the present procedures are not working satisfactorily, and it has left the TUC in no doubt that the current Trade Union Bill will be amended to incorporate provision for 'contracting in' unless the unions produce proposals for changing the existing arrangements which the Government finds acceptable. In the meantime, what the Bill does is to require trade unions which operate political funds to ballot their members at least once every ten years if they wish to maintain them in the future. In almost all cases, the first such ballot will have to be held within twelve months of the Bill being enacted.

The public reaction of trade union leaders and Labour Party spokesmen has, of course, been one of indignation and outrage. The Bill has been variously described as an attempt to cripple, neuter and fetter the trade unions; an attack on the rights of working people; hypocrisy elevated to an art form; a shabby, partisan stratagem designed to assist employers and the Conservative Party; an attempt to bankrupt the main opposition party; and much else in the same vein.

But clearly, ringing phrases apart, because it does not amount to a

frontal assault, or anything like it, on the trade unions or trade union power, it will be difficult for the unions and the Labour Party to oppose the Bill or mobilise effectively against it. Who, after all, will be prepared to man the barricades, go on strike, or even demonstrate in protest against what purports to be simply an extension of the voting rights of trade unionists? As Ministers have pointed out, nothing the Bill requires trade unions to do is not already being done by some union or another. The Bill vests no additional powers in the Government; nor will there be any additional intervention in the internal affairs of the unions by the Government itself or any other new or special agencies.

To all appearances, then, these are modest and reasonable proposals. As portrayed by Ministers, the Bill is a straightforward and wholly above-board measure that will result in the power of the unions being used 'more accountably and in accordance with the views of their members'. It will 'put the shop-floor workers in charge of their leaders, rather than the other way round'. According to the Government, the purpose of the Bill is simply to 'give the unions back to their members'.

Quite so. It would be surprising, however, if other considerations were entirely absent from the minds of Ministers and their advisers when the Bill was conceived. The trade unions are to be made more democratic. An excellent thing in itself, of course. But the fact is that there is often an inverse relationship between the degree of democracy that prevails within an organisation and its effectiveness as a fighting force in the world outside. Who better to appreciate that simple truth than senior members of the Conservative Party? A large injection of Conservative 'ballot-based democracy' may, indeed, as one commentator puts it, 'profoundly alter the balance of power within the unions'. In doing so, it may also alter the balance of power between unions and employers, and between unions and the Government too. Certainly, one does not need particularly vivid powers of imagination to discern a role for the new legislation not only in relation to the conduct of union affairs, but in relation to the Government's overall economic and political strategy as well.

Central to the Government's thinking is the premise that excessive trade union power not only constitutes a threat to the personal freedom of individual trade unionists; for many years it has also been largely responsible for the relatively poor performance of the British economy. In the post-war period of full employment (the argument runs) the unions exploited both the opportunities offered by a buoyant labour market, and also the advantages conferred on them by a legal framework established originally to promote collective bargaining on reasonably equal terms at a time when the unions were weak, and genuinely in need of statutory privileges and immunities. But, combining folly and selfishness, in many sectors of British industry unions have vetoed change, resisted technological innovation, and perpetuated restrictive practices and the inefficient use of manpower. By means of strikes and strike threats, it is argued, they have forced up money wages faster than the growth of productivity; raised unit labour costs; set in motion an upward spiral of



wage and price increases; and undermined the competitiveness of British industry at home and abroad. The result has been a good deal of unnecessary unemployment, which remains at its present high level largely because of the rigidities built into the workings of the labour market by union power and obstinacy. The experience of the United States, it is suggested, shows clearly that cheaper jobs mean more jobs.

The power of the trade unions ought, therefore, to be diminished. But how to do it? One strategy, of course, is to make use of the tools of economic management. Whatever its technical rationale as a means of combatting inflation, the effect—intended or not—of the Government's monetarist policies has been a high and rising level of unemployment. The Government takes the view that the unions help cause unemployment; whatever the truth of that, recession and unemployment certainly have a considerable impact on the unions. The last few years have seen a dramatic fall in their membership, an unmistakable decline in militancy, a reassertion of management control over the shop-floor, and, of course, a markedly lower level of wage settlements.

But, quite apart from the moral and human objections, a strategy that relies upon unemployment as an instrument of policy is likely to provide at best no more than a short-term solution to the problem of excessive union power. For one thing, it entails political risks which the Government would surely not be prepared to run. True, inflation seems to have replaced unemployment as the phenomenon that now causes governments most anxiety as they approach a general election. It is also true that the Government won the last election with unemployment at a level that only a decade ago would have been thought electorally suicidal. But in many respects Mrs. Thatcher's last Government was an extraordinarily lucky government. It cannot reasonably expect to be as lucky again.

So that, whilst defeating inflation will remain the primary objective of the present Government, as the next general election draws nearer it will also be increasingly concerned about unemployment, the issue still rated most urgent by most voters. After all, it was the promise of economic recovery, and the prospect of more 'real' jobs that was supposed to make the hardships of the last few years all worthwhile. In 1983 Mrs. Thatcher could argue that more time was needed for her strategy to work. If, after eight or nine years of Conservative Government, and in spite of lower inflation, unemployment remains stuck at something like the present level, the electorate may begin to have doubts about both the strategy and the Government that is pursuing it. As the months go by, if there is no sign of unemployment coming down of its own accord, as per monetarist doctrine, doctrine may have to take a back seat, while other, more traditional methods are brought into play to *make* it come down.

On the other hand, it may be, of course, that the strategy will work in good time; the level of unemployment may start to fall without government intervention; and Ministers will rejoice to find themselves and their policies vindicated. In either case, whatever it is that brings unemploy-

ment down, the crucial question remains the same: what then will curb the veto and bargaining power of the unions?

The fact is, of course, that at the heart of the monetarist strategy for curtailing union power there is a paradox. If the strategy works, it eventually restores the conditions in the labour market that made it necessary to curtail the power of the unions in the first place. The fatal flaw in the 'discipline through unemployment' approach is admirably summed up by Stephen Milligan in his book *The New Barons:*

> As soon as unemployment ceases to rise, or starts to fall again, all the 'benefits' of unemployment may be lost. It may be possible (although politically very difficult) to maintain a high level of unemployment for a period, but it is certainly impossible to keep it rising. Once unemployment stabilises, the fear of job losses begins to recede and it is fear that determines the effect on wage bargains. Those already unemployed, after all, cannot bargain.

For a Government that has no interest in a concordat of any kind with the unions, and is not prepared to contemplate a formal prices and incomes policy, the alternative to unemployment as a means of sapping the strength of the unions is to tilt the balance of negotiating power against them by means of changes in the law. Changes of this kind will, of course, be vigorously resisted by the unions. In the past, their resistance has proved successful. But whilst recession does not offer a long-term basis for curbing union power, it does provide the Government with an opportunity—at a time when the unions are relatively weak and demoralised—to carry through this alternative strategy of installing a new legal framework, less favourable to the unions, before economic recovery begins to restore their bargaining strength.

With the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982, dealing with picketing, secondary industrial action, the closed shop and trade union immunities, a start has clearly been made. The Trade Union Bill 1983, it would seem, is intended to be a further step in the same direction. In this case, however, the thrust at trade union power is oblique and indirect, for if more balloting does mean a less formidable trade union movement, it will be because trade unionists themselves, though they may not see things in quite this light, choose to make it so.

The unstated logic behind the provision for election to union executives by secret ballots of the whole membership is easy enough to follow. At present, these elections are often by a show of hands at thinly attended branch meetings. Union leaders are thus chosen by a tiny minority of the membership. The activists who attend branch meetings are usually more militant than the members in general. So, too, in consequence are the leaders they elect. All of this will be changed by the Bill. As a result of the new electoral arrangements, the unrepresentative militants who now run many unions will be replaced by more moderate and less aggressive leaders. More moderate leaders will make more moderate demands. They will resort less frequently to industrial action. And the credibility of the strike threat—the most important weapon in the trade union armoury—will be accordingly diminished.

In case this provision is not sufficient to reduce the incidence of indus-

trial action, strike proposals will now have an additional hurdle to cross. In many unions, it is said, if the membership is consulted at all, critical strike decisions are often taken at rowdy, open-air meetings where intimidation and other irregularities are far from unknown. Under the Bill, rather than risk the loss of immunity, unions will in future (the Government no doubt reasons) feel constrained to hold secret ballots before calling strikes. This requirement was included in the Bill, presumably, partly because it seemed electorally attractive, but also (as the Donovan Commission put it) 'in the belief that workers are likely to be less militant than their leaders and given the opportunity of a ballot would often vote against strike action'.

Hitherto, an insurmountable obstacle in the way of a 'legal' approach of this kind—curbing union power by means of changes in the framework of industrial relations law—has always been the problem of ensuring the survival of such changes beyond the life of the Government that introduced them. As the Engineering Employers' Federation has put it:

> Under the British political system it is virtually certain that immunities taken away by a government of one political complexion will be at least restored by another government more sympathetic to the cause of trade union power... However desirable in principle the wholesale radical reform of union immunities seems to be, there is no advantage in attempting it unless the British political system can deliver the prospect of durability.

Or, as Keith Ewing observes, more explicitly, in a recent Fabian Tract:

> The question of trade union restriction and control was never in the past a realistic option in the development of British economic policy, even if there had been any government seriously committed to this cause. A major reason for this is that the Labour Party, as the only credible and realistic opposition, could be relied upon to secure election and reverse the restrictive policies of earlier administrations. In other words, economic policy was constrained by the structural reality of British politics.

It is at this point that the significance of Part III of the Bill—which requires unions to hold periodic ballots to authorise the continuance of their political funds—becomes apparent. Some commentators have suggested that this provision has nothing to do with industrial relations. Such a view is surely both short-sighted and wide of the mark. For although the implications of Part III do indeed go far beyond their impact on the trade unions, in the long run this requirement could well have a profound and lasting effect on the balance of industrial power, as well as on much else besides. It may well go a long way towards locking into place all of the Government's other changes in labour law, past and yet to come.

There can be little doubt that the effect of Part III of the Bill will be to reduce the number of unions operating political funds, and using them to affiliate to the Labour Party. The party's financial position, already shaky, will be further undermined. Labour's chances of forming a Government after the next election, slender enough in the best of circumstances, will be further diminished. And a Labour Government is, of course, the instrument to which the trade unions have always looked to ensure that industrial relations law is not changed permanently to their disadvantage by the judiciary or the Conservatives. If, partly as a result of this Bill, Labour is broken as a political force, no one else is going to

put back the clock, and return to the unions the rights, freedoms and immunities the present Government has taken away.

Will the Trade Union Bill achieve its objectives? Here, of course, we are in the realms of speculation. Insofar as more ballots mean more democracy, more democracy in the unions there will be. How far the Bill will fulfil the unadmitted hopes and expectations of its authors is more open to question.

So far as union militancy is concerned, the introduction of secret ballots for national executive committees may well make no more than a marginal impact. Postal ballots have indeed produced higher polls. But the Bill does not require unions to hold postal ballots. Nor does it provide for any form of independent administration or supervision of the balloting.

More important, power and influence are not concentrated exclusively in national executive committees. Shop stewards, non-voting general secretaries, national and regional officials, and annual and biennial delegate conferences all play an important part in the life of a trade union. But only elections to national executive committees are regulated by the Bill. The generality of trade unionists may indeed be less militant than the activists who now elect the leaders. But leaders are judged by results, and if militancy is seen to pay—as it might in an economic upturn—militancy might come to seem acceptable again in the eyes of the generality of trade unionists who in future, it is assumed, will play a bigger part in electing the leaders. Nor, it seems, is there any necessary correlation between the mode of election employed by a union and the degree of militancy or political complexion of its leadership. Left-wingers and militants do get elected to positions of authority in unions that hold secret ballots. In any case, right-wing union leaders, it seems, call strikes just as frequently as left-wing leaders.

As for strike ballots, the difference they will make to the industrial scene may well be equally limited. Most strikes are unofficial, and will not be affected by the Bill. In fact, some observers argue that one consequence of the Bill may be to increase the incidence of unofficial action and other forms of obstructive behaviour which can sometimes be more damaging to employers than orthodox strikes. Working to rule and overtime bans—often highly effective methods of 'softening up' employers and raising enthusiasm for a strike—will not, it seems, be subject to the Bill. It may also be the case that, because the Bill relates only to industrial action that 'breaks or interferes with' contracts of employment, unions could give notice to terminate their members' contracts and then call strikes without holding ballots and without risking the loss of immunity.

There is, moreover, the difficulty that always arises when the onus of bringing the law into play is placed upon employers: will management—anxious about the long-term effect on industrial relations—be willing to seek injunctions and damages against unions when their own employees are involved? Again, the assumption on which the provision for strike

ballots is based—that workers are less likely to vote for strike action than their leaders—may itself be erroneous. The notion that union officials are constantly dragging reluctant workers out on strike, it is argued, may in fact be the opposite of the truth. Certainly, experience in the United States (admittedly of government-imposed rather than union-organised ballots) suggests that when strike ballots are held the circumstances of the particular dispute are often lost to sight, the ballot becomes a test of union solidarity, and is regarded as a vote of confidence in the union leadership.

It is in relation to ballots for political funds that the Bill seems most likely to achieve both its stated and its unacknowledged aims. So far as the outcome of these ballots is concerned, much will depend, of course, on the mid-term standing of the Government, and the extent to which the Labour Party has rehabilitated itself by 1985 (when the ballots are expected to be held) after the disaster of the 1983 general election. If the Government's stock has fallen, and the recent upward trend in the Labour Party's ratings continues, it is possible that the damage to Labour's finances may be kept within reasonable bounds. It must be said, however, that a good many political funds—particularly those of a number of white-collar and craft unions—look distinctly vulnerable. And recent opinion poll evidence suggests that even within some of the larger blue-collar unions, there are only the barest majorities, or no majorities at all, in favour of continued affiliation to the Labour Party. As a result of these Part III ballots, it has been estimated, if it comes to the worst, the Labour Party could lose as much as £2 million a year, or more than half its annual income.

If the Government should also introduce the 'contracting in' system, instead of 'contracting out', the position would, of course, be even more serious, for there can be no doubt that, whether because of timidity, apathy or inertia, many trade unionists who do not 'contract out' would never contemplate 'contracting in'. Even if provision for 'contracting in' is not written into the Bill, clearly it will be only because the TUC has offered up a modified form of 'contracting out', which—if it satisfies the government—*ipso facto* will certainly have the effect of reducing the number of trade unionists paying the political levy and thereby contributing to the Labour Party's funds. All in all, the prospects for the Labour Party and its finances look decidedly bleak.

This, however, is not necessarily the end of the story. If the effect of the Trade Union Bill, and any associated changes in the arrangements for collecting the political levy, is merely to reduce, albeit substantially, the Labour Party's income, the Government, for its part, will not be unduly perturbed, and Labour will have to get by as best it can. If, on the other hand, the Labour Party's income is so badly depleted as virtually to disable the party, the Government may well find itself coming under increasing pressure for a major review of the methods by which political parties are financed. It might be argued, for example, that there should be changes in Company Law, requiring shareholder ballots before dona-

tions are made to the Conservative Party or associated organisations. New legislation of this kind might not particularly worry the Conservative Party; there are some who believe that it would do nothing to reduce the flow of business money to the Conservatives, and might even increase it. If, however, as a result of the Labour Party's financial plight, the vexed question of state funding for political parties were to be reopened, that would be a highly unwelcome development for the Conservative Party and the present Government, because up to now the Conservatives have been firmly opposed to anything other than a voluntary basis for the provision of party funds.

The effectiveness of any piece of legislation must, of course, be assessed in the light of its objectives. Industrial relations laws, it is often suggested, are characteristically stronger on symbolism than on substance. The 1983 Bill, some would argue, is no exception. A populist measure if ever there was one, devised mainly to impress the voters and the Conservative faithful, it can scarcely fail, because mere enactment fulfils its purpose. Others take the view that this Bill, to an exceptional extent, is the product of ulterior motives; more than is usually the case, its unstated aims are more important than its acknowledged objectives. If this is so, a certain poetic justice would be done if, in relation to union elections and strike ballots, the Bill secures its professed aim—of making the unions more democratic—but nothing more.

As regards the provision made in the Bill for political fund ballots, this requirement seems to apply the Machiavellian principle of combat: if you are going to hit an opponent, hit him so hard that he never hits back. It would be even more ironic if the impact of this part of the Bill were so severe that a Conservative Government—embarrassed by the overkill effect on the Labour Party and its funds—felt morally obliged to establish a system of state aid to political parties, the effect of which was to rescue the Labour Party from the mounting financial difficulties it faces quite independently of the Trade Union Bill. But then legislation often fails to achieve its objectives, and sometimes the consequences of an Act of Parliament are anything but what its authors intended.

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IN THE STRANGLEHOLD OF TEHERAN'S MULLAH REGIME

by Alfred Joachim Fischer

HOW times have changed! In 1955, when a mullah's inflammatory speech on the Iranian Radio unleashed a wave of attacks and lootings against the Bahais, Eisenhower—then President of the United States of America—lodged a protest with the Shah's government which at once put an end to the violence. When, in May 1983, Ronald Reagan appealed to Ayatollah Khomeiny not to carry out the death sentences against 22 Bahais charged with espionage, the leader of the Islamic revolution reacted with scorn and derision. Just as the members of the recently outlawed Communist Tudeh Party were spies for the Soviet Union, he declared, so were the Bahais spies for Great Britain, the United States and Zionism. In neither case would he show clemency to the condemned.

Islamic fundamentalists do not go to much trouble to establish the hypocritical pretext of espionage. The fact that, due to successful missionary work, the number of American Bahais had risen from 10,000 to 100,000 between 1960 and 1970, was enough to arouse suspicion. Now 10,000 refugees from Iran were added to that number. Certainly—so goes the polemic argument—these newcomers would acquire state secrets for the CIA through their friends back home. Zionist espionage is construed on equally primitive grounds. All Iranian Bahais who have ever visited Israel are under suspicion. Their number is considerable, since their faith requires them to make this pilgrimage at least once in their lifetime, until the government of the Islamic Revolution prevented it. The holiest places of the Bahai faith are found in the Jewish state, such as the domed 'Great Temple', overlooking the port and the industrial city of Haifa. It followed quite naturally, therefore, that Haifa became the seat of the Bahai World Centre and of the Spiritual Assembly as its highest office. The Islamic Fundamentalists' suspicions were further aroused by the fact, that in 1971, the State of Israel granted full recognition to the Bahai faith, which had not been attained under Turkish and British rule.

The accusation of espionage is, of course, merely a pretext. An imprisoned Bahai need only renounce his 'false' religion to be immediately set free. Since the victory of the Islamic revolution, 130 Bahais have been executed, mostly after barbaric tortures. A further ten were murdered in the most bestial manner, some as flaming torches.

What are the reasons for this hatred by the Moslems? The Bahai religion is banned not only in Iran, but since 1970 also in Iraq, and even earlier in Morocco, Syria and Egypt. While Iran recognises Christians, Zoroastrians and Jews (though some of them have been executed as 'Zionist spies'), such recognition has always been denied to the Bahai, 'because their faith is not a religion of the Book.'

Many years ago, the merchant Siyyd Ali Muhammad Shirazi, herald of the Bahai faith, came into conflict with Islamic dogma. In his home town of Shiraz, on May 22nd, 1844, aged 23, he proclaimed himself a prophet who would be followed by an even greater prophet, whereas the fundamental credo of Islam declares that 'Allah is Allah and Mohammed is His Prophet', hence the ultimate prophet. Siyyd Ali Muhammad Shirazi later referred to himself as 'Bab' or 'the Gate', sometimes also as 'Nukta' or 'Primal Point of the Koran'. To orthodox Moslems this was already blasphemy.

The demands of the Bab and of successive fathers of the Bahai faith bordered on sacrilege. He insisted on the equality of the sexes, including matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance, the abolition of polygamy and the establishment of compulsory education, even for girls. Finally, he attempted, through the removal of formal worship and the priesthood, to saw off that very branch upon which the influential mullahs were so comfortably ensconced.

In July 1848, the 81 leading disciples of the Bab announced their separation from Islam and the abrogation of Islamic Law. The ethnic principles of the Bahai faith are comparable to the ten commandments. Divorce is made difficult, being permissible only if after a year of separation the conflict remains unresolved. Marriage requires the consent of both sets of parents. Pre- and extra-marital sex and the consumption of alcohol, drugs and tobacco are taboo.

The 'heretic' Bab was executed on July 9th, 1850, by order of the government. 20,000 Bahais, at that time known as Babis, joined him in death, victims of a horrible bloodbath. Only those who returned to Islam were able to save themselves.

Host of that decisive meeting in Teheran in July 1848 was Mirza Huseyn Ali, son of one of the wisest and richest Viziers of the Shah. After four months' imprisonment and the confiscation of his entire property, he was banished to Baghdad. On April 23rd, 1863, before the Turkish Sultan-Caliph (whose realm at that time included Iraq) deported him to Adrianople—now Edirne—under pressure from the Shah of Persia, he declared: 'I am the universal manifestation of God, foretold by the Bab and all the prophets of the past.' Henceforth he called himself Baha'u'llah —'Splendour of God'. His next exile was Acre, in present-day Israel. It was he who laid down the basic teachings of Bahai. He is said to have written no less than one hundred books, papers and edicts, among them one to Queen Victoria and one addressed to Wilhelm I, as 'King of Berlin'.

Bahai'ism is a syncretistic religion. The fact that it recognised not only the Bab and Baha'u'llah, but also Krishna, Buddha, Zoroaster, Abraham, Moses, Christ and Mohammed makes conversion easier for many, particularly in India, where the Bahais have a strong following.

Horror stories of new pogroms reached Acre, and Baha'u'llah called upon his followers not to defend themselves, but to suffer death rather than kill. This uncompromising pacifism clearly contradicts the Islam doctrine of *Djihad*, or holy war. The Bahai's goal is not only world peace

but also the establishment of a world court of justice, a uniform script and a universal language, alongside everyone's mother tongue. While admonished to abide by the laws of the land, Bahais are barred from any kind of political activity, party membership, elections and plebiscites.

Ayatollah Khomeiny's rage accelerated when this minority—at 300,000 the largest in the country outnumbering all others by almost 2 to 1—stayed away from the plebiscite, which was to establish the Islamic Republic. The situation had been similar to Hitler's Germany, seat of the largest Bahai community in Continental Europe. Not one member joined the NSDAP or took part in elections. Since the pacifist and international orientation the Bahai seemed suspicious to the national-socialist potentates, Himmler, chief of the SS and of the Gestapo, issued a 'Special Order' on May 21st, 1937, banning the Bahai faith and closing all its institutions. This was followed by the usual confiscation, lootings, show trials and often years of imprisonment.

Almost immediately after World War II, the Bahai community of some 3,000 adherents was permitted to re-establish itself in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin and its pilgrims once again visited Israel.

One of the most important buildings in Acre is the Mausoleum of Baha'u'llah, who died in 1892. The Bahai turn towards it in prayer, as Moslems do towards Mecca. The remains of the Bab which had been kept hidden for 48 years, were brought from Persia to Haifa, where the Temple serves as his Mausoleum. Baha'u'llah's successors are also buried in Israel. For this reason, it is the 'Holy Land', also for the Bahai.

During the Pahlevi era, this minority endured a cat and mouse game.

Nonetheless, the situation of the Bahai under the Pahlevis was almost idyllic compared with the ever-increasing threat of the 'final solution' that was to follow. As members of an unrecognised religion, they are not granted birth certificates, which also serve as identity and ration cards. With the prevailing black market prices, they are threatened with starvation. Bahai marriages—there are no secular registry offices—have no validity. Thus the women are regarded as concubines, or even prostitutes, for which they are subject to curses and whippings. Their children are treated as bastards.

Gruesome reports of forced conversions and massacres are reminiscent of the dark days of the Inquisition. During the Pahlevi era, a word of protest from the League of Nations or from Presidents Roosevelt or Eisenhower, was sufficient to prevent a bloodbath. Today, under Ayatollah Khomeiny and the mullahs, efforts by the United Nations Commission for Human Rights, the Canadian government, the European Parliament, the British Upper House, the Australian House of Representatives, the German Parliament and the Federal Government, and finally President Reagan, are met with cynical disregard. Nevertheless, the civilised world cannot remain indifferent without sharing the guilt of criminals.

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PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING AND THE ARTS

by Alasdair Milne

IN the 60 years of its existence, the BBC has acquired so high a reputation for cherishing, nurturing and lovingly supporting the Arts that we tend as a society to regard it as axiomatic that public service broadcasting should indeed be mentor to the Muses. While I believe the BBC's policy towards the Arts wholly justified, I would like to argue that it took courage and involved risks to adopt this policy; after all, broadcasting in the public interest, with public money, must be based on criteria that do not apply—and ought not to be applied—to any appraisal of artistic values and premises.

Let me, before developing this argument, cite the most obvious example: the need of all public service broadcasting institutions to have adequate audiences for their programmes.

In the balmy days of monopoly, there floated through various BBC circles the collected wisdom of a Mandarin—whether true or false was never established—to the effect that a broadcast programme was still a programme, whether it had any audience or not. If the communicative act that is broadcasting fails, what is left? A script, a piece of tape, a roll of film that might never surface again: you cannot broadcast with total indifference as to whether or not there is anybody out there, nor can you wait for half a century before your worth is recognised.

A broadcast may, on certain rare occasions, aspire, like *Under Milk Wood*, to the status of a work of art, but it must seek an immediate recipient. The medium is not, as Marshal MacLuhan proclaimed, the message; but must ensure that the message is heard or seen or both. The freedom accorded to individual artists to follow the devices of their own hearts is not, in the first instance at least, available to public service broadcasters. It is their particular duty to acquire the trust of their many interlocking and overlapping audiences. This process takes a long time and is achieved in various ways. By far the most important is to tell the truth, as far as you can get at it, and stick to telling the truth. If you are believed at the start, you can gradually extend the range of your programming, because you are being trusted.

If, for example, the BBC had, in the first or second decade of its existence, played as much of the work of the Second Viennese School, namely, Schönberg, Berg and Webern, as of Schubert, Beethoven and Brahms, I very much doubt whether the BBC would now have six orchestras bearing our name and a radio network largely devoted to serious music-making. This is in no way to question the originality of these great 20th century composers, but to say that the establishment of confidence in public service broadcasting starts not only with truth-telling in new operations, but with meeting and satisfying public taste in the tried and the familiar. Once public good will has been established, every public service

broadcaster worthy of that name will seek to extend the taste and the range of his operations.

In this endeavour, he will differ totally from his commercial competitors. The commercial broadcaster must, sooner or later, make a profit for his shareholders, or else go out of business. The best proven method to do this is to invest in the well-tried and familiar. This is the reason why so many American television series are kept going, by a sort of television equivalent of artificial respiration, long after their authors have run out of plot and ideas. The public service broadcaster, on the other hand, given that his income is assured and that he can count on a loyal and substantial audience, constantly departs from familiar ground and seeks to widen the base of his operations and the range of his programmes.

If I were to tell an American executive that I had two promising writers under contract who wanted to describe the love/hate of two London scrap-dealers, do you for a moment think he would have invested in *Steptoe and Son*? And yet this unlikely couple at one time attracted the attention of virtually half the nation. And when the series was breaking viewing records, nobody forced the writers to write further episodes when they felt they had exhausted this particular vein. The series came to an end.

If the cultural history of television in Britain comes to be written, I have little doubt that the degree of innovative thinking by the BBC and its producers and writers and designers will be found to be very remarkable indeed. Nor was this an accident. In both radio and television, we started on familiar ground. In radio, music and light entertainment provided the initial attractions for our parents and grandparents to invest in radio sets. But very soon people like Lance Sieveking found that radio was a wonderful medium for drama; and the result of this discovery is that today there is barely a playwright in this country who does not owe his first public success, or his start, to radio drama. The significance of this support for the health of our theatre in general and for television drama in particular cannot be overestimated. Hundreds of drama scripts are now being written every year, dozens of new writers are being discovered and many of these writers go on to write for television and the theatre. Very little has been either said or written about this particular form of arts patronage by the BBC and yet it constitutes a conscious and immensely fertile cultural policy.

By contrast, a policy of getting private sponsors such as merchant bankers to invest in the Arts is fraught with difficulty. They know that supporting the Arts is a risky business and tend to be selective; that is to say, they put safety first. Few industrial sponsors would care or dare to commission atonal music, simply because its likely public reception is not going to increase the good will the investors hope to generate from their investment. Playing safe in the arts is often the same as repeating yourself. Public service broadcasting, on the other hand, must constantly renew itself. Its discoveries are always likely to be copied by its commer-

cial competitors. Hence, secretly rather than publicly, our commercial rivals are rather glad we exist. They can safely wait for us to pioneer and then generally offer a great deal more for roughly the same show.

Thus it comes about that the very nature of public service broadcasting demands a continuous, interested and disinterested involvement in the Arts. Interested, because the Arts provide the most absorbing, fascinating programme material without which our output on radio and television would be immeasurably poorer; disinterested, because we generally allow the artistic chips to fall where they may. If a good many television plays have an underlying left-of-centre premise, then there is no easy way of balancing authors the way you ensure fair play in current affairs programmes by inviting protagonists of both government and opposition. The Arts and Politics have always been uneasy bedfellows. To subject artists to any kind of supervision, however gentle, during the creation of their work is likely to have a disastrous effect on the quality of that work. If, in the course of safeguarding that freedom, we broadcasters take some hard knocks, so be it. 'Disgusted, Tunbridge Wells' will always have his or her say, and membership of a free society has its price.

It was with music, in the days of the crystal set, that the BBC's involvement in the Arts began. Performances were early supplemented by explanations, a tradition pioneered by Walford Davies and then notably extended by Antony Hopkins. Even when recording became technically easy, we continued, in sharp contrast to many of our continental colleagues, to cherish live concerts so that today the BBC is probably the broadcasting body with the biggest number of live musical events to offer daily to its listeners. Relatively early in the BBC's history, important orchestras were created, not just to serve as broadcasting orchestras, but also to play to concert audiences at home and abroad. This function is of very great importance outside London and fortifies musical life all over the United Kingdom. We took over the running and planning of the Promenade Concerts; some 56 or so annual concerts which, in their totality, probably amount to the greatest musical festival in the world.

All these activities are virtually taken for granted and it is rarely pointed out that if it were not for the vast BBC investment in musical programmes, on both radio and television, musical life in this country would shrink very considerably. The Robert Mayer Concerts for children, the St. John's, Smith Square lunch-time recitals and those in the town halls of Manchester and Glasgow are all firmly anchored in the weekly musical output of the Corporation. The commissioning process of composers is yet another token of the BBC's commitment not merely to music-making but to contemporary music. Much of such music is difficult to do justice to at one hearing, and repeat performances are often as important as the premieres for new works. That Britain, once called on the continent 'the country without music', should today be one of the leading world musical centres has not a little to do with the amount of music broadcast by the BBC over 60 years, and the rigorous standards established in these broadcasts. Even bearing all these things in mind, the extent of the BBC's

support of the Arts, expressed in terms of money, may come as a surprise. Our total expenditure on the Arts in 1981/32 came to £140 million—a good deal more than the Arts Council disburses annually, or something like a quarter of the total licence fee income over the same period.

I have already touched briefly on the process of widening the range of programmes by setting out from familiar ground and gradually exploring the unfamiliar. This task has been performed again and again by our music producers, often by slotting new or contemporary works in between well-tried and popular compositions. If you look at the Royal Festival Hall concerts by the BBC Symphony Orchestra or, indeed, the BBC Promenade Concerts, you will find that they differ sharply from the repertoire of most other musical bodies which would like to be equally venturesome, but feel they cannot bear the commercial risk.

By broadcasting such concerts, the BBC can absorb a part of such costs. But the process of making unfamiliar and seemingly dangerous cultural territory accessible—possibly one of the proudest achievements the BBC can claim to its credit—deserves description in greater detail. It is based on the premise that language is probably the most potent factor in dividing as well as uniting people culturally. When, in the 60s, an episode of *Steptoe and Son* could register an audience of 27 million viewers, such a statistic implied a cultural bond between people of the widest possible educational discrepancy, Ph.D.s and school-leavers sharing a brand of humour in a country notable for its class divisions.

The professional broadcaster, at his or her best, is a bridge-builder who believes that interest in a particular subject can transcend deep gulfs between the more and the less educated, so that in telling your tale you may succeed in not offending the one or puzzling the other. A good many programmes start by appealing to relatively small audiences and end up with large ones. A good example is the BBC's *Young Musician of the Year* competition, which, in its final stages, has attracted very considerable audiences.

In trying to describe the BBC's involvement with the Arts, there is a further vital facet—the great number of talks, discussion and magazine programmes, on both radio and television, which are either wholly devoted to the Arts or include the Arts as daily subject matter. The total cultural effect is not just to keep Arts subjects in the public eye, but to treat such subjects as a vital, daily experience. It would be hazardous to guess at the combined cultural repercussions of all the book programmes or film programmes or critical discussion programmes, but in some areas at least the effect is plainly visible. Far from television having led to a decline of reading, librarians are clear that the televising of, say, a classical serial has a marked effect on the demand for the particular book on which the serial is based.

The radio and television broadcasts of concerts, opera, ballet and ballet music and of drama have made these media of communication the two most important national stages for artistic exposure. That this has

happened is due partly to the quality of the men and women who, over the years, were responsible for tens of thousands of broadcasts, but also to the operation of the licence fee. This much discussed device for financing public service broadcasting in this country has characteristics that have a profound effect on the BBC's ability to foster and encourage the Arts.

First, the licence fee is a general fee; not a payment for specific broadcasts only. It does not make popularity the decisive criterion of finance. Second, the legal obligation to have a licence if you want to watch television in this country, makes the income largely predictable, provided the licence fee is awarded for a period of years rather than a single year. This reasonable expectation of a certain income makes forward commitments possible; hence the investment in programmes that often take years to make. This is the case with *All The World's A Stage*—Ronald Harwood's personal history of the theatre — and with David Attenborough's follow-up to *Life On Earth—The Living Planet.* Thirdly, the licence fee throws a protective screen round the process of striking out from familiar to unfamiliar cultural territory. If your income, on the other hand, were specifically dependent on the profits of a popular success, you would have to wait much longer before daring to invest in a venture whose audience you cannot predict.

There are voices raised in favour of introducing the mechanism of the free market in cultural matters. If the existence and influence of the BBC has proved anything, it is that culture is a subtle, tender and complex plant whose growth needs time, money, talent and patience. In contrast, in countries where the immediate sales result is decisive, such as in the United States, standards of broadcasting have stayed below the level we would tolerate in this country.

In part, the expansion of cable and satellite broadcasting in the United States represents a justified reaction to the overwhelming mass of second-rate material which appears virtually round the clock on American television screens. But even cable has not greatly affected broadcasting standards there. High hopes were entertained when CBS launched an Arts network on cable; but within a year, substantial losses running into many millions of dollars brought that venture to a close. What you can do patiently as a public service broadcaster of the Arts, you cannot do from one day to the next and stay in the black. Nor do I believe that were cable operators to try the same thing in Europe, they would fare much better in this field. Where some modest artistic initiatives in future cable networks might be expected, is on a local level: improvisation, pop techniques, participatory fun . . . there is quite enough scope here, provided, of course, viewers will pay for it, in densely populated areas. Cable will find it very hard to reach the countryside. Satellite broadcasting, on the other hand, fulfils one basic postulate of public service, namely, that it should be available at the same time to everyone, irrespective of where we happen to live. A few weeks back, we launched the idea that a European Music Satellite network could be created. This network could, on

almost any day of the week, drop in on one of the great music-making European institutions, La Scala or the Stuttgart Ballet, and relay from there, to paying home audiences, the operas, concerts and ballets which, at the moment, we can only offer from time to time, since the costs are prodigious. This is an exciting possibility which we are now exploring. There is thus every difference in the world between an extension of public service broadcasting which the BBC is exploring, and an exploitation of the new technology for private gain, which, to be successful, may have to settle for the lowest common denominator.

Monetarists accept Sir Thomas Gresham's law that bad money drives out the good. Gresham has yet to make his appearance in broadcasting. That his name has not had to be invoked in our cultural debate is, to a significant extent, due to the convictions of my friends and colleagues.

The above article is based on the Gwilym James Lecture by Alasdair Milne at Southampton University on 7 Februcry, 1984.

[Alasdair Milne joined the BBC in 1954 and, following a period of current affairs production in External and Home Services, entered television as a producer. In 1982 he succeeded Sir Ian Trethowan as Director-General of the British Broadcasting Corporation.]

The May issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *The End of the Begin Era* by Avi Schlaim, *The Enduring Role of Government* by S. G. Shanker (held over from the April issue), *In Search of Europe* by Paul Rose and *Shakespeare as Autobiographer* by A. L. Rowse.

IS POLAND A CATHOLIC COUNTRY?[1]

by Keith Sword

AT the beginning of November 1983 a team of Catholic journalists from London visited Poland at the invitation of the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL). During their short stay, they were able to visit a number of cities (apart from Lublin—Warsaw, Krakow, Opole, Czestochowa) and to talk to representatives of party and government, as well as Church representatives and activists. On December 13, six members of that team gave a briefing on their experiences at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies in London.[2] Although not claiming to be 'experts' on Poland, their views as trained and articulate observers were of considerable interest to the more seasoned Poland-watchers present.

As might be expected, much of the interest at the seminar centred on the political situation in the wake of martial law. The political role of the Church and its authority as the main source of alternative opinion within Poland continue to exert a fascination and excite comment as they have done for much of the post-war period. Church spokesmen, however, have frequently played down this political role, saying that the Church is politicised because it has to be, because of its anomalous and threatened existence within a totalitarian state. Over recent decades, under the able leadership of its former primate, Cardinal Wyszynski, the Church learned how to survive the periodic assaults made upon its rights and privileges by the Warsaw authorities.

By exercising caution, by recognising the realities of power while making the most of its genuine support within the Polish population, by making sure that as far as possible concessions granted were balanced by concrete gains, the Church managed not only to survive, but to enhance its influence. Wyszynski grew in stature and popularity.

In 1981, for the first time, the mantle of chief opposition spokesman was taken over by Solidarity, which quickly adopted a more strident and confrontational tone. Ignoring the cautious manoeuvring that had characterised Church-State negotiations over the best part of the previous three decades, Solidarity embarked upon one of those cavalry charges so beloved of romantically-inclined Polish patriots, but usually so ill-fated. The introduction of martial law, while viewed with a certain amount of relief from the Church's point of view, also placed it in an invidious position. On the one hand it came under intense pressure to support human rights, work for the release of imprisoned Solidarity activists, and to take a stand against the Jaruzelski regime. On the other hand, no doubt keenly aware of the real possibility of outside intervention, the Church hierarchy did not want to make Jaruzelski's position untenable.

The situation of the Polish primate, Cardinal Glemp, was particularly unenviable. Having come into office only a few months before emergency measures were introduced, he was given little time to adjust to the

demands of the new job before facing a major national crisis. He had succeeded, in Cardinal Wyszynski, a highly experienced and respected figure, much loved by Poles at home and abroad. Finally, by the time Glemp came to office, many Poles were already looking towards their representative in the Vatican for the voice of leadership. It is hardly surprising then, that with the introduction of martial law and the eventual withdrawal of legal recognition from Solidarity, Glemp's appeals for calm, his apparent equivocation and inability to express adequately the rage felt by the populace, should have provoked criticism. Indeed, Glemp had to endure a good deal of criticism from within the Church itself, and at one stage confronted dissatisfied priests for a question and answer session. Once again, it was possible for the historian to see evidence of the complex relationship that has grown up between Polish patriotic fervour and Roman Catholicism—and to see in this context, just what demands Poles make of their Church. Although the Church is commonly regarded as the chief repository of Polish identity, culture and traditions, the interests of nationalism and those of religion do not always overlap.

By late 1983, Glemp has grown in stature considerably and the widely-voiced criticisms of his leadership had become muted. His mediating role perhaps better appreciated with the benefit of hindsight, he was described to the London team as being 'the father of the whole nation'—while Solidarity, by contrast, was portrayed as a troublesome and potentially dangerous teenager. If, at one point, Glemp felt that he was being elbowed aside by Solidarity, now the aspirations which Solidarity represented seem once more to have become focussed on the church. Poles are returning to more accustomed ways of signalling defiance to their political masters. The Church knows how to survive and people look to it to do so. As one relieved Pole told the visiting journalists, Glemp has restored the situation from one of confrontation to one of dialogue.

Certainly dialogue has resumed in a significant way, although the recent hint from Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Wiejacz, that improved Church-State relations may lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican was probably as much for White House ears as for domestic consumption. Ironically, dialogue may have been made easier by the sense of mutual dependence that the martial law crisis emphasised. One of the benefits that the crisis brought the Polish people was to expose eloquently the poverty of the communist party's claim to legitimate rule. Solidarity was nothing if not a working-class movement (and indeed it captured the imagination of the people; at one point during the crisis, party members were reported to be handling in their membership cards at the rate nationally of 25,000 per month). Jaruzelski can therefore claim neither ideological justification for his actions, nor the legitimacy of mass support. Nevertheless, in a situation where naked power has been brought into play, a greater honesty sometimes informs the procedings. While visiting the offices of *Polityka*, the party weekly, one of the London party asked her hosts whether, in the event of free elections being held in Poland 'tomorrow', the communist party would

poll more than 200,000 votes. Her host responded that the state militia (police) in Poland numbered more than 200,000!

On the economic front, the Church has had an equally important role to play. The trade embargoes by the West, which followed the imposition of martial law, caused havoc to an already battered economy, bringing widespread food shortages and hardship. A turnaround in the Polish economy meanwhile occurred, whereby many of the exports which formerly headed west are now being directed to Comecon trading partners —estimated to be as much as 70% during 1983. This has the dual effect of limiting Poland's earnings of 'hard' western currencies, while increasing her dependence on her eastern neighbour.

Throughout the crisis, the Church has been involved in the distribution of aid—notably food and medical supplies—sent by welfare agencies from the West. But the alarm of the Church about the worsening economic situation has led to two initiatives. One is the recent appeal to the West to end the embargoes. The other is the proposal, first made in late 1982, that the Church should administer a fund for rural investment, created by money raised in the West. This Agricultural Relief Fund, if approved, could be something of a landmark, since the Church would become involved for the first time in the running of the economy. However, to what extent there would be consultation in the decision-making process remains to be seen. Power-sharing may be a long way off yet.

The mood of the population as encountered by the London team ranged from dark passimism to a guarded optimism. In some quarters there was both hatred and despair at the suppression of Solidarity and the record of the Jaruzelski regime. John Wilkins, one member of the London group to have visited Poland previously, described how, in 1970, his Polish contacts had seemed resigned to, if not entirely content with, a socialist future. Cynicism with the authorities found expression in political jokes. More recently, however, he had the impression that people were angry and wanted to be shot of the whole system, but along with the anger was a sense of helplessness. This pent-up frustration was detected by others in the team. Many Poles, it was said, are depressed, having been deprived of the belief that change is possible. Some, however, were taking the long-term view, recognising that before conditions in Poland could be materially affected, there was a need for radical internal change (the word used was 'revolution') in the Soviet Union.

In some quarters this gradualist approach had taken on a more positive note. A female student in Lublin pointed out that communist rule in Poland had survived forty turbulent years, while the Polish Church could look back on a history of over a thousand years. She would, she said, 'wait and work, study and pray'. The importance of such patience and caution, a belief that it is possible to outlast communism, was repeated ('He who counsels revolution is no friend of Poland') along with further optimism which reached surprising heights about the future of Poland and Polish Catholicism: 'It is possible to have more hope for Poland than for Ireland in the 20th century.'

But on what is this optimism based? The London team, as many visitors before them have been, were impressed by the high levels of religious activity they witnessed. They described the 'energy, enthusiasm and hard work' of the priests in glowing terms, and commented wonderingly on the fervour of the ordinary people. The world is familiar, after all, with the scenes of mass devotion that greeted the Pope on his return to his native land; we have seen the statistics—baptisms, the number of priests leaving seminaries, the high levels of church attendance; those who have visited Poland will be familiar with the devotionalia which adorn the walls of every household, with the ubiquitous roadside crucifixes. But are these outer manifestations of belief merely empty ritual, the husk which hides a rotten core? One experienced observer of the Polish scene remarked that Poles hear what they want to hear from the Church and disregard the rest. If this is thought to be overly cynical, it probably contains more truth than most Poles would care to admit.

Is Poland a Catholic country? The question may have raised a few quizzical eyebrows, but it was thought worth asking some years ago by a prominent Polish Jesuit writer exiled in London. In an article warning his countrymen against complacency in the practise of their faith, he pointed out that Roman Catholic belief also implied a moral code, certain expectations governing behaviour in one's day to day life. The author then turned his attention to a number of areas of social pathology. Official figures from Poland show that the number of legally induced abortions was among the highest in Europe during the 1970s. Indeed, for most of the decade, the overall figure was double that of the United Kingdom, although Poland has a considerably lower population (36 million as compared with 56 million). Only in 1978-79—interestingly in the year of the Pope's election and of his first return visit to Poland—did the figures show signs of a downturn, and then to a level which still comfortably exceeds that of the UK. However, official statistics mask the real scale of the problem since they do not include those abortions which are arranged privately, and as a result are not registered.

By the late 1970s the rate of divorces finalised in Poland put her in a middling position on a world scale. In 1970 it was more than twice the level per 1,000 married inhabitants than in the UK. But the alarming truth is that the rate of divorce in Poland had more than trebled over the previous twenty years. A further cause for concern was that the proportion of divorcing couples with children under 18 years of age had risen from 39% in 1951 to 60% in 1978. Due in large part to concern for the welfare of such children, the Polish government introduced amendments to the Family Code in 1975 which have helped to stem the rising statistical tide. However, it is difficult to say to what extent such measures have merely disguised the real nature of the problem.

Alcoholism is one of the social ills in Polish society most visible to the casual visitor. It is also the one which is probably of most concern to the authorities, because of its deleterious effects on family life, work-

place discipline and efficiency, the maintenance of public order—indeed because of the very scale of the problem. By 1980 the number of alcoholics in Poland was estimated to be 500,000. More than 10% of these were thought to be chronic cases. Annual expenditure on alcohol had reached a staggering 150 billion zlotys and constituted 30.5% of total expenditure on food and drink. By contrast with the countries of western Europe, more than 50% of alcohol consumed is in the form of spirits. Once again, it is a problem which has mushroomed alarmingly in the post-war period. It is also a problem which had spread at a disproportionate rate among younger members of the population—teenagers and young men in their twenties. Furthermore, in the past decade to alcoholism has been added an increasing drugs problem.

All this is of concern to a Church which, in the past, has been criticised by western observers for its intolerance of progressive ideas and insistence upon traditional values. Those present at the London briefing seemed taken aback when informed that teachers at the Catholic University of Lublin not only had to be practising Catholics; they were compelled to leave the University in the event of divorce. But such apparent harshness has to be seen in context. Polish Catholicism has always laid especial emphasis upon the family unit as a cradle of values and the bearer of culture. The present Pope has referred to the family as the 'domestic church'. It could hardly be otherwise in a country which has spent so much of its recent history under foreign occupation. Even today, the family and the Church have been described as the last bastions of freedom in a country where the secular powers aim to monopolise the mass media and the educational system.

Thus, erosion of family ties and of values surrounding forms of social behaviour strike indirectly at the Church. Indeed, it is arguable that the Church in Poland faces as great a threat from secularisation of values within the community as it does from the more overt and publicised threat to its existence on the political front.

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1. 'Czy Polska jest krajem katolickim?' in Ks. J. Mirewicz: *Zycie Wewnetrzne Emigracji* (1979; London).
2. The six were: Kevin Grant (former editor of *The Universe*), Philip Juviler-Bacon (LBC), John Wilkins (*Tablet*), Chris Howse (*Catholic Herald*), Bernard Jackson (BBC), Frances Gumley (BBC).

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

OLIVE SCHREINER TODAY

by Colin Style

SLIGHTLY over a hundred years ago, in January, 1883, *The Story of an African Farm*, a novel by an unknown author, Ralph Iron, was published. The first edition was quickly sold out, and a second followed in July of the same year. The publisher, Chapman Hall, had invited the author to call and, as Samuel Cronwright-Schreiner later described it, was surprised when 'a small, shy, girlish-looking young woman was ushered in instead of the big, powerful man expected'.

Literary London also found it piquant that this young, pretty ex-governess from the backveld of South Africa could write such an original and powerful work. Olive Schreiner soon had droves of callers at her lodgings, and *The Story of an African Farm* was a popular, widely-discussed, success. In fact, she became something of a cult overnight. She remained so—albeit probably more as seer, advanced thinker, and feminist than as a novelist. In 1947, D. L. Hobman commented in her article, 'Olive Schreiner', in the April issue (Vol. 171, p. 230-236) of *Contemporary Review*, that

> The two women (the other being Emily Brontë) had something more in common than their literary art: that queer, fierce female power which in other ages might have led men to dread them as witches, or to revere them as sibyls filled with oracular wisdom. Within their souls the curtain of sanity hiding the last secrets of the universe from mankind was worn to so thin a veil that at times flashes of light seemed to penetrate from the mystery beyond.

This romantic, fervent style of criticism is slightly unpopular today, but it suited the image of Olive Schreiner then, her apotheosis as sibyl and prophet.

In an introduction to *Not Without Honour: The Life and Writings of Olive Schreiner* by Vera Buchanan-Gould, published in the same decade, Jan Smuts commented, in similar vein:

> And how little we really know of what passed in those great souls. They live beyond good and evil, in the pure atmosphere of the spirit which we ordinary mortals so seldom breathe. Such women cast a radiance on this sombre scene in which we carry on the human struggle!

The sibylline image of Olive Schreiner was added to, layer upon layer, as her writings, subsequent to *The Story of an African Farm*, proved powerfully affective in contemporary affairs. Vera Brittain wrote, in *Testament of Youth*:

> To Olive Schreiner's *Women and Labour*—that 'Bible of the Woman's Movement'—which sounded to the world of 1911 as insistent and inspiring as a trumpet-call summoning the faithful to a vital crusade—was due my final acceptance of feminism.

The same strength of emotion could affect the anti-imperialist who read *Trooper Peter Halket of Mashonaland*. Similarly, H. W. Nevinson described the effect Olive Schreiner's pro-Boer stand could have on audiences at the turn of the century:

> I described her at the time as a short, heavy, brown-eyed woman, but when she

> began to speak she was transfigured! Indeed, though she stood perfectly still, she was transfigured into flame . . . I have heard much indignant eloquence, but never such a molten torrent of white-hot rage. It was overwhelming. When it suddenly ceased, the large audience—about 1,500 men and women—could hardly gasp. If Olive Schreiner (for, of course, it was she) had called on them to storm Government House, they would have thrown themselves upon the bayonets.

Olive Schreiner's contribution to feminism and enlightened, progressive thought is enormously significant. However, it leads us away from the aspect of her that is the most attractive and interesting today. It is one of the sadnesses of passing time that there are two Olive Schreiners. There is the young, extremely attractive, ex-governess who wrote one of the most unusual novels in the English language from a seemingly unpropitious environment. The other is the stocky, dishevelled, middle-aged woman of eccentric habits who, whilst she never managed to better her first novel, was able to put her finger on contemporary and looming social and political issues through speeches, pamphlets, essays, fragments, and novelettes.

If we cannot completely redress the injustices of time, we do have the right to seize on a person's earlier life and personality as quintessential, before time superimposes layers on it. Not just for sentiment; many do not, in any case, present their best image in youth. But Olive Schreiner did write *The Story of an African Farm* before she was twenty-one, and all her attitudes and ideas are germinal in the novel which James Agate described vividly, and not quite accurately, as a 'little masterpiece of twisted, Brontësque, pre-Freudian psychology'.

Elsewhere in his introduction, earlier referred to, Jan Smuts wrote:

> But I still feel that I came closest to her in a moment when we were far apart—when I was marching with my commando through the brown, barren hills and valleys of the Eastern Karroo in the South African War, and one of my men said to me: 'Here, on this farm, Olive Schreiner kept school when she wrote her book.'

To echo Jan Smuts, today Olive Schreiner achieves her truest interest and relevance viewed in the context of the Eastern Karroo. Paradoxically, we can discover a greater universal identity there and recreate her reputation closer to what it was in 1883 and 1884.

She was born in 1855 on a mission station in a remoter part of the Cape Province. Her father was German, a missionary with the London Missionary Society, and her mother, Rebecca Lyndall, was the daughter of an English Congregational Minister. Olive received an unsystematic home education, although she read very widely and, at the age of fifteen, became a farm governess in the Karroo. In 1881, she came to England and, after the publication of *The Story of An African Farm*, made many friends, including a lifelong relationship with Havelock Ellis, and received admiring assessments of her book from such personages as Gladstone, Lecky the historian, Arthur Symons, Edmund Gosse, and Sir Charles Dilke. She excited at least one literary quip from Oscar Wilde: 'Olive Schreiner is staying in the East End because that is the only place where people do not wear masks upon their faces, but I have told her I live in the West End

because nothing in life interests me but the mask.'

Alas, she did not produce a second novel to provide impetus to her reputation and, eventually, the lionisation petered out. In 1889, she returned to South Africa, and later married a gentleman-farmer, Samuel Cronwright, and wrote *Dreams*, *Peter Halket*, and *Women and Labour*. She moved homes continually in search of inner serenity and relief from her lifelong marytrdom to asthma. She lived in London again, during the First World War, but died back in the Cape in 1920.

Given like this, the facts of her life seem bare and the corpus of her works small. It is, however, like *The Story of an African Farm* itself, small in events but extraordinarily rich in bizarre and exotic detail, intensity, and inner life. For example, her only child died at birth and thereafter accompanied her, embalmed in a box. When she herself was buried, at Buffels Kop in the Karroo, a strange white bird glided and spiralled over the burial party. It was uncannily like the white bird of Truth that Waldo's stranger describes in the book.

The search for truth lay at the centre of Olive Schreiner's sensibility. It resulted in the dichotomy of *African Farm*: whilst parts are incredible as aspects of the inner life of the imagination, Olive Schreiner saw it as a work of unvarnished realism. Rider Haggard had suggested that, like his novels, hers should have been more concerned with ingredients of high adventure. She defended herself in the preface to the second edition:

> But, should one sit down to paint the scenes among which he has grown, he will find that the facts creep in upon him. Those brilliant phases and shapes which the imagination sees in far-off lands are not for him to portray. Sadly he must squeeze the colour from his brush, and dip it into the grey pigments around him. He must paint what lies before him.

Within this context, her characters often seem to behave unrealistically. The little girl, Lyndall, having spent her whole life on the farm, goes to boarding school for a couple of years and returns highly sophisticated and with advanced ideas on feminism—rather like Heathcliffe in *Wuthering Heights*, going away a barbaric, penniless boy, and returning transformed into a gentleman with money. Of course, the neatest answer is that Lyndall is proved true to life by the case of the author herself. In another instance, the youth, Waldo, endures a programme of humiliation, beatings and robbery at the hands of the villainous interloper onto the farm, Bonaparte Blenkins. A complaint is that Waldo endures with a patience not true to life. Then again, we have ample precedence in seeing how minorities have endured exploitation and even genocide with the same curious passivity.

The best confirmation of verisimilitude is to experience the actual physical location. As a student, I had occasion to hitchhike through the area—Bathhurst, Bedford, Cradock, and Aliwal North. I remember sitting for some hours outside Cradock, filled with heat, dust, and a quiet desperation. I think we all feel something of this sensation when we pass through unfamiliar towns. A first reaction is to feel sorry for the people who have to live in these coldly inhospitable places. In this case, the feeling was accentuated, and a sense of stunted, provincial lives welled

up in me as a sort of hatred. And this, of course, is exactly what Olive Schreiner is describing in *African Farm*, finding the starting point for all the large ethical and human issues dealt with in her works. It was the colony for the stultifications that one human group inflicts on another—man on woman, white on black, rich on poor, old on young.

Olive Schreiner's life and art reflect a cycle of perpetual alienation of travel and return. Lyndall, the projection of herself, pours out her hatred of life on the farm to Waldo, also her *alter ego*. She runs off with the man she loves and hates, and dies, proud and alone, in a hotel in one of the dusty little South African towns. Waldo, the son of the old German overseer who died shamefully heart-broken and displaced by Bonaparte Blenkins, lives on the farm in a Caliban existence. Waldo has had his dreams, and tried to run off and work in a store in the town, but returns. In the same way, Olive Schreiner ran off and returned to the South African farm.

And, in another way, the position of Olive Schreiner has seemed to have gone full circle. We have become interested again in the life and values of high Victorianism—judging from the popularity of media depictions. Nonetheless, with universal education and its utilisation questioned by high unemployment, the Victorian values of education and self-help are not so self-evident. Perhaps we need to be reminded of them again, and Olive Schreiner was a true Victorian in her ardent belief in self-improvement and enlightenment.

In *African Farm*, a stranger comes riding by and stops to rest. He talks to Waldo and the boy confides his dreams and hopes. Waldo's stranger tells him a long poetic allegory of Man's search for knowledge and truth; how, in the end, an old hunter, who has been seeking all his life, is rewarded by a single feather from the high circling white bird of truth. The stranger then gives Waldo a book which the boy treasures as the greatest, redemptive gift of his life. Today, this might seem almost quaint, but it is recreation of Olive Schreiner's own experience. When she was a young girl, a certain Mr. Bertram came riding out of the night to the farmhouse where she was staying. He and Olive talked far into the night, and before he left he gave her a book, Spencer's *First Principles*. She wrote afterwards: 'I always think that when Christianity burst on the dark Roman world, it was what that book was to me.' It was the act of attention and sympathy, as much as the gift of the book, that set her alight.

Other influences were disastrously negative and certainly today no biographical or literary assessment is complete without some sexual investigation. Olive Schreiner had a brief shadowy affair with a man who remains for us, metaphorically, another stranger who rode out of the night and disappeared into it again. Like Coleridge's 'man from Porlock' who disturbed the successful completion of 'Kubla Khan', there is a traumatic influence from an unknown figure. She seems to have been briefly engaged to a Mr. Julius Zaar of Dordrecht who annihilated her feelings, and it has been suggested that the painfulness of the experience

contributed to a certain bi-sexualism in her nature. Like the sexual mystery of Thomas Hardy, here is an aspect of intractable Victorianism that is not likely to yield to modernity. It is a grey area not helped by the equivocating comments from her lifelong friend, Havelock Ellis: 'We were not what can be technically, or even ordinarily, called lovers. But the relationship of affectionate friendship which was really established meant more for both of us, and was really even more intimate, than is often the relationship between those who technically and ordinarily are lovers'. The pioneer sexologist refrains from specifying whether there was a degree of sexual rapprochement short of full consummation between them. (Incidentally, she planned a book on sexology herself, which was never written.)

Damaged and inhibited, the effect as an author on Olive Schreiner was to penalise her into being unable to portray an effective and sympathetic male character—except for Waldo, and the loving portrait of her father in the old German overseer. Lyndall's and Undine's lovers are shallow, selfish, and heartless, and Bonaparte Blenkins is an evil yet stupid sadist.

Another event, which she herself described as crucial, was being severely whipped as a child for saying 'Ag!'—an Afrikaans exclamation. (There is a long tradition for the English in South Africa to consider Afrikaans as a debased dialect.) This small seed was reflected by her championing of the Boer in the South African War, and was the beginning of her long battle for the underdog and for human decency. She defended the Shona against the settlers in Rhodesia, and, as an act of great moral courage, was a pacifist in the First World War. She also saw with blinding clarity the consequences of Native policy in South Africa: 'We shall reach the bottom at last, probably amid the (horrors) of a war with our native races, then not the poor savage, but generous races whom we might have bound to ourselves by a little generosity and sympathy'. Thus she wrote in a letter to the politician John X. Merriman in 1897.

Prophetic, indeed, and obviously highly relevant today. However, such arresting predictions should not blur her greater relevancy as author and literary influence where she was an active, living force. A collection of studies on Olive Schreiner were published in South Africa in the *African Farm* anniversary year of 1983. The blurb describes her as 'a figure of enormous contemporary influence', and the studies range over all her activities in social questions, politics, religion, and literature. The fact that it has been brought out in 1983 suggests that, notwithstanding the wide range, the lynchpin is still *African Farm*. The literary influence is most substantive now that she can be seen as the precursor of a number of women writers: Pauline Smith, Nadine Gordimer, Bessie Head and Doris Lessing. It is the number of similarities that she bears with Doris Lessing that vivifies Olive Schreiner and her relevance today as an African author of genius. Both reacted, and wrote, in direct response to the pressures of an unjust society locked in insularity. Both possessed a negligible formal education. Olive Schreiner became a farm governess at fifteen. Doris Lessing left school at fourteen to become a child nursemaid

in the then Salisbury. The literary reputations of both were created by their first books on African farm life, written from personal childhood experience. Both are cult figures on feminism who won an international reputation. Both writers, also, although so powerful and intense, are conspicuously humourless in *African Farm* and *The Grass Is Singing*, respectively.

I had occasion to visit the farm that Doris Lessing grew up on in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and described my impressions. They seem apposite to Olive Schreiner:

> Doris Lessing is a product of the distorted but highly formal white Rhodesian society of the 1930s and 1940s. It moulded her intense, idiosyncratic vision. And, in *The Grass is Singing*, lie the seeds of her later novels: the feminist, Sci-Fi, the intensely psychological works, with which she reached a wider public. For example, how the hapless protagonist of *The Grass is Singing*, Mary Turner, was pushed into marriage prefigures the feminist themes. Lessing is, at the same time, in the tradition of white South African writers like Pauline Smith and Olive Schreiner. They showed her how to use arid, rural lives in the service of fiction.

So we seem to go back to the bedrock of locality to find the Olive Schreiner for 1984. And, irrespective of political and social relevance, back into the bedrock of perennially beautiful and evocative writing:

> The bridal pair mingle freely in the throng, and here and there a musical man sings vigorously as he drags his partner through the Blue Water or John Speriwig; boys shout and applaud, and the enjoyment and confusion are intense, till eleven o'clock comes. By this time the children who swarm in the side-rooms are not to be kept quiet longer, even by hunches of bread and cake; there is a general howl and wail, that rises yet higher than the scraping of fiddles, and mothers rush from their partners to knock small heads together, and cuff little nursemaids, and force the wailers down into unoccupied corners of beds, under tables, and behind boxes. In half an hour every variety of childish snore is heard on all sides, and it has become perilous to raise or set down a foot in any of the side-rooms lest a small head or hand should be crushed. Now, too, the busy feet have broken the solid coating of the floor, and a cloud of fine dust arises, that makes a yellow halo round the candles, and sets asthmatic people coughing, and grows denser, till to recognise anyone on the opposite side of the room becomes impossible, and a partner's face is seen through a yellow mist.
>
> (from 'A Boer-Wedding' in *The Story of an African Farm*)

D. L. Hobman quotes a Mrs. Hodgson who met Olive Schreiner during the First World War: 'In the Gothic legends, a tradition survives of certain tried and experienced women in each tribe, who were specially reverenced as keepers of the soul and tradition of the race. Such a guardian woman Olive Schreiner appeared to me'. To this, D. L. Hobman appends her own comment: 'It is as such a keeper of the soul of mankind that this daughter of South Africa deserves to be remembered.'

[Colin Style is represented in six Southern African anthologies, including *A New Oxford Book of South African Verse in English* (OUP, Cape Town, 1980) and is a contributor to many periodicals in England, USA, Australia, Canada, South Africa and Zimbabwe, including *Stand, The Cornhill Magazine, Country Life, The Sewanee Review, Christian Science Monitor, The Listener* and *PN Review.*]

CORRESPONDENCE

A CONTROVERSIAL DIARY

Dear Madam,

Peter Hall's disarming admissions should fool nobody, least of all my colleague, Clare Colvin (No. 1414, Vol. 243). The candour of his *Diaries* is mitigated by a lot of calculation.

Throughout the book, there are errors of fact and distortions of other people's motives. The main point of Michael Blakemore's paper to the Associate Directors in March 1976 was not that 'the associates had no power'. This wasn't even a secondary point. Blakemore complained that the associates were being implicated in decisions over which they had no control and were not even consulted. He proposed that a three-man executive (of Hall, Peter Stevens and Lord Birkett) should run the National Theatre with a free hand, consulting the associate directors when necessary.

The implication of what Hall has to say is that Blakemore was simply envious of his position. He is also inaccurate in his references to me. I did not circulate the manuscript of my book, *The History of the National Theatre*, around Fleet Street. I was not the source of the Max Hastings' articles in the *Evening Standard*: Hastings, 'the first into Port Stanley', can do his own research. If anybody was trying to organise a Fleet Street conspiracy it was not me, but the NT's press office, whose avidity for favourable comment may have rebounded against them. Nor was there such a conspiracy. The articles supporting Hall's NT always outnumbered those which were critical; and several editors were known not only to favour Hall personally but to be extremely wary of printing anything which might be deemed in the National Theatre's disfavour.

The impression left by the *Diaries* is that Hall, who openly admits his minor faults, was and is unfairly attacked by those with personal grudges of one kind or another. It is impossible, of course, to say that envy may not play a part in the criticisms, as it does elsewhere in life. It is also true to say that Hall's style of leadership and his artistic judgement have aroused unfavourable comment, though not necessarily malicious. But the bulk of the arguments have been directed against the principles, rather than the personality, of Hall's NT:— against the very high level of subsidy given to the NT as opposed to the very low ones given elsewhere, against the way in which the NT 'creams off' artistic and technical expertise from other theatres and similar matters.

Peter Hall's character is really a digression from these problems, which remain to be solved. I agree with Miss Colvin that gossip is entertaining to read, but unfortunately this kind of theatrical *tittle-tattle* demeans its subject, the many people who have devoted their lives to the cause of establishing the NT and, not least, Hall himself.

Yours faithfully,

London W.14. JOHN ELSOM

Clare Colvin writes

One can understand John Elsom's dismay at the 'disarming yet calculated admissions' to be found in Peter Hall's Diaries. He is, after all, more harshly treated by them than virtually anyone else. I am sad, however, that he himself has been 'fooled' by the ironical terms in which I attempted to express my views.

London N.1. CLARE COLVIN

WHOSE INTERESTS?

Dear Madam,

Following on the article by S. G. Shanker, 'The Challenge of Mass Unemployment', in the December 1983 issue of *Contemporary Review* (No. 1415, Vol. 243) and with unemployment higher than at any time this century, it may be worthwhile to look again at one or two aspects of the economic system in which the population of the United Kingdom seeks its livelihood, and to see how the interests of the nation are served within this structure.

Perhaps the most dominant feature of the economy during the past thirty years has been the inability of small commercial and industrial firms to maintain an economic viability. Parallel with this decline has been the rise of large corporations, resulting in a serious loss of employment within the manufacturing and retail industries. These large-scale enterprises dominate the economic structure of the UK to an extent that was not foreseen a generation ago, and they are found in every economic sphere.

It is within the food manufacturing industry that corporation growth has been most spectacular, with a relatively small number of multinational combines controlling every stage of the manufacturing, wholesale and retail processes in several vital commodities.

This responsibility for all aspects of production is also found within the tea industry, with four companies, including Brooke-Bond Liebig, Unilever and Twining controlling not only the UK market, but those of the rest of the world. Brooke-Bond's share of the UK market alone exceeds 45%, while Unilever, with more than 500 companies in 70 countries, has annual sales totalling more than £6,000,000,000.

A similar pattern is found in the production and marketing of cocoa, with nine companies controlling 80% of sales in western Europe and the United States; Mars, Cadbury-Schweppes, Rowntree-McIntosh and Nestles being amongst the market leaders.

The increasing tendency towards large-scale concentration of production is highlighted by the fact that 11,000 mergers have taken place in the UK since 1965, while Britain also has a higher proportion of large corporations than any other country in the world. It has brought social deprivation to many areas of the United Kingdom, and will continue to do so while its economic rationale remains unchallenged.

Yours faithfully,

Vauxhall, London SW8. BRIAN LOOK

THE DISABLED AID PLAN

Referring to 'Care for Handicapped Children' by Peter Niecke (*Contemporary Review*, No. 1412, Vol. 243), we have received the following information from *Eurofocus* (2983).—Editor.

About 30 million people in Europe suffer from some kind of disability and efforts to help them are an 'integral part' of European social policy, according to European Social Affairs Commissioner Ivor Richard. The European Commission has just published a plan for the economic and social integration of the disabled in Europe.

European Community involvement with the disabled has been going on for some time. In addition to European Social Fund aid for numerous training projects, in 1974 the Community introduced professional rehabilitation programmes and in 1976 started to subsidise pilot projects to convert and build special housing.

But it was the United Nations' International Year of the Disabled which gave European efforts the boost that they needed. In 1981 the Community undertook an ambitious programme in the form of a five-year plan and the European Commission set up a special office to deal with issues relating to the disabled.

The most important recent development has been the creation of a network of local groups designed to help the disabled. Sixteen projects have been set up by the Commission office, in close co-operation with the member states.

In each region concerned, the local authorities are committed to strengthening programmes aimed at improving the integration of the disabled into local life. Teams are assisted by consultative committees consisting of the disabled, their families, representatives of local authorities, professional groups, employers, unions and charitable organisations. Their activities relate to employment, social services, transport, housing and publicity campaigns. Funding is provided jointly by the local authorities and the ESF.

The ESF is still the biggest aid donor to the disabled, financing training and job creation. In 1982 about 66,000 people took part in ESF-funded training schemes. Numbers should increase in future with a 10% increase in funds allocated to the ESF, amounting to £89 million/109 million £IRL, 18% up on last year.

The Commission wants to enlarge the scope of its action in the future. It is to present a series of proposals on how to help the disabled in every aspect of their daily lives—environment, housing, mobility, leisure, etc.

The European Parliament is also concerned about the disabled. In March 1981 the Parliament appealed for a concerted effort by Community member states to do something for them. A few weeks ago four Italian MEPs tabled a motion reiterating the call.

The group want equal rights for the sick in Europe and the adoption of a 'European charter for the seriously disabled.'

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

The Wasp Factory. Iain Banks. Macmillan. £7.95. *The Sandman.* Miles Gibson. Heinemann. £7.95. *Woman, Beware Woman.* Emma Tennant. Cape. £7.95. *Mental Matters.* Penelope Gilliatt. Macmillan. £8.50. *An Open Prison.* J. I. M. Stewart. Gollancz. £7.95. *1984.* George Orwell. Secker (Reissue). £7.95. Penguin (Reissue). £1.95. *Animal Farm.* George Orwell. Secker (Reissue). £3.00. Penguin (Reissue). £1.00.

It is always a pleasure to read a first novel by a young author. Whether or not such works are assumed to be mainly autobiographical, there is a fascination in discovering what furnishes the minds of a new generation of writers. This is particularly true of *The Wasp Factory*, a first novel of unusual promise. It is the story of frustrated adolescence, set on a remote Scottish island. The idyllic background of lochs and mountains has little effect on Iain Banks' young hero, Frank Cauldhame. His has been a singularly cheerless upbringing. The Cauldhame family, once extensive landowners, now own only a delapidated farmhouse on an offshoot of the mainland. The Cauldhame womenfolk have come and gone. The mother of Eric, an older brother, died in childbirth. Her successor, Frank's mother, remained only for a brief period, returning to give birth to a delicate infant named Paul. The consistent influences in Frank's life were his father, a reclusive character who spent much time behind locked doors in his private sanctum; Mrs. Clamp, the cleaner, and a strange little dwarf of about Frank's own age. With the instinct for compensation common to many lonely children, Frank has set up an elaborate fantasy world to co-exist alongside the drab realities. This is no fairyland scene, but a highly-wrought system of near-pagan ritual, involving the sadistic killing of mammals and insects. Unfortunately, he was not content with the extermination of rabbits and spiders and soon turned his almost casual attention to the murder of human beings. The victims were all children; his bother, Paul, by means of an ingeniously contrived explosion; Esmerelda, a young playmate, harnessed to the rigging of a powerful runaway kite, while his cousin, Blyth, died from a venomous snake bite after Frank had placed an adder in a socket of the little boy's artificial limb. All these crimes remained undetected by the not unperceptive local police, and Frank learned to live with his guilt.

The petrifying atmosphere of the Cauldhame home also had an adverse effect on Eric, the surviving older brother. He also suffered from a pathological indifference to the suffering of humans and animals and, after a succession of anti-social crimes, was incarcerated in a mainland psychiatric hospital. His escape from the institution forms the narrative plank for *The Wasp Factory.* Eric is on the run and must remain in hiding. He telephones Frank frequently from unidentified boltholes, each one a little nearer to the Cauldhame homestead. Predictably, the novel reaches its climax with the tracking down of Eric, following renewed excesses of cruelty and vandalism. It is not surprising that the tension places an added strain on Frank and his father. When Mr. Cauldhame becomes ill and Frank enters the permanently barred and bolted workroom, he makes a horrifying discovery. It appears that Mr. Cauldhame has

for years been secretly experimenting with sex hormones, and feeding them to his unsuspecting offspring in an attempt to bring about a sex change. Thus, *Frank* is really *Frances*; a pitiful haemaphrodite who may, with counter-treatment, one day win through to normality, and is thus honourably acquitted from blame for crimes for which he cannot be held responsible. A bizarre tale, certainly, straining credulity to breaking point, yet conveyed with humour and a capable perception of character, shot through with splendidly evocative descriptions of the island scene.

Miles Gibson is not concerned to analyse the basic causes of murder and violence or to bring events full circle with a plausible exoneration of the culprit. The opening of his first novel, *The Sandman*, is unequivocal: 'My name is William Mackerel Burton, I have killed eighteen men and women. It has been my life's work.' Told through supposed entries in a journal, this is a study of unmitigated sadism and bestiality which makes no concessions to the squeamish reader. In the opening episode, the blowsy, good-hearted prostitute readily invites the killer into her basement dwelling. It might promise just another sex story until William Burton makes his chilling request: 'It's nothing unpleasant, . . . but I'd feel so much happier if I could keep my gloves on . . . '.

William Mackerel Burton did not steal from his victims. They were randomly selected and so he escaped detection and even when questioned by the police on another matter, the investigation failed to link him with the baffling series of killings. And so he goes free, forever, it is assumed, with time on his hands to mull over his grisly notes.

If we must continue in the realm of sudden, unexplained death, it could be reassuring to do so in the company of an experienced writer. In *Woman, Beware Woman*, Emma Tennant has set in motion a somewhat complicated train of events after the body of a well-known novelist, Hugo Pierce, is found in the woods near his home. This is in the village of Dunnane, on the untrammelled west coast of Ireland, and events are portrayed through the eyes and ears of the young narrator, Minnie. The Pierce family live in splendid isolation, surrounded by shabby grandeur, although, like everyone else, they have their problems. Minnie had hoped to marry one of the Pierce sons, Philip, but his parents decided otherwise. Gareth, the second son, chose for his wife an American career girl, Fran, Minnie's former friend and confidante. Not surprisingly, Fran and her mother-in-law, Moura Pierce, are soon on a collision course. Hugo's death has other repercussions among family and neighbours, assembled in Dunnane for the funeral, resulting in some fine scenes of conflict and confrontation. However, the paramount objective of *Woman, Beware Woman* is to solve the mystery of Hugo's death. There are various possibilities, all of which are explored in standard crime detection routine which conflicts with the quietly subtle characterisation of the opening chapters. In the end, the sleuth-hound *motif* triumphs with an unconvincing dénouement which does not do too much damage to the earlier excellence. The descriptive scenes are very good indeed: but when is it going to dawn on contemporary novelists that the Edwardian style of life in the Republic has almost—if not quite—irretrievably disappeared?

Disappointingly, in *Mental Matters*, Penelope Gilliatt is content to rework a familiar theme: in this case, the predicament of doughty Northerners who pull up their roots and migrate to the capital city. Lady Corfe, a cheerful octogenarian, once a vigorous campaigner for women's and other rights, now lives in Kensington with an unsatisfactory son, his mildly frustrated wife and

a grandson who displays all the unconvincing traits of the popular teenage image. In a basement kitchen, the stalwart factotums consume quantities of fried foods, untroubled by nostalgic longings for Tyne and Wear. It all becomes too much for Lady Corfe, so that, on impulse, she reserves a sleeper to Newcastle and travels northwards in an attempt to rediscover her true origins. People welcome her: but does she really experience a sense of 'belonging'? The chances are against it, for individuals as well as landscapes undergo radical changes with the passing years. In a series of flashbacks we learn what it was like once upon a time, when businesses thrived through dedication and hard toil and political convictions really mattered. What emerges of the Corfes' family past is interesting, though not unique, and the problem is that material which might have provided a full-blooded family saga is too sketchily and rapidly presented.

However skilful the characterisation and evocation of a background, it must be acknowledged that an unusual theme offers considerable advantages for the novelist. Much of the action of J. I. M. Stewart's *An Open Prison* takes place in a middle-grade Public School a decade or so ago. A bachelor schoolmaster, Pog Syson, manages to combine an honest naïveté with a welcome degree of clear-headedness, which is as well, considering the strange happenings which threaten to engulf the 'closed society' of his 'House'. When Pog returns to take up his duties after a year's sabbatical abroad, his head boy, Robin Hayes, reveals that, during the holidays, his father has been gaoled for fraud. Clearly, the boy is reeling from the family disgrace and Pog's self-appointed role is to dissuade Robin from leaving the school and generally to reinforce his morale. This involves a visit to the intriguingly maladjusted Hayes family and to the open prison, the governor of which conveniently turns out to be an old friend. Further complications arise. The judge who sentenced Hayes *père* is the grandfather of David Daviot, a junior boy in another section of the school, described as handsome, curly-haired and with a strong desire to become an actor. We learn that Robin Hayes is enamoured of the boy; and so the scene is set for a tangle of ensuing events, one of which is the appearance on the scene of Robin's sinister uncle, Jasper Tandem, while another is the acceleration of homosexual relationships at a time when the staff believed themselves to be reasonably immune from this particular problem. And then, as an additional assault on the daily routine, comes the elopement of Robin and David, aided and abetted by Jasper Tandem—or so it seems. From that point onwards, the school routine takes second place while the author sets about unravelling the mystery of the boys' disappearance; soon to be revealed as having as its purpose the more commonplace crimes of kidnapping and blackmail. If the finale is unconvincing and leaves many loose ends, J. I. M. Stewart must be forgiven; for in the process of arriving at a solution he has provided so much that is satisfying; not least a timely reminder of the dedication of teaching staff to a way of life which many people might consider tedious and stultifying.

In this much publicised year of 1984, it would be difficult to ignore the reissue of two of the most famous novels of the century, *1984* and *Animal Farm*. For more than thirty years, they have straddled the literary scene, while words and phrases used in them have infiltrated our language. Yet how many people who refer to 'Newspeak' and 'Big Brother' have recently—if ever—read George Orwell's science-fiction horror works and assessed them purely as works of fiction? The problem in re-reading them today is to divorce the novels from the ideological overtones which, for many years, have been the

main consideration. A celebration of the relevant year, with TV documentaries, a reading of *1984* on radio, *Thought Crimes* at the Barbican and an opera based on *Animal Farm* at the National, could be described as overkill. The contrast between this fanfare of publicity and George Orwell's struggle to get the books accepted would be laughable if it were not so poignant.

It needs to be remembered that when *Animal Farm* was written, a political satire for children was something of a novelty. Those adults who read the sombre tale aloud to a child will have experienced the full intended impact. The savage battleground of the slaughterhouse and knackers' yard is never camouflaged, and is far removed from Beatrix Potter's cosy world of semi-human mice and kittens.

What George Orwell referred to as his 'inner voice' was to become more insistent in *1984*. The prophetic aspect of his work may have been unduly stressed, for he had had ample experience of distorted ideologies during the Spanish Civil War and from his World War II service with official propaganda units. From this solid background of information he decided what it was he wished to say and, by any standards, said it admirably.

> It was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking thirteen. Winston Smith, in an effort to escape the vile wind, slipped quickly through the glass doors of Victory Mansions, though not quickly enough to prevent a swirl of gritty dust from entering along with him.

With this opening paragraph we enter the grey world of lies and shortages, from which a rare escape into the unvandalised countryside resembles a minor miracle. As Winston Smith's struggle against the 'system' is unfolded, it seems almost possible to taste the synthetic food and hear the manic outpourings from the ever-present television screen. It is not George Orwell's fault that a succession of science films, plays and novels have conditioned us to anticipate Winston's eventual arrest and torture or that, as a result, this comes over as the least satisfying section of the novel.

Also Received

The Sories of Bernard Malamud. Chatto & Windus. £12.50. Like many writers, Bernard Malamud began his career as a novelist by sending short stories to magazines. His powers must have been immediately apparent. The present volume provides excellent reading. Specially rewarding are 'The Cost of Living' (his first short story), and 'The Man in the Drawer'.

The Village of Stepanchihkovo. Fydor Dostoyevsky. (Translated by Ignat Avsey.) Angel Books. £8.95. Students of Dostoyevsky's work will discover a rich harvest in this new and easy translation by Ignat Avsey of a little-known work of which, as the translator himself states, few translations have been made and none for a long time. *The Village* was first intended as a play—a comedy with serious undertones. Foma Fomich Opiskin, the domineering central character, is by no means tethered to his period of pre-Revolution Russia and speaks for all time.

The Russian Woman. Tom Hyman. Hodder & Stoughton. £7.95. Once again, Tom Hyman, the able and talented author of *The Giant Killer*, displays his particular skill of building a mounting tension of passion and intrigue against an authentic background—this time the White House.

Sharpe's Enemy. Bernard Cornwell. Collins. £8.50. *Sharpe's Enemy* is the latest in a series of novels describing the exploits of Richard Sharpe, a soldier who has come up the hard way to the rank of captain. The sphere of his activity is the seemingly endless Peninsular campaign, a situation rich with opportunity for drama and bloody action. It is to Bernard Cornwell's credit that he delivers far more than a mere adventure story. The personalities at the top come over clearly, as do the appalling deprivations endured by a travelling regiment of Wellington's period.

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

A HISTORY OF THE ASTOR FAMILY

Dynasty—The Astors and Their Times. David Sinclair. J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. £12.95.

'It is easier for a camel', we are told in the Gospel, 'to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven'. About two hundred years ago, John Jacob Astor the first, a German butcher's son, arrived in New York as a penniless immigrant. Before he died, he had become the richest man in America. Since then, in the United States and, for the last ninety years, in Britain, all those born into the Astor family have been endowed with all the opportunities and confronted with all the temptations of great wealth.

The American side of the story is told with much vividness by David Sinclair. I have no reason to question its accuracy, but I cannot vouch for it at first hand. In the last fifty years, I have had ample opportunity of studying the British Astors and, indeed, have received much kindness from them. With one major reservation (noted below). I feel that David Sinclair has made a gallant effort to provide an accurate picture.

He does well to stress the noble nature of Waldorf, the second Viscount, husband of Nancy. There is a splendid book to be written about one of the most disinterested of men. The four sons of Waldorf emerge as interesting characters in their own right. David, the second son, was editor of the *Observer* for twenty-seven years, there and elsewhere carrying on his father's philosophy of doing good by stealth. The other three sons all entered the House of Commons without making any real mark there. (David Sinclair seems to be under the impression that a parliamentary private secretary is a member of the government.) I treasure the telegraphic reply of Michael, the third son, to a demand from his constituents that he should return from abroad at a time of crisis. 'You must take me as you find me—if you can find me.' But he wrote two excellent books and became chairman of the London Library.

Jakie, the youngest, has been a notable figure in the racing world. He has been knighted for his services to the Agricultural Research Council. I am particularly glad that Bill, the third Viscount, is presented here in a role far removed from that of Stephen Ward, though the latter had many qualities. I even paid a short tribute to him on television after his spectacular suicide. Bill Astor was criticised very distressingly, but very unfairly, for not coming forward to give evidence during his trial. I know from lunching with Bill that week that he was guided entirely by what Stephen Ward's legal advisers considered best for their client. Bill's lifelong interest in voluntary organisations

concerned with social work is rightly emphasised here. They turned up in tremendous force at his memorial service.

The failure of the book lies in the one-sided portrait presented of Nancy Astor. It does full justice to the provocative side of her personality and quite a lot of justice to her gift of repartee. But no one would gather from the anecdotes recounted here that she was not only a very exciting, but a much-loved personality. Early in the war, she visited me in a nursing home where I was undergoing a breakdown in health. She herself read the Gospels daily and read St. John to me until I fell asleep. This, too, although she learnt that I had become a Roman Catholic, which to her was the deadliest of all the sins.

The story of the Astors, as told by David Sinclair, carries an aroma of decline and fall. Certainly, the days are long since past when a Mrs. Astor could dominate New York society—'the fount of fashion, the high priestess of manners and etiquette, the chief justice in the supreme court of social respectability, the queen of New York'.

William Waldorf Astor, who came to England because America seemed so 'vulgar', acquired the splendid residences of Cliveden and Hever Castle. His sons added *The Times* and *Observer* newspapers. All four properties have now been disposed of. The Astors, we are told here, are now just ordinary millionaires. But, in my experience of the faimly, I would say that a tradition of social obligation has persisted notably.

Scott Fitzgerald is said to have asked Ernest Hemingway: 'What have the rich got that you and I haven't?' Hemingway replied: 'They have got more money.' That has certainly been and remains true of the Astors, but it is by no means their most interesting aspect.

FRANK LONGFORD

FRIEDMAN VERSUS KEYNES

Public Expenditure. David Heald. Martin Robertson, Oxford. £19.50 hardback, £6.95 paperback.

Mr. Heald's thoughtful and scholarly work on public expenditure is not for the simplistic adherents of the good versus the bad schools, whether Keynsian or followers of the monetarist guru of the present counter revolution, Milton Friedman.

In a spirited defence of the welfare state, Mr. Heald attacks the obsessive antagonism of key members of the Cabinet towards the public sector, but by the same token he criticises the thoughtless advocates of spending who do not consider where the money is to come from or disregard the inefficiency of anything in the public sector.

Mr. Heald identifies the economic libertarianism of those for whom 'minimal state interference' is the goal. One telling quotation from Berlin, 'liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happineess' encapsulates the ideology of most who share the monetarist view. If I was riveted by Sir Keith Joseph's demolition of traditional social democratic notions, the answer lies largely in the curious ambivalence when it comes to authoritarianism in the political field that most frequently accompanies such ideology.

These philosophies are discussed in depth and it is revealing that the advocates of the free market can claim that 'liberty in this sense is not incompatible with some kinds of autocracy, or at any rate with the absence of self-government.' The right to buy or sell private property and the elevation of the market economy as against what is seen as bureaucratic interference ignores

the role of the state in the promotion of individual welfare. It above all ignores the fact that there is no right of choice except in theory for the impoverished in society.

It may have been demogogic of me, but I well remember addressing audiences in my former constituency and asking how many of them had the choice of Eton for their children's education or the choice of influencing opinion by buying a mass circulation newspaper.

Mr. Heald shows that our level of public expenditure is comparatively low in Europe, and between 1960 and 1970 we were overtaken by our neighbours. However, the complexity of the meaning of public expenditure and the facility with which figures can be manipulated are amply demonstrated. Mr. Heald avoids jargon and is unpretentious, tending to understatement. Keynsian ideas had become establishment—now the monetarist counter revolution poses a serious intellectual challenge which he meets. However, for a non-economist this is no entertaining 'easy read'.

Nonetheless, simple examples assist the non-specialist. Is tax relief on mortgage repayments public expenditure? Certainly housing subsidies are. His definition of public expenditure is 'the dispensation by the state on non-market criteria of economic resources which it has acquired from firms or households.'

Of course, some public enterprises may be profitable, and the ideological battleground of 'pros' and 'cons' is heard in noisy exchanges in the House of Commons. One prong of the SDP attack in such battles was pragmatism and the refusal to look at the issue through such ideological spectacles. P.S.B.R. and money supply may have taken over from Keynsian demand management since 'Thatcherism' replaced the consensus of the sixties and seventies. The optimism of Tony Crosfield depended upon growth but in the context of world recession, efficiency and equality are more serious issues to consider. This Mr. Heald does. On the former, he concludes that the state must develop mechanisms of its own which will perform for the non-market public sector those functions which are performed by the market for the public sector. However, the growth of such activities of the state may be in conflict with efficiency, justified by equality—an anathema to the 'safety net' simplicity of Sir Keith Joseph.

Mr. Heald rightly analyses the difficulties of implementing egalitarian policies in a society characterised by extensive inequalities which supporters of the welfare state have too easily brushed aside. The better off make use of services freely provided more effectivly. Redistribution may impair incentives and paternalism and bureaucracy grow. Choice in the public sector is often non-existent. Mr. Heald gives the lie to 'those on the political left who automatically assume that non-market methods of allocation are necessarily more favourable to lower income groups.' Subsidised urban transport is sensible but in fact redistributed to the suburban better off, not the inner city poor; (pace Ken Livingstone). Perhaps, one should look to negative taxation or better still read the awe inspiring chapters of Mr. Heald's detailed examination of managing and controlling collective bargaining and decentralisation.

Finally, in challenging the fundamental change in intellectual opinion in which monetarist and free market economists have been setting the intellectual and political agenda, Mr. Heald does not ignore the Marxist challenge. He rejects the assumption that the economic activities of the state destroy freedom and are inherently inefficient, and in particular the argument that public expenditure and P.S.B. are inherently bad. There is no evidence that anything

the public sector does the private sector can do better—or in my view vice versa. The government's fixation on privatisation and money supply and its ignoring of social, material and moral decay prove to me that economists who live in vacuums forget that economic methods are there to achieve social and political aims. Even Mr. Heald falls into their trap by fighting on his opponents' territory—but it is a convincing display of polemics backed up by a degree of detailed analysis that makes hard reading for a mere mortal untutored in economic niceties.

PAUL ROSE

SURVEYS OF AMERICAN LITERATURE

The Literature of the United States of America. Marshall Walker. Macmillan. £14 hardback and £3.95 paperback.

American Literature in Context, I. 1620-1830. Stephen Fender. Methuen University. Paperback £5.50.

American Literature in Context, III. 1865-1900. Andrew Hook. Methuen University. Paperback £5.50.

One should never attempt to compare the incomparable. And that is what is involved in comparing Marshall Walker's *The Literature of the United States of America*, one of the volumes in the Macmillan *History of Literature* series, with the two volumes in the Methuen series under the general editorship of Arnold Goldman. Marshall Walker, once of Glasgow University and now of the University of Waikato in New Zealand, attempts an ambitious task: a survey of American literature from the colonial period to today in less than 200 pages. (Each century of English Literature since the sixteenth gets a volume apiece; the US, Scotland and the Commonwealth are each seen as less important.) He gives a useful additional reading list and a valuable date-list setting the literature in the context of political and social development. The survey itself, however, is inevitably cursory, little more than a succession of one-paragraph, or even in places one-sentence, comments. Not that the comments are anything but incisive; it is their brevity that is tantalising. Thus, while offering four pages of comment on Robert Penn Warren as 'the most versatile and vigorous of the Fugitives', Professor Walker says much too little of the group, and of Allen Tate says laconically that his 'critical elegance and flair for personal mischief were unsurpassed by any of his colleagues'. Again, the short accounts of Jefferson and Franklin, Cooper and Poe leave too many aspects unmentioned—readable though each of them is (particularly that on Poe). And at least we have references to the Black Renaissance, and to the work of Berryman and Lowell and the poetry of James Merrill. Professor Walker should simply have been given more room; when he does, as in his first chapter of personal assessment—Terms of Tradition—he reveals a grace and quality that makes it the best piece of writing in all three books.

Stephen Fender and Andrew Hook are thorough and stimulating. The assignment in each volume is to open up their chosen period by a series of long extracts from a writer, each of which then becomes a springboard for discussion and analysis. It is a useful formula for students, and as demonstrated in these two studies it is a successful method of discussing an author's *oeuvre*. If Stephen Fender is hesitant in his difficult opening chapters on the very early colonial and Puritan periods, he has much that is fresh to say even on well-worked themes like the Declaration of Independence, Tom Paine, Philip Freneau and James Fenimore Cooper. And Andrew Hook is able to allow himself a few pages on less familiar names like Harold Frederic and Kate Chopin as well as

the rich canvas of Utopians (Edward Bellamy), emerging economists (Veblen and Henry George) and 'great names' (Whiteman, Henry James and Twain) who wrestled with an America in violent change. There are two further volumes to come in this series, by Brian Harding on 1830-1865 and by Ann Massa on 1900-1930. They will be very welcome.

ESMOND WRIGHT

SIR ROBERT BIRLEY—SCHOLAR-STATESMAN

'Red Robert', A Life of Robert Birley. Arthur Hearnden. Hamish Hamilton. £9.95.

In the last paragraph of this careful and discerning biography these words occur:

> Robert Birley's greatness is to be found in the least splendiferous strand of his distinguished career, the unquenchable vitality and intelligence of his teaching, whether it was as the Head Man in the division rooms of Eton or, as the 'old man' in the classrooms of Orlando High School in Soweto. It was in this element, quintessentially his, that he encouraged and inspired so many, a private example that far outshines any public honours that were heaped on him—and this is the memory that most deserves to endure.

All very true, but Robert Birley was also a scholar-statesman, author of much of the Fleming Report (Public Schools and the General Education System, 1942), four times Chairman of the Headmasters' Conference, Educational Adviser in post-war Germany (1947) and 'midwife, godfather and guiding spirit of the Königswinter Conferences', Professor of Education at the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa (1961), Professor of Rhetoric at the new City University, London (1968-1981). I could mention also half a dozen voluntary bodies, including V.S.O. (Voluntary Service Overseas) to which Birley devoted time and thought and often was the main inspiration or Chairman.

Arthur Hearnden, author of other books on British and German education, has been given access to all the Birley family papers and to Robert's personal papers by his widow, Lady Birley, who shared his adventurous career. Hearnden has taken enormous trouble to consult scores of friends from Birley's undergraduate days at Balliol, Birley's former pupils at Charterhouse and Eton, his colleagues from later days in Germany, South Africa and London in order to produce this fascinating biography.

Robert Birley's ancestors were well-off Lancashire merchants with a fine tradition of public service. His father joined the Indian Civil Service. Robert was sent to Rugby where he was allowed to develop his love of history; from Rugby he went to Balliol with a Brackenbury Scholarship for History, won the Gladstone prize and left with a First. It was at this time that he decided to become a schoolmaster, for which profession he had the two necessary qualifications—he was fascinated by his subject (History in its widest sense) and was enormously interested in young people. Not many graduates in their twenties can afford to turn down a Fellowship at Oxford; Birley did, and accepted a special invitation to teach History at Eton. This was a flying start, though one for which he had assiduously prepared himself both at Balliol and during vacations from Oxford.

Like Arnold Toynbee, William Temple and the current Master, A. D. Lindsay, Birley left Balliol with a social conscience and a desire to widen the opportunities for quality education. He used his passion for history to make boys think and would not tolerate sloppiness in ideas or argument. Thus he fostered a stimulating intellectual life not only at Charterhouse and Eton but

wherever his duties called him in later assignments. Wherever he went he created an atmosphere where problems could be studied and often solved. He brought two famous schools into the modern world without destroying their traditions. His own residence became an expanded family centre. He wrote countless long and understanding letters to parents, students and to all those, however unimportant, with whom he happened to be working.

The roll-call of ex-pupils, many of whom pay their personal tributes in this book, include Rees Mogg, David Astor, Gore Booth, Con O'Neill, James Prior, Nigel Nicolson, Peter May, Giles Alington, Dick Taverne, etc. Balliol's first precept: 'Men are greater than theories'.

The whole book bears witness to a kindly, humane, Christian character who brought to bear an imaginative and constructive attitude on major educational and social questions of the period, mostly pre-war, war and post-war Britain.

Why the author and publisher allowed the word *Red* to be used in the title is beyond belief. Or is it a poor joke?

KENNETH LINDSAY

KIPLING'S FAMILY LETTERS

'O Beloved Kids': Rudyard Kipling's Letters to his Children. Edited by Elliott L. Gilbert. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £10.95.

The affection which Rudyard Kipling felt for his two children, John and Elsie, is warmly expressed in the long, entertaining letters which he wrote to them between 1906 and 1915. Their collection, together with the accompanying impromptu illustrations, stories and poems, is the first new Kipling material to appear in almost half a century. It serves to bring again to life the ebullient, vigorous imagination which has for many years been eclipsed by its unfortunate connection with an imperialist past that is even now being re-examined: it heralds a possible revival of much in the Kipling literary canon which has unwarrantably been neglected. Angus Wilson, V. S. Pritchett and other critics have in the last few years paid attention to aspects of Kipling's work unconnected with the Raj and have unveiled much of Kipling's 'imperialist' writing which turns out to be a more acute analysis of Empire than had been assumed.

The letters display the wit and verve of the *Just So Stories* and, indeed, contain many anecdotes written in the same vein. They include impromptu illustrations, stories and poems, interspersed with graphic descriptions of people and places. The book's main attraction lies in the variety of its contents: there are over fifty of Kipling's pen and ink sketches, a substantial section of photographs and some interesting documents. Despatches from Canada, Europe and Egypt with amusing and technically brilliant line drawings provide a new insight into Kipling's many-sided talent as well as into his care and consideration for his two remaining children.

In 1906 when the letters begin, *Puck of Pook's Hill* had just been published. Dan and Una, the children to whom Puck appears, are modelled on John and Elsie; and they reappeared in 1910 in the pages of *Rewards and Fairies.* The Kipling's first-born child, a girl, had died of pneumonia in the United States in 1898: John, born in Burwash at Bateman's, the house which the family regarded as their permanent home after returning from a sad time in America, was destined to be killed in action in the First World War, shortly after his eighteenth birthday. More at ease with children than with most of his contemporaries, Kipling could write freely and delightfully to these two who were,

in any case, doubly dear to him. It is only as John is approaching manhood and is entering the armed services that his father's letters to him become hesitant and distinctly more reticent. They are, however, some of the most moving letters in the book. Few of Kiplings' family letters have been seen before in print and Professor Gilbert has here made a notable contribution to Kipling studies.

BETTY ABEL

SHORTER REVIEWS

Two brief books on St. Benedict have been published appropriately at the same time by Collins in their Fontana paperback series. The first is the English edition of **Saint Benedict of Nursia** (£3.95) in which Patrick O'Donovan outlines the history of the Benedictine Order and its offshoots, including the Cistercians, with particular reference to the Saint himself and the medieval monastic way of life. The volume is greatly enhanced by 50 colour photographs. There are no notes on the text or a bibliography. The other volume is Esther de Waal's **Seeking God** (£1.75) in which she discusses the Rule of St. Benedict and its relevance to the present day. In a brief Foreword, Cardinal Hume, himself a Benedictine monk, recommends the work. The author 'has shown that ancient wisdom, when it is truly that, is also very modern and contemporary.' Dr. Runcie has also contributed a short Foreword.

Understanding American Politics (Fontana Paperbacks. £2.50.) The second edition of this useful and informative volume by Mr. R. V. Denenburg comes at a particularly appropriate time during the American presidential election year. It is a brief survey intended as an 'introduction primarily for non-Americans to the politics and government of the United States'. It includes the main political and constitutional developments since the first edition was published in 1976. Mr. Denenburg fairly comments that 'like all perspectives, mine is probably skewed a good deal by personal values and judgements' and 'not all students of American politics would agree with some of the statements I have made'. This, of course, is inevitable in a study of this kind upon one of the most complex yet sound systems of democratic government and administration in the world. The author provides a most valuable analysis and insight into its workings, within a small compass. He writes in simple terms without technicalities.

Speaker's Rulings and Decisions (Biswa Jnan, Calcutta. Rs. 100.) 'The evolution of parliamentary democracy with special reference to West Bengal' is the subject of this study by Dr. Ranajit Basu, himself employed in this parliament. It contains a detailed account of the practice in the West Bengal legislature, and compared with that in other Indian assemblies. Indian parliamentary practice still owes a great deal to that of the British House of Commons, enshrined in Erskine May. This study should prove useful to students of legislative procedures.

The Whirlpool (Hogarth Press. £3.95, paperback). This is one of George Gissing's later works, written

in 1897 six years before his death. During his short life, he was twice unhappily married, and this novel has the background of marital incompatibility. In a new and penetrating Introduction, Gillian Tindall relates the main characters in the story to Gissing's own life, beliefs and attitudes. She writes: 'The characters seem locked in an argument which is partly—but only partly —relevant to their own particular actions and destinies. There is a hidden agenda, that of Gissing's own perpetual struggle with the nature of truth and wisdom.' She describes the work as 'though flawed, it is perhaps his most subtle and ambitious novel.' *New Grub Street* is, of course, his best known and most valued book.

The Victorian Art World (Barrie and Jenkins. £20.00). This is a very remarkable publication by the eminent authority on Victorian art, Jeremy Mais. Thirty years ago, he started a collection of photographs of Victorian artists. Over the years, he became more and more interested in enlarging this collection from private and institutional sources, sales, bookshops and junk shops. In the result, this volume contains 425 photographs; indeed, he acquired such a quantity that 'for every photograph selected, about five were rejected.' Mr. Mais can rightly describe this volume as containing 'a comprehensive survey of nearly all the celebrated people who played a part in the busy, lively and richly heterogeneous art world during Queen Victoria's reign.' In addition to artists, there are sections on patrons, 'dilettanti and writers on art,' 'models, mistresses, wives and children,' 'dealers, print publishers and photographers,' and 'literary associates.' In respect of each photograph its source and type is described; and every one is accompanied by a brief note about the work of the individual concerned; and usually there is also a short commentary by a contemporary. It is a fascinating volume, which should be a valuable work of reference.

The Heptameron (Penguin Books. £4.95.) This collection of short tales was first published in 1558, with 67 stories attributable traditionally to Marguerite de Navarre, sister of Francois 1. Later editions included 70 stories. Mr. Paul A. Chilton has now produced a new translation. There are numerous manuscripts with no definitive text. Mr. Chilton bases his translation 'on the most up to date accessible edition of the manuscript source—that of Michel Francois.' He also 'utilises the de Thou manuscript of 1553.' He has alsc contributed a valuable Introduction. The setting for the tales is an isolated monastory where five men and five women have taken refuge from the storms and floods. They tell each other of their experiences, largely about marriage and sexual relations out of marriage, interwoven with religion and truth. Mr. Chilton discusses the authorship of the individual tales, probably collective, and how far true or fiction, and related to conditions of the period.

I Remember (Harvard University Press. £4.20.) Boris Pasternak's 'sketch for an autobiography' of his early years was first published in 1959. Its publication as a paperback, with David Magarshack's translation, Preface and Notes, should be widely welcomed. It is, of course, a brilliant account of his recollections and comments on his contemporaries, Russian art and the literary scene. The volume also contains a translation by Manya Harari of his essay, 'Translating Shakespeare'.

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Contemporary Review

119th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

MAY 1984

THE END OF THE BEGIN ERA

Avi Shlaim

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Clive Archer

THE ENDURING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

S. G. Shanker

SHAKESPEARE AS AUTOBIOGRAPHER

A. L. Rowse

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Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

May 1984 Vol. 244 No. 1420 Founded 1866

Contents *Page*

The End of the Begin Era	Avi Schlaim	225
Malta: the Opposition Standpoint	John Hatherley	231
In Search of Europe	Paul Rose	234
Oberammergau's 350th Anniversary	Geoffrey Humphrys	240
Recent Developments in Nordic Security	Clive Archer	243
Shakespeare as Autobiographer	A. L. Rowse	249
Poem: Youth	Roger Elkin	257
Venezuelan Viewpoint	Steve Ellner	258
The Glory of Whose Garden?	John Elsom	261
The Enduring Role of Government	S. G. Shanker	265
Correspondence: The Labourites Try Again	Hari Stajner	272
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		273
Lord Longford, Esmond Wright, Molly Tibbs, Betty Abel		
SHORTER REVIEWS		279

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© 1983 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H. G. Leates Ltd., 45/47 Alexandra St., Southend-on-Sea, Essex. U.S. Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N.Y. 10022. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £14.50, U.S.A. and Canada $47.50. Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U.S. and Canada; extra costs given on request. U.S. Postmaster: please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 515 Madison Avenue, New York N.Y. 10022. (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

May 1984 Vol. 244 No. 1420

THE END OF THE BEGIN ERA

by Avi Shlaim

THE key to understanding Israeli politics during the six years of Menachen Begin's premiership lies not in Begin's personality but in the ideology of his mentor, Zeev Jabotinsky, the founder of Revisionist Zionism. Spurning the step by step and practical approach of Labour Zionism, Jabotinsky and his followers laid a claim to Jewish statehood over the whole land of Israel in its Biblical dimensions. The notion of compromise on the question of sovereignty or territory was alien to their way of thinking. In common with other right-wing nationalist movements, the Revisionists adopted a populist style and a militant foreign policy stance, denying co-existence with the adversary and relying on the building up and use of superior force for the attainment of national objectives. In stark contrast to mainstream Zionism with its reliance on gradualism, on the cultivation of internal consensus and international sympathy, and with its emphasis on universal humanistic and liberal values, the Revisionists propounded an ideology of 'blood and iron.'

Begin himself made no attempt to put into practice the full-blooded Revisionist programme immediately following the Likud's victory in the 1977 election—a victory which brought to an end twenty-nine uninterrupted years of Labour rule. Within the ranks of the new ruling party and inside the coalition government there were individuals and groups who wanted continuity and worked for moderation. For a variety of reasons, of which this was only the most important one, the style of the new regime and the substance of its policies remained relatively muted. It was only Begin's second government, the one he formed following his narrow victory in the June 1981 election, that represented a real break with the past and the beginning of a tough and uncompromising phase in Israel's foreign policy. During Begin's second term in office, Revisionist ideology came to the fore and increasingly dictated the course of Israeli conduct in foreign affairs. Charges that Begin had betrayed the ideals of his movement, emanating from the extreme right-wing fringe of the Likud and prompted by the conclusion of the Camp David accords, were seen to be wide of the mark. For better or worse, Begin proved himself to be a true believer and the authentic heir to the legacy of Zeev Jabotinsky.

The Revisionist movement had always been much more explicit about its political aims than about its social and economic ones. But no assess-



ment of Begin's record as Prime Minister would be complete without reference to the domestic aspect. Social tensions and conflicts greatly intensified during the six years following the Likud's rise to power. So did the polarisation of Israeli society along ethnic lines. Admittedly, these were long-term trends, but they were powerfully accelerated by the populist, not to say demagogic, style of Begin and his followers. In this respect, the 1981 election represented a watershed. Sensing that large segments of the Israeli public warmed up to his aggressive style, Begin stepped up his verbal attacks on the Labour Party in a manner which accentuated the underlying division of Israeli society into oriental and Western Jews and identified the former more overtly with the Likud and the latter with the Labour establishment. The result was the ugliest, most bitterly fought and, for the first time, violent election campaign in the country's history.

Begin's critics had sometimes warned that if he assumed power, civil liberties would be endangered and the survival of Israeli democracy would be called into question. Such fears were greatly exaggerated. In fact, Begin took no deliberate steps to strike a blow at Israel's democratic structure and handed over to his successors a parliamentary system and the accompanying civil rights, especially freedom of expression, virtually intact. This statement, however, must be qualified on at least three scores. In the first place, Begin's defence of freedom applied only to the Jewish population; it did not extend equally to the State's Arab citizens, much less to the Arabs of the occupied territories. Secondly, while punctiliously observing constitutional conventions, he did nothing to preserve the spirit which informs the workings of Israel's parliamentary institutions. Thirdly, some of the individuals whom Begin placed in positions of power do not possess either his liberal credentials or share his commitment to the preservation of democratic norms. Ariel Sharon is the greatest menace to orderly government and to Israel's democratic values for which he has never evinced anything but contempt. He is part of the Begin legacy that will continue to tick away like a time-bomb beneath Israel's democratic structure and it is still very much an open question whether Begin's successors will be capable of defusing it in time.

The economic legacy of the Begin era is much more unambiguously negative. It would be difficult to imagine a worse record of economic mismanagement, blundering and failure. From his Labour predecessors, Begin inherited a basically sound economy, an agricultural sector among the world's finest, a modest inflation rate which was on the way down and inescapably high defence spending which was nonetheless accompanied by a steady rate of economic growth. When he left office in September 1983 there was no growth, the agricultural sector was in deep trouble, inflation was galloping at 160 per cent and the external debt reached a staggering $30 billion.

Once again, the 1981 election was a significant landmark on the road to economic ruin. In search of popular support, the Likud embarked on a course which was as economically ruinous for the country as it was electorally beneficial for the party. By keeping the rate of exchange of the

shekel artificially high and cutting taxes and customs duties, Finance Minister Yoram Aridor flooded the country with imported consumer goods and generated for a while a completely false sense of prosperity. Spurred on by Begin's paternalistic promise to 'be generous to the people,' the Likud committed one of its most sordid acts by mortgaging the country's future in order to bribe the electorate. Within just over a year, Aridor's so-called 'correct policy' brought the country to the brink of total economic collapse. A massive increase in imports and a contraction in productive industry and the volume of exports created an adverse balance of trade and depleted the country's foreign currency reserves. American aid, running at about $2.5 billion per annum, was frittered away on services, subsidies, lavish government spending and the building of new settlements on the West Bank, leaving a negligible amount for investment. It was inevitable, perhaps, that the Likud should try to lay the blame for this appalling state of affairs at the door of its predecessors in power. Blaming your opponents for the consequences of your own ill-considered actions is, after all, an old demagogic ploy. But the inescapable truth is that it was the Likud Ministers themselves who, through a combination of opportunism, ignorance and ineptitude, plunged the country into the most acute economic crisis of its entire history. Begin himself knew little and cared less about the economic facts of life, reserving his attention for matters of 'high policy.' But as Prime Minister, he cannot escape responsibility for the economic disaster over which he presided. Far from being the victim of Labour's legacy, it was he who played fast and loose with the national economy and demonstrated in the process the woeful inadequacy of free enterprise and the operation of free market forces in coping with Israel's peculiar economic problems.

In discussions of Begin's record in foreign affairs, the peace with Egypt usually heads the list of achievements. It is arguable, however, that Begin did not attain the peace with Egypt; he missed it. He paid the full price in order to secure for his country the peace agreement with Egypt, but he did not bring home the fruits of peace, at any rate, not the fruits for which most Israelis had been yearning. Characteristically, Begin the lawyer, the stickler for formalities, spent weeks on end haggling over every comma in the peace treaty with Egypt. But once the treaty was signed and the Nobel peace prize collected, he seemed to lose interest and personally made very little effort to further the process of normalisation between the two countries. Having planted the seed of peace, he was neither assiduous nor imaginative in cultivating it and trying to bring it to full fruition. It is true that the peace process could not have got under way at all had Begin not been prepared to pay for it by effecting a complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the dismantling of Jewish settlements there. It is also highly unlikely that any Labour Party leader would have been prepared to pay such a price. That is to Begin's eternal credit.

But from the very start, a wide gulf lay between President Sadat's glowing vision of dismantling the psychological barriers that made up the conflict and moving towards comprehensive peace in the Middle East and

Begin's limited vision of a separate peace with Egypt that would leave Israel free to assert her supremacy over the rest of the Arab world. Begin made the most of the freedom of action afforded by Egypt's disengagement from the conflict: he annexed the Golan Heights, bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor and stepped up the fight against the Palestinian people. Worst of all, he marched on Beirut to enthrone Christians over Moslems and thereby dealt a body blow to the newly-born and fragile peace agreement with the first Moslem state. If the peace with Egypt is a cold peace and the normalisation process has been frozen, the blame lies very largely at Begin's door.

It is not that Begin saw the peace with Egypt as an isolated act, whereas Sadat saw it as the first step on the long road to comprehensive peace in the region, but rather that Begin's actions appear to have been governed by a Grand Design of a very different kind. Within the framework of his Grand Design, the function of the peace with Egypt was to neutralise this most important and more powerful Arab state and thereby pave the way to the absorption of the West Bank into Greater Israel. The ultimate objective of this Grand Design was not to bring about an historical reconciliation with the Arab nations, but to realise the age-old dream of Begin's movement: the assertion of Jewish sovereignty over the whole Land of Israel.

It is his policy towards the West Bank, however, that constitutes the real test of Begin's long-term intentions and the yardstick for measuring his faithfulness to the Revisionist creed on which he was nurtured. At Camp David, Begin had agreed to 'a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority', the granting of 'full autonomy to the inhabitants', 'the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people' and a solution to the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. Begin's actions, however, cast grave doubt on the sincerity of these far-reaching commitments. The 1981 coalition agreement flatly contradicted them. It stated that Israel would assert its claim to sovereignty over all the land west of the Jordan River at the end of the transition period envisaged in the 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East' signed at Camp David. Thus it became official policy to establish a permanent and coercive jurisdiction over the 1.3 million inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza and not to negotiate a solution to the Palestinian problem as agreed at Camp David. The emptying of the autonomy concept of any political content, the creation of Jewish settlements in the most densely-populated areas of the West Bank, the expropriation of land and the displacement of its owners, and the strong-arm policy of military repression instituted by Defence Minister Sharon and Chief of Staff Eytan in the occupied territories—combined to scotch any possibility of continuing the peace process.

This remorseless policy of creeping annexation implies that Camp David was a charade, a confidence trick played by Begin on Presidents Sadat and Carter. If this was indeed the case, it would amount to a terrible indictment not only of Begin the man but of the State of Israel, because Arab critics would be able to charge that Israeli leaders had

acted in bad faith. Ironically, the claim that Begin had not meant anything of what he said at Camp David, works to rehabilitate him in the eyes of his severest domestic critics, the ideological proponents of Greater Israel. In their eyes, Begin made a mistake in handing back Sinai, but he had not done anything in practice to relinquish Jewish control over Judea and Samaria which, unlike Sinai, constitute an integral and inalienable part of their ancestral homeland, of *Eretz Yisrael.* On the contrary, Begin by his deeds, as opposed to empty promises to foreigners, increased Jewish presence and tightened Jewish control to a degree which would effectively preclude the possibility of territorial compromise. From this nationalistic perspective, Begin now appears as a worthy heir to Zeev Jabotinsky, the true standard-bearer of Revisionist Zionism and the real architect of Greater Israel.

Any pretension to a strategy of peace that Begin may have entertained until June 1982, was finally and irrevocably destroyed by the invasion of Lebanon and by the ill-conceived and ill-fated collaboration with the Christian Phalangists there. The war in Lebanon was a Revisionist war *par excellence.* It was Revisionist in its assumptions, Revisionist in its methods and, above all, Revisionist in its aims. More than any other action, therefore, it warrants Warmonger as the epitaph on Begin's premiership.

The Revisionists had always been consistent in their rejection of the central Zionist assumption of 'no alternative'. For them, there always was an alternative: the resort to brute force. Whereas Israel's previous four wars were all defensive wars based on the assumption that there was no alternative, the war in Lebanon, by Begin's own admission, was 'a war of choice.' War was not imposed on Israel by an external threat to her existence; rather, the warpath was consciously and deliberately chosen by her leaders in pursuit of power, prestige and some highly controversial political objectives.

The direct and activist approach that thrust the Israeli army into Lebanon also marked a sharp departure from the Labour movement's belief in gradualism. The theory of stages on which the whole Zionist enterprise had been built was cast aside in favour of an immediate and maximalist all-or-nothing approach. In this respect, Ariel Sharon emerged as the most fervent disciple of Zeev Jabotinsky. When the Lebanon war was in its early stages, Sharon explained to the Israeli public the difference between the Begin government and previous Israeli governments. Unlike those governments, he said, the Begin government did not move step by step but used military force in order to bring about total solutions. That is what it did in Judea in Samaria and that is what it was doing in Lebanon. 'Operation Peace for the Galilee', to use the war's official misnomer, was not designed to hit the PLO and remove it from Israel's northern border, but to destroy the organisation, militarily and politically, once and for all. Similarly, the operation was not designed simply to bring a measure of stability to Lebanon and tranquillity along Israel's northern border, but a formal peace treaty between the two countries.

It is in its ultimate aim, however, that the war in Lebanon is most clearly and fundamentally a Revisionist kind of war. The official version that 'Operation Peace for the Galilee' was intended to create a forty-kilometre-wide *cordon sanitaire* to protect Israel's northern settlements wore very thin once Israeli forces reached the outskirts of Beirut. It could not obscure any longer the undeclared but more fundamental aim of the war, which was to pave the way to Greater Israel. 'We are fighting here the battle of *Eretz Yisrael*' proclaimed chief of staff Rafael Eytan, in a rare moment of honesty, to IDF soldiers besieging Beirut. Begin and Sharon, too, whatever their differences about the actual conduct of the war, were as one in their conception that the war was necessary to the attainment of Jewish mastery over the West Bank. Their calculation was that by destroying the PLO they would break the backbone of the Palestinian national movement and bring to an end any effective resistance to the imposition of Jewish rule in the West Bank. The Sharon-Begin master-plan was not confined to ensuring lasting Israeli control over the West Bank and safeguarding the integrity of the historic homeland, though that was its core. It also aimed to make Israel the dominant power in the Levant by expelling the Syrians from Lebanon, by helping the Christian allies into power and by replacing Syria as Lebanon's main protector. In short, the idea was to use Israel's military power in order to accomplish a politico-strategic revolution round Israel's eastern and northern borders. The authors of this master-plan replaced Israel's aspiration to peaceful co-existence with her neighbours by the drive to assert Israeli hegemony over the entire region.

In support of such a war, there was not, nor could there be, consensus inside Israel. It was not the lack of consensus that caused Israeli failures in Lebanon, as the government's apologists were arguing but, on the contrary, the flawed policy of the government itself that precluded any possibility of a national consensus and bitterly divided the nation. While the grandiose political objective of the war turned out to be incapable of realisation, the cost of the war in terms of human lives, financial burden and damage to Israel's reputation, kept going up and with it the level of domestic political dissent. Clearly, this war had not gone according to plan. Wars rarely do. Begin was reported to be very depressed by the outcome of the war and especially by the heavy toll in casualties.

The legacy of the Begin era in domestic affairs consists principally of a crippled economy, acute social conflict and a gradual erosion of the country's democratic traditions. In foreign affairs, the mismanagement of relations with Egypt, the tragedy of Lebanon and the escalation of the war against the Palestinian people, stand out as Begin's greatest failures. The truth, however, is that this was not the failure of the man or of a group of politicians, but of a school of thought in Israeli politics.

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MALTA: THE OPPOSITION STANDPOINT

by John Hatherley

DR. EDDIE FENECH ADAMI, leader of Partit Nazzjonalista (Nationalist Party) since 1977, is quietly confident that he will be the next Prime Minister of Malta, after the elections due in 1986. Living up to his deserved reputation for modesty, he expresses the forecast in party terms.

'We have 51% of the vote, and this is growing,' he claimed. This is not a politician's rhetoric. The Nationalist Party gained 51% in the 1981 general elections, and I heard enough widespread criticism of Dom Mintoff during my recent visit to Malta to believe that the latter's support has dwindled considerably. One shopkeeper said to me: 'Mintoff is the Maltese Cross we have to bear.'

There were other pleasant surprises in the meeting with the quiet-mannered, stocky forty-nine-year-old leader of Malta's only opposition party. The first question I asked was what his party would do, if it gained power, to tackle Malta's problems. He answered: 'The first thing we should do is restore the Rule of Law.' My heart warmed to this. True, he is an LL.D, but the world has lawyers enough in politics who lack the insight or the stature to insist on so fundamental an aspect of democracy and freedom.

The sternest test of a man's adherence to a principle is his reaction when it affects him personally. From his reaction to events on 'Black Monday', 15th October 1979, there can be little doubt about Dr. Fenech Adami's sincerity in the matter of the rule of law.

The occasion was the 30th anniversary of Dom Mintoff's accession to leadership of the Socialist Party. A gang followed up the looting and arson of the Nationalist Club in Floriana, near Valetta (the 19th attack on it) by moving to the inland town of Birkirkara, where they ransacked and pillaged Dr. Adami's home, manhandled his wife and chased his 78-year-old mother and five children across the rooftop to safety in a neighbouring house.

His reaction was exemplary. Addressing a mass meeting the following Saturday, he said: 'Our reply to violence is not retaliation. On behalf of myself, the Party and all, I appeal to you not to retaliate or react. Go home in peace. Even if provoked, try to avoid incidents as much as possible.' He appealed to the Attorney-General to investigate and prosecute. He said that the proper reply to violence is '... insistence that those responsible for governing Malta do their duty to stop violence and charge the culprits according to law.' In a subsequent statement, the Executive Committee of his party renewed the appeal for non-violence.

He will have to educate some of his own followers. There are rumours of a split in the party between those who would meet violence with violence, and those who believe in his ethic—a split which the Nationalist Party denies. Also, I spoke to a Maltese who (though it was two decades

or so ago) recalls with sadness that when he was a member of the Young Christian Workers' Movement, there were occasions when women in black with whistles, and Church bells, disrupted Socialist Meetings. He will have to initiate the re-training of the police who, for whatever reason, do not seem energetically to have stopped or prosecuted rioters.

Although the press is free—*The Times* of Malta (its offices gutted on Black Monday) daily condemns the government—State-controlled radio Xandir Malta cannot escape the charge of diluting the voice of Church and of the Opposition party alike. Amongst other dangers to democracy which Fenech Adami sees is the general intervention by the State in every walk of life—education, Church and business especially. 'Mr. Mintoff,' he said—he always scrupulously referred to his opponent as '*Mr.* Mintoff' —is not a Socialist. He is certainly not a Social Democrat. He is his own personal, dictatorial, type of Socialist.'

Professor Ralph Dahrendorf, of the University of London, would surely agree that one of the saddest interventions has been in higher education. Called in during the early 1970s to help reorganise and modernise tertiary education, he resigned in 1978. In a Bill full of the role of the government, Mintoff's entry requirement for students is selection by committee of trades unionists and employers, with six months spent at university and six spent in employment. Those who are interested in study for its own sake, and would leave till later their choice of employment, have no place. Dahrendorf's general comment on the political scene in Malta at that time brings him closer to Fenech Adami's view: 'But as one observes events on the island—and here the university is but one example—one can see a creeping totalitarianism.' (*The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 16th June, 1978).

A step which may yet prove to be the height of folly in an overwhelmingly Roman Catholic country is the Devolution of Certain Church Property Act, passed in June 1983, whereby Mintoff may take over 70% of Church property, the proportion that is not supported by documentary title. This is not the first bout in the State versus Church conflict. Readers may remember the Blue Sisters case of 1980 when an order of nursing nuns, largely foreign, had their work permits and licences withdrawn. The High Court found that the Minister had not used his discretion within the constraints set by law. Mintoff thereupon changed the law so as to remove the possibility of judicial review of administrative discretion—surely another example of 'creeping totalitarianism,' or of the type of government that the late Lord Chief Justice Hewart warned us about years ago in Britain in *The New Despotism.*

Prior to reading law, Dr. Adami graduated in Economics, Philosophy and Classics at the University in Valetta in 1955. He has therefore a longstanding interest in economic matters. He would scrutinise and doubtless largely loosen the grip which government has on so much of the economy—in the form of price controls, a fixed high rate of exchange, government purchases of companies, and alleged corruption in the issue of licences. However, he would clearly not undertake this from a

theoretical or doctrinaire standpoint, but in the light of circumstances of the time. He feels that Malta's accumulated reserves should be used for investment (for example in attracting sophisticated electronics industry) and especially services. He is interested in the idea of a free port. When asked how Britain could help Malta, he began his reply with the need to preserve democracy: 'I should be grateful if the people of the United Kingdom would keep on eye on Malta. If democracy here declines further, we shall need the consciousness of political parties in Britain. No, not of government,' he insisted, 'but of parties.'

He suggested that the all-party parliamentary Malta Committee could send a genuinely-interested fact-finding party to the island. On economic matters, he felt that the UK could use Malta far more as a transhipment centre.

His early education, when he won many prizes, was at a Jesuit School, an authoritarian institution, engendering firmness; combined with this, he has a deep interest in social legislation, favouring worker participation and an allowance to housewives in recognition of the social value of their work in raising families. The combination makes him eminently a man of the people whatever their station as individuals.

Like the British, the Maltese are a nation maturely self-critical, with a fine sense of humour. Like the British also, they are usually unflappable, though ruthless when roused. The difference lies in the British wisdom in eschewing violence in internal political disagreement. If Eddie Fenech Adami does become prime minister, either in the 1986 general election or earlier through the erosion of Mintoff's three-vote majority in the House of Representatives, and can instil the necessary tolerance and wisdom into an inherently courteous people, and restore the rule of law, Malta could stand out as a bastion of individual freedom and democracy in the Mediterranean, small though it is (one-sixth the area of Greater London, with 330,000 inhabitants).

Vice-President of the European Movement of Christian Democrat Parties, Adami feels at home with the more progressive currents in European Christian Democracy, and his party has virtually lived down the fact that during World War II a few of its leading members were interned for pro-Italian sympathies. If he succeeds in obtaining full membership of the EEC for Malta, Fenech Adami might find it a great help in achieving reform.

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IN SEARCH OF EUROPE

by Paul Rose

A COUPLE of random Press releases by the European Commission just ten years ago reveal the unsung positive side of the EEC.

'EEC provides money to improve safety for British mining and steel workers'.

This included £400,000 for studies on chronic respiratory ailments to nine studies in the Institute of Occupational Medicine, Edinburgh, the medical services of the British Steel Corporation and the NCB.

'The Commission of the European Community is to contribute up to £18 million to the NCB towards expenditure on powered roof supports'.

By such nuts and bolts is the EEC held together, while the headlines highlight the titanic struggles of Mrs. Thatcher and President Mitterand over a Common Agricultural Policy which everyone in Britain concedes to be the major obstacle to our unagricultural nation's sense of identity with the Community. Britain's role before two catastrophic European conflicts was in ruling the seas leading to the Jewel in the Crown, the lands of the Kiwi and the Kangaroo, the fertile highlands of Kenya and a thousand islands dotting the globe. Empire Day was celebrated and pride swelled in my breast as a schoolboy contemplating a world map on which a quarter—curiously coloured red—revealed an Empire on which the sun never set.

Empire became Commonwealth and the mother country lost her sons and daughters to the winds of change sweeping Asia and then Africa. Meanwhile, far sighted European statesmen contemplating the ruins of Cologne or Coventry were thinking in a new dimension. A European idea was born—not the Europe of the Nordic racial insanity that created the obscenities of the Third Reich, fed by the insensitivity of Versailles, but a Europe resolved to use its industrial power as a counterweight to the superpowers, reducing the imbalance between the North and South. Such men as Willi Brandt, Roy Jenkins and Edward Heath have taken on the mantle in recent years. The sad fact is that even with the expansion of the six to the nine and the addition of a tenth—there is no doubt that the European Community was a factor in dismissing the legacy of the Greek Colonel's dictatorship—the idea has only touched the consciousness of this Island.

In the first European Election in 1979 only 33% turned out to vote compared with 65% in Federal Germany. Pollsters found attitudes very vague and the former hostility of the Labour Party clearly created a climate in which the elections were seen as politically peripheral. The more positive approach following the June 1983 defeat and the Alliance announcement that 'we want Britain to play a leading role in the development of the Community and in reforming the structure of existing policies' will generate greater interest this time round for the June 1984 elections.

However, huge Constituencies with single members militate against meaningful elections as we stubbornly cling to the Westminster voting system. Nevertheless, the elections and a decade in Europe give us a chance to assess how far we have come—if at all. My own view is that the vision of a Federal Europe has been lost in the national haggling as old fashioned sectional interests still take precedence over a wider view of the EEC's role. But there are advances and there can surely be no return to the mentality of the Maginot Line, tight little Islands or a Greater Germany. Alsace Lorraine is no more an issue than the War of the Roses but in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Belgium we see the need to combine the Centralised European Community with decentralisation from the Nation State. A Europe of regions would weaken Westminster, the Bundestag and the Quai D'Orsay but it would strengthen Bilbao, Cardiff, Edinburgh and Brittany. That dual movement from nationalism to regionalism and internationalism seems to remain a pipe dream although there have been slow, jerky movements towards it. The other dream that the Treaty of Yaoundé would narrow the North-South rift seems as far away as ever and yet is the most pressing problem in the Modern World alongside the threat of nuclear self-destruction.

> Now we are nine, [announced *European Community* in those early days,] an age old dream is becoming reality—the dream of a peacefully united Europe. An end to armed conflict, removal of trade barriers and a larger home market, recovery of European influence, a force for peace and an example of stable International law and order based on consent.

Those were the heady ideals. The ideals remain and within Europe itself none would deny the material progress—albeit badly stopped in its tracks by the recession—but the headlines from day to day hardly reflect a world in which those ideals prevail or in which Europe has played the role of which it is undoubtedly capable. 'Common goals yet achievement modest'! would be my end of term report on the first ten years.

The European Community, immediately prior to Britain's accession, had published a pamphlet for the layman entitled *The Common Market and the Common Man.* It asserted that it

> was never intended to be just another mutual-benefit society. Politically, its founders aimed at eventual union in the social field, they sought to provide all sections of society with a fair share in steadily rising prosperity.

Ironically, the 'Internatonalist' Labour Party was shocked at the idea, the far left regarding it as an economic counterpart to NATO and an instrument of the cold war fettering their Socialist aspirations for Britain —as if they were possible in a UK so dependent on outside economic forces. The 'little Englanders' shared with the Tory right an old-fashioned, eccentric attitude to post-Imperial Britain while others honourably saw in the Commonwealth and broader ties an alternative to a 'Rich Man's Club'. A few turned to the concept of the English speaking world—Peter Shore and Enoch Powell sharing the same aspirations in highly charged emotive calls to a patriotism that united them with such disparate elements as the Communist Party and the National Front. In that atmosphere the 'Common Man' voted two to one for the *fait accompli*

negotiated by Mr. Heath and somewhat cosmetically renegotiated by Lord Wilson.

Nevertheless, whatever the political aspirations, economic action was the means to the end and most common men and women would judge it by its economic actions. Most of them shared irritation at the bureaucracy in Brussels impinging upon everything from tachometers to skimmed milk. Politicians schemed to circumvent such attempts at standardisation to assist the vested interests of their electors. Farmers rioted in France and the European 'Democratic' group—mainly British Conservatives—has answered by a pamphlet urging greater use of lobbying campaigns to influence the Commission, the Parliament with its expanding role, the Economic and Social Committee and the Council of Ministers.

That vision of a New Europe built on the ruins and rubble of repeated European conflicts has given way to an amalgam of vested interests fighting for a place in the Brussels sun or the Strasbourg and Luxembourg revolving Parliamentary moon. It may not be the great vision of the founding fathers but it is the reality of modern democracy in the capitalist mixed economies of the West. The other irony which has hurt the protagonists of British membership is that our accession was followed by the world recession so that the German miracle, the new prosperity of France and the progress of Northern Italy which epitomised the early EEC gave way to rising unemployment and greater competition for survival in the harsh world of fuel crises and reduced demand. Only North Sea oil has saved Britain from ruin as it now imports more manufactured goods than it exports for the first time since the Industrial Revolution.

One may juggle the figures according to when one starts but the suspicion must be that membership of the Community in naked economic terms has made a scanty difference to our overall position but that resignation from the Club would be a political and economic disaster isolating Britain diplomatically and giving it the status of an offshore oil rig monarchy, albeit not a banana republic.

The European Parliament is just cutting its teeth and impinging on the public consciousness. The European Community Court of Justice has captured the imagination of many. It is the failure to expand the Social fund, Regional Development Fund Investment Bank as against the still gigantic Common Agricultural fund, and the imbalance in contributions which has discouraged some, disappointed many, and disillusioned a few advocates of membership. Reluctant acceptance of the need to be positive has replaced the outright opposition of most opponents. Thus in March 1983 Labour was still as committed to withdrawal as it was in June.

> British withdrawal from the Community is the right policy for Britain—to be completed well into the lifetime of the Parliament. That is our commitment . . . We are seeking to extricate ourselves from the Treaty of Rome and other Community treaties which place political burdens on Britain. (*New Hope for Britain*).

As the Euro-Elections approach, a radical and positive reappraisal is replacing this attitude among all but the committed diehards. It would,

however, be idle to pretend that all is healthy in the Community and there are many specific areas and priorities that call for new initiatives, accepting that many of our difficulties arise from our failure to be in at the birth and formative years. As we reach our teens our adolescent fervour could be an important factor for radical reform if we begin to think European and display our *bona fides* to nations who still regard us as less than enthusiastic for the long-term political aims of the Community. Opinion polls recently taken do show more interest in the forthcoming European Parliamentary election and more significantly a desire to increase the powers of the Parliament. After ten years, however hesitantly, we are adapting to a European Community that has been less than inspiring whether in the field of Consumer Protection or the expansion of the Social Fund.

The potential is still immense—with a population, gross-domestic product, share of world trade greater than the USA or USSR and share of aid to the Third World outstripping the USA, USSR and Japan combined.

The European movement argues that, since joining, trade with the Community has risen twice as fast as with the rest of the world and that if one adds associated countries 60% of our exports now enjoy a tariff-free market in Europe; that membership has boosted foreign investment in Europe, particularly from the US and Japan. The question one asks is whether we are merely assembling the products of their technology and losing our skills with a relatively cheap labour force. It argues that £8,000 million in grants and loans from the Community have created jobs so that some 2½ million jobs are now directly dependent upon our trade with Europe. My suspicion is that the picture might have differed only marginally had we not joined but that to leave and renege upon our neighbours would now be catastrophic.

Britain, unfairly one may argue, has been a net contributor to the EEC budget. Indeed, given our current economic and industrial decline this is manifestly unjust. However, the amount itself is of marginal significance as it constitutes about one-third of one per cent of public expenditure. As I see it, at the time of the great debate the arguments for entry were based primarily on political grounds, albeit economic isolation or the notion of a North Atlantic Association of English speaking nations. This was about as attractive to me as becoming the equivalent of Spain after the fall of its Empire. Twenty miles of water hardly separated us historically from a common European heritage and the potential for good in Western democracies outweighed the dilution of traditional British institutions. Our holier than thou attitudes and irrational fears borne of prejudice did not appeal to a generation for whom Rome, Paris, Amsterdam or Bonn were as familiar as Edinburgh, Cardiff or Exeter.

It is for this reason that I am disappointed in our failure to adopt a common electoral system for the 1984 elections, more majority voting in the Council of Ministers and an extension of the powers and involve-

ment of the European Parliament in the appointment of the Commission and decision-making generally. It is the failure to overcome national and sectional interest that troubles me; not the pooling of sovereignty that so concerned those opposed to entry. That must be a field where, according to personal inclinations, the argument that there has been insufficient or too much progress is irreconcilable. It could be justifiably asserted that what has been achieved is the right balance, by those who merely want economic co-operation.

Certainly, there is a desperate need to expand the Community's resources and activities in respect of regional and social policies. Be it Calabria or Cardiganshire, the need to inject life into the declining peripheral areas of the Community, introduce new industries and tackle those high areas of unemployment, replacing declining industrial areas with new technological industries is a first priority. The attractions of the Golden Triangle may, however, be insuperable if one leaves development to the free play of economic forces.

Clearly, in order to achieve such aims the agricultural budget must be pruned, intervention prices held back and limited to prevent the butter mountains and wine lakes. These exist side by side with the industrial decline of the North-West or Wallonia and the pollution of the air and sea by inadequate progress on environmental safeguards. The Greens have shown that the Germans have a greater concern than we have—a far cry from the traditional perception of Germans that is the legacy from the Nazi period and which most of us must admit to in our innermost consciousness.

Britain's failure to join the European monetary system is disappointing but until we have ironed out the imbalance in agricultural policy and budget contributions and achieved parity in other fields there are strong arguments for holding back. However, membership must be our aim if we are to steady exchange rates and so protect trade and jobs damaged in the past by wild and sudden fluctuations.

Again, while each member State pursues its own foreign policy, common European initiatives towards the reduction of East-West tension and various zones of conflict could play a major role in a world of super-power confrontation. If the ten speak with one voice to the USA and USSR and recognise that there are differences of emphasis and interest with US allies, then Europe can play a distinct part in diffusing tension. Mrs. Thatcher's very recent assertion of independence might be extended to a consideration of whether it really serves Europe's interests to be the repository for Cruise and Pershing missiles creating a scenario where it could become the nuclear wasteland of a war fought by proxy.

However, when it comes to the crunch one returns inevitably to the great stumbling block that separates UK interest from those whose Constituencies lie in the great farming regions of France and Germany. Our Peasants' revolt is so far in the past and farmers so small a part of our labour force that it is hard to understand the pressures on politicians where peasants and farmers can bring capital cities to chaos. The CAP

has achieved an increase in productivity, security of supply and, some would say, feather-bedding for the farmers. Yet the combination of our small agricultural sector with the extraordinarily high proportion of Community budget funds spent on it has not only produced unwanted surpluses but created tension and mutual suspicion between the UK and the largest members of the Community, France above all. Not only must spending be reduced and farmers induced to change to other products and their number reduced but there must be a counterbalance. This means expanded Regional and Social funds, energy conservation, industrial training programmes, industrial innovation with a special attack on unemployment, particularly among young people, and areas dependent upon declining industries. By the same token by widening the sources of funds and creating greater parity in budget contributions, a harmony will be achieved that will spill over into the political and foreign policy field.

Facts, figures and statistics can be trotted out to show how membership of the EEC has aided our growth rate, exports and investment and better conditions of work and citizens' rights. The fact is that there has been progress and we are still in infancy. As we reach our teens and twenties after cutting our teeth and preparing for our 11+, I believe that the need for the European dimension will have gained universal acceptance. The only argument will be the framework in which it is to develop and how fast we leave behind old-fashioned notions and recognise our inter-dependence and common interests rather than the petty squabbling over the CAP and budget contribution. We might do well to remember the exciting and visionary aims of those who first founded the Community, rather than to continue being bogged down in detail.

The June issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *East West Relations Since D-Day, June 1944* by Philip Towle, *Zimbabwe: After Four Years of Independence* by Stephen Chan, *Glue-sniffing: a Tragic Social Phenomenon* by Ludwig Lowenstein, *Venetian Music* by Fiona Maddocks and *Cinema: a Quarterly Review* by David Shipman (held over from the May issue).

OBERAMMERGAU'S 350th ANNIVERSARY

by Geoffrey Humphrys

MANY people from Britain and elsewhere will be visiting the delightful West German mountain village of Oberammergau during the summer months of 1984. The chief attraction will be the now world famous *Passionsspiele* or Passion Play. Normally it is only produced every ten years and the last production was in 1980. But it was first produced in 1634, so there are to be special performances this year from May to September to mark the 350th anniversary.

This means that once again the 4,000 inhabitants of Oberammergau will adjust their daily lives to the demanding needs of the *Passionsspiele* production. It will bring at least half a million visitors from all over the world to the village overlooked by the 5,300 feet Mount Kofel, so will require a major task of readjustment for all concerned.

The exercise is one to which most of the villagers are accustomed. Indeed, it is a repetitive thread which has run through most of their lives, for producing the *Passionsspiele* is an inborn Oberammergau tradition calling for a communal effort which involves almost everyone in some way or other. The response is never lacking.

It all came about in October 1633, when the Parish Council and a Council of Elders sought a way of ridding their village of the dreaded plague known as the Black Death. At this time there were about 1,560 inhabitants and over 20 per cent had died of the pestilence. The village administrators made a vow before the Cross in the Parish church, that to obtain's God's mercy they would produce a representation of the sufferings and death of Jesus Christ, and repeat it every ten years.

A chronicler of the time recorded that although when the vow was made many villagers had the dreaded marks of the plague on their bodies, not another death from the Black Plague occurred. So between Easter and Pentecost in 1634, a single performance of a Passion Play with about eighty participants was presented before the Cross of the Vow in the Parish church. As good as their word, the people of Oberammergau have continued to honour the pledge of their ancestors ever since.

Of course, in 350 years, there have been many changes. The oldest surviving Play was written in 1662. Through the decades there were adjustments to the length and content of the text, together with the introduction of music and singers. In 1811, however, the local parish priest, Father Weis, produced an entirely new prose text and schoolmaster Rochus Dedler composed new Passion music. All the subsequent alterations to make the *Passionsspiele* suitable for modern, world-wide audiences have been around the core established by the Weis-Dedler combination.

The first Play was no doubt only for Oberammergau audiences, but subsequent productions attracted people from nearby villages. It soon developed to the extent that the church could not accommodate all who wished to see it, so it was produced in the open in 1680 and, to a certain

extent, has been ever since.

At a time when pilgrimages were at their height the *Passionsspiele* attracted many more observers, so that extra performances were given. Even so, until 1790, all who came to see the performances had to travel on foot, for no form of vehicle could possibly travel across the mountains.

In 1900, when 46 performances were given, the primitive, tent-like erections which sheltered observers were superseded by a large audience hall, on the site of the present auditorium. Today, each performance is watched by just over 4,000 people, and the middle stage and front stage are still open to the sky and the mountains.

The Play lasts for five and a half hours in two sessions, and once started it continues regardless of bad weather. This is why all costumes are duplicated and the orchestra pit can be retracted beneath the stage.

The open air stage areas are made of ferro-concrete and weather-resistant stone material. On these the Last Supper, the Crucifixion and other 'Living Tableaux' Biblical scenes are presented. The streets of Jerusalem, the houses of Pontius Pilate and Caiaphas appear on the side stages which are enclosed in slanting round-arched arcades.

Behind the stage are the large properties which have been used for many Play periods—the table and stools for the Last Supper and the Cross on which Jesus has to hang for twenty minutes.

Adjoining the massive stage area is the wardrobe building. Here the performers change and await their entry cues. The various costumes for Jesus, the Magi, the Apostles, Roman soldiers and Jewish citizens are in separate areas.

One glance at all the complexities of lighting and stage manipulation is enough to see what an enormous undertaking it is to present each performance. This is why almost everyone in Oberammergau has to be involved. Quite apart from those who actually appear on the stage, there are a host of people concerned with lighting, scene shifting, costumes, make-up, staffing the theatre and general administration. Then, of course, there are all the services required by the enormous influx of visitors from May to September.

Throughout the village, during the Play periods, everyone works together in the common fulfilment of honouring the tradition which began in 1634. No one can appear in the Play unless they were born in Oberammergau or have lived there for at least ten years.

There has never been any financial benefit in taking part, and during the Play periods all normal work and leisure takes second place to ensuring not only that the Play goes on, but that everything is done to maintain a superlative standard of performance. It is this spirit which has aroused astonishment and admiration all over the world. As a result, kings and commoners alike have declared that seeing a performance of the *Passionsspiele* is a never-to-be-forgotten experience.

Some Oberammergau families have had members involved in consecutive productions for more than two centuries. Some individual inhabitants have appeared in productions each decade throughout their lives. They

start off as children in crowd scenes; then, as they grow up, play minor speaking roles, become understudies for more important roles, perhaps play such roles, and then return to the crowd scenes in their old age.

During the Play period it is possible to meet a key character walking through the village, as a hotel receptionist, a shop assistant, at the Wellenberg alpine swimming pool, driving a taxi, carving a wooden statue or painting an alfresco picture on a housefront. The cast of the *Passionsspiele* is drawn from the broad spectrum of Oberammergau life.

Even so, appearing in the Play is not easy or by any means an automatic choice. Initially, it stems from the recommendation of the producer, then is finalised by secret ballot among the Passion Play Committee. Thus, all speaking parts are voted for, and this applies to the two directors of the Passion music, the chorus leader, the musicians and singers. Yet, in spite of the many hours of free time which have to be sacrificed for rehearsals and music practices, all the performers regard taking part as a great honour which provides them with a personal sense of fulfilment.

The 1984 production will be the 38th Play period and it is bound to be an outstanding success, for so much expertise has been gained over the centuries. Visiting Oberammergau to see the 350th anniversary *Passionsspiele* will be a feature of holiday planning among tour promoters. Yet the course of the productions over the years has not always been smooth.

In 1634 the Thirty Years' War was still raging in Bavaria. In 1770 the Play was banned and a revised text had to be prepared. In 1800 three performances had to be cancelled due to the invasion of the French Army. The First World War robbed Oberammergau of seventy persons vitally concerned with the *Passionsspiele*, so that it was not produced again until 1922. World War II prevented production in 1940. But in 1950 a new production achieved even greater popularity.

Today's success is largely due to audiences coming in organised parties from all over the world. They travel to Oberammergau in air-conditioned coaches; the village now has its own railway station and, since 1960, a regular system of air travel from Munich-Riem.

Yet the spirit in which the *Passionsspiele* is produced remains unchanged. The present population of Oberammergau still consider themselves bound by the commitment of their ancestors made in 1633. Before all the world they will endeavor to make the sufferings of Jesus Christ known and understood by all classes of society. In the past this has included kings, representatives of most European royal families, Presidents of the USA, leading politicians, writers, artists, scientists and ordinary people of the whole world. Today, from the producer downwards, all regard their participation as a contribution to the Christian cause of world peace and reconciliation.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORDIC SECURITY

by Clive Archer

SINCE mid-summer 1983 the Nordic states have been suffering from the tension in East-West relations. Popular opinion against nuclear weapons has made itself felt in both Denmark and Norway and the governments of Sweden and Finland have continued their efforts to ameliorate the effects of a renewed Cold War in Europe. The new government in Iceland has confirmed that country's security policy whilst the centre-right administration in Denmark, re-elected in January of this year, is still hamstrung by a lack of an overall parliamentary majority. As mentioned in my August 1983 article in *Contemporary Review* (No. 1411 Vol. 243), the Social Democrats in Denmark and the Labour Party in Norway have attempted to distance themselves from the consequences of NATO's 'Dual Track' decision which led to Cruise and Pershing II missiles coming to Europe.

In June 1983 the Norwegian minority Conservative government, elected in September 1981, broadened its base to include the Centre and Christian Peoples' Parties. The new government has continued to reinforce the insurance aspects of its security which is based on NATO membership. In September, the government announced that their 1984 Defence Budget would be 3.5 per cent greater in real terms than that of 1983, and an agreement was signed with West Germany on the joint development of six submarines for the Norwegian navy. At the same time as making dispositions for their own forces, the Norwegians were firming up Allied commitments to their defence. The Canadians agreed in principle to pre-position ammunition and equipment for one of the battalions of the Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) brigade which is earmarked for service in Norway in times of crisis or war. Preparations were also being made for the pre-stocking of materiel in Trøndelag for the US Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). Meanwhile, the Norwegians were visited in August by US Navy Secretary John Lehmann who considered that 'an attack on Finnmark is the same as an attack on Washington' and warned that 'we will not leave the Norwegian Sea to the Russians'.

One effect of the US Administration's attitude has been to edge the Norwegian Labour Party away from the defence consensus which has existed in Norway since 1949. The Party has become increasingly worried by fears of conflict resulting from rearmament in Europe and by the general deterioration of East-West relations which is partly blamed on the rhetoric of the Reagan Administration. Opposition to the government's defence policy has mainly centred around criticism of the emplacement of Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. Though these nuclear armaments will not be going to Norway (which anyhow prohibits such weapons being placed on its soil), the Norwegian centre-right government has supported deployment in other NATO countries.

In November 1983 the Labour Party's executive committee came out

against the siting of these missiles in Europe and, at the end of that month, pressed the issue to a parliamentary vote. Although they got the support of the left-wing Socialist Left Party and of five government MPs, the Labour Party failed by one vote to get their resolution passed—a salutary jolt for a government which had already suffered electoral reverses in the September local elections and which faces opinion polls showing 60 per cent of the Norwegian electorate against missile deployment.

The Norwegian government has continued its policy of reassuring the Soviets that there is no direct threat to their strategic bases in the Kola Peninsula from Norway. Norwegian administrations can emphasise peaceful relations with the Soviet Union by seeking agreement on common resources issues, especially those in the seas offshore from their mutual northern frontier. The maritime boundary in this area is disputed by the two countries and earlier last summer the Soviet Union started drilling in the Barents Sea practically on the border of the contested area. This has worried the Norwegians as it is possible that hydrocarbons extracted from such a well could come from a reservoir stretching into the area claimed by Norway, and also the drilling activity might have adverse effects on fisheries. Finally, the Soviet move came only a couple of months after they had signed a contract for Norwegian Petroleum Consultants to prepare a master oil-prospecting plan for the Barents Sea. However, this incident did not stop the two countries from reaching their annual agreement on fisheries in the Barents Sea in November 1983. This sets the quota of cod and capelin both sides can fish in a 'grey zone' which overlaps the disputed maritime border area.

The position of the Danish centre-right government is even more precarious than its Norwegian counterpart. A four-party coalition of Conservatives, Liberals, Centre Democrats and the Christian Peoples' Party took over from the Social Democrats in September 1982 but depended for its parliamentary majority on the support of the maverick anti-tax Progress Party and the small Radical Liberal Party. Whilst this represented a nominal non-socialist majority, the practice was made more difficult by the Radical's reservations on security policy, the jailing of the Progress Party's leader, Mogens Glistrup, on tax fraud charges and the subsequent fragmentation of that party.

During 1983 the Social Democrats started to embarrass the government on the defence issue. From the vantage point of the opposition benches, Social Democrat spokesmen called on the government to work against the emplacement of Cruise and Pershing II missiles and for a more active disarmament policy. On this question they had the support of the Radical Liberals whose votes could have caused a government defeat.

The government got round this problem in May 1983 by abstaining in a vote on a somewhat mildly critical Social Democrat parliamentary resolution on the INF missiles. The government's position was made more difficult by the knowledge that a large majority of the Danish voters (58 per cent in one poll) were against these missiles, even though an even

larger number (69 per cent) favoured NATO membership.

As the INF negotiations dragged on in Geneva and the date for the missiles' arrival in Western Europe came closer, so the Social Democrats pressed home their point. In November 1983, again supported by the Radical Liberals, they pushed through a parliamentary resolution requiring the Danish government to work for the creation of a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. The government parties abstained. On 1st December they returned to the INF issue, requiring the government to make clear to the forthcoming NATO Ministerial meeting Danish opposition to the placing of Cruise and Pershing II in Western Europe. The Social Democrat parliamentary resolution further required the government to work for the early resumption of negotiations over these missiles and the combining of START and INF talks. On this issue the government parties took a stand and were defeated by the combined forces of left-wing socialists, Social Democrats and Radical Liberals. The Danish Foreign Minister had to make his parliament's position clear at the NATO Foreign Ministers' gathering and Denmark joined Greece and Spain as a 'footnote country' in NATO communiques. After this humiliation and after disagreements with the Radicals and Progress Party on economic questions, the Conservative Prime Minister, Poul Schlüter, called an election for 10 January, 1984. The result represented a triumph for the Conservatives who substantially raised their parliamentary representation, and a disaster for the Centre Democrats and the Progress Party. However, the shift of seats from socialist to non-socialist parties was minimal and the Radical Liberals increased their representation thereby entrenching their crucial balancing position on security questions. It was noticeable that even before the results were known, Mr. Schlüter had promised that he would not try to reverse the 1983 parliamentary resolutions on INF and a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

Concern about heightening tension in Europe has been shown among government circles in both Sweden and Finland. In May 1983 President Koivisto of Finland took up the call for a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone, a proposal originally advanced by his predecessor, President Kekkonen, twenty years earlier. His message was echoed the following month by the Social Democrat premier of Sweden, Olof Palme, who was harshly critical of the ability of the two superpowers to bring security to Europe. Palme considered it to be left to European countries themselves, especially 'the small and medium-sized states' to take the initiative. Whilst the idea of a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone has not yet been turned into practical results, the Swedes and the Finns have been involved in some positive moves in international security. The Conference on Security and Confidence-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which opened on 17 January, 1984 and which brought together all the European states as well as the USA and the USSR, was prepared for in Helsinki at the end of 1983. The Finnish and Swedish governments were active at the Madrid meeting of the CSCE (from which the Stockholm Conference sprang) and were prominent members of the

Neutral and Non-Aligned Group which helped prevent the breakdown of the Madrid talks.

At the opening of the Stockholm Conference, Mr. Palme predicted 'a cautious melting, or perhaps a slow thaw in East-West relations', though he did not foresee any major improvement. The Swedes and the other Scandinavians are hoping that Mr. Palme's 'realistic optimism' is valid and that the Stockholm meeting will at least produce some modest results to reverse the trend towards confrontation between the superpowers. At the same time as talking arms control and disarmament, both the Finnish and Swedish governments have been building up their own defences. After previous incidents involving foreign submarines intruding into Swedish territorial waters—including the running aground of a Soviet Whisky-class submarine off Karlskrona naval base—the Swedish military and government have made efforts to reassure the public about Sweden's ability to defend itself. The defence budget has been increased to expand anti-submarine warfare, though many of the measures will not be operative before 1984/5. In December the Swedish parliament approved an appropriation of £22 million, the first part of a proposed £100 million plan to combat the submarine menace to Sweden's shores. The Swedish supreme Commander, General Lennart Ljung, reported sixty-three 'strong indications' of submarine intrusion from June to November 1983 with three of these being 'incontravertible'. The first figure is eleven more than the total figure for 1982 and, as NATO involvement has been ruled out, it must be assumed that the Soviet Union and its allies are continuing their underwater trespassing in Swedish waters. This is particularly worrying for Mr. Palme who, as host of the Stockholm Conference, cannot afford a diplomatic row with the Soviet bloc.

Finland has also been looking to its defences. The concern here has been less with interference from submarines (though some have apparently strayed into Finnish waters) than with the threat from Cruise missiles. At the end of 1983 the Finnish government announced that it was to spend some £60 million on the wherewithal to track and intercept low-flying missiles crossing Finnish territory. This was seen as a response by Finland to some Soviet expressions of doubt about their western neighbour's ability to prevent Cruise missiles from violating its airspace and neutrality. Though the generation of Cruise missiles presently being placed in Western Europe is unlikely to cross Finnish territory, it is possible that later versions based off the north coast of Norway could track across Finland.

June 1983 saw Iceland's fifteenth government since the establishment of the Republic in 1944. The two largest parties, the conservative Independence Party and the liberal Progressive Party, formed a coalition that was strong enough to face up to Iceland's chronic economic problems including that of an inflation rate of up to 100 per cent. The creation of this government has had consequences for Iceland's security policy as well as for its economic well-being. Previous governments have often depended for their existence on the anti-NATO left-wing Peoples' Alliance. Whilst

this party has never persuaded the other parties to distance themselves from the Atlantic Alliance, let alone leave it, they have managed to veto any modernisation of the US Iceland Defence Force.

By August 1983 the new coalition, consisting of two pro-NATO parties, started discussions on a modernisation programme. This involved the re-equipping of the US Distant Early Warning (DEW) line stations in Iceland. Already an agreement had been signed with the United States in July for the building of a new civilian terminal at Keflavik airport and the taking over by the US of the existing terminal for exclusive military use. In a parliamentary debate on these topics the new government re-iterated Iceland's policy of not deploying missiles in that country.

This policy of emphasising constraint at the same time as contributing something to NATO's common defence—in the form of infrastructure—seems to have the approval of Icelandic public opinion. An opinion poll taken in November 1983 showed 62 per cent to be in favour of Icelandic membership of NATO and only 17 per cent against. 52 per cent supported the presence of the US Iceland Defence Force with 30 per cent against it—a reflection of residual nationalist feeling against a 'foreign' entity on Icelandic soil.

Iceland's rather larger neighbouring North Atlantic island—Greenland—has also witnessed recent political developments that could impinge on its security position. In April 1983 the Greenland Home Rule assembly had its second general election. The moderate left ruling party, Siumut, ended up with the same number of seats—twelve—as the centrist opposition party, Atassut. A left-socialist group, Inuit Ataqatigiit, with two seats, held the balance and decided to plump for a continuation of the Siumut government under Pastor Jonathan Motzfeldt. The Greenlandic assembly and administration is limited in its authority to the control of certain policies—social, welfare, education, fisheries, cultural, for example—whilst defence, foreign and economic policies are still the concern of the Danish government in Copenhagen. So when the Greenlanders in February 1982 voted by a narrow margin to come out of the European Community, it was Denmark that had to initiate negotiations in Brussels as a result. The Greenlandic election means that the moderately anti-European Community Siumut party is in power with the support of the rabidly anti-Community Iniut party. The new government announced that if negotiations for withdrawal were not concluded satisfactorily, Greenland would pull out of the EC unilaterally, thereby producing a crisis for Denmark and the European Community.

The United States has an important base in Greenland—Thule—and plans were in hand by the middle of last year for a £45 million improvement. Previously, the existence of this base had not been criticised by Greenlanders but the fear that it might become part of President Reagan's 'Star Wars' system has created concern. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference, which links eskimo representatives from Greenland, Canada and Alaska, protested at the development both because of the supposed effects on Thule's environment and because of the fear that the Arctic was

becoming a superpower battleground. It was possible that the 'base issue' could have become a problem for the Danish and American governments had the Greenlanders felt let down by Copenhagen or frustrated by the European Community over their plans to leave the Community. As yet, the Greenlandic administration has shown a pragmatic attitude towards the question of developing the Thule base. Whether they like it or not, the Greenlanders and the Icelanders are becoming drawn into a superpower confrontation that is now moving further into the northernmost part of the Atlantic: last year saw clear signs of Soviet submarine activity along the coastline of both Greenland and Iceland.

In conclusion, all the Nordic countries have been bringing their security policies up to date by strengthening their military postures and, in the case of Denmark, Iceland and Norway, by entrenching their allies' commitment to their defence. At the same time, these states have been anxious to reassure the Soviet Union of their peaceful intentions and have sought to encourage military disengagement between the two blocs. With the New Cold War between the USA and the USSR, the Nordic states have been forced to make invidious choices. More than ever since 1949, there has been disagreement in these countries about whether—and how—defences should be improved, and about the balance between insurance and reassurance in the security policies of the Nordic states.

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SHAKESPEARE AS AUTOBIOGRAPHER

by A. L. Rowse

SHAKESPEARE is the most autobiographical of all the Elizabethan dramatists, the only one to write his autobiography—in the Sonnets, during the most crucial years in his life, 1592, 1593, 1594/5. Yet no one has grasped the significance of this or noticed its importance. In consequence, people go on repeating that we do not know much about him. In fact, we know more about him than about any other Elizabethan dramatist. In the Elizabethan age, people were not much interested in the life of mere writers, let alone theatre folk. Elizabethans were interested in the lives of grandees, royal personages and nobles, or people in public life, such as bishops or controversial clerics, Puritans or Jesuits.

It is not surprising that we should know so much about William Shakespeare, for his father was a leading figure at Stratford, alderman, then bailiff (mayor) of the town; his mother an Arden, a small heiress owning a bit of property, fairly certainly a sprig of yeomen-gentry. William was always conscious of his gentility, and behaved like a gentleman—unlike the theatre people in general or the denizens of literary Bohemia.

Again, not surprisingly for so autobiographical a writer, his work is full of personal references, and to places and people of the time, topical events, personal tastes and interests, his values and reflections. A self-portrait of him can be built up from his work in his own words.

One can trace Shakespeare's grammar school education—there is more about it in the plays than with any other. His earliest plays are out of the grammar school stable—Plautus, Ovid, Seneca. Then, country life—there is the enthusiasm for sports, with a noticeable fixation on deer-hunting in the early plays. Most numerous are the revealing references to the stage and acting from the actor's point of view, and the best dramatic criticism of the age comes from him as producer in *Hamlet*.

We are given the intimate portrait of his youthful patron, Southampton—recognisable in every detail, personal characteristics and circumstances—in the Sonnets. Marlowe is hardly less recognisable, that 'able spirit', that 'worthier pen', the veritable circumstances of his most famous play, *Dr. Faustus*, described in the valedictory Sonnet 86 upon his death in 1593. The character and circumstances of the dark young mistress are given. We are told practically everything about her, except her name: musical, down on her luck, haughty and tyrannical, promiscuous and of an ill-reputation, quite well-known. This was completely factual now we know that she was the discarded mistress of the Lord Chamberlain, Patron of Shakespeare's Company—one could hardly get closer—Emilia Lanier, née Bassano.

It all bears out Ben Jonson's tribute to him as of an open and free, candid nature. He did not write the Sonnets to create any mystery; and he did not publish them, they were far too near the bone. They were not published until years later by the publisher T.T., Thomas Thorp, who had

got the manuscript from a W.H., who is also now identified.

Shakespeare was familiar with Court life from constant performances there before Elizabeth I and James I. We find several references to Essex, Southampton's friend, and a tell-tale caricature of Don Antonio Pérez, Philip II's ex-Secretary, then resident at Essex House, as Don Armado in *Love's Labour's Lost.* We are given four or five tributes each to Elizabeth I and James I; and at least a score of references to contemporary events, familiar to Elizabethan historians, as well as to the places he knew—Warwickshire, the Cotswolds, Oxford, London.

Altogether, he is more evident in his own work than other Elizabethan dramatists, and everything he tells us about himself is corroborated by all that we are told about him from outside. It is all of a piece. Where is the difficulty? Except, of course, in ordinary people's imperceptiveness. It was Henry James who said: 'Nobody ever understands *any*thing'.

Much unnecessary confusion is due to the flowery language of Thomas Thorp's dedication of the Sonnets, when he acquired the manuscript of them from Mr. W.H. *So Mr. W.H. was his man, not Shakespeare's.* Yet people have gone on mistakenly assuming that Mr. W.H. was the young Lord referred to as such all through the Sonnets—Shakespeare's obvious Lord, his patron. Why have people been so obtuse? Simply because, as Agatha Christie (who was clever enough to see all this) used to say to me: 'People always miss the significance of the obvious.'

Hundreds of superfluous books and articles have been written searching for a W.H. who looked like the young Lord in the Sonnets, some of them well-known scholars like E. K. Chambers and Dover Wilson, who didn't see the obvious point that W.H. was Thorp's man, not Shakespeare's. In Thorp the publisher's dedication there is only one difficulty—*Mr.* W.H. Now, everyone should realise that no Lord could be addressed as Mr. Yet E. K. Chambers and Dover Wilson, followed by scores of lesser intelligences, looked round for some lord, under the misapprehension that W.H. was Shakespeare's man.

This is where the historian's knowledge of the Elizabethan age is indispensible. In those days, it was quite regular to refer to a knight as Mr., never a lord, any more than you could today. It was regular social usage to refer to Sir Francis Bacon as Master Bacon; Southampton's mother, the Countess, refers to her second husband, Sir Thomas Heneage, as Mr. Heneage—respectful, but not pompous. Quite recently, I learned, from the History of Parliament's volumes on the Elizabethan House of Commons, that it was the rule in Parliament to refer to knights as Mr., not by their titles.

I knew all along that this was the usual form, and that Mr. W.H. was someone in Southampton's circle who had obtained the manuscript for the publisher. The obvious person was the Countess's third husband, Sir William Harvey, to whom she left all her household goods and chattels when she died in 1607. Harvey was a young man who next year, 1608, married a young wife, Cordelia Annesley. This is why Thorp, in 1609, wishes him 'all happiness, and that eternity promised by our ever-living poet'—the eternity of at last having children and carrying on the family

to posterity, as Shakespeare had promised young Southampton years before in the Sonnets if he would marry and do his duty by the family.

It is all quite clear: 1607, when Southampton's mother died; 1608, when Sir William Harvey married a young wife; 1609, when Thorp got the Sonnets from him and published them. The dates are all corroborative, in keeping with the facts and with the relationship between the poet and his young patron—about whom a great deal is known independently, all of it confirmed by what Shakespeare tells us so candidly in the Sonnets. Here again one needs a knowledge of the Elizabethan age to understand properly the flowery, deferential language. That they are patronage poems, written by a poet in the course of duty to his patron, is made clear again and again; it was the regular Renaissance way to write in such language—a poet addressed the Queen as a semi-deity, a goddess.

Young Southampton, with his long locks, was as beautiful as a girl; we know that he was ambivalent, not yet settled on the opposite sex—one reason why he would not marry. Shakespeare tells us clearly that he was not at all interested in the youth sexually:

> And for a woman wert thou first created,
> Till Nature, as she wrought thee, fell a-doting,
> And by addition me of thee defeated,
> By adding one thing to my purpose nothing.
> But since she pricked thee out for women's pleasure
> Mine be thy love, and thy love's use their treasure.

All perfectly clear: the youth has a prick, which doesn't interest the poet; women can have that, let the poet have his love, which is not at all sexual.

When Shakespeare publicly dedicated *The Rape of Lucrece* to his young Lord the following year, 1594, he wrote: 'The love I dedicate to your lordship is without end.' He would never have written this if it had been a homosexual love; everything shows throughout his work that Shakespeare was enthusiastically heterosexual. Both Marlowe and Bacon were known homosexuals, Shakespeare the reverse. The facts of his life show him a normal family man, who had got his girl with child at eighteen and married her when five months pregnant.

The Sonnets about the young, dark-eyed, black-haired mistress show how responsive he was to women, and that he couldn't help himself where she was concerned, though he knew (and other people knew, too) that she was a bad lot. Once more he is all too open and candid, telling us everything except her name. Simon Forman's information, in the Bodleian, enabled me to identify her as the discarded mistress of Lord Chamberlain Hunsdon, patron of the Company; daughter of Baptista Bassano, one of the Queen's Italian musicians.

Brought up in the vicinity of the Court by the Countess of Kent, Emilia was well educated and turned out to be a good poet herself. When Thorp published the Sonnets in 1609, with their all too real portrait of her, she was enraged and immediately announced the publication of her long religious poem, *Salve Deus, Rex Judaeorum*, with its dedicatory poems to James I's Queen, Princess Elizabeth, and a number of countesses, some of whom she knew. But she inserted a flaming prose reply directed against men for defaming women.

We must remember that Shakespeare was not responsible for publishing the Sonnets, also that those candid sonnets were not written to the young lady herself, but to his patron. They served partly to warn the youth against getting into her clutches; for she naturally made a pass at him, a much better bet, rich, unmarried young peer of her own age, than an impecunious actor-poet, however charming, years older and with a family to maintain at Stratford.

That is the story: a triangular affair, which grievously worried the poet, who felt responsible for entangling his young patron with a seductive, disreputable, promiscuous woman, who might give him a venereal infection—deplorable as his first introduction to *hetero* sex. The whole situation, psychologically subtle as it is, is something that the Victorians and Victorian-minded professors cannot take, or even understand. It is quite outside their range of experience and imagination. Today, we are in a much better position to understand it all.

For Shakespeare, a strongly sexed man hopelessly subjugated by a younger woman—and superior socially, though her status was equivocal —was a humiliating experience: he says at the time that it drove him 'frantic-mad'. Some years later, among the disillusioned references to sex in *King Lear*, we suddenly come upon these tell-tale sentiments:

> Let not the creaking of shoes, nor the rustling of
> silks betray thy poor heart to woman.

Everyone of any perceptiveness knows the sexual suggestiveness of women's shoes, tap-tapping (Elizabeth Bowen notices it in a novel), as well as the *frou-frou* of women's skirts. Women know it as a weapon in the sex war, though insensitive professors may not. This links up with another such tell-tale reference:

> Not so young, sir, to love a woman for singing.

When I first discovered who the extraordinary young woman of the Sonnets was, an Eng. Lit. don at Oxford, who should have known better, said: 'But there were hundreds of whores in Elizabethan London.' How imperceptive! Emilia, though promiscuous, was not one of those hundreds; she had been the mistress of the Lord Chamberlain, the Queen's first cousin; well-educated and musical, brought up on the margin of the Court, and a married lady, socially superior to an actor: a strong personality, temperamental and undependable, she took it out of him and eventually dismissed him.

Professor Roger Prior, who has recognised her identity all along, thinks that the Bassanos were Italian Jews—as was Southampton's tutor, Florio. He considers *The Merchant of Venice*, with its Italian-Jewish theme, in the light of this: Shakespeare knew what he was writing about. Another aspect of Emilia Lanier is even more remarkable: her poem shows her as not only the best woman-poet of the time (except for Sir Philip Sidney's sister), but a unique feminist, ardent and convinced, with a contempt for menfolk. She had had a disillusioning experience at their hands. When her poem came out, William Shakespeare kept silence—he had plenty to keep silent about. Neither her poem nor the Sonnets were reprinted, and that is a suspicious fact. Southampton was by this time a leading figure in

government, Shakespeare the most famous dramatist of the day: neither of them would want the too candid, too near the bone story of their past relationships brought up again years afterwards.

I have recently been able to show how much light *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* throws upon the triangular relationship. The theme of the play is the conflict between the claims of friendship against love; and the two men are in love with the same woman, Silvia. One of the friends, Proteus, behaves badly and betrays his friend, Valentine. At the end, he is found out and repents with tears—not only as Southampton had done in the Sonnets, but in practically the same language. Thereupon Valentine forgives him,

> And that my love may appear plain and free,
> All that was mine in Silvia I give thee.

All critics have found this improbable and unconvincing; not one of them has had the perception to see that it was precisely what happened between the poet and his patron: Shakespeare naturally had to get out of the way for his young Lord . . .

> Take all my loves, my love, yea, take them all.

All the commentators have noticed that the play has no known source: naturally not, for the whole theme and situation are autobiographical.

We are given a fascinating insight into what Shakespeare thought about himself and his young patron in the first scene. Proteus says, in the very language of Sonnet 35:

> Yet writers say, as in the sweetest bud
> The eating canker dwells, so eating love
> Inhabits in the finest wits of all.

That is what William Shakespeare thought of himself; 'wit', to Elizabethans, meant intelligence in general, as well as wit specifically. To this, Valentine, i.e. Shakespeare, reproaches young Proteus—Southampton:

> And writers say, as the most forward bud
> Is eaten by the canker ere it blow
> Even so by love the young and tender wit
> Is turned to folly, blasting in the bud,
> Losing his verdure even in the prime,
> And all the fair effects of future hopes.

Who are the *writers* who say just that? Shakespeare is referring to himself. It is precisely what he had warned his young friend against, entangling himself with Emilia, losing both freshness, risking disease, disappointing people of his early promise. Sonnet 35 says:

> No more be grieved at that which thou hast done
> For . . . loathsome canker lives in sweetest bud.

Sonnets 33 and 34 describe in detail the situation between Shakespeare and Southampton in relation to Emilia which is developed in the play.

There is no difficulty with the equally autobiographical character of *Love's Labour's Lost*. Both plays spring from the Southampton circle and belong to 1593, as do the related Sonnets. The second play again has no outside source: it is a skit on the early Southampton theme of foregoing the society of women. Shakespeare thought this to be nonsense, and the first section of the Sonnets was devoted to urging him to marry.

Everybody has noticed that Berowne expresses Shakespeare's point of view, all in favour of women, and that his dark girl is described in practically the same words as is his dark mistress in the Sonnets, i.e. Berowne is Shakespeare, and Rosaline is his Emilia. But no one has had the insight to see that the King is, of course, Southampton, and that when the dark Rosaline describes Berowne it is Shakespeare laughing at himself.

> a merrier man . . .
> I never spent an hour's talk withal.
> His eye begets occasion for his wit,
> For every object that the one doth catch,
> The other turns to a mirth-moving jest,
> Which his fair tongue, conceit's expositor,
> Delivers in such apt and gracious words
> That aged ears play truant at his tales
> And younger hearings are quite ravished—
> So sweet and voluble is his discourse.

Though laughing, he shows no false modesty, but has a good opinion of himself, as we have already seen. It is in keeping with Robert Greene's attack on him the year before, 1592, who had been put off by the poet-actor-dramatist's confidence in himself, 'a perfect Johannes Factotum in his own conceit.'

The first scene adds further touches to his portrayal of himself: his liking for women and food, and a good night's sleep, with a suggestive innuendo about winking. It adds up to a portrait of a normal euphoric man, merry and good-humoured, with plenty of confidence in himself and his powers. The plays are full of bawdy; that, too, is typical of a normal heterosexual: it is well recognised psychologically that homosexuals do not go in for that sort of thing; they are just not interested.

Nor is there any difficulty about the identity of the rival poet, whose rivalry for Southampton's patronage added a further strain to the relationship of the poet with the patron. For the years 1592 and 1593 were years of severe plague, when the theatres were mostly closed and Shakespeare was largely dependent on his generous young patron. The rivalry in itself shows that the Sonnets were written as part of his duty, to and for Southampton and for nobody else:

> . . . for all my songs and praises be
> To one, of one, still such, and ever so.

The characteristics of his rival are recognisably described in the Sonnets. Courteously, as always, Shakespeare recognises him as a superior:

> He of tall building, and of goodly pride . . .
> My saucy bark, inferior far to his, etc.

We can take this with a grain of salt—Shakespeare was always gentlemanly; yet a serious tribute enters in with his valedictory tribute—

> Was it the proud full sail of his great verse?

Marlowe was famous for his 'mighty line', the splendid rhetorical blank verse he brought to the stage. This Sonnet 86 suddenly brings the rivalry to an end. Marlowe is not mentioned again. He was killed on 30 May, 1593, over a dispute about 'the reckoning', according to the inquest.

Shakespeare knew all about the circumstances and actually refers to them in *As You Like It*, along with the touching tribute:

> Dead shepherd, who knows not now thy saw of might:
> 'Who ever loved that loved not at first sight?'

This is the only time that Shakespeare pays a specific tribute to a contemporary, quoting a well-known line of his. For Shakespeare and Marlowe were well-known to each other; Shakespeare wrote his poem *Venus and Adonis* and Marlowe his *Hero and Leander* in competition for the patronage of Southampton, who is recognisably described as Adonis in the one and Leander in the other. They were aware of each other's work, but Marlowe did not live to finish his poem. As Shakespeare says in the Sonnets, his young Lord was 'fond on praise'; the rivalry between the two poets for his favour did not last long—only a few months at the beginning of 1593. What would have happened if Marlowe had lived we cannot tell —no doubt he would have finished his splendid poem.

Next year, 1594, Shakespeare decided for independence, and to throw in his lot with the theatre for good and all. For this he was doubly, trebly equipped as poet, actor, playwright, and the generous Southampton purchased for him a share in the Lord Chamberlain's Company. Henceforth he was free.

We see that all the so-called 'problems' of the Sonnets are solved, the dating, which is definitive and sets the bounds of these crucial years in Shakespeare's life and experience. The topical references in the Sonnets, which I have quoted, run from 1592 to 1594/5, those three exciting, passionately involved years. This completely coheres with the common sense, traditional view that the Sonnets were written along with *Venus and Adonis* and *The Rape of Lucrece*, each publicly dedicated to Southampton in 1593 and 1594. The Sonnets, however, were private, only a few harmless ones circulated among friends; not printed as a whole until Thorp got the manuscript from Southampton's stepfather years after.

Everything about William Shakespeare is consistent and homogeneous. But it takes an intimate historical knowledge of the time from year to year and month to month, combined with literary and poetic perception, plus common sense, to achieve it. No professor writing about Shakespeare appears to possess this combination. Take, for example, a typical professor, well-known for his editions of some of the plays and probably fairly good run-of-the-mill on textual *minutiae* of little importance. When it comes to the person and career of our greatest writer—a man noted in his time as of an 'open and free' nature—as revealed in his near the bone autobiography, the Sonnets, this is what the professor says:

> The reader must not expect to be told of the identity of Mr. W.H., nor whether he was the person to whom the Sonnets were addressed, or merely the procurer of the manuscript. I do not know whether the Dark Lady was Lucy Negro, or Emilia Lanier, or someone else, or an imaginary character. I do not know the names of the rival poets. I do not know how far, if at all, the Sonnets were autobiographical.

Another provincial university professor could not see that there was any resemblance between the personality and characteristics of the young Lord in the Sonnets and the well-known personality and characteristics

of Shakespeare's young patron—when, as we have seen, they are one and the same!

It would perhaps be merely comic, if it were not that such people have thoroughly confused the public mind—to such an extent that many simpletons do not know whether William Shakespeare ever existed or wrote his own work. Thus, they have become victims of the academic third-raters.

These have done, and do, a great disservice to the public knowledge and study of our greatest writer. Harold Macmillan wrote to me when I first tackled the subject with *William Shakespeare: a Biography:* 'What a mess they have made of it!'

I regard this as the greatest literary crime; for Shakespeare is our grandest contribution to the world's culture, and these inferior intelligences have made utter confusion of his life and work—and, to judge from the quotation above, take pride in their ignorance, when the problems have been resolved for them, dating and all, with proper historical and literary knowledge.

This kind of thing is not unexampled in intellectual history. When the great physiologist, Harvey, announced his discovery of the circulation of the blood, no one would credit it, and his practice as a doctor fell almost entirely away. Harvey lived long enough to see a new generation grow up which was acclimatised to his new ideas.

I have had a similar experience with my findings and discoveries about Shakespeare—though they are entirely in keeping with tradition and should not be surprising, since they come from the leading authority on the Elizabethan age, Shakespeare's lifetime. When I began to make these findings with my first Shakespeare biography, twenty years ago, I announced a revolution—a conservative one, it is true—in our knowledge of Shakespeare. Further findings have followed, which would never have been possible if the first had not been correct; they have not been answered, and will not be, for they are unanswerable. The revolution is complete, though it may take a new generation to absorb it.

[Dr. A. L. Rowse's definitive edition of the *Sonnets* was published in March, 1984 (Macmillan) and in April the first volumes of *The Contemporary Shakespeare, Hamlet, The Tempest, A Midsummer Night's Dream, The Merchant of Venice, Julius Caesar,* by the University Press of America, Washington D.C. at $2.95 per volume paperback.]

POEM

YOUTH

That lad's casual attitude who sits
Lodged on top of the stone-clad wall on the edge of the ridge
Ignoring the mural behind him of moor, hill and peaks
Belies the fears that lurk behind his eyes.

He's another trapped Atlas
Shouldering care as well as cloud and skies.
Or, inhabiting the here and now, the young Prometheus
Who each day each week each year sees
In a land shackled to the past
His guts picked out picked out by his concern
For a future that holds no future for him
But smug-eyed Gods at the Labour Exchange
Doling out worse by far than Hercules' tasks:
No work but nothing. Nothing but nothing.
Time after time. Again again again.

It is youth that keeps him hoping
And hoping that relieves the pain
Of the world behind him, and time's stone-growing
In his hands, his heart, his soul, his brain.

He'll be old before he's twenty-one.

ROGER ELKIN

VENEZUELAN VIEWPOINT

by Steve Ellner

THE third-world movement in favour of a new world economic order, which was beginning to show signs of inertia as a result of the cold response of the Reagan administration as well as declining world economic conditions, received a sudden and unexpected boost with the conflict over the Falkland Islands. This revived interest in third-world solidarity was nowhere more evident than in Venezuela. During the presidential term of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1979), some of his critics including future President Luis Herrera Campins (1979-1984) ridiculed Pérez' outspoken third worldism for overstepping Venezuela's importance on the world scene. Shortly after the Falkland Islands dispute, however, the Herrera Campíns government announced its intentions to seek membership in the Organisation of Non-Aligned Countries, improve relations with Cuba and call for a meeting of Latin American chancellors to examine relations with the United States. These actions in a sense vindicated Pérez' previous militant stands. Now, with the election of Jaime Lusinchi (1984-1989) who belongs to Pérez' Democratic Action (AD), Pérez again has a direct input into the shaping of Venezuela's foreign policy.

Although Pérez is frequently acclaimed by the Soviet Union for his third-world positions and is one of the few Latin American presidents to have visited Moscow, he can hardly be considered part of the Soviet camp. On the contrary, Pérez evidences a profound faith in the capacity of the United States to rectify its positions towards the Third World and to play a positive role in its development. Pérez is especially laudatory of ex-President Carter whom he maintains is the North American president—including Roosevelt and Kennedy— who has 'best understood and best treated Latin America'.

In a recent interview with this author, Pérez discussed the need to diversify sources of arms purchases. He acknowledged that the acquisition of advanced military equipment from the socialist bloc would form new patterns of dependency, but added 'we need greater independence from those who have been traditionally considered our allies'. During the Falkland Islands incident, Pérez had stated that Argentina's purchase of Soviet weapons would have been understandable if not justifiable.

The ineffectiveness of both the OAS and the inter-American mutual assistance provision of the Rio Treaty during the Falkland Islands conflict has prompted some political leaders to ask whether the idea of United States-Latin American co-operation has not become outdated. Carlos Andrés Pérez thinks otherwise. Pérez calls for the creation of an exclusively Latin American organism, not to replace the OAS but rather to consolidate Latin America's position by serving as a caucus within the organisation. Pérez' proposal would thus transform the OAS into an arena to carry out 'north'-'south' negotiations on a hemispheric scale.

'To abolish the OAS would be to absolve the United States of its commitments and obligations towards us,' Pérez says. At the same time, he calls for an international security treaty strictly for the Latin American nations.

Pérez also advocates the creation of a Third World Development Bank as an answer to the World Bank and other international lending institutions which are mainly controlled by the developed nations.

Why does a major political leader of a relatively prosperous oil-producing nation like Venezuela make far-reaching proposals of this nature? Indeed, the more affluent third-world nations including prominent OPEC members have been most reluctant to commit themselves to third-world schemes for fear that they would be called upon to foot the bill and that in general their privileged positions would be jeopardised.

Pérez views such proposals as the diversification of arms purchases, north-south co-operation and Cuba's integration into the Latin American community of nations as necessary and valid measures in their own right, but a second consideration is also of considerable importance. Pérez sees third-world solidarity in general and these proposals in particular as bargaining chips to be used in negotiations with the developed nations. Only through significant concessions from them in such areas as technological transfer and large scale loans at reasonable terms can Venezuela realise the ambitious programmes of industrial development which nationalists like Pérez view as urgently needed.

Basically, Pérez' international strategy is designed to shock the United States into action in favour of the New World Economic Order (NWEO). A large segment of US public opinion views the third-world movement in favour of a NWEO as seeking hand-outs from the wealthier developed nations. The attitude that NWEO is essentially a charity crusade is reflected in official US policy. American resistance to full-fledged north-south co-operation has been interrupted only by the Cuban revolution when the government embarked on the Alliance for Progress and, to a much lesser extent, as a result of guerrilla successes in Central America which led Reagan to draw up his Caribbean assistance programme. The rest of the time general sentiment has seen co-operation between developed and developing nations as at best superfluous to national needs.

This viewpoint overlooks an important dimension of the movement for a NWEO. The third-world movement has in many instances allowed European nations to establish closer ties with developing countries, while undermining US prestige and influence in that part of the world.

Outspoken third-world leaders impart a greater share of the blame for their nation's pressing conditions on the US, while Europe is sometimes let off the hook entirely. Furthermore, leaders such as Pérez and the Argentine Radicals who are directing the foreign policy of President Raúl Alfonsín have a natural affinity with European social democratic parties of the Socialist International (SI) which endorse state planning and state ownership of basic industries; these policies are generally criticised by the US government.

European parties of the SI have been receptive, at least in theory, to NWEO, as demonstrated by the report of the Brandt Commission headed by the renowned leader of the German Social Democratic party. With the advent of socialist governments in France and Spain, NWEO has received an additional boost in Europe.

the advent of socialist government in France and Spain, NWEO has counter to the 'hand-out' view widely held in the US. The economy of developed nations is now more than ever sensitive to what happens in the Third World; the financial crisis caused by the enormous international debt of developing nations and the unemployment set off by the movement of companies from rich to poor nations provide two graphic examples. Developed and developing nations are in the same boat and are thus forced to look for mutually acceptable solutions.

The shift in influence occassioned by the NWEO movement is especially evident in the case of Venezuela. Rómulo Betancourt, the nation's leading political figure until his death in 1981, had often told his close political associates that geopolitical considerations obliged Venezuela to eschew nationalist policies which would antagonise the US. This approach has been modified by Pérez, Betancourt's protégé. Not only has Pérez become a sharp critic of the US, but has also developed a close working rapport with SI leaders such as Willy Brandt, Francois Mitterand and Felipe González (although he has denounced other members of that bloc including Helmut Schmidt and James Callaghan for staunchly defending 'international capitalism').

The growing political influence enjoyed by European governments has paved the way for inroads on the economic front. Nationalists like Pérez have long advocated diversification of trade and sources of technology and capital in order to break their nation's exclusive dependence on the US. This position is especially appealing when it seeks to develop ties with nations which—as in the case of several European countries—appear to be genuinely interested in the plight of the Third World. The increasing influence of European social democratic and Christian democratic parties in Latin America in the 1970s has coincided with a burgeoning trade between the two continents.

The US, especially under Reagan, has been victimised by its narrow Cold War vision which views world relations only in terms of the Soviet threat. America can attempt to counter its deteriorated image in the Third World by embracing NWEO, but this path will not be as easy as it has been for Europe. SI parties of Europe and their governments have benefited from NWEO support even though it has not gone beyond mere rhetoric. More is expected from the US. At this stage verbal concessions by the US which do not get immediately translated into action are sceptically viewed as part of a strategy of 'buying time.' The US is thus forced to choose between the 'benign neglect' approach of Richard Nixon and the type of full fledged commitment made by John F. Kennedy. Mere good-will gestures will have a negligible impact.

THE GLORY OF WHOSE GARDEN?

by John Elsom

NOTHING became the Arts Council's press conference in March so well as its stage management. It was a masterly display of how to deflect criticism while seeming to invite it, of increasing power while apparently giving it away, of altering everything while changing very little. It also showed how skilfully the British Establishment can keep its head while all around are losing theirs.

The star was Sir William Rees-Mogg, ex-editor of *The Times*, vice-chairman of the BBC, antiquarian bookseller and now Chairman of the Arts Council. He has a donnish way of answering questions lucidly, but as if he were also pondering higher philosophical matters. Some drunks have the same knack. The title of the Council's booklet, rushed out in forty-eight hours flat, was evidently his, *The Glory of the Garden*, for his introduction began with a quotation from Kipling:

> Our England is a garden and such gardens are not made
> By singing, 'Oh, how beautiful!' and sitting in the shade
> While better men than we go out and start their working lives
> At grubbing weeds from gravel-paths with broken dinner knives

which is a fine and noble thought, unless you happen to be one of the weeds.

By his side sat Luke Rittner, the Secretary-General, young, sharp and chosen, it seemed, to be as unlike the last Secretary-General, Sir Roy Shaw, as possible. The relationship between them told us much about the new Arts Council. It resembled that between a benevolent landlord and the agent of his estate. Mr. Rittner knew the facts and figures, Sir William the grand design. In the past, Arts Council Chairmen have been somewhat avuncular figures, not excluding Lord Goodman, who murmured pious words about changing the priorities of government and always congratulated the Council officers on the grand job they were doing on limited resources. Sir William was different. Here was a Chairman who intends to chair from the front.

Off-stage, to the right, sat three rows of Arts Council officers and the Chairmen of the advisory panels, leashed in and waiting, crouched for employment, which never during the conference came their way—and may never, things being what they are, come their way again. The future of the advisory panels is in doubt, but when Sir William was asked about them, he brushed the question aside as one of those matters of internal organisation which would be resolved in due course. The panel Chairmen listened impassively, like a jury determined to hear both sides of the argument though the matter in question were their own execution.

But the silence from the panels was less deafening than the docility from the journalists, who had come armed, as it turned out, with the wrong questions. No Arts Council press conference has ever been heralded by so much advance publicity, much of it mistaken. A month before, we had heard that the Royal Court was to be axed. Letters of support poured

in to *The Times* and *Guardian*, including one with the signatures of Trevor Nunn and Peter Hall from the nationals. 'Nice of them,' said one fringe director, 'to earmark the cost of a postage stamp from their publicity budgets.' But the Royal Court was not to be lopped off, not yet anyway. Nor were Riverside Studios (although Sir William queried its administrative quality), the Hayward Gallery, the Serpentine Gallery, all confidently tipped as candidates for decapitation. The fuss had all apparently been about nothing; and the confusion among the commentators was such that ten hours later, David Hare, who had been summoned to the *Newsnight* studios (why?), was still trying to attack Luke Rittner for decisions which had not been taken.

There were sacrifices, of course, but not those for which any of us were deeply prepared. The grants to literature were halved, but not abolished altogether, as had been expected. The London Orchestral Concerts Board lost 35% of its grants, which meant that one London orchestra, unspecified, would disappear. Some suburban reps lost their grants—at Guildford, Bromley, Leatherhead and Farnham—which helped Sir William to meet the familiar criticism that only left-wing companies were threatened. Nobody was prepared to stand up and say that the Arts Council had selected the wrong victims, particularly because we were nearly all agreed that, if sacrifices had to be made, they were being slaughtered on the right altar, that of regional devolution. The whole purpose of the exercise was to achieve a shift in Arts Council resources from London to the regions of about 5% and nobody could quarrel with that, only with the thought that the chief spending culprits were the national companies, the four untouchables, which were duly left untouched.

Thus, the Arts Council turned the tables on its critics, who were left gasping and not a little grateful to Sir William for the civility of his manner. There was even some forelock-touching, I thought, among the questions asked. Sir William did not betray any satisfaction, but there must have been an inward purr inside the Mogg. He had achieved the result he wanted—a slimmed-down Arts Council, with more money in reserve to meet any emergencies, with the advisory panels well in control and no damaging outbursts from the press. Above all, he had contrived a personal ascendancy, leaving the impression that he knew where he was going, even if nobody else did, and that the arts were best left in his hands, for who else could match his certainty, his philosophic detachment?

And yet of all the Arts Council's many silly statements, I suspect that *The Glory of the Garden* will eventually be awarded the palm. Despite its facts and skilful accountancy, it is profoundly out of touch with the reality of the current situation; and while Sir William was re-drawing the arts map of Britain, I instinctively thought of Napoleon on St. Helena or Sir Oswald Mosley in retirement, endlessly re-fighting lost battles, except that Sir William had not yet realised that they were lost. And regiments of ghostly soldiers rise up behind the subtitles to his document: *The Development of the Arts in England—A Strategy for a Decade.*

A week is a long time in arts politics and as evidence, I cite the shifting reactions before and after the Arts Council's press conference. A month is interminable and a decade passes beyond the realms of human understanding. If we skip back a decade in the theatre, to 1973/4, what do we find? Neither the new National Theatre nor the Barbican had opened, all our estimates as to what they would cost to run were wildly inaccurate and Hall had just taken over from Olivier in circumstances of much acrimony. Bill Bryden had brought his strident Edinburgh Lyceum Company to the Shaw Theatre in his play, *Willy Rough*, and the Lyceum was tipped as the National Theatre of Scotland. Where is it now? Or for that matter the Shaw Theatre? The Manchester '69 Company had not yet gone into orbit in its space capsule at the Royal Exchange. John Gale was predicting the end of the West End by 1980; and the cautious punter would have put his money on the new network of regional repertory theatres as offering the best hope for British theatre in the future, while the reckless ones would have gambled on the still flourishing fringe movement, anarchic, experimental but, ah, what youthful vigour! The whole theatrical climate was different. Few young directors wanted to be *metteurs en scéne*, as they do now. They wanted to work with small, tightly knit companies, democratic in structure, in theatres where the maximum seating capacity was about 150. If we shift back another decade, we'd discover that it was considered important to keep the commercial theatre and the subsidised sector in balance, with the civic reps complementing the 1, 2 and 3 touring networks, then in decline but showing signs of recovery; while by leaping over ten more years, we'd be wondering whether subsidy would ever become an important element in theatre financing.

To put forward a strategy for a decade suggests a marvellous conceit, a serene confidence to be able to predict events; and, to give one small illustration of how events might knock the strategy off-course, we only have to consider the consequences of the abolition of the Metropolitan Authorities and, no less important, the effects of rate-capping on the local authorities. Sir William was asked about the first point and answered that the government had indicated that it did not intend the arts to suffer when the Metropolitan Authorities disappear and that the Council took the government at its word. That may be so, but we have yet to hear about the exact provisions that the government will make. Sir William was not asked about the consequences of rate-capping, which could be even more severe. I suspect that the entire shift of resources to the regions will be quickly absorbed by picking up the bills left by the local authorities, who will have no alternative but not to pay them. Yet much of the strategy is based upon devolution to the RAAs (which are financed by the Arts Council, the local and metropolitan authorities), together with many other incidental recommendations—such as inviting the Kensington and Chelsea Borough Council to support the Royal Court Theatre with local generosity so far unprecedented.

The battle for devolution has been a long one. Indeed, one constant

factor over the past thirty years has been the call for more devolution. About five years ago, the Arts Council enthusiastically endorsed the Redcliffe-Maud Report, which predicts that the local authorities would all become the arts patrons of the future. Unfortunately, they reckoned without the particular difficulties of the local authorities which arise from having too many responsibilities already and too narrow a base from which, through rates, they could raise their funds. Most local authorities depended, then as now, on their rate support grants, which make them vulnerable to central governments which hope to economise. Until the political and financial balance (and division of responsibilities) between central and local governments are sorted out, and there is no sign of such a resolution at present, all talk of genuine devolution is mere theory—and has been proved, time and time again, to be mere theory.

If to talk about a decade seems somewhat high-flown, what about the word, 'development'? In 1978, I wrote a green paper for the Liberal Party called *Change and Choice*, which proposed that the Arts Council should be re-titled an Arts Development Board. I was taken to task for my naïvety, by artists who said that the arts don't develop like that and by Arts Council officers who pointed out that the Council can't develop anything exactly, only respond to events. Anything more than a policy of response would lead to totalitarianism. My response was that I thought that the Arts Development Board should undertake a programme of investment in the arts for Britain, rather than simply hand out annual block grants to its major clients. The practical point at issue was whether we should observe any longer the old division between profit-distributing and non-profit-distributing companies.

This was not a trivial distinction. Only non-profit-distributing companies, registered under the Charities Act, could receive grants; but that had led to practical difficulties, many anomalies and some outright cheating. The chief practical difficulty was that subsidised companies could not hold reserves of money in order to offset the losses of one year against the profits of another. It also meant that these subsidised companies were placed in the hands of well-meaning amateur boards, who might not know whom to pick as artistic directors. The anomalies were striking, in that many theatres and companies which called themselves commercial relied on productions rehearsed and staged under subsidised conditions; which led to evident cheating. Because non-profit-distributing companies could not, by definition, distribute profits, it led to the practice of going into partnership with commercial companies that could. When I wrote *Theatre Outside London*, in 1969, I came across several examples of where an artistic director had spent almost his entire annual grant on one production, which then transferred to the commercial theatre with the director receiving a good slice of the profits. In those days, the practice was frowned upon by the Arts Council, who were, however, reluctant to rock the boat by taking steps against it. Now it has become a common practice, with the nationals as well as the reps joining in the game. The result is simple: the tax-payer bears the costs of a production, while the

commercial impresario receives the profits.

If the aim is to be the *development* of the arts in Britain, then some way has to be found of returning the profits from state-subsidised arts into the common pool. At present, subsidised companies have no incentive, commercially speaking, to develop their audiences and the tax-payer has no incentive to increase the stake in arts enterprises. The use of the word 'development' in *Change and Choice* was part of an attempt to shift the emphasis away from patronage as charity toward patronage as investment; but in *The Glory of the Garden*, there is no such change of direction. 'Development' is whatever Sir William chooses to dub 'development': to an outsider, it might well seem a euphemism for recession.

There are many other questions begged in *The Glory of the Garden*, not least the relationship between the live arts and the technological media; and it is typical of short-sighted, inward-looking nature of the report that the rapidly growing field of information technology should be regarded as a threat to the arts, rather than as an opportunity. But the main shudders, the chief chill in the spine, were aroused by this spectacle of Sir William as a grand landscape gardener. I suspect that there is an unspoken analogy in the corridors of power between the arts and the steel and coal industries. Just as Mr. McGregor has closed uneconomic pits to improve the profitability of the industry and to reduce production to the level of known demand, so Sir William has been appointed to achieve similar results in the arts world. But unfortunately the analogy breaks down as soon as you look at it. There is no known public demand for the arts. There can be sudden waves of enthusiasm and equally sudden declines. If we avoid, as any prudent politician must, any sudden increases in the sums of public money available to the arts, we must not fall into the trap of assuming that therefore the arts cannot grow beyond the limits of the public resources available to it. It will grow, as it has done before, to meet the popular demand which only the artists can encourage. The Arts Council has yet to learn how to handle the mixed economy in the arts. It cannot cope with the changing interests, fashions, excitements, values, patterns of organisation, talent and inspiration. Its thinking is still administrative and institutional rather than flexible and creative.

But even if we concede that there is some merit in this approach, that the arts being volatile and temperamental need some strong administrative framework within which they can grow, how can we honestly respond to the thought of one man being so much in charge of the garden? We had a foretaste of what was to come in the modest suggestion that the axed London orchestra should move to Nottingham, which smacks of direction of labour. But the nation-wide choice of weeds and flowers is not one to be wished on any man, however capable and self-assured; and Sir William by downgrading the roles of the advisory panels has inevitably taken the burden of decision-making much upon himself. As vice-chairman of the BBC, he already possesses considerable influence over one large area of the cultural landscape. Can we stand aside and allow him to take more? And if not, what can we do about it?

THE ENDURING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

by S. G. Shanker

AT the beginning of his first Reith lecture, Sir Douglas Wass recalled how, gazing at Ambrogio Lorenzetti's Allegories on Good and Bad Government in the Palazzo Publico in Siena, he began to muse on the problem whether 'history is right to equate good government with prosperity and bad government with poverty.' He then recounted how, as he pondered on 'the essential requirements of a good system of government', he found that he could 'narrow them down to two ideas: efficiency and responsiveness'. This is, indeed, a profound if not revealing anecdote with which to approach the question of the role of government in post-industrial society.

The fourteenth-century Sienan would clearly not have seen Lorenzetti's frescos as a simple allegory on 'Poverty and Prosperity'. Rather, they would have constituted for him a sweeping representation of the medieval conception of order. His attention would no doubt have been fixed on the central majestic figure representing the Commune of Siena, above whose head hover Faith, Hope, and Charity, while on either side of him sit the principal Civic Virtues. The most conspicuous of these is Justice, guarded over by Wisdom, and flanked by two winged figures: Commutative Justice, who is bestowing arms on a nobleman and money on a merchant, and Distributive Justice, who is in the act of crowning a kneeling figure with her left hand while chopping off someone's head with her right. According to Nicolai Rubinstein, the central themes of the frescos are the benefits of Justice tempered by Wisdom and the tyranny which results when the common good is sacrificed to self-interest (cf. 'Political Ideas in Sienese Art' in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute*, 1958). Hardly, one would have thought, the virtues to appeal to the modern conservative spirit. But then, the power of the frescos lies in their ability to inspire different cultures when seen from a myriad of different perspectives.

What, for example, would the Sienan blackshirt have made of the frescos? Would his attention have been captured by the imposing nude figure of Securitas, who carries in one hand a scroll proclaiming that all men walk in peace under her benign protection, while in the other is a gallows with an executed miscreant dangling from it? If anyone could write a history of how the past two hundred generations have viewed the frescos he would have produced the definitive textbook on the evolution of modern political theory. Disregarding the probably unsolvable puzzle of whether any two single attributes could be discerned as common to all of these various perceptions, the question which must concern us most is: what could he tell us about ourselves; about the fact that when we look upon the frescos we are led to ponder the overriding need for government to be efficient and responsive? At any rate, what can we learn about our own times from this fascinating example of the conceptual spectacles through which our bureaucratic leaders view politics?

Such a question is complicated, however, by the fundamentally problematic nature of these two concepts. After all, efficiency came to take on chilling resonances in the hands of the Italian fascists. And what of responsiveness: do we have the people's needs or demands in mind? Herein lies one of the great political issues of the twentieth-century. For that matter, why seize on these two particular attributes? Has Sir Douglas perhaps confused—or rather, attempted to conflate—the question of the role of government with that of the civil service? Or does his argument perhaps reflect a trend which is becoming increasingly prevalent in contemporary political theory?

Sir Douglas' argument was (deliberately) reminiscent of the controversy created by Sir John Hoskyns' lecture 'Conservatism Is Not Enough', delivered at the Institute of Directors last September. The principle theme of that lecture was that 'the way businessmen think and act is more relevant than that of most of the politicians, civil servants, academics and commentators who have concerned themselves with the nation's problems thus far'. For business, unlike government, has been trained to survive by its efficient response to the harsh demands of the market. What could be simpler, therefore, than to resolve our current domestic problems by introducing a healthy infusion of business talent into our decrepit political structure? To be sure, as Sir Douglas gently remonstrated, the matter is not quite so straightforward, for business can measure its efficiency by examining its balance-sheets, but no such unequivocal criterion is available for the complex duties subsumed by government. But surely the real point is: it is not just that the nature of government is more complex than business: it is that the two are categorically distinct!

We can discern in this argument the first tentative glimmerings of a conceptual revolution in the perception of the role and nature of government. A generation ago Parliament remained the focus of institutional analysis, but what we are witnessing today is the emergence of the multinational corporation as the new paradigm of political thought. The central theme in this development is that both the function and methods of government should be patterned after the management structure of a large corporation. Used as a negative thesis, the point of this argument is that because government has been insulated from the driving pressures of supply and demand it has become a 'privileged club' which is hopelessly antiquated and inefficient. Moreover, due to the centralising forces of post-war domestic politics, government has shifted increasingly into the mainstream of business activities. But, in that case, government should be subjected to the same management criteria as operate in the business-world, which is the very opposite of what has occurred.

This is merely the by now familiar argument for the rationalisation of government. It leads, however, into the even stronger conclusion that government would be better run by businessmen *simpliciter*. This in turn has been interpreted in two different ways. The first is that businessmen should literally be co-opted into government, where they will breathe a new air of efficiency and responsiveness into the stale atmosphere of

Whitehall. But this experiment has already been conducted countless times throughout the western world, hitherto without any notable successes. Whether this is due to the sheer magnitude of the problems involved in rationalising a government, or to the fact that, once he moves from the market arena into the murky world of politics the business protegé must quickly acquire the instincts and methods of the civil servant or politician if he is to survive (let alone prosper) is a matter for political scientists to explore.

There is, however, a deeper meaning of the thesis that government would be better run by business which underlies the various positions outlined above. This is that the duties currently performed by government should somehow be devolved into the world of business, and the offices previously overseen by government should be curtailed. Obviously this is the privatisation argument and, as I have argued before, this need not signify a direct assault on the Welfare State. If it is the case that, given the new technology, certain services could be run more efficiently by private firms without disturbing the equitable basis on which they are presently enjoyed, it would be folly to impede this development; the folly borne from a political ideology which has failed to keep pace with technological developments. But having said that, the argument does not commit us to the further premise that government *tout court* should be abolished and replaced with business.

It is striking how similar this last theme is to the other monument of twentieth-century political thought. For both Marxism and this modern form of *laissez-faire* conservatism are arguing that the State should wither away. Of course, the former are thinking primarily of the termination of the instruments of 'negative' government (e.g. the law courts), whereas the latter are thinking of the dissolution of the institutions of 'positive' government (e.g. quangos). What is particularly interesting is that neither side feels the need to clarify this point, and both are content to speak in the crude terms of the abolition of the State. Perhaps this is the *leitmotif* of the post-war generation: that because of the barbarities unleashed by twentieth-century civilisation we have inherited a basic distrust of, and hostility to, government?

Certainly the terms 'bureaucracy', 'civil service', and 'politician' have all taken on a perjorative overtone in the modern lexicon. Is this because the very idea of a 'government'—an elite body of citizens dedicated to the furtherance of the public good—has become an anomaly today: a neo-Hellenic ideal resurrected in the seventeenth-century which, like most abstractions, has encouraged false hopes and perceptions? For, without the notion of the public good, what is to become of the notion of government?

It is thus not that surprising, perhaps, when a zealot like Paul Johnson converts from one extreme position on the political spectrum to the opposite. On the practical level both positions are committed to the demise of politics; where they differ is in their perception of the manner in which this is to be achieved. In an article entitled 'Is There a Future For Politics?'

(published in *The Bank Credit Analyst*) Johnson claims for himself the role of a modern Nietzsche, struggling to announce that it is time for us to recognise that the basic feature of post industrial society is that 'politics is dead'. We shall see, he feels, 'a new kind of public life and public decision-making, so remote from the present one as to make the term "politics" inapplicable'. For 'the age of politics', he concludes, 'like the age of religion, is now drawing to a close. Politics has failed; politicians have not delivered'.

Few of us will agree, however, that the purpose of politics is simply to 'deliver' some goal. The idea that politics is the 'science of the possible' rests on an enthusiasm which has long since departed. We now see politics as in effect the price we must pay if we are to encourage freedom of speech and personal liberty. In essence, Johnson's argument is that the advanced technological revolution has literally 'destroyed politics', but technology cannot in itself have any effect on the diversity of opinion. Johnson maintains that the various tasks performed by government and the civil service can be far more efficiently administered by private business. Modern government, he maintains, has been at best a hindrance to market forces, and political parties have merely acted as vehicles of mass-manipulation in the quest for personal power, the new religion of the twentieth-century.

It is not my concern here to challenge the historical evidence on which Johnson's interpretation of twentieth-century politics is based, nor even his vision of the post-industrial future. Rather, what does concern me is the conceptional confusion underlying his argument, which is the starting-point for the new right's perception of government. Curiously, Johnson never actually defines what he understands by 'politics', a striking lacuna in a paper announcing its expiration. But this is a common feature in all of the new wave of conservative arguments on the need to rationalise government. They invariably begin their argument with the assumption that government is solely concerned with wealth-creation, and hence with economic management. This may seem a curious position for conservatives to take if you consider their ideological heritage, but it reflects the dramatic shifts in the political spectrum which have been introduced by post-industrialism. It is the commitment to a strong central authority which above all else accounts for the continuity between this position and previous conservative orthodoxy.

The basic confusion inherent in this argument is manifested in Johnson's paean to post-industrialism. Johnson compares post-industrial society to Athenian democracy, where the voters of today enjoy a similar position to the 'privileged citizens' of Athens, and technology performs a role comparable to Athenian slave labour. But the metaphor itself conveys the tension of this argument, for Athenian democracy marks the conceptual foundation in the evolution of modern politics. It was when a proportion of the society was freed from manual labour that democracy evolved: a complex system where the pressures of conflicting opinions were contained under the democratic principles as enshrined in the government.

It was to be government by two opposing forces: the centrifugal pressures created by the conflict of opinion and the centripetal forces rendered by the shared dedication to the well-being of the Polis. The very fact that Johnson continues to speak of the behaviour of 'voters' and 'government' in his supposedly 'post-political' society betrays his equivocation on this point.

The real problem with this argument is that, under the guise of curtailing politics, what the conservative is really after is a much stronger form of government (look at Johnson's list of twentieth-century political heroes in his *A History of the Modern World from 1917 to the 1980s*). It is not politics that alarms the conservative: it is consensus politics. For consensus politics is at best a disorderly affair; which accounts for why we have all this emphasis on productivity and efficiency. In speaking of the demise of politics what modern conservatives really mean is the demise of political debate. Whatever the motives, the end result of this trend lies in the strengthening of the State. For example, the present Government has made a great deal of political capital over its commitment to the reduction of the size of government, but not only have we witnessed the continuing growth of the public sector, but more worryingly, we can discern precisely the opposite objective in such measures as the Government's White Paper on Local Government.

What is at issue here is not the question of the relative merits of a centralised versus a devolved institutional structure, but rather, what are the basic features which characterise government *per se*, however it be organised. The principle drawback of the argument that the two essential requirements of government are that it be efficient and responsive is that it suffers from too narrow a scope. In order to appreciate the full conceptual dimensions of government we must examine it in light of the wide range of responsibilities which it is called upon to assume.

It is quite true that in the past three decades governments have moved increasingly into the area of financial management, and hence it only makes sense to argue that this particular role should be rationalised as far as is practicable. Nevertheless, we have hardly exhausted the nature of government with this aspect of its activities, and thus hardly laid the groundwork for an argument claiming the imminent demise of politics. There are two more immensely important roles subsumed under the general concept of government.

The first of these derives from the fact, alluded to above, that government must act as an arbiter between the various warring factions in society. Whatever the drawbacks of pressure-group politics, it does have in its favour the fundamental benefit that it manages to preserve the possibility of maintaining consensus politics. The basic reason why the left, unions, powerful interest groups etc. must not be barred from all participation in the political process—apart from the obvious dangers inherent in the single-party State—is because if completely ostracised there is a terrible danger that they will agitate for either counterproductive or subversive issues. As responsible members of society they have a strong

desire to be effective. If they are encouraged to operate within the political process the result must be that they become politically 'mature'—i.e. aware of the realities and complexities of social management—and hence more productive as they work on real as opposed to platform issues. Barring the sudden collapse of social and intellectual divisions—an event which would be far from desirable—the claim that post industrial society is witnessing the demise of politics is both naïve and obscurantist.

There is a further role that must be performed by government which is closely allied to this. Government must play, in the largest sense, an educational role at the centre of society. In this function governments must act both as pupil and as pedagogue. As students of the domestic and international scenes governments must strive to learn, first, what their people want and what they are becoming, and then, the obstacles—whether foreign or internal—which must be overcome if these aims are to be achieved. As teachers the government must educate the nation in its socio-economic reality; it must try to ensure that the nation understands the nature and consequences of its desires and the efforts it must make if it is to realise those aspirations. Clearly, there must be an ongoing dialogue sustaining this process, and more importantly, there must be a concerted effort to draw the electorate into this educational process in order to minimise the dangers inherent in the situation where the public becomes alienated from the State. It will be noticed that all of the emphasis here has been on the government's educational as opposed to tutelary role, a distinction which, unfortunately, is once again being consistently overlooked.

Despite the massive technological changes heralded by post-industrialism, the roles of government as outlined above will remain fundamentally undisturbed unless there is a widespread conceptual revolution in our perceptions of the importance of the individual and the nature of society. If, for example, wealth-creation as mentioned on a *per capita* basis does become the sole criterion whereby we assess the success of a government, then perhaps it might well become the case that efficiency and responsiveness will be the most important attributes that we demand from a government. But we are still a long way from that state of affairs, and happily still a long way from envisaging what a society which was solely concerned with the accumulation of wealth would be like. Perhaps in this respect we might indeed do well to study the civic virtues which Lorenzetti depicts in his Allegories on Good Government. We might even begin by contemplating the enduring significance of the mere existence of the frescos in the *Sale della Pace.*

[The next article in the series by S. G. Shanker, 'Orwell and Liberty', will be published in the July issue.]

CORRESPONDENCE

THE LABOURITES TRY AGAIN

Dear Madam,

Lord Hatch's article 'Labour's Future' (*Contemporary Review* No. 1415, Vol. 243) and 'Can Labour Come in from the Cold?' by Austin Mitchell, M.P. (No. 1414, Vol. 243) prompt some interesting discussion on the future of the British Labour Party. It is not often that a General Election has produced such immediate and drastic changes of leadership. This applied to other parties as well, since Roy Jenkins, a well-known politician and leader in European Community affairs, stepped down in favour of a younger man of charm and enterprise, Dr. David Owen, once a Labour minister.

Obviously, the Labour party had good reason to make changes, after a devastating defeat at the polls on June 9, 1983 in a campaign led by Michael Foot and Denis Healey; and from the very start of the reshuffle the favourite as Foot's successor was the youthful, energetic Neil Kinnock.

Viewed from the vantage point of distance, it seems that by selecting the moderate 'left-winger', Neil Kinnock, by an overwhelming majority, and a moderate 'right-winger', Roy Hattersley, as his deputy, the Labour Party remained consistent to a policy of having 'two parties in one.' This, I recall, was the case with the first post-war Labour government, with Clement Attlee and Aneurin Bevan and later with Harold Wilson and George Brown.

One gains a clearer picture of the significance of last year's defeat of the Labour party when bearing in mind that Margaret Thatcher's Tories had scored no outstanding victories and even won fewer votes than in the 1979 General Election and considerably less than under the leadership of Edward Heath. Last June, the Conservatives attracted only 31 per cent of the votes.

At the same time, it must be remembered that the Labour vote suffered seriously from the relative popularity of the Liberal/Social Democrat alliance; many candidates for the latter having seceded from the Labour Party. As the historian, Eric Hobsbaum, has commented, the success of Thatcherism was partly due to 'civil war' within the Labour ranks.

To the detached onlooker, it would appear that the British Labour Party did not fully comprehend the social changes that have occurred in Britain over the past two decades, and were therefore unable to talk convincingly to the electorate. The traditional British 'worker', loyal to Labour through thick and thin, is now in very short supply.

However, although the Labour Party still appears to be divided on such crucial issues as defence and the European Community, it seems likely that under Neil Kinnock, enjoying as he does support from almost all sections, including the trade unions, the British Labour Party might, in the near future, well become a far more important political factor than it has been in recent years.

Yours faithfully,

HARI STAJNER.

Political Editor of *Nin* magazine, Yugoslavia.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

A. J. P. TAYLOR'S DIARY

An Old Man's Diary. A. J. P. Taylor. Hamish Hamilton. £8.95 net.

A. J. P. Taylor has long been the most readable of historians. His style is famous for its short sentences though he discovers, in the course of this book, that Macaulay in his *History of England* uses 'more single verb sentences one after another than I should ever dare to attempt'. Alike as an academic lecturer and a television personality he has always provided compulsive listening and viewing. He has still more solid claims on our admiration. Many years ago there was rather frantic argument as to whether he or Hugh Trevor-Roper should be appointed Regius Professor of History at Oxford. The winner, Lord Dacre as he now is, has distinguished himself greatly since that time, but so has Alan. His hagiographic biography of Beaverbrook did him no good, but there are still historians to be found who revere him as the leading figure of their profession in England.

These enjoyable extracts from his 1981-1982 Diaries neither add to nor detract from his main reputation. The question soon arises when discussing his seriousness or alleged irresponsibility 'where does Alan Taylor draw the line between professional history and journalism or between history and contemporary politics?'. He comments at one point on 'the penalty of trying to foretell the future. An historian should have more sense.' But he has been for many years a dedicated champion of unilateral disarmament. It has for long been impossible for him to keep those beliefs out of his historical pronouncements.

The one substantial piece of historical writing here is his Romanes Lecture in 1981. It is as sparkling as one hoped for but the conclusion is all gloom and doom and CND. I will take one specimen of his departure from ordinary ideas of objectivity. He traces the origins of the Cold War to the Allied invasion of Russia in 1920! Yet I do not regard him as possessing any special sympathy for the Soviet Union. The truth is, I think, that he is utterly sceptical of statesmen in all countries. The Western lot are no better and no worse than the Eastern lot. The only solution is some form of pacifism though he does not hold out any hope of this suggestion being adopted. How far does he really mean these things? How far is he setting out to twist our tails or set our minds working in the traditional manner of a provocative Professor? That we can never know. What we *can* know is that he is a warm-hearted, affectionate man with many friends, who has given entertainment of an intellectual character through his books to many thousands and through television to millions.

FRANK LONGFORD

REFLECTIONS OF NORMAN ST. STEVAS

The Two Cities. Norman St. John-Stevas. Faber & Faber Ltd. £12.95.

Mr. Norman St. John-Stevas is soaked in the great prose writers of the nineteenth century. His own writing is always elegant and pointed, more so than that of any contemporary politician. Six Roman Catholics have been members of the British Cabinet since the war; Dick Stokes, Bob Mellish, Shirley Williams and myself—all Labour at the time; Lord Windlesham and Norman St. John-Stevas, Conservative. Norman is the only one of us who

has enjoyed a complete theological education. Dom Chapman, fourth Abbot of Downside, once wrote: 'The better a man knows his theology, the better he ought to preach.' Norman St. John-Stevas admirably illustrates his thesis.

This striking collection of essays is full of pithy reflections. There is only space to quote one passage: 'A junior Minister has no weight to throw around, and if he attempts to do so the only certain result is that he will throw himself out of the window. Junior Ministers are treated by the Civil Service rather as bishops are in Rome. They are two a penny, and the only politicians to whom civil servants pay attention are Secretaries of State and members of the Cabinet, who constitute the cardinals of the British political system.'

He describes with dignity his dismissal from the Cabinet by Mrs. Thatcher. I am only surprised at his finding it totally unexpected. He had spoken out on a number of occasions in a fashion more critical of the government than would have been permitted in the Cabinets I knew best—those of Attlee and Wilson. It was also widely rumoured that some of his references to the 'Blessed Margaret' might have been misunderstood in high quarters. He seems to be aware of this type of criticism when he writes: 'Because I like to make little jokes, see the funny and contradictory aspects of human activity and am burdened with a capacity for wit, people have sometimes had the impression that I am not serious in my approach. Nothing could be further from the truth. I am deeply conscious all the time of the swiftly fleeting character of life, of the need to organise one's time and to apply oneself, of the duty to use one's talents and to achieve objectives.'

No one who knows him well doubts the seriousness of his life's purpose or his constant spiritual awareness, but it would be an affectation to deny that his 'little jokes' are a handicap in achieving his lofty aims. Norman is perhaps attempting the impossible, in trying to combine religion and politics, in a single volume. Has anyone ever really succeeded in our time, though Lord Hailsham made a noble effort? I have, incidentally, tried once or twice myself without much satisfaction. Indeed, I have now fallen back on writing one book on religion and another on politics, which is rather like a man who has failed with bifocal glasses and reverted to two pairs of spectacles. If the task were to be attempted at all, no one now alive in this country could perform it better, or indeed as well, as Norman St. John-Stevas.

FRANK LONGFORD

THE NEW EDITION OF THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LITERATURE

The Oxford Companion to American Literature. James D. Hart. Oxford University Press. 1983. £27.50.

For at least 45 years James Hart of the University of California at Berkeley (and as he admits all the members of his family) have lived with this book. Originally he saw his role primarily as Editor, drawing on the expertise of colleagues like George Stewart and Henry Nash Smith. But for over 40 years this work has become his own personal achievement. This is the fifth edition of a now-indispensable and lovingly-compiled reference book which first appeared in 1941. Nor are the changes in the fifth edition minor and textual only. There are at least 240 new authors here, and over 115 new entries giving excellent summaries of books (in general more detailed and more useful than the author-entries). Earlier entries have been revised, some abbreviated and even omitted, others extended. As one would expect, Professor Hart is especially

strong on West Coast names, as the entries on Dashiell Hammett and Lillian Hellman, on Bancroft as historian and collector, and on Mike Fink as legend, testify; but then he is equally strong on Faulkner and the world of Yoknapatawpha County, on Ellen Glasgow and the literature of the South. This is an immensely thorough and by now quite invaluable reference work, which—for the most part—avoids assessments or analysis. There is a proper hesitation on the inclusion of living historians: Daniel Boorstin, Librarian of Congress, aged 70, is rightly here, and so—with equal justice—is Dumas Malone the biographer of Jefferson, now 92 (though his chair at the University of Virginia goes unrecorded); Bernard Bailyn still teaching at Harvard, and C. Vann Woodward, now Emeritus of Yale, will have to wait, it seems, for the next edition. Since the editor has also thrown off, almost as an aside, a matching companion to his home state he is worthy of a very special salute for his industry, his thoroughness and his command of a vast literature—and for his ability to get his successive volumes so regularly into print.

ESMOND WRIGHT

AMERICAN LITERARY THEORY

After the New Criticism. Frank Lentricchia. Methuen. £7.95.

In the common-rooms of English Faculties in American universities, especially at Yale, the chit-chat over the simmering coffee-machine is now, according to Frank Lentricchia, Professor of English at Rice University, Texas, of seers such as Jacques Derrida, who writes like this—

> [the structurality of structure] has always been neutralised or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a centre or referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin. The function of this centre was not only to orient, balance, and organise the structure—one cannot, in fact, conceive of an unorganised structure—but above all to make sure that the organising principle of the structure would limit what we might call the *freeplay* of the structure... Nevertheless, the centre also closes off the freeplay it opens up and makes possible.

Professor Lentricchia sees nothing untoward in all this, and is perfectly happy to join the game. How Cyril Connolly would have teased these strangulated words and tossed about that tempting 'freeplay'!

In 1963, at the University of Iowa, Professor Murray Krieger was elevated to the first chair of Literary Criticism in the USA. The literary theorists there have certainly made up lost time since then, and *ism* has succeeded *ism* remorselessly. Après (not according to) the American New Criticism, a later flood indeed. English readers of Lentricchia will feel the lack of a definition of that New Criticism, which developed in the 1920s and argued for 'close reading' and detailed textual analysis of poetry rather than a concern with the mind and personality of the poet, sources, the history of ideas and political and social implications. Semantics was important. In 1941, John Crowe Ransom produced *The New Criticism* in which he criticised I. A. Richards and William Empson and made a plea for the 'ontological critic'. Now, it seems, the New Criticism is as dead as a stuffed dodo, and was on the wane in the later 1950s when Dr. Leavis was still waxing. Structuralism is slipping, and Post-Structuralism struts its brief life.

The most rarefied American and continental literary theorists have toppled so far over the brink into philosophy that their discourses appear remote from the literature which is their host. In 1980, Professor Lentricchia published an extraordinary, in-bred treatise (here reissued in paperback) couched in jargon and in-reference which can only be of interest to like-minded academics. None

but the most brilliant of students would understand him, let alone find him helpful. Literature, and literary criticism, are curiously absent behind the arras of abstractions. An unparalleled essay in esoterica.

His intention in this *oeuvre* is to compose an exposition, and a running evaluation, of the course of critical theory in America over the last quarter of the century or so, since the fall of the New Criticism. He finds some kinds of thinking more productive than others, and he tries to explain why they are so. He believes that the desire for originality has seriously marred and enervated more than a few contemporary critics. Antihistorical bias is still rife—and this is but one of the ways in which the New Criticism remains influential. Dipping back into the outdated 50s he seeks to show how Northrop Frye, Wallace Stevens, Frank Kermode, Jean-Paul Sartre, Georges Poulet, Martin Heidegger, Ferdinand de Saussure, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault have all set the terms and themes of present discussion. This feat achieved to his satisfaction, he proceeds to a more particular analysis of the intellectual careers of four American theorists who have been influential in critical thought during the period at issue: Murray Krieger (as aforesaid), E. D. Hirsch, Paul de Man and Harold Bloom. His book is, we are told, the first history and evaluation of contemporary American critical theory *within its European philosophical contexts.* It certainly demonstrates the gulf between American and mainstream British literary studies. If Professor Lentricchia were to attempt to leap that abyss on his phenomenological tricycle, he would merely remain suspended in a cloud, a fog, of hermeneutics.

MOLLY TIBBS

THE LIFE OF HILAIRE BELLOC

Hilaire Belloc. A. N. Wilson. Hamish Hamilton. £12.95.

A. N. Wilson's biography of Hilaire Belloc is the fullest account yet given of the life and writing of a man whose best remembered prose work is *The Path to Rome.* Belloc's *Cautionary Tales for Children* with their mixture of humour and violence are perhaps the most familiar of his poems. And yet he wrote a prodigious number of books (over 150), pamphlets, articles and poems: they include history with a bias towards Rome and a strongly Whiggish interpretation, economics about which he grasped only the most rudimentary notions, politics of a bellicose kind especially against Lloyd George in the parliament of 1906-10 where Belloc sat as Liberal M.P. for South Salford. 'He appears in print,' says Mr. Wilson, 'as a man of pugnacious certitudes'. And his certitudes, formed unshakably before 1910, stayed the same throughout his life: his political creed was that of a thorough-going individualist, opposed to state interference and bureaucracy, both seeming to him intrinsically evil. His radicalism was never that of the Liberal egalitarians and was even then a nineteenth century throw-back.

In strong contrast, Belloc comes through this book as a loving, romantic husband and friend and also a lyric poet of unexpected strength. His imagination transcended the clever, superficial versifying in which he daily indulged with the smart Asquiths, Tennants, Lyttletons and Mannerses of his set. His book, *The Four Men,* a 'hymn to stability by one of the most restless beings who ever crashed about the surface of the earth', sounds an authentic country poet's note in, for instance, his song of 'The South Country':

I will gather and carefully make my friends
Of the men of the Sussex Weald.
They watch the stars from silent folds,

They stiffly plough the field.
By them and the God of the South Country
My poor soul shall be healed.

Belloc was born in France and retained all his early love of French art, life and religious culture. Marrying an American, Elodie Hogan, after walking clear across the United States to California to ask for her hand, he spent 17 years devoting his thoughts and feelings to her though not always his physical presence, so restless a person was he in pursuit of wealth and new ideas—or rather new ways of reinforcing his religious and social prejudices. No opportunity is missed by Mr. Wilson of telling a good humorous anecdote and perhaps one of the most typical concerns Belloc's own perfectly serious account, immediately before the Russian Revolution of 1917, of how he had cunningly invested a considerable inheritance when at last he actually got one, in Russian government stock. When Maurice Baring and others, all equally horrified, remonstrated with him, Belloc explained, as one who has the inside track, that it would be 'a Jewish revolution' and his money would, therefore, be safe. He ended up as penniless as before.

After the untimely death of Elodie, Belloc lived out his life with an irredeemable sense of loss and remorse. His embittered feelings of failure included a long-held resentment at his rejection by the Fellows of All Souls when, in 1896, he applied to become one of their number, largely on the strength of a brilliant record in Oxford Union debates. His disappointment never abated and his wife's tragic death in 1914 somehow brought to mind other sufferings, of which that had certainly been one. His deep religious faith did not assuage his grief and he was for years 'widowed' in dress and demeanour, as many Victorians had been.

Mr. Wilson's book is delightful to read as well as being satisfyingly explicit as to dates and events in his subject's life. He shows Belloc passing through some of the most cataclysmic periods of the twentieth century and provides a telling commentary upon society between the wars.

BETTY ABEL

A. E. HOUSMAN: A NEW BIOGRAPHY

A. E. Housman, A Critical Biography. Norman Page. Macmillan. £17.50.

The house of Macmillan, which turned down *A Shropshire Lad* on its first submission, has now elected to publish a life of Housman which has been well and truly pipped by a considerably better biography by Richard Perceval Graves (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). Professor Norman Page, of the University of Alberta, Canada, tells us that his own project was under way before he came to know of Mr. Graves' work. Such simultaneity illustrates the debated need for some kind of registry of literary work in progress. It is inevitable that the reader of both books will have been here before—and only five years ago. Making a virtue out of brevity, as he does tendentiously in his 'controversial' opening pages on the nature of biography, eschewing elaboration such as extended genealogical data—mere undergrowth—and rightly, though not originally, despising speculation presented as fact, he offers a skeletal version of Housman's life, pared, he hopes, to a meaningful quintessence. It certainly differs from Mr. Graves' rich woodlands.

However, this new work is barely justified by the sufficiency of its original material, such as passages from the diaries of A. C. Benson, which would have been as adequately encapsulated in a paper, or by the brilliance of his in-

terpretation. The last biographical chapter has a fair stab at distilling the essence of the poet, but, over all, Page's Housman is a pale shadow of Graves' Housman. Housman's life was, in fact, a great deal more interesting than is popularly supposed and it lends itself well to Mr. Graves' discursive treatment, and loses by abridgement. It is quite remarkable that Professor Page considers Mr. Graves' reasonable, temperate, decorous discourse to be riddled with romantic speculation. He is unfair, but very amusing, when he refers to Richard Graves' 'fantasies' about Housman's homosexual activities. He is with Mr. Graves when, in spite of the testimony of Housman's own brother, Laurence, he marks as not proven the case for Housman's having a physical relationship, *faute de mieux,* with Adalbert Jackson, brother of Moses, who turned from him. He questions, however, the delights of Housman's continental holidays, with the astonishing clincher that satisfaction would have been difficult to obtain in quiet cathedral towns.

Nor will he accept that the relationship with Andrea, the *barcaiuolo,* who enjoyed fiscal benefits, was other than seigneurial. (And certainly there was a strange mawkishness about Mr. Graves' straight-faced celebration of this episode. Was it really 'love'?) As for the notorious list of alleged male prostitutes, annotated by Housman with the price paid to each (and it has still, it appears, not been possible to reproduce the document) the Professor, allowing in all fairness that Richard Graves merely states that it *seems* to be such, will have none of it. Nor does he discuss alternatives. What else can the entries represent? The cumulative weight of the evidence is against Professor Page. These are Housman mysteries, and we certainly have not heard the last of them.

In that other cloudy area—Housman's failure in Greats—Professor Page inclines more for explanation towards the poet's depressed mental state as a result of family troubles than towards the received idea that wrong preparation and intellectual arrogance caused the fiasco. He argues this very well. As did Richard Graves, he found it impossible to incorporate the critical component of his work into the main chronological flow. Mr. Graves compromised valiantly with interpolations which were not wholly satisfactory, but Professor Page takes the easy way out by appending a chapter of useful practical criticism of the poetry.

Mr. Enoch Powell, who attended Housman's Cambridge lectures, considers that Housman's biographer needs to be 'not only a classical scholar but in his own right a textual critic of sufficient standard to be able to trace the course and development of Housman's work and to appreciate and expound his stature.' Professor Page does not fill this bill. Like Richard Graves (who far outpaces him here) he contributes a short, respectful chapter on Housman's Latin scholarship. Mr. Powell's strictures seem very harsh. Professor Page is not unaware of this point of view, but characteristically overstates his refutation—it is 'perhaps like saying that only a Jesuit ought to undertake a biography of Hopkins, only a thief one of Genet.' What Mr. Powell would have in mind would be something like Professor Richard Pfaff's daunting and monumental tome on M. R. James' life and works, which minutely examines the Provost's palaeographic and apocryphal researches: the ghost stories are a speck in the galaxy. Professor Page is a fierce critic of others and he should not be surprised if he, too, is thought to have fallen short of perfection.

MOLLY TIBBS

SHORTER REVIEWS

British Parliamentary Constituencies (Faber and Faber. £25.00.) This is an invaluable 'statistical compendium' by Ivor Crewe and Anthony Fox, with a separate entry in respect of each of the 650 constituencies into which Great Britain and Northern Ireland are now divided. There have been, of course, changes in most constituency boundaries since the 1979 election. These alterations are set out in relation to each constituency and the new composition by wards is set out. The 1983 election result with details is given, and also the notional result in 1979 had the changes been then in operation. This could also be a notional change in the winning candidate. There is also a most revealing '31-category classification of the new parliamentary constituencies based on published demographic, socio-economic and housing data from the 1981 census'. Each entry concludes with a summary sketch about the situation and general character of the constituency, together with other useful information. There are also eight pages of maps showing the new boundaries, and a number of useful indices in which constituencies are classified under different categories.

Governing Britain (Fontana Paperbacks. £2.95). This well established 'guidebook', first published in 1970, is now in its fourth edition, by Dr. Malcolm Walles and the late Professor A. H. Hanson. It is concerned not only with a description of 'the administrative institutions of central government, but also with 'concentration on the interesting problems of institutional change.' Their main conclusion is that since 1980 'a move from consensual to confrontational politics has occurred'. On the other hand there appears to have developed a considerable degree of consensus in the work of the fourteen departmental Select Committees in the House of Commons. Their introduction in 1979 has been recently described by Sir Charles Gordon, Clerk of the House of Commons, as 'momentous'. This development receives surprisingly little treatment in a new study on British government, **The New British Political System** (Longman £5.50). It is a composite work by Ian Budge, Ian May and six other academics, mainly from the University of Essex. As its subtitle, 'government and society in the eighties', indicates, it covers a much wider field than *Governing Britain.* It includes, for example, discussion of the judicial system and the influence of judges, and also of local government. The authors conclude that British government is inefficient and fragmented. 'Fragmentation does not guarantee effective popular control. Instead, it puts a great premium on the *negative* or *reactive* power of various organisations.' This does not read like confrontation.

A Directory of Modern Culture (Routledge & Kegan Paul. £4.95, paperback.) This is an abridgement of the well received *Makers of Modern Culture,* published in 1981, and which contained 537 articles. This shorter edition contains only 320 entries, under the editorship of Justin Wintle. The policy has been to reproduce the complete original article selected for inclusion rather than to produce shortened versions of more of the original entries. For the person seeking factual information rather than a larger degree of comment, this

approach by the Editor is disappointing. On the other hand, it suits the object of the volume, namely 'to provide an introduction and encouragement to those persons who wish to explore the world of thought, literature and the arts beyond their immediate concerns and interests'. The period dealt with 'runs around the turn of the century to the present.'

In making this abridgement, concerned primarily with 'the culture of liberal/socialist societies', Mr. Wintle has retained 'very few politicians' and theoretical scientists. Among the former Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Che Guevara, for example, remain in this edition, as well as Hitler. Among scientists Rutherford is still properly included. The Editor fairly acknowledges that neither book can claim to be comprehensive. Within its limits it should prove a valuable source of reference, with contributions by more than 200 contributors, many of distinction.

Brendan Behan's Island: An Irish Sketch Book (Hutchinson. £4.95. Paperback). **Brendan Behan's New York** (Hutchinson. £4.95. Paperback). First published in 1962 and 1964, respectively, the time is as ripe as out of joint as any for the reissue of these two inimitable Behan monologues, rather than travelogues, which have proved to be timeless and so must, indeed, have distilled the vital essence of his two subjects by highlighting obliquities which have endured. Artfully concealing their patterns and shape, like Sean O'Casey's work, Behan's discursive, anecdotal flow of words creates vivid, idiosyncratic impressions well complemented by Paul Hogarth's understated drawings. Both writer and artist seem to find fresher and more fruitful inspiration in the orchard of New York than in the bogs of Ireland.

(R.W.E.)

Introduction to Psychology. An Integrated Approach. (Fontana Paperbacks. £5.95). Peter Lloyd, Andrew Mayes, A. S. R. Manstead, P. R. Mendell, and H. L. Wagner are all lecturers in psychology at the University of Manchester, and, between them, they have produced a manual on their discipline which is invaluable as being sharply up to date, clear and reliable. Their treatment is different in that they believe that psychology should be seen as an integrated subject rather than a collection of parts held together loosely by a common thread called mind. The student needs help in correlating the whole, and this book, where possible, pursues an integrative philosophy. The suggestions for further reading are thoughtfully composed. (M.T.)

The Common Reader I (Hogarth Press. £4.95 paperback, £9.95 hardback). Continuing the stream of Virginia Woolf's letters and diaries, Hogarth are re-issuing the two collections of literary essays known as *The Common Reader*—although it is an uncommon reader indeed who lightly stays with Virginia Woolf's oblique and allusive style. The new editor, Andrew McNeillie, has contributed a helpful short introduction and notes, and included an essay, *Miss Ormerod*, not previously published in a British edition. (M.T.)

Chance (The Hogarth Press. £3.95.) This is a new paperback edition of Conrad's novel published in 1913. It was a best seller which finally established Conrad's popularity. Nonetheless it became lost in esteem in later years among his other works. Now in this edition, Jane Miller has written a valuable Introduction in which she analyses the book and Conrad's views on women, and re-assesses its importance as one of Conrad's major novels. This edition should be widely welcomed.

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Contemporary Review

119th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

0528

JUNE 1984

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D-DAY
Stewart Menaul

GLUE-SNIFFING AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE—A TRAGIC SOCIAL PHENOMENON
Ludwig Lowenstein

CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW
David Shipman

and other articles together with a seven-page Literary Supplement and Half-yearly Index

Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

June 1984 Vol. 244 No. 1421 Founded 1866

Contents *Page*

East-West Relations Since D-Day, June 1944	Philip Towle	281
The Nuclear Freeze and the Presidential Politics of 1984	Adam M. Garfinkle	287
The European Parliament and its Initiatives	Richard Corbett	292
Hong Kong	Rudi Weisweiller	299
Reflections on D-Day 1944	Stewart Menaul	303
Glue-sniffing and Substance Abuse — a Tragic Social Phenomenon	Ludwig Lowenstein	309
Namibia: the Struggle for Independence	Sam Nuyoma	314
The Great War and its Effect on Henry Williamson	Don Cook	315
Venetian Music in the Sixteenth Century	Fiona Maddocks	318
Cinema: a Quarterly Review	David Shipman	324
Correspondence: Scientists and War	Robert D. Leakey	328
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		329
Kenneth Lindsay, Betty Abel, Desmond Hawkins, Richard Whittington-Egan, Ernle Money		
SHORTER REVIEWS		335
HALF-YEARLY INDEX, January-June, 1983		336

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© 1984. Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H. G. Leates Ltd., 45/47 Alexandra St., Southend-on-Sea, Essex. U.S. Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 515 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N.Y. 10022. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £14.50, U.S.A. and Canada $47.50. Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U.S. and Canada; extra costs given on request. U.S. Postmaster: please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 515 Madison Avenue, New York N.Y. 10022. (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

June 1984 Vol. 244 No. 1421

EAST-WEST RELATIONS SINCE D-DAY, JUNE 1944

by Philip Towle

THE warmth of East-West relations rises and falls with a wave-like motion and we are now at the bottom of the third trough since the Second World War. Western relations with the Soviet Union were at their height when US and British troops landed in northern France on D-Day in June 1944. Previously Stalin had resented the delays in the landing which he ascribed to indifference to the sufferings of the Russian people and a Machiavellian desire on the part of the British and American governments to see Germany and the Soviet Union bleed each other to death. We now know that the delays were a result of British fears that a premature landing would lead to defeat and that they were intensely resented by many Americans. However, when Churchill sent Stalin a telegram announcing that the landing would take place, Stalin sneered, 'Yes, there'll be a landing if there is no fog. Until now there was always something that put it off. I suspect tomorrow it will be something else!' Yet the landings proved to be the high point in East-West relations which steadily deteriorated as arguments about the nature of the governments to be established in the territories liberated from Axis rule became more bitter.

The bottom in this first trough in East-West relations—the Cold War—occurred between the siege of Berlin in 1948 and the Korean War (June 1950–July 1953). But with the death of Stalin in March 1953 and the ending of the Korean conflict relations began to improve. The first Indo-China War was brought to a halt at the Geneva conference from April to June 1954 when Vietnam was partitioned between a communist north and a non-communist south. Bulganin and Khrushchev visited the West in 1955 and again in 1956 instead of lurking, as Stalin had, in Moscow. But the 'spirit of Geneva' was short-lived; the invasion of Hungary by Soviet troops in October 1956 reminded the West of the conditions in Eastern Europe and the second Berlin crisis in November 1958 showed that the German problem was unsolved. There was a brief period of improvement from September 1959. However, in May 1960 a US spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union and relations continued tense until the Cuba crisis in September 1962, which many felt had brought the Super Powers to the brink of war. Nevertheless, from that low point onwards, East-West relations began to improve for the longest consistent period in

post-war history. It was not until after the middle of the 1970s that detente began to weaken with reports of Cuban military intervention in Angola in October 1976, US belief that the Soviets were using detente as a cover for their drive for military superiority and finally the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 27th December 1979.

Looking back at these crests and troughs from the Western point of view, we can see that in a period of detente the Western public, the media and statesmen emphasise the more attractive aspects of Soviet society and play down its darker side. In wartime it was the sufferings of the Russian people and their epic struggle against the Germans which received attention. Those who visited the USSR, like the French scientist, Eve Curie—who recorded her experiences in *Journey among Warriors*, published in 1943—emphasised the patriotism and determination of the Russian people and the barbarism of the Nazi aggressors. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 and the Soviet attack on Finland in November of that year were forgotten. The tension between Stalin and Churchill and Roosevelt was unknown and the nature of Soviet society was played down.

After the onset of the Cold War the situation was reversed. Chester Wilmot's account of the Second World War—the *Struggle for Europe*, published in 1952—barely mentioned the Soviet war effort. The internal nature of the Soviet regime was becoming more and more widely understood with the publication of George Orwell's *Animal Farm* (1945), *1984* (1949), the *Captive Mind* (1953) and of many other novels and studies. The great debate began over whether the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was motivated by a desire to build up a bulwark against another attack from the west or by the desire to expand the communist empire. It coincided with the outbreak of communist led insurgencies in Greece, Indo-China and Malaya.

The spirit of Geneva from 1954 to 1956 was too shallow and short-lived to alter popular attitudes towards the Soviet Union. Admittedly Khrushchev was clearly a much more likeable figure than Stalin. The media enjoyed his peasant stories and his behaviour at the UN, where he beat on the table with his shoe, was considered amusing and encouraging rather than the reverse. In this light it is perhaps surprising that most of the period of detente was dominated by the remote and humourless figures of Brezhnev and Kosygin. But the series of treaties, which began with Partial Test Ban Treaty and the 'Hot Line' agreement in 1963 under Khrushchev and continued after his fall through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) to the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (1972), both symbolised the general improvement in East-West relations and helped to consolidate that improvement.

Once again the unattractive aspects of Soviet society were played down. In the 1960s at least China appeared in many ways more of a threat than the Soviet Union. Suggestions by Chinese leaders that China would be able to survive a nuclear war better than other states were alarming and many believed that it was China which was encouraging the North Vietnamese to subvert South Vietnam. Naturally, Soviet leaders en-

couraged the general currents of Western opinion and signed agreements which presented their society in the best possible light. In August 1975 the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe—the nearest the continent has had to a post-1945 peace conference—concluded its labours. The heads of state or government of all the European countries, except Albania, reaffirmed their objective 'of promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security'. On Western prompting they also promised 'to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion'.

Clearly the Soviets could not abide by such an agreement without destroying their society and subverting their empire. Presumably they must have assumed that Western governments and peoples knew this and expected them to ignore the agreement. Instead there have been bitter arguments at the two conferences held since 1975 to review the operation of the agreement about Soviet failure to abide by the stipulations in the Final Act. There have also been allegations that Russians were breaking the first SALT agreement and using chemical and biological weapons, in defiance of international law, in Afghanistan and South East Asia. In a period of detente, if such suspicions had emerged, there would have been diplomatic consultations between the Super Powers but in the much tenser atmosphere in the late 1970s they rapidly became public.

At the crest of a wave in East-West relations anything unpleasant which the Soviets do is played down or ignored, at the bottom of a trough everything is interpreted in the worst possible light. After the capture of Eastern Poland by the Germans in 1941, they claimed to have discovered the bodies of several hundred Polish officers murdered by the Russians when they captured the area from Poland in 1939. The Russians maintained that it was the Germans who were responsible. The British Foreign Office knew from the evidence that the Germans were telling the truth, but it kept quiet to avoid antagonising Stalin. In a much more trivial example, when the Russians broke an international agreement by sending the aircraft carrier Kiev through the Dardanelles on July 18th 1976, Western leaders did their best to hush up the incident to prevent damage to detente. In contrast, when the Russians shot down a South Korean airliner over Sakhalin in September 1983 killing all 269 people on board, there was a tendency to put the worst possible construction on the incident. The probability is that the aircraft was destroyed partly because it was confused with an American RC 135 Intelligence aircraft and partly because the officers in the Far East felt that they had to act quickly, in order to comply with their standing orders, before the aircraft left their territorial waters. According to President Reagan it was 'an act of barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life'.

Do Soviet views of Western societies oscillate as wildly as Western

views of Russia? We have unfortunately few first-hand accounts to show what Soviet leaders really believe. But we know that on the eve of D-Day Stalin turned to his Yugoslav visitor, Milovan Djilas and warned him that British Intelligence might try to kill Tito by destroying his aircraft. The Soviet leader also told him that the British and Americans 'will never accept the idea that so great a space [as the Soviet Union] should be red, never, never!' Afterwards Djilas reflected that 'the world in which the Soviet leaders lived . . . seemed to me to be . . . a horrible unceasing struggle on all sides. . . It was a world in which there was no choice but victory or death'. With such a view Stalin would not have been surprised when the Cold War broke out and he may have expected it to end in a full-scale conflict. It was left to Khrushchev to argue that nuclear weapons had forced the Super Powers to co-exist and to compete peacefully. In his memoirs, which appear to have been smuggled out of the Soviet Union and which were published in 1970, Khrushchev made clear his opposition to war and his belief that ideological rivalry need not end in war. Unfortunately we have no similar guide to the thinking behind the policy of his successors.

There are however two other guides to what Soviet leaders feel, their military efforts and their official statements. Soviet armed forces fell to about 2.87 million men in 1948, rose again to 5.76 million in 1955 and then fell to 3.62 million in 1959. Clearly, as in the West, there is a delay between the growth of tension and its reflection in the scale of Soviet armaments. The mid 1950s peak reflected the tensions of the Korean War period, whilst the cuts which Khrushchev subsequently tried to impose on force levels, were a result of his own estimates of the likelihood of war. 'Under Leonid Brezhnev', Jonathan Steele, the *Guardian's* chief foreign correspondent, argued in a sympathetic account, 'the Soviet Union became a world power. It acquired an arsenal of long-range missiles that can reach any part of the globe within minutes. Its navy patrols the world's oceans. . . All this is a vast change from 1964 when Nikita Khrushchev was removed from power'. This build up continued through the 1970s when US force levels were falling from 3.7 to just over two million men.

There have been many attempts to account for the increase during the years of detente. The opposition of the Soviet armed forces to the cuts during the Khrushchev period may have convinced Brezhnev that he could remain in power only by reversing Khrushchev's policy. Soviet leaders may have believed that they needed this vast increase in order to achieve parity with the West or superiority over it. Soviet leaders openly state that such a situation made detente possible. Thus Mr. Suslov told the Supreme Soviet on 29th September 1972 that East-West treaties were 'a result of the growing might of the Soviet Union, a change in the world's power situation in favour of socialism'. There is a curious parallel between this process and that followed by the German government before the First World War. Then the Kaiser and his advisers strengthened their forces partly to symbolise German strength and partly to achieve political

gains in both war and peace. The High Seas fleet was established to deter Britain from entering a European war. In fact it made Britain more hostile to the German government and similarly the Soviet military expansion in the 1970s contributed to the collapse of detente and the election of a US administration under President Reagan who was determined to rebuild US military power.

Statements by Soviet spokesmen about the West vary less than statements by Western spokesmen about the Soviet Union. At the height of the spirit of Geneva, when Mr. Khrushchev visited India, he told the Indians that 'the colonialists stayed in your country in order to rob your people, to take the last piece of bread away from them'. The British government considered cancelling the official visit which Khrushchev and Bulganin were going to make to Britain but eventually decided to let it proceed after protests to the Soviet government. Throughout the period of detente there were similar attacks on the Western countries. Mr. Brezhnev told the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1971, 'the Soviet Union counters the aggressive policy of imperialism with its policy of active defence of peace and the strengthening of international security'. Again in June 1974 Mr. Brezhnev attacked 'the circles in the USA and in the countries allied to it that oppose detente [which] are striving to spur on the arms race and are now trying to place responsibility for the arms race on the Soviet Union. . . Under these conditions, the Central Committee and the leading bodies of our state continue to devote unflagging attention to the strengthening of the defensive might of the socialist homeland'.

The waves of detente and troughs of confrontation are certainly not only a Western phenomenon but they are clearly more extreme in the West than in the Soviet Union. Periods of detente encourage the West—leaders, media and public—to ignore the internal nature of the Soviet regime, to play down Soviet breaches of international agreements or crimes against humanity and to support the reduction in Western defences. Periods of confrontation encourage the West to ascribe the worst possible motives to Soviet actions, to assume that internal tyranny will lead to sudden and unpredictable external expansionism and to build up its defences. Conversely Soviet leaders do not modulate their statements so closely to the prevailing mood and under Brezhnev the Soviets continued their military expansion, despite detente.

Part of the blame for the extreme nature of Western reactions lies with the nature of open and democratic societies. Commentators feel that they have to exaggerate to make their views known. Statesmen have to compensate for the over-reactions of their predecessors and to say what they feel may please the electorate. The inexperience of many Western leaders with international life in general may exaggerate this process; President Carter changed from being a 'dove' to be a 'hawk' during his period in office, showing how little his ideas were based on a coherent and carefully thought out view of East-West relations. Another problem stems from the nature of Soviet society which has always attracted the

vociferous support of a minority of intellectuals. Malcolm Muggeridge has described how in the 1930s, 'the fine flower of the intelligentsia . . . were prepared to believe anything however outrageous, admire anything however cruel . . . in order to keep intact their conviction that under the auspices of the great Stalin a new, more just, more equitable society was coming to pass'. Such stupidity and dishonesty still exists and continues to anger the Soviet emigrés and others who understand the true nature of the *Gulag Archipelago* and causes them to stress their hostility to the Kremlin and its plans.

How then should the West behave? It should take a leaf out of Moscow's book and try to act with more consistency. The Soviet Union was not so benevolent as it was painted during the years of detente, nor so aggressive as some Western commentators and statesmen have suggested during periods of tension. Internally it is less tyrannical than it was under Stalin but less open than it was under Khrushchev. Externally it has seized opportunities when they appeared—of a Cuban alliance in the early 1960s, of the take-over of Afghanistan in 1979—but its policy has—though with certain notable exceptions—been cautiously revisionist. Amongst its most alarming actions in recent years have been the missions by Soviet submarines into the territorial waters of neutral Sweden. These appear to have continued despite the grounding of a Whiskey class submarine there in October 1981 and the political embarrassment which would result were another submarine to be caught in the same way.

On the eve of D-Day West and East needed each other to crush the Nazi menace. Today they need each other to minimise the risk of general war and to manage regional crises in the Third World. Western emotionalism and Soviet misconceptions can only hinder this process. Detente was based on a genuine Western desire to coexist peacefully with the Soviet Union not on fear of the Soviet military expansion as the Kremlin apparently believed. On the Western side, unless we can be more consistent, we shall frighten ourselves more than we need in the troughs, and trust the Soviets more than we ought on the crests. Only consistency will assure our future.

[Dr. Philip Towle has worked for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and for Reuters News Agency. He taught at the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth and was a senior research fellow at the Australian National University from 1978 to 1980. He is currently deputy director of the Centre of International Studies at Cambridge University and a fellow of Queens' College. His publications include *Estimating Foreign Military Power* (1982) and *Arms Control and East-West Relations* (1983).]

THE NUCLEAR FREEZE AND THE PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS OF 1984

by Adam M. Garfinkle

THE debate over the proposal to freeze the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons has seized a prominent share of the centre stage of American politics over the last three years and is sure to play a significant role in the presidential politics of 1984. This is so partly because the Democratic Party views arms control as an issue that can be used in its favour against the Reagan administration, whose image in this regard is poor. The freeze is also destined to play a large role within the Democratic Party as it struggles to select its presidential nominee. This seems improbable at first glance, since all the remaining candidates support 'the freeze' in one of its many versions. Yet as the candidates attempt to differentiate their views from each other, the inescapable point of departure in the defence/arms control debate within the Party during the nominating season is the freeze proposal. Thus, particular interpretations of the freeze—what it would allow and what it would prohibit, how to negotiate it, what its relation to the SALT (or START) process should be, and what US strategic modernisation programmes would be affected by a freeze—are all likely to overshadow discussion of more consequential issues and to seize the vocabulary of the entire arms control debate. Mixed into this brew are the spices of personality, yielding arguments about who is most 'sincere' and who is or is not a johnny-come-lately to the freeze banner. All of this ensures that the freeze *cum* symbol will be with us at least through November, if not beyond.

There is, of course, another reason why the freeze will shadow the US presidential season—Freeze Voter '84. From its nidus in the organisations of the professional and religious left roughly three and a half years ago, the freeze movement has expanded, fractured and changed with great rapidity. Today, it represents a broad coalition of interests whose underlying motivations for supporting the freeze and whose own political agendas vary widely. On one thing, however, the freeze movement is united, and that is its desire to turn the Republicans out of the White House in November. As the election approaches, differences are more muted as freeze activists of all sorts prepare for battle. Freeze Voter '84—the legally established political action committee of the freeze movement—is the weapon of choice.

There is some question as to how influential the freeze movement can be in the general election. Public opinion analyses show that recent anxiety over nuclear war has yet to subside but, at the same time, lengthy public scrutiny and Congressional debate have stripped the freeze of one of its most alluring qualities—its ostensible simplicity. American popular culture is fast-paced; even political catch-phrases tend to fade quickly from memory. The freeze is still there but to the public in general its

novelty, its benign simplicity, and its heroic anti-establishment grassroots image have eroded deeply. Indeed, if the nuclear angst that catapulted the freeze into national prominence in 1981 and 1982 can be so banalised and stripped of controversy as to form the theme for a prime time television bomb-opera like ABC's *The Day After*, then the freeze is probably on the way to a kind of cultural gerontocracy along with the gold standard, hoola-hoops, and both Senators Joseph and Eugene McCarthy. Nevertheless, how much strength it retains, and its rate of political decay, are important matters because freeze activists mean to prove their clout in the 1984 Presidential elections.

The deacons of the freeze movement met in large numbers—over 500 national and regional leaders—in St. Louis on December 2-4, 1983 to plot a strategy. The meeting was marred by disagreements of various sorts about strategy and tactics, the founders of the professional left assailing the 'newcomers' of the Liberal Establishment for the most part. The rhetoric from the dais was much further left than most of those on the floor wished to hear from time to time, and a number of votes on tactics occasioned considerable acrimony. Nevertheless, the freeze movement as a whole did emerge from the meeting with a new direction, one clearly beckoned by the upcoming Presidential election. Instead of planning mass marches and general fundraising campaigns as top priorities, the freeze leadership hopes instead to lobby directly for candidates at all levels, including the Senate and the White House. The movement has, in its own language, moved from 'public education to political action.' According to Bill Curry, the Executive Director of Freeze Voter '84, 'the freeze movement has come of age and understands the realities of the political process. We are not easily fooled by press releases.'[1] Curry believes that the shock of a Janus-faced Congress, which passed the (amended) freeze one day and voted up the MX missile the next, taught the movement that unless support for the freeze could be channelled politically, it was unlikely to accomplish anything practical. Therefore, Freeze Voter '84 has targeted thirty Congressmen and ten Senators specifically, and hopes to become the single most powerful organised lobby in the 1984 election. Curry hopes to bring together one million supporters of the freeze who will pound the sidewalks for pro-freeze candidates in what he called the Congressional 'build-down,' the 'trading in of two obsolete Congressmen for one committed to the freeze.'[2]

Freeze Voter '84 comes upon the hundreds of Democratic Congressmen and Congressional hopefuls as mixed news, and the Party's reaction has been mixed, too. Some fear President Reagan's strength in 1984 and wish not to put too much distance between themselves and the President on this issue. Thus, while the Democratic National Committee had effusive praise for the Pastoral Letter in September, the House Democratic Caucus' *Renewing America's Promise*—a sort of pre-campaign platform in general—listed in January of 1984 three 'grave threats' upon which to focus: budget deficits, the decline of investment, and *last of all*, the 'accelerating nuclear arms race.'[3] Others who feel their districts strongly support the

freeze and can be motivated to vote for or against a candidate based on this issue alone will surely welcome the resources of Freeze Voter '84 with open arms. Polls done on behalf of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee have indicated the freeze issue may be the one issue strong enough to encourage voters to split their tickets in November, those who vote for President Reagan making the effort nevertheless to vote for a pro-freeze Congressional candidate.[4] Pro-freeze sentiment also seems to dovetail closely with the so-called gender gap, another fact of political life that the Democrats hope to exploit in the election.

The effects of the freeze have been evident for some time in the Democratic Presidential politics of 1984. Senator Alan Cranston based his head-start campaign on the 'peace issue' and campaigned hard to get Freeze Voter '84's PAC endorsement. But, though he attended the December 2-4 meeting in St. Louis, he was unable to sway the movement, which seemed then to prefer a Democrat with a better chance to beat President Reagan—Walter Mondale. Nevertheless, Cranston's early success in using the freeze politically, most notably in the Wisconsin straw poll of June 1983, forced most other contenders to announce support for the freeze, at least in some form. Luckily for Mr. Mondale, Mr. Glenn (now out of the race), and Mr. Hart, the House debate over the freeze had so obscured its original content that the Democratic hopefuls, like the Congress itself, could support both the freeze and elements of the Reagan Administration's strategic modernisation programme simultaneously.

But the strong likelihood that freeze supporters in the Democratic party will hold great influence as the elections draw nearer is also a function of two other matters, one structural and one happenstantial. The structural matter is that, for many years now, the party professionals among the Democrats are much further left than the rank and file. This is one reason, incidentally, why AFL-CIO support for Democratic presidential candidates has eroded over the past twenty years or so. This means that in order to win the party's nomination, a candidate must speak one way, but to win the election, he must speak another way. This is in part why, before the primary season, Mondale led Glenn among party professionals by vast margins, even though most polls showed that Glenn had a better chance to defeat Reagan in the general election. It is also why even George McGovern and Jesse Jackson were always likely to bring more delegates to the Democratic National Convention than Reuben Askew, even though Governor Askew's views are far closer to those of the party rank and file.

The happenstantial factor is the unexpected absence of Senator Henry M. Jackson, who passed away in September 1983 of a heart attack. Jackson was the bastion of the party's centre and had his own quite considerable national constituency. His passing threw the balance of the party on foreign and defence issues decidedly to the left,[5] where it has been leaning ever since the Vietnam War. As Morton Kondracke reported after the Dartmouth College Democratic debate of January 1984, even

> . . . if the consensus of Democratic foreign policy intellectuals no longer is as isolationist and pacifist as it was prior to the bitter experiences of the Carter

> Administration in Iran, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan, younger Democrats in Congress seem as isolationist as ever. As one Mondale advisor put it, 'Their foreign policy is based on guilt. It's corrupt, in fact. If something's hard or ambiguous, their advice is, "Don't do it. Don't get involved in any struggle that might get our skirts dirty." That puts a lot of pressure on Mondale.' For Mondale to suggest that Grenada somehow was comparable to Afghanistan or Poland—the Grenadians happen to be free now, the Afghans are not—suggests that Mondale has been affected by his party's moral confusion.[6]

Many centrist Democrats rightly fear that the public, 'which counts strength as much as peace among its goals, will sense that the Democrats have learned nothing from the Carter years and again choose Reagan . . .'[7]

With even more direct reference both to Senator Jackson's passing and the nuclear freeze, a liberal Democratic Senator was reported to have confided privately: 'Without Jackson we campaign for the Presidency on a platform which we cannot govern.'[8] No one can fill the role that Senator Jackson played. Other influential Democrats with views similar to Jackson's discredited themselves in Party eyes by going to work for a Republican administration (Eugene Rostow, Paul Nitze, Richard Perle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and others), and those who remain, like Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, simply lack sufficient clout to stop the tide. Thus, the freeze is almost certainly destined to become part of the Democratic platform in 1984, and in far less equivocal language than it was at the Party's mini-convention in Philadelphia in 1982.[9]

If the Democrats win back the White House and Senate in 1984, and the freeze in some form becomes an expression of national policy, then three outcomes are likely. First, in practice, the freeze will be either entirely banalised by the realities of negotiating with the Soviet Union, or it will produce the sort of Treaty that is unlikely to muster two-thirds ratification in the Senate no matter how the Senate is composed at the time. Second, the 'victory' of the freeze that a Democratic election victory would symbolise would probably end the freeze as a popular movement, and leave its remnant for the professional left to reclaim and reshape for other purposes. Third, a resounding Democratic victory would clearly make it more difficult, even with a Democratic President working with Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress, to secure a defence budget sufficiently robust to support a firm negotiating position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In other words, if the freeze becomes national policy even at the level of symbol or rhetoric, its most significant effect may be to undermine the establishment of conditions necessary for serious arms control and arms reductions to take place.

If, on the other hand, President Reagan wins re-election but faces a more hostile Congress, then we can expect more of the same partisan dickering over arms control, and perhaps some shrinking of the space in the political centre to build workable compromises on the key defence and arms control issues. We can also expect continued Congressional intrusion into foreign and security policy-making, which poses both political and constitutional issues of considerable importance.[10] A continued trend to the right, epitomised by a Republican majority in the House of Representatives, seems extremely unlikely.

Whatever its original intentions—noble, subtrafugic, or both—the freeze movement has to some degree sharpened the expression of US national disagreement over these issues and made them hostage to narrow partisan goals. In conjunction with the current political environment, this has rendered a truly unified national policy more difficult to construct and maintain. For these members of the professional left who originally saw the freeze as a way to save the world from nuclear peril, the track record of the freeze movement thus far has probably been counterproductive on balance. If we are no closer to arms agreements with the Soviet Union, it is not only or primarily because the United States has been 'unserious' about arms control. It is rather because the peace and freeze movements in Europe and the United States have tempted the Soviet leadership into hoping that, by playing to the gallery, it could create restraints on Western military programmes without having to promise to restrain its own. But for those who saw the freeze primarily as a way to generate political trouble and, potentially, political defeat for the Reagan administration and its constituency, the record of the last few years must be encouraging.

NOTES

1. Curry quoted in Richard E. Cohen, 'The Big Freeze,' *National Journal*, December 10, 1983, p. 2583. See also David M. Rubin, 'Can the Peace Groups Make a President?' *Harpers*, February 1984, pp. 16, 18-20.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 2583.
3. See Phil Gailey, 'Democrats Urge Steps to Prevent Nuclear Warfare,' *New York Times*, September 21, 1983; Steven V. Roberts, 'Group in House Stresses Three Issues,' *New York Times*, January 8, 1984; and Cohen, 'The Big Freeze,' p. 2583.
4. Cohen, p. 2583.
5. This is ably discussed in Leslie Gelb, 'The Democrats and Foreign Policy,' *New York Times Magazine*, December 18, 1983. See also Charles Krauthammer's short article, 'What Happened to the Center?' in *Time*, December 19, 1983.
6. Morton Kondracke, 'The Candidates Cross-Examined,' *The New Republic*, February 6, 1984, p. 13.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
8. Quoted in Michael Novak, 'In Memoriam: Henry M. Jackson,' *Commentary*, January 1984, p. 49.
9. See 'Democratic Party Goals and Principles, Draft Workshop Statements,' Issues Workshops, Philadelphia, June 25-2, 1983, pp. 9-10.
10. See Judith Miller, 'House Restricts Funds for Arms That Defy Pacts,' *New York Times*, July 29, 1982 and 'Congress and the Arms Control Process,' *National Security Record* No. 59 (July 1983).

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THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND ITS INITIATIVES

by Richard Corbett

ON 14 February, 1984, the European Parliament (EP) adopted by 237 votes to 31 with 43 abstentions a proposal for a 'draft Treaty establishing European Union' which would amend and supplement the Treaties of Rome and Paris. It will be proposed to the Member States, and is likely to become a major issue in the 1984 European elections. At a time of growing paralysis and conflict in the Community, the EP has come forward with a detailed blueprint for reform.

Parliament's decision to draft proposals for the form of the Community was taken on the initiative of the 'Crocodile Club', founded by Altiero Spinelli[1] comprising MEPs from all parties who were convinced of the need to reform the Community, and for Parliament to take the lead in this reform. Named after the Strasbourg restaurant in which they first met, members of the 'Crocodile Club' held regular meetings and published an open letter to MEPs. The Club grew rapidly from the original nine to the near two hundred who signed their motion for resolution. This led to Parliament deciding, on 9 July, 1981[2] 'to take full initiative in giving fresh impetus to the establishment of European Union' and 'to create a permanent Committee on institutional affairs' 'whose task it will be to draw up a modification to the existing Treaties.'

An explanation of why Parliament considers a new Treaty to be necessary can be found in the Committee's report:[3]

> The purpose of a new treaty is to take a qualitative step in the process of European integration going beyond the important, but limited, achievements of the existing Communities. This is necessary in particular:
> (a) to *update* the treaties in order to include *new areas* of competence that were not foreseen in the original treaties but which, at a time of growing interdependence, require a joint European approach,
> (b) to bring into a *single clear institutional framework* the various forms of cooperation that have grown up over the past 30 years (European Communities, European political co-operation, European monetary system, etc.),
> (c) to render the institutions established by the Community more *democratic*, more *effective* and more *accountable* than hitherto.

The need for such changes and for progress along the path of European Union has been recognised by many. Over the past few years a number of initiatives from the governmental side have put forward proposals and defined objectives for European Union. One may recall among many others the declaration of the Heads of Governments in Paris in October 1972 fixing the goal of European Union to be achieved by 1980, the Tindemans report, the report of the 'three Wise Men', and, more recently, the Genscher/Colombo initiative. All these reports concluded that further progress towards European Union, including institutional reform, was necessary. However, they all suffered the same fate of being sent for further consideration to working groups of national officials and 'experts' which invariably watered down the initial proposals to insignificant com-

promises.

The EP hoped to avoid this fate by taking a Parliamentary initiative. Instead of relying on officials from national ministries, it hopes to start a political process, thrashing out an agreement among parties that they will support in their own countries.

Central to this strategy is the plan to submit the treaty directly to national authorities for ratification without it first being strangled in intergovernmental negotiations. This was foreseen in the resolution which established the committee which specified that the proposals 'should be sent directly for ratification to the appropriate constitutional authorities in each Member State.'[4] This is to avoid using the EEC Treaty revision procedure (Article 236) in which an intergovernmental conference determines 'by common accord' the amendments to be made to the Treaty, which then require ratification by all Member States. Parliament wished to avoid this procedure, both because of its above-mentioned suspicion of intergovernmental negotiations and to allow the Union to be set up by only some Member States if not all were willing to join, thus avoiding the familiar situation of one or two Member States blocking all progress. The idea stems from the precedent of Schuman's decision in 1950 to move ahead with those Member States of the Council of Europe which agreed to proceed further down the path of integration. In the words of Mr. Spinelli:

'No member State of the Communities which refuses to join the Union can be obliged to do so, but nor may it, through its refusal, prevent the others from setting up the Union. It must, therefore, be possible for the Union to be established by a substantial number of the existing Member States, and to negotiate with those countries which did not join a solution to all the problems deriving from their previous membership of the Communities.[5]

The committee started work under the chairmanship of Mauro Ferri (Soc. It.) in January 1982. It first drafted guidelines which were adopted by the EP on 6 July, 1982[6] by 258 votes for, 37 against and 21 abstentions —an 81.64% majority.

On the basis of these guidelines, the committee then elaborated a detailed resolution specifying the contents of a new Treaty. Six rapporteurs were responsible for different aspects: Mr. Moreau (Soc. Fr.) on economic union; Mr. Pfennig (EPP, D.) on policies for society; Mr. Prag (ED, UK.) on international relations; Mr. Junot (EPD, Fr.) and after his departure from Parliament, Mr. Seeler (Soc. D.) on the finances of the Union; Mr. De Gucht (Lib. B.) on the legal structure of the Union; and Mr. Zecchino (EPP, It.) on the institutions of the Union.[7] For his part, Mr. Spinelli (Com. It.) was appointed co-ordinating rapporteur.

The committee organised hearings with the Presidents of the Commission, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee, the European Trade Union Confederation, UNICE and various individual experts (political scientists, economists). Two seminars took place at the European

University in Florence in which the rapporteurs and leading academics from universities throughout Europe took part.

The rapporteurs' drafts were discussed in detail, amended, moulded into a single draft, adopted in committee by a large majority, and forwarded to the September '83 plenary session.[8] Here it was debated for two full days, slightly amended, and adopted by 202 votes to 37 with 71 abstentions. The committee, with the assistance of four legal experts[9] then 'translated' the text from the political resolutions to the legal language of the draft Treaty adopted on February.

The debate and vote revealed interesting tendencies. The Socialist, Christian Democrat (EPP), Communist and Liberal Groups supported the resolution, while the Conservatives allowed their members a free vote and the Gaullist Group did not vote. Within most groups, however, there were dissenting minorities.

In the Socialist Group, 46 voted for, 12 against and 34 abstained. In favour were Benelux, Italian, German and Irish members. The French socialists decided to abstain, but not all their members conformed, some supporting the resolution and others not voting. The Greek socialists abstained—a change from their previously hostile position. The British Labour members who had decided by a majority of two to oppose the project in September 1983, and the Danish Social-Democrats voted against.

The Conservative (European Democrat—ED) Group, which had masked its divisions by abstaining in September 1983, although they had supported the original initiative and the guidelines, this time allowed a free vote, and its members split with 22 in favour, 6 against and 6 abstentions.

The Communists split between the Italians who were strongly in favour of the motion, as explained in person by party secretary Berlinguer, and the French and Greek 'Exterior' Communists who were strongly against. The Greek 'Interior' Communist abstained.

The Liberals, apart from two of their Danish members who abstained, were unanimous in their support for the motion, as were the Christian Democrats. The Gaullists decided not to take part in the vote, but two rebels voted in favour. Among the independents and non-attached, a large majority supported the Treaty.

By country, a majority of every nationality except Denmark supported the Treaty. This was unanimous in the case of Belgian, Italian, Luxembourgish, Dutch (bar one abstention), German (bar 5 abstentions) and Irish (bar 2 against) members. The UK members divided 22 for, 12 against, and 9 abstentions.

Lastly, it is worth noting that the European Commission expressed strong support for the initiative in the debate.

Why did so many parties, and ultimately the Parliament itself, rally to such an initiative? Spinelli himself attempted to answer that question in the Jean Monnet Lecture[10] he delivered to the European University in Florence on 13 June, 1983:

> Initially, Parliament had not been driven by any great incentive for reform. It was scarcely a hot-bed of revolutionaries and dogmatists. Most of its Members

> were, on European questions, moderates, prepared to fulfil their mandates with caution, abiding by the responsibilities conferred upon them by the Treaties.

He went on, describing specific events in the Parliament's first two years, to argue that Members' attitudes had changed with their experience of how inadequate Community instruments, powers and resources are compared to the growing needs for joint action, and their experience of how little influence the Parliament has in seeking to change that situation in the current structure of the Community.[11] In his words:

> The obvious impossibility of overcoming the glaring contradiction between the needs of Europe and the policy of Europe run by the Council to respond to these needs was the bitter experience which led the Parliament, composed as it was of moderates, to take up the proposal put forward by the Crocodile Club.

Parliament has not come up with a utopian super-federalist draft as some people had expected. Its proposals are based on the existing Community structure, and institutions, and the acceptance of the *acquis communautaire* as the starting point for the Union. Mr. Spinelli describes it[12] as the delineation of an area in which *gradual change* could take place with the ripening of political will, without the excessive obstacles which hamper progress at present. It is not a matter of taking a 'big step' but rather of giving the Community legs to walk on.

Gradual change would take place in specified policy areas coming under 'concurrent competence' where the Union would have the right to act (and could do so when qualified majorities in both Parliament and Council so decide)—but until it did so, or within the limits of its decisions, the Member States would retain their powers.

'Exclusive competence', where the Union alone may act, is restricted largely to those matters in which the Community enjoys exclusive competence under the existing Treaties (e.g. tariffs).

The degree of competence in any field would be determined by the principle of subsidiarity, which states that the Union could only act in those areas that can be dealt with in common more effectively than by the Member States acting separately. This would ensure that the Union does not become a centralised structure, but would be limited to those areas where separate action by Member States is no longer sufficient. Those areas in which, due to lack of an adequate legal base or because of institutional obstacles, Community action has been insufficient such as research, industrial policy, environmental matters, transport policy, would be developed, and new competences would be taken on in specified areas of foreign policy, security, cultural exchanges and monetary affairs.

The respective powers of the institutions would be modified. Legislative power and the approval of international agreements would be shared jointly between Parliament and Council instead of, as now, being up to the Council alone. Democratic accountability would thus be ensured both to the representatives of the people (Parliament) and to those of the Member States (Council). A conciliation procedure would reconcile differences between them. Majority voting and time limits would speed up the decision-making process. These changes have been described[13] by John Pinder, Director of the PSI, as being of an importance that 'can hardly be exaggerated. Instead of spending years discussing matters critical to

our future before reaching either weak decisions or none at all, this method of legislating is designed to enable the Community to take action on them in good time: to convert common economic management from an unsatisfied need into an effective reality. This aim deserves the strongest possible support.'

The Commission's executive function would also be strengthened. Its normal term would be five years. It would be appointed after each European election—thus rendering both it and the election more political —by a procedure involving the designation of its President by the European Council, his/her constitution of a team and programme, and a vote of confidence by Parliament allowing it to take office.

The role and tasks of the European Council would be clearly defined, giving it general responsibilities in the field of co-operation among Member States in areas not subject to common action and giving it certain specific responsibilities in Union matters as such.

Last but not least, the Community's finances would be reformed with the elimination of the division between so-called compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure and with the possibility of establishing new resources with a fairer distribution of burdens among Member States.

Do the proposals have any chance? Mr. Spinelli referred[14] to Hemingway's novel *The Old Man and the Sea*, in which the old man, having caught an enormous fish, finds when he tows it to port that the sharks have nibbled at it and nothing is left but a skeleton. Parliament had just caught the biggest fish in its life, but there is still a long way to port and there are many sharks around. . . .

An early test will be the European elections. They are an opportunity for explanation and debate. In particular, national political parties will have to take a position on the proposals, bearing in mind how their MEPs voted, and these positions will also serve in domestic fora. A dynamic process will have started.

The proposal that the Union should be set up, if necessary, without all of the Ten is controversial but would overcome the familiar obstacle of one or two Member States blocking all progress. These states would have to choose whether to join with the others or stay out of the Union. There would have to be a 'critical mass': a minimum number of Member States for the Treaty to enter into force. (The proposal is six States comprising two-thirds of the population of the Community). The legality of such a procedure raises questions but a careful reading of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties shows that it is possible.[15] At worst it could lead to a side-by-side existence of the Community and the Union, but the political and practical absurdities of such a situation would force instead the negotiation of some form of association agreement for those countries not joining.

The current crisis in the Community does not augur well. However, it should not be forgotten that big steps in European integration often follow crisis (e.g. the Schuman plan following the failure to strengthen the

Council of Europe; the EEC Treaty following the debacle of the Defence Community Treaty). It is possible to imagine circumstances in which a number of countries will be looking for a new departure, if necessary without all the others. They will find a concrete proposal on the table. Conversely, if the current crisis is overcome a more positive spirit might develop.

Whatever happens, Parliament's work will not have been wasted. It is a remarkable achievement to have agreed among politicians of ten countries and many more parties such a detailed blueprint. It is something the governments have proved incapable of doing, even though they have declared it to be their objective time and time again. At the very least, the document, drawn up by the elected representatives of the people, will be a major reference point in all future debates and discussions on European Union. In the words of one seasoned observer of European integration:[16] 'The history of the Community is strewn with proposals on which no apparent action has been taken. Many of these have nevertheless contributed to that body of ideas which have provided over the years the essential preparation for the successive stages of the development of the Community. They have sown the seeds which have come to fruition later —often many years later. One such case was the proposal that the parliamentary body of the Community should be directly elected: that took some 28 years to realise. Its current members are prepared for another long campaign. They have laid the foundations for it, having been bold and courageous enough, in the face of much scepticism, to imagine a future for the Community at a time when others are incapable or unwilling to do so.'

If Parliament achieves at least this—and there are many who hope and believe it will be more—its work will not have been in vain.

NOTES

1. If Monnet, Schuman, Spaak, Adenauer and De Gasperi are often called the 'fathers of Europe', then Spinelli must be the 'grandfather'. He was co-author of the 1941 *Manifesto di Ventotene* which was widely circulated in the anti-fascist resistance throughout continental Europe which called for the establishment, after the overthrow of fascism, of a European federation as the only way to prevent war and to deal with common problems. He set up the *Movimento Federalista Europeo* and the 1945 Geneva meeting of resistance leaders which adopted the famous Geneva Declaration of the European Resistance Movements in favour of a European Federation: all this spreading the 'European idea' well before it was taken up by governments. Spinelli's unique network of friends and contacts in all parties, arising both from the European Movement and his years as European Commissioner, certainly helped in his success in building cross-party alliances in the European Parliament.
2. OJ C 234/48 (14.9.81).
3. Doc. 1-575/83/B, p.4 (Explanatory Statement) § 7 and 8.
4. OJ C 234/48 (14.9.81). The term 'appropriate constitutional authorities' gave rise to some confusion as certain observers understood it to mean national parliaments. However, bills authorising ratification of Treaties can only be introduced into national parliaments by national governments, and the latter will be the main recipients of the proposal.
5. Doc. 1-575/83/B, p.6 (op.cit.).

6. OJ C 238/25 (13.9.82).
7. Their working documents were subsequently collected and published in Doc. 1-575/83/C.
8. Doc. 1-575/83/A.
9. Professors Capotorti of Rome University and former Advocate-General of the European Court of Justice, Hilf of Bielefeld University, Jacobs of King's College, London and Jacque of Strasbourg University.
10. Published in the European document series by Agence Europe No. 1270/1271.
11. See J. Lodge, 'The European Parliament after Direct Elections: Talking Shop or Putative Legislature', *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 5, 1982, pp. 259-84, and her 'European Union and Direct Elections, 1984', *The Round Table*, No. 289, 1984, pp. 57-68.
12. See, for instance, the letter from Mr. Spinelli to Mr. Thorn on the occasion of the meeting on 13 April, 1983 between the Committee on Institutional Affairs and the Commission of the EC, reprinted in the 11th issue of 'Crocodile'.
13. John Pinder: *The European Parliament's motion for a resolution on the substance of a draft treaty to establish the European Union.* Paper delivered to seminar of the Federal Trust for Education and Research 5.10.83, p.2.
14. Debates of the EP 14 September, 1983, explanation of vote.
15. See notably the articles by Nicola Catalano, former Member of the Court of Justice; 'The European Union Treaty: Legal and Institutional Legitimacy' and by Jean-Paul Jacque, President of Strasbourg University: 'The European Union, Treaty and the Community Treaties', printed in Crocodile, open letter to MEPs, 11th issue, June 1983.
16. Roy Pryce: *The Community in search of its future*, paper delivered to seminar of the Federal Trust for Education and Research 7.10.83, p.14.

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The July issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Building a Multi-Racial Society* by Sir Kenneth Newman, *India's Muslims: a Divided Allegiance* by Anatol Lieven, *Impasse at the Politbureau* by Huet Owen and *'Topolski's Memoir'* by Michael Leech.

HONG KONG

by Rudi Weisweiller

HONG Kong's most striking characteristics are love of activity (mental, emotional, physical, intellectual, vocal) and the ability to alternate effortlessly between deepest gloom and extreme optimism. The taxi drivers' strike and resulting riots in January 1984 reminded one of the former. Varying views about the likely outcome of the Beijing negotiations illustrate the latter.

The ownership of Hong Kong Island and the ownership of Kowloon were laid down in agreements signed over a century ago, physically held in Taipei and repudiated by Beijing long since.[1] The 99-year lease of 1898 of the 235 other islands (including enormous Lantau) and of the New Territories on the mainland was also repudiated.

Opinions still differ as to why the Prime Minister raised the 1997 question in such blunt and offensive terms last year. Did she really ignore advice from her own experts? Did she feel that the matter had better be settled now and not left to confuse us for another decade? Was she warned by Beijing that they would force the issue if she did not?

What people in Hong Kong agree about is that, with the Falklands and the General Election behind her, this was a good moment to negotiate. The inevitable withdrawal of British claims to absolute sovereignty constitutes loss of face for HM Government, but sometimes loss of face is rewarded by sympathy from those who have gained face: both sides can now talk sense without the need for face concealing the true state of the body.

Europeans and Americans with business interests in Hong Kong need to see the future clearly. To those who live and work in Hong Kong, many of them first-generation refugees from Red China, such certainty is vital. The true key to the negotiations, however, is that a clear and early settlement of Hong Kong's future is apparently of paramount importance to the government in Beijing. To them Hong Kong is important as a gateway to the West, as a rich customer on its doorstep and a supplier of Western goods and know-how. But the real key is Taiwan.

The unity of all Chinese in one large empire, however loosely unified, is part of the historic image which has deep significance to all Chinese. The secession of Taiwan shows this to have been brutally and deliberately destroyed. Its re-establishment is to the Chinese what Ecumenism is to divided Christendom: the present division negates a fundamental ideal and, therefore, constitutes a deeply-felt loss of face.

The betrayal in Shanghai, where the continuance of capitalism was promised and then repudiated, stands as a reminder of how easy it would be for Beijing to promise 50 years of capitalism and democracy to Hong Kong and a few years later to go back on that promise. Some of the richest men in Hong Kong are the penniless refugees from the Shanghai

of those days. This explains why the very suggestion of a negotiated settlement caused a flight of money from Hong Kong last year. It also explains why many people feel justified in trusting the Chinese Government now: the main purpose of the Hong Kong settlement will be to prove to Taiwan that Beijing can now be trusted. Taiwan can then be lured back by similar promises. Although there seems no reason to believe that this would work, it is regarded in Beijing as an essential minimum if Taiwan is ever to be persuaded to bury the hatchet. The Chinese proposal of a 50-year guarantee until 2047 shows that they accept that one or several generations of Taiwanese will have to pass before there is real hope of that.

It is, therefore, quite reasonable to believe that the Chinese want a fair and early agreement. Their recent substantial investment in a Hong Kong firm selling television sets to China and in a large housing project in Hong Kong may be anything from a proof that Beijing believes in Hong Kong's future prosperity to a sinister scheme to get political through economic control. Statements from Beijing that they will not intervene to restore order if there are more riots in Hong Kong can be interpreted to mean anything from a genuine respecting of local authority to a warning to extremists to lie low.

All in all, the gloom of 1983 now seems to many to have been excessive or at least premature. The present optimism is, of course, very heartening, but may turn out to be both too great and too early.

An appraisal of the Hong Kong situation must attempt to answer three awkward questions: Why is China now so amenable? Will the resulting agreement survive half a century of political change? How will the Territory come to terms with its status?

The foregoing paragraphs suggested some possible answers to the first question. We must leave the reply to the second one largely to the ingenuity of the political psychiatrist and to the pragmatic skills of tomorrow's statesmen. However, the very real problems which the new deal for Hong Kong will create have so far been largely ignored.

The Beijing Government used to deny that the 1997 date had any meaning at all, giving as its reason that the lease then due to expire had no legal significance. The status quo was a matter of political convenience and would continue as long as, and only as long as, it happened to suit both parties. Since the beginning of talks in 1982 the attitude has switched to a tacit acceptance of the 1997 date and a determination to agree now to a further period of collaboration for the half-century to 2047. Beijing wants this agreement to be reached during 1984. The agreement is likely to recognise and respect a sovereign Hong Kong and, therefore, to restrict if not wholly deny sovereignty over Hong Kong by either Britain or China.

It seems clear that this involves considerable changes and that some of these will take place in 1984, or soon after, and not in 1997. One of them is the appointment of a Hong Kong resident, whose mother-tongue

is Chinese, as Governor in succession to Sir Edward Youde. The first such appointment is likely to be made by London and quite soon. Who is it to be?

Within the next few years a form of democracy will have to be established in the Territory. Without it, the agreed respecting of the local population's wishes by both London and Beijing is a meaningless phrase and incapable of having any practical reality. China is aware of this and has begun to suggest that free elections and a free parliament are not an irksome Western and Capitalist foible which they are willing to accept, but a recognition of basic rights of which it is their duty to remind the authoritarian and imperialist British.

Apart from any games about faces to be lost, this creates a real difficulty. Hong Kong people have had very restricted say in government, limited to dreary topics like street cleaning and shop licensing. This has, of course, resulted in a noticeable lack of interest in local elections. Even the legal system has been undemocratic because the courts operate in the English language and few Chinese speak English well enough to sit on juries. In spite of this, nobody would suggest that free speech is restricted or that justice is not done. There are, however, obvious shortcomings in the present system if European standards of democracy are applied. When and how will changes be made?

While administration is at present honourable, fair and generally efficient, those who have till now exercised power are civil servants and not politicians. Few of them are fluent in Cantonese. A change from English-speaking administration to Cantonese-speaking democracy may be an ideological move forward, but it might break many bones and create new tensions. There is as yet little evidence that sufficient thought is being given to this impending and relatively rapid transition.

Last year's run on the currency was made easy by the lack of monetary system since the link with Sterling was broken in 1972. A new system has now been brought into operation which operates not unlike the old gold-standard but uses the US dollar instead of gold. The large US dollar reserves exceed the total of the Hong Kong $ note issue. At an official rate[2] the note-issuing banks will change Hong Kong bank notes into US dollars and US dollars into Hong Kong bank notes. Without the need for exchange control the currency can thus be held at any value the government chooses. As a result there have recently been some much-needed inflows of foreign money and rumours of a possible re-valuation of the Hong Kong dollar.

The new monetary system clearly inspires confidence, but is not without its dangers. It, perhaps unnecessarily, perpetuates the pre-eminence of the two note-issuing banks, the Chartered Bank and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. It may become unavoidable either to add the Hong Kong office of the Bank of China to this list or to extend the privilege of access to the Government to all authorised banks by establishing a proper central bank. Nobody so far seems willing to discuss and face this technical banking problem, which is of crucial importance in a

financial centre of world status.

The other danger of the present banking arrangements is that any government could upset them by withdrawing the present bank notes and issuing new ones only to certain classes of owners. To prevent this from ever being contemplated there are now schemes afoot for abolishing Hong Kong dollars altogether and using a foreign currency (US dollars or Special Drawing Rights) in all local transactions, thus moving control of the currency and of the money supply out of Hong Kong. Such plans will excite bitter political controversies. This does not mean that their discussion can be avoided when the financial consequences of the political changes become more obvious.

While a solemn promise to allow Hong Kong to continue as a capitalist economy makes good sense for China and is, therefore, capable of achievement and perhaps even of some durability, its exact meaning is less clear. Confidence is the key to success in any free-market economy. With a powerful neighbour, whose political attitudes and economic needs may vary from time to time, something more than the virtue of hope is needed to sustain confidence. As the problems throw some shadows they must stimulate us to seek more light.

All sides agree that peace and prosperity in Hong Kong are in everybody's interest. One is, therefore, entitled to hope for agreements which will safeguard them. A few days in the Territory nevertheless remind one that the present mood of optimism needs to be tempered by a reasonable recognition of the many practical problems which will have to be faced and solved before written promises can be turned into a new lifestyle for a country which has a unique past but an uncertain future.

NOTES

1. After the First Opium War 1839-1842 Hong Kong Island was ceded to Britain in perpetuity. After the Second Opium War 1858-1860 Kowloon and Stone Cutters Island became British.
2. The Exchange Rate was fixed in October 1983 at $HK 7.80 = US$ 1.00.

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REFLECTIONS ON D-DAY 1944

by Stewart Menaul

IN the early hours of the morning of the 6 June, 1944, the navigator of a Pathfinder Lancaster bomber returning from yet another bombing sortie against transportation targets in Northern France could have been forgiven for thinking that his H2S radar set had gone haywire. His exclamation over the intercommunications system as the aircraft crossed the French coast to the east of Cherbourg suggested that something very unusual was taking place in the English Channel.

The H2S radar equipment fitted to all Pathfinder aircraft and which, incidentally, was the forerunner of the modern radar sets fitted to all airliners today, enabled the Pathfinder aircraft to navigate accurately to the target and thereby improve bombing accuracy. A coastline was always particularly well defined and ships on the surface of the water could be seen as blips on the radar screen, by day or night. On this occasion, the navigator exclaimed in disbelief that 'the bloody channel is full of ships'. In normal circumstances this would have been a most unusual occurrence, but what the navigator was seeing on his radar and which other members of the crew were soon to observe visually was the mighty armada of Allied ships crossing from their assembly ports on the South Coast of England to the Normandy beaches. Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of Hitler's occupied Europe, was under way.

Dawn came early on the morning of 6 June, 1944, and as the Lancaster approached the English coast it was daylight. Other bombers could be seen heading for home bases and below was the incredible sight of hundreds of ships large and small heading for the Normandy coast, yet there did not appear to be any enemy reaction either at sea on in the air. After years of flying over Germany in an increasingly hostile environment the bombing raids against transportation targets in Northern France (railway marshalling yards, junctions, rail/road choke points, etc.) on what were known as invasion softening up sorties, were regarded by bomber crews as almost a pleasant diversion.

Accustomed to running the gauntlet of heavy and accurate anti-aircraft fire and fighters on missions over Germany, which took a heavy toll of bomber crews, the sorties over Northern France prior to the invasion saw a dramatic drop in casualties in Bomber Command. On the night of 5/6 June, there appeared to be few German night fighters operating over Normandy, though there was sporadic AA fire on the coast.

D-day for the crews of Bomber Command could be said to have been 6 March, 1944, when the Bomber offensive was switched from Germany to Northern France and Belgium. Early in 1944, the projected assault on occupied Europe began to take absolute priority over all other military operations. For the previous four years, since the debacle of Dunkirk, the bomber offensive had been the only means of direct attack on Germany, but with the impending invasion of Europe by allied armies,

it was decided that the might of the bomber forces of Bomber Command and the United States Eighth Air Force based in England should be directed against the transportation system in Northern France and Belgium, especially the dense railway network in Northern France.

The operational plan called for attacks on about 80 rail centres and began on 6 March. The targets were attacked relentlessly night after night by Bomber Command so that by the time the invasion forces went ashore on 6 June, the whole rail transportation system, which would have fed the Normandy battlefield, had been paralysed. Reinforcements which had been hurriedly diverted from Eastern Europe were unable to reach the invasion area. In describing the effects of the bombing campaign in a book published after the war, Herr Albert Speer, Hitler's chief armaments production minister and the Fuhrer's confidant, said that the bombers had 'opened up a gigantic second front' long before the invasion of France.

The switch from targets in Germany (and Italy) to transport systems in Northern France as part of the softening up process so disorganized the German plans for reinforcing the invasion areas in occupied France that allied forces were able to land on the beaches, consolidate their positions and eventually execute a successful break-out from their beach-heads, though not without opposition. There were anxious moments during the first few days and weeks, and the break-out of British forces from the Caen bridgehead was held up by the stubborn resistance of the German forces defending that sector of Normandy. The break-out was finally achieved after heavy and concentrated attacks by Bomber Command on enemy positions facing our ground forces. The heaviest attack was in daylight on 7 July.

The fact that these bombing sorties were carried out in daylight was indicative of the failure of the Luftwaffe to gain air superiority over Northern France. The relentless pressure exerted by Bomber Command and the United States Eighth Air Force over Germany in the previous three years, especially attacks on industry, including the aircraft industry, had won the battle for control of the air space over France and Germany. The bombers continued to devastate targets in France and Germany in support of the allied armies advancing across Europe and were particularly effective in support of the Rhine crossings.

General Von Rundstedt, in an interview after the war, said of the success of the invasion: 'it was all a question of air force, air force and again air force. The main difficulties which arose for us at the time of the invasion were the systematic preparations by your air force; the carpet bombing; the smashing of the main lines of communication, particularly the railway junctions. The bringing up of armoured divisions was out of the question. Those were the main things which caused the collapse'.

Immediately after the war, a spate of instant assessments by amateur armchair strategists with little or no knowledge of the principles governing the application of air power, aided by self-styled historians, sought to


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WEYMOUTH
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belittle the efforts of the great bomber forces and to denigrate the reputation of one of the finest Commanders-in-Chief of all the armed forces who directed the bomber offensive from 1942 until the end of the war. They failed miserably. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Harris died on 5 April, 1984 at the age of 91. He was held in high esteem by all who served under him in Bomber Command. His repeated assertion that the strategic bomber offensive had a decisive influence on the outcome of the war was shared by those who were there and who knew what the offensive achieved. Among them were Field Marshal Lord Montgomery and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, the aircrew who flew the missions and lived to see the results of their efforts in the immediate post-war months by flying over the devastated Third Reich. Albert Speer confirmed these views and added that the bomber offensive was 'greatly underestimated in Britain and in the United States.'

But the price was high. 55,500 aircrew of Bomber Command died in the long and dangerous campaign which they had waged from the first day of the war until the last. On one night raid alone, on the town of Nuremberg on 30 March, 1944, 96 aircraft were lost, representing some 672 aircrew. This was more than the total casualties suffered by Fighter Command in the entire Battle of Britain.

The days of the great bomber fleets are over and we are unlikely to see again amphibious operations on the scale of the Normandy landings in June 1944. Only the two superpowers now maintain four-engined strategic bombers which only they can afford. Even so, they would find difficulty in penetrating modern air defences of fighters and surface-to-air missiles such as the Soviet Union deploys around her borders and in defence of important strategic targets. To prolong the life of the strategic bombers and to maintain their credibility, both sides arm the aircraft with Cruise missiles and 'stand-off' missiles which can, for the time being, penetrate the air defences. But eventually, highly accurate ground-launched and air-launched Cruise missiles and ballistic missiles will obviate the need for bombers capable of even approaching enemy territory. New Cruise missiles under development, using 'stealth' technology, will soon be available and will be virtually invisible to radar.

The Pershing II mobile ballistic missile is a good example of future weapons systems for strategic attack. It has a guidance system, using inertial and radar terminal equipment, which gives it an accuracy never before achieved by a ballistic missile. It can find and hit targets at more than 1,000 miles distant with great precision. Similarly, Cruise missiles currently being deployed by the United States, can find pre-selected targets using a guidance system known as TERCOM (terrain correlation) by which the missile compares the terrain over which it is flying, with the data stored in its memory system and corrects any errors in navigation that may have crept in during flight to the target. On arrival at the target, the missile uses a terminal update to enable it to hit the target with an accuracy that is measured in feet.

Even more effective systems are under development, including some

which use satellites or the stars as guidance systems over long ranges to attack targets on land or on sea. Despite these new high technology weapons, the manned aircraft will be with us for many years to come in the fighter interceptor, strike and reconnaissance roles. We may not again become involved in operations on the scale of OVERLORD, but there is always the possibility that some amphibious operations may have to be undertaken in the event of war in Europe or in other parts of the world. Air power will be essential in such operations.

The Falklands war demonstrated the vital need for air support in any amphibious operation, but sadly we had not heeded the lessons of World War II and were desperately short of airpower. The outcome of that war was a close run thing and had it been fought against a more determined and proficient army and air force the result might have been very different.

At the end of the Vietnam war, in which many new and hitherto untried weapons were used to good effect, General Abrams, the commander of United States forces in Vietnam forecast what he called the 'automated battlefield' by the end of this decade. He might well be proved right.

For the future, the conquest of space will have an enormous effect on concepts of military strategy, tactics and weapons systems. Already, both the superpowers depend on space-based satellites for communications, command control and intelligence (C3I), surveillance, early warning of missile attack, reconnaissance, meteorology, navigation and many other military services. There is virtually no part of the globe that cannot be observed from space by suitably equipped satellites, and both superpowers are competing in the race to dominate space. Already the Soviet Union has deployed and tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) designed to destroy United States satellites in the event of war. The United States is developing a similar capability. Both sides have embarked on research and development programmes to demonstrate the capability of a ballistic missile defence (BMD) which, using high energy lasers and particle beams deployed on the ground and in space, would be able to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles in the boost, post-boost and terminal phases of their trajectories.

Ships at sea could be attacked by ballistic missiles fired from the ground over long ranges and guided to their targets by satellites. If these space-based systems are to be maintained and available in the event of war, they may have to be defended and the struggle for control of space will enter a new dimension. Whether we like it or not, unless there is a comprehensive agreement, capable of verification, to prohibit the deployment of offensive and defensive weapons in space, it will become a combat zone in any future war.

Operation OVERLORD was almost certainly the last of the great amphibious operations of its kind. Those who took part in it by land, sea and air may have different personal recollections of the momentous events of 6 June, 1944, but none can forget the sheer dimensions of the undertaking or the courage and determination of those who executed it.

Nor will they forget those who did not live to see the re-establishment of freedom and democracy in Western Europe, which the populations of Eastern Europe have been denied. It is vital that the free world be prepared to defend that freedom against a threat that is, alas, still with us today.

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GLUE-SNIFFING AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE— A TRAGIC SOCIAL PHENOMENON

by Ludwig Lowenstein

WHAT people are most concerned about in connection with glue-sniffing is how to deal with the causes and hence to prevent the problem in the first place and, once it is established, to discover remedies for it. Recently, government legislation has come into force to place restrictions on retailers in the selling of substances which are likely to lead to glue-sniffing. At present, however, they are still voluntary guidelines. The reason for concern is that glue-sniffing has killed 236 young people since 1971 (*Nursing Mirror*, 1983).

Perhaps behind the whole obsession of glue-sniffing there is the desire for 'escape'. Such escape is also possible through alcohol, and soft or hard drugs. Even in Homer's *Odyssey*, there is mention of the use of 'Nepenthe', which is likely to have been a form of *cannabis indica*, in order to banish anxiety and fear as well as grief. The *Odyssey* is reputed to have been written in 1200 BC.

During the reign of Queen Victoria, there was a use of chloroform and ether, and in the 1950s gasolene sniffing became the vogue in the United States, and soon spread to Europe.

Glue-sniffing has been with us for some years now, but it is the use of other substances that is extremely worrying, because of the tragic repercussions. The method is to place the substances within a polythene bag and to inhale and exhale into the bag. Another method is to saturate a rag with a solvent such as turpentine, anti-freeze or gasoline and to hold it up to the nose and mouth for inhalation. Those who sniff aerosols or hair lacquer place the whole polythene bag over the head and around the neck so that none of the substance can escape. The dangers of these methods are only too obvious. The moment most likely to lead to asphyxiation is when the individual collapses while unconscious from the substance inhalation.

Some abusers actually burn objects such as beer mats, tennis balls and other toxic objects, and one of the latest crazes is to break fluorescent tubes and inhale their contents.

The effects of the use of these substances vary considerably. Some affect the nervous system (*Toluene*), some the heart muscles (*hydrocarbons*) and some gases such as propane or butane cause death by asphyxiation; the sniffing of benzine produces anaemia and damage to the heart, liver and adrenal glands. Other substances which are used for abusive purposes are chloroform, which affects the liver, aerosols which affect the heart and leaded petrol which causes lead poisoning.

The overall effect of glue-sniffing disorientates the individual and promotes loss of self-control and consciousness. There is even a possibility of seizures. Inhalation of intoxicating toxic substances also results in

sores around the nose and mouth, pallor, fatigue, forgetfulness, inability to think clearly, weight loss, depression, irritability, paranoia and death through asphyxiation or abnormal heart reactions.

As with any intoxicating substance the result is often a loss of sensible rational thinking that can result in bizarre notions of being immune to death or damage. There is a likelihood that such individuals may become aggressive and have delusions of power and may fail to heed the dangers around them and hence fall prey to traffic accidents and a multitude of other forms of self-destruction.

It is obviously better to prevent the problem of substance abuse than to have to deal with it later. The initial greatest influence on the child is the home and parents. This is followed by the influence of the peer group and school and other adults with whom the child comes into contact.

Children who are highly motivated towards school work or are keen on strengthening their bodies for sporting pursuits are less likely to come into contact or fall prey to substance abuse. It is very often the children who are academic failures or those who are bored and eager to conform to negative norms who become interested in glue-sniffing and eventually habituated to it.

It is vital, in the first instance, for parents to take an interest in their children and to guide them effectively. The school also has an important role to play in educating youngsters in the dangers of substance abuse. Both parents and schools must be aware of the signs that are the warning signals.

Help should be made available as soon as it is indicated that a child has used or is using substances resulting in self-abuse. Even short-term abusers may continue to use these substances, and when they become addicted it is all the more difficult to treat. Unfortunately, there is usually a considerable amount of denial and lying about the use of such substances, especially when punishment is feared. Although it is sometimes possible to treat adolescents and children while they are living at home and hence in the community, some have become so habituated that residential placement would appear to be desirable.

As already mentioned, the habitual use of such substances is likely to be based on troubles in the child's life at home and school.

Children who abuse themselves either do not feel they are doing any real damage or they claim it is their own body and hence their right to do as they wish with it. It then becomes an ethical question as to whether the child should be treated forcibly or allowed to continue with this self-destructive behaviour. Specialists and practitioners who are psychologists, psychiatrists and others, differ in their viewpoint.

Between 1977 and 1980, there were 13 studies on glue-sniffing recorded in the Psychological Abstracts. Eight came from the United States, two from Japan, two from the United Kingdom and one from Israel. Most studies are concerned with the causes and history of such behaviour and rather fewer with the treatment of the problem. Gamage and Zerkin

(1974) considered the voluntary inhalation of volatile substances from an historical perspective. Watson (1979) identified the most commonly inhaled substances and placed them into three categories. These included aerosols, Evo-Stick, Chemico, Uhu, Britfix, Bostik, Thixofix and cleaning fluids.

As already stated, parents, teachers and perhaps members of the peer group would be the most likely to be aware of glue-sniffing behaviour both by direct and indirect observations. O'Connor (1979) identified glue-sniffers by the strong smell of chemical and the suspicious stains on the skin around the mouth, nose and hands. There is also a loss of appetite, psychological rather physical tiredness, and a deterioration in school work resulting in academic underachievement as well as truancy. Parents frequently find it difficult to control the conduct of their children who stay out at night, are missing from home and who find that certain items are missing from the house including glue, freezer bags, polish, hair spray, nail polish remover and frequently money. Children who have been using glue or other substances appear to be in a dazed and drunken state and yet they may or may not be conscious of or admit to this behaviour. Other observable features are the staggering walk, the slurred speech and the unexplained violence either verbal or physical. A close inspection of the pupils indicates that they are dilated. Such children also suffer from poorer health and there is a strong likelihood and possibility of accidents.

Goko (1977) used psychological tests and Thematic Apperception Tests as well as the Rorschach and Sentence Completion Test with 50 juveniles referred to the Tokyo Family Court for inhaling glue or solvents. The most common features of these children were that they were languid, lacked insight into their problems, were immature and had poorly developed egos. They also tended to be introverted, neurotic, depressive and ambivalent towards their parents.

The use of substances in an abusive manner frequently leads to the use of other substances such as alcohol and drugs as well as smoking cannabis and eventually the use of hard drugs. It is therefore vital that two things happen when considering the treatment of the problem:

1. That the actual use of the substance must be stopped.
2. That the source, or cause of the use of the drugs or substances be dealt with through psychological treatment and other methods.
3. That we treat or consider the relevance of associated features such as parental behaviour, the school and the peer group, which frequently initiates substance abuse and perpetuates it.

In the treatment of these conditions, it is not merely a question of removing or reducing likelihood of drug abuse but the substitution with positive channels including an increase in the development of hobbies, promoting academic achievement and providing youngsters with the care, love and affection which is frequently lacking and contributory to the destructive demeanour.

Somehow these young people have managed to find an escape through destruction of their own bodies and minds, and it is the responsibility

of every conscientious citizen to do everything possible to prevent it.

In Scotland, there has been an effort made to deal with the problem of substance abuse through the Scotland Act of 1983. The 1968 Act has, therefore, been amended and suggests that from now on 'conditions indicating the need for compulsory measures of care' be introduced when there is a deliberate attempt to inhale substances for other than medical purposes. Many police officers are taking not merely an enforcement agency approach, but a caring approach to help adolescents with their problems. In this way the considerable physical damage which results from substance abuse can be prevented (Glaser and Massengale 1963; *Lancet*, 1974; Merry, 1967; O'Brien et al 1971; Satran and Dobson 1963: Watson, 1979). In addition to the physical damage, the psychological problems which result could and do end in suicide (Glaser and Massengale 1963), and damage to lungs and brain, (Allen 1966: Press and Done 1967; Walter et al 1976-7). It is unfortunate that such tools as the electroencephalogram still fail to identify the damage to the brain as a result of substance abuse (Comstock 1977), but psychological tests such as the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory indicated that continued use of glue or other substances results in psychological damage, including the ultimate—death due to acute brain syndrome (Schneider 1980).

The treating of inhalation of substances and other substance abuse is as much an ethical dilemma as it is a tragedy of many young people to suffer, shorten their lives and die from this condition. A variety of approaches have been attempted with varied success. Faillance and Guynn (1976) used a combination of Toluene and ingestion of Methuene and 'mushrooms' with Thorazine and found a quick recovery resulted. The whole family was treated by Goko (1978) while residential treatment provisions were proposed by Shottstaedt and Bjork (1977).

I myself (1982) used a variety of intensive and comprehensive methods to deal with the problem of glue-sniffing and substance abuse in a therapeutic community. The approaches used were as follows:

1. A high level of staff which made it possible for the children to be observed, to be constantly occupied in positive and constructive pursuits including following an intensive educational programme.
2. There were regular group and individual therapy sessions. During these sessions, the causes and results of glue-sniffing were discussed openly and remedies elicited from the group itself.
3. Alternative programmes of a positive nature were prescribed including:
   (a) An intensive educational course to promote academic achievement.
   (b) A considerable amount of hard physical work including building, repairs and maintenance were prescribed in order to obtain basic privileges.
   (c) New hobbies were introduced and old ones made available.

The results of treatment indicated that the three boys who participated in this study returned to a more positive and constructive way of life and

eschewed further glue-sniffing.

The side effects of this positive result showed that such children were capable of responding to firm and consistent as well as intensive psychological and residential care. Academic work improved and eventually, when they returned to their homes, the relationship between themselves and their parents also appeared to be mended and most important of all, their self-esteem was considerably enhanced.

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

NAMIBIA: THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

by Sam Nuyoma (President of SWAPO)

THE struggle for the liberation of Namibia has reached a highly critical phase, critical in the sense that the masses of the Namibian people, under SWAPO leadership, have stepped up and strengthened the armed liberation struggle against the forces of colonialism, racism, fascism, oppression and exploitation, as personified by the Republic of South Africa. The national liberation war is being waged by determined men, loyal to the struggle, by members of the national-liberation army of Namibia. Gun in hand, they are today fighting in all parts of Namibia, in all regions, in order to attain freedom and independence.

However, it is important to stress at this moment that the imperialist forces of Great Britain, France, West Germany, Canada and the United States of America, especially of the Reagan administration, have realised that the people of Namibia have vowed to fight against and conquer the racist regime of South Africa, which represents the bastion of imperialism in this country, and through which capitalist forces and multinational corporations of the capitalist countries in the west are ruthlessly exploiting the Namibian masses. In fact the imperialist forces have now begun to engage in various tactics and manoeuvres; they have approached us claiming that they realise that Namibia needs independence. They proposed that in the first place SWAPO should guarantee and ensure the protection of the white minority, that they should guarantee and protect their property and that then, when independent Namibia has been constituted, a constitution of sovereign Namibia be promulgated by a two thirds majority. SWAPO agreed to all these demands of America, West Germany, Great Britain, Canada and France. And then, they requested a combined, i.e. a mixed electoral system, or rather a system of proportional representation. SWAPO refuses to accept such a combined electoral system, the so-called system of one man-one vote—*two* counts. We said this must be the system: one man-one-vote—*one* count, and that it must be founded on the proportional electoral system. We opposed the combined electoral system, for this would create scope for the South Africa regime to manipulate the election results.

The United Nations must not be permitted to serve the regime in South Africa by realising the senseless scheme of bantustans, something the Namibian people have been absolutely opposing for years. The racist regime in South Africa and its imperialist allies must be made to realise that the people of Namibia will never stop fighting, until free of the yoke of colonialism. In the absence of genuine attempts to find the right electoral system, to find a peaceful solution by means of negotiation which would result in true independence, founded on Resolution 435 of the UN Security Council, there can be no alternative.

THE GREAT WAR AND ITS EFFECT ON HENRY WILLIAMSON

by Don Cook

WHEN a controversial writer is dead the analysis of his work and personality continues with a diversity of views about him which become more objective with the passage of time.

Of the major writers of this century, Henry Williamson was among the most complex. His support of Hitler and Mosley throughout his adult life cost him whatever chance of an O.M. he might have had, and earned him the vituperation of those literary and other critics more concerned with ideology than literature. Apologists for his seemingly unwholesome allegiance tend to dismiss it as political naïveté, and leave it at that. This, however, is not enough, because a significant part of the driving-force within the writer was stimulated by the Great War. What if Williamson's formative years had been different? If, for example, he had fought in Palestine rather than on the Western Front? Certainly his writing would have been quite different, and possibly he might not have become a writer at all.

The key to all his attitudes, his style, and his political rebellion lie in those experiences on the Western Front. It is easy for the critic seventy years later to gloss over this aspect, but no analyst of Henry Williamson can afford to do so when seeking an objective appreciation of his work. For that experience left him unhurt in body, but deeply affected in spirit, and from which eventually emerged some of the finest descriptive writing of the Great War in our literature.

The Third Battle of Ypres, or Passchendaele as it is more familiarly known, which was fought from July-October 1917 was perhaps, for him, the climax of degradation and despair. The ceaseless shelling by both sides, the continuous rain, the desolation of the battlefield transformed into a morass with every shell-hole filled with water was a pitiless horror. Add to that the stench of decomposing bodies, and the fear of not only being killed by the enemy but also of drowning without trace in the mud, and it is not difficult to imagine the effect on a sensitive young man.

It was at Passchendaele, too, that Williamson appeared to have become fully aware of the apparent relentless indifference of the High Command in its pursuit of the war of attrition. The sight of Haigh riding about the rest areas in a spotless uniform on a shining charger escorted by an equally immaculate lancer and standard bearer must have seemed an unacceptable contrast to the battle-weary, mud-soaked soldiers just back from the Salient. Already, in Russia there was revolt against the established order which was shortly to be replaced by a far more savage and repressive regime. Germany's turn would also come.

When at last the guns fell silent, and Williamson came home, he was appalled by the lack of understanding of the War by the older generation. All they could think about was, 'Making the Germans Pay'. He knew

too well that the German soldier had gone through the same hellish experience, unable to influence or control events, and his comrades had died in the same awful carnage.

He fell out with his father over this, and finally went off to the village of Georgeham in North Devon to write, and to try and find tranquillity. It was during those years that he analysed his ideas and ideals, and explored the countryside alone. In this period he tried to understand the nature of conflict not only in man, but in the wildlife around him and its relationship with man, but peace evaded him.

In 1928 he won the Hawthornden Prize for *Tarka the Otter*, which brought him recognition and financial help for his young family. The conflict so beautifully described in the otter story emphasises those constraints which affect the survival of all creatures. Thus, Tarka was the prey of the otter-hunters within a set of clearly-defined rules, and met his end in the fight to the death with the hound, Deadlock. Then again, Old Nog, the Heron, lived by taking fish from the river and was pursued by gamekeepers. Similarly, the men who poached the salmon in the estuary were chased by the police. In the end it was always the same unbroken chain, no change, no release, and the wildlife escaped or died, and the men, often unemployed ex-servicemen or tied farm labourers, avoided capture or were fined or sent to prison. There emerged an acute awareness in Williamson's writing of the sense of injustice at the failure to change attitudes in the post-war years. Were not the otterhounds as symbolic of restricted freedom as Orwell's pigs in *Animal Farm*?

The years following Hitler's coming to power in Germany in 1933 seemed to Williamson to be the answer to his own philosophy. Here was an ex-soldier of his own age filled with the dynamic spirit and will to change the old ideas and to put Germany back on its feet, backed by the majority of the people. Initially, that view was shared in Britain where most people were ignorant of the Nazi ideology set out so plainly in *Mein Kampf*. After all, the man was an ex-soldier who fought on the Western Front and he would never want that to be repeated. So, the danger of another war receded. It must be remembered, too, that in an era of political upheaval in Europe it was very difficult to sift any truth in both Nazi and Communist propaganda. Visitors to Germany and Russia saw only what Hitler and Stalin allowed to be seen, the brutality and savagery of both regimes was kept well below the surface.

When Henry Williamson went to Germany in 1936 he saw a country transformed. It served to strengthen his belief in Hitler. The post-war misery of the twenties had gone, and people were smiling and singing again. He also went to a Rally and reported accurately on the vast scale of the affair and the hypnotic effect Hitler had on the audience. There is no doubt that he was very impressed by all that he saw, and was not influenced by detractors. It was at about that time that the Soviet Union, it has since been revealed, was recruiting promising young undergraduates at Cambridge as spies.

The outbreak of the Second World War was a shattering blow to

Williamson. All his hopes crumbled. At that time he was working all day on his Norfolk farm which he had restored from dereliction, and writing late into the night. In spite of everything his loyalty to his own country was only momentarily in question during the 1940 invasion scare. There is no doubt that if the Germans had landed he would have fought against them even though the vision inspired by the Christmas truce of 1914 and the dead of Passchendaele had failed.

Five years after the War had ended he began the first volume of *The Chronicle of Ancient Sunlight.* It was in fifteen volumes and took him nineteen years to write. As a historical novel it begins in the last years of the nineteenth century and ends in 1952 with the great storm over Exmoor and the Lynmouth flood disaster. As always with Williamson, the detail is both penetrating and convincing, and has few equals in modern literature. It is the complete mirror on attitudes and life in England in the first and most devastating half of the present century, woven around the Maddison family. Critics praised the early novels, and those covering the Great War won universal acclaim, but the later ones were damned by some because of the fascist associations. In fact, certain critics did and still do display such hostility that the matter of objectivity in contemporary literary criticism can be seriously questioned. It is the sum total of the experience which counts, and against which judgement should be made, for *The Chronicle* is too important to be dismissed because of dislike of the author's political beliefs. The fact that these crashed around him are faithfully recorded in the books, and future generations will gain personal understanding of the reasons and the mood which provoked them in the turmoil of recent European history.

The final volume, *The Gale of the World,* is perhaps the most significant of all. Its message seems quite simple. The violent storm which struck Exmoor in the summer of 1952, turning quiet little streams into monstrous, boulder-carrying rivers of destruction to smash the fishing village of Lynmouth, demonstrated the ultimate power of Nature. This storm is the climax of the book, described in great detail, and shows that in spite of the anguish of man's inhumanity to man, there is a greater power over which man has no control, and that will, in the end, bring either the sunlight of understanding or finally overwhelm him.

Having completed this mammoth task Williamson waited for it to be recognised, for the accolade, but it was not to be. He only wrote one more book in his lifetime—the story of a pigeon. He had returned to the world of Tarka.

[Don Cook is a life-long student of the works of Henry Williamson. He specialises in the literature of the Great War and the English countryside.]

VENETIAN MUSIC IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

by Fiona Maddocks

DURING the past few months, an average of two thousand people a day visited the galleries of the Royal Academy's *Genius of Venice 1500-1600* exhibition, gazing in awe at so prodigious a display of paintings. That one small city state, even one as extraordinary as Venice, could produce such an amount within a century is remarkable indeed. Art historians have taken the opportunity to reconsider the precise nature and influence of this Venetian genius, stimulated by having so many examples, some hitherto unseen, together in one place. Newspapers and journals have used the exhibition as an excuse for lengthy articles on every aspect of the city from Veronese to *vcporetti*, from its architecture to its pastries, safe in the knowledge that the British have an almost proprietorial passion for all things Venetian.

One aspect, however, has been ignored. That aspect is music. Monteverdi and Vivaldi have long been lauded as pioneers of the opera and concerto, but this was not until the seventeenth century. It can be argued that changes of equal importance were taking place in Venice during the period covered by the Royal Academy's exhibition, without which this later flowering would not have been possible. In the sixteenth century, the music of the Most Serene Republic was admired across Europe and, if anything, was better known than her painting, architecture and statecraft. No other community was to have so profound an effect on the history of music in the next two centuries, laying the ground plans for a musical style which leads directly to Bach and Handel.

Before examining the nature of this influence, let us return briefly to the Academy. One of the first sights to confront the visitor was Carpaccio's vast *Lion of St. Mark's*, a visible glorification of Venetian power. The winged creature bares its teeth wryly, standing astride land and sea to indicate the Empire's dominance in both spheres, while itself declaring peaceful intentions as symbol of the Evangelist, patron saint of Venice. Behind, stands the Piazzetta San Marco, containing as it does today the city's two most important buildings: the pink-iced Doge's palace, seat of state power, and crouching behind it the Byzantine domes of the basilica, holy shrine of St. Mark. While paintings such as this, and later those by Titian, Tintoretto, Veronese, were jolting Europe with their bold and alarming use of colour, St. Mark's itself was witnessing a revolution of almost equal impact beneath its own domes—a revolution which established it as a centre of musical progress without rival.

To say that St. Mark's was not like other cathedrals may seem obvious, but its differences had a direct influence on its music. Strictly speaking, it was not even a cathedral, but rather a private chapel for the Doge, with the bonus of containing a holy shrine. Like Venice itself, it was independent. Clergy and musicians answered to the Doge rather than to any external church authority. All Venetians were proud of their prowess in

trade and commerce at home and abroad, and this pride extended to St. Mark's. Its music had to be more brilliant than that of any other place in Christendom to reflect the greatness of the Republic. Thus, festive state and religious occasions were almost interchangeable. They took place on a lavish scale, and foreign ambassadors carried home fantastic tales of their splendour. One English traveller, Thomas Coryat, claimed that in Venice he heard the 'best musicke that I ever did in all my life . . . so good that I would willingly goe an hundred miles a foote any time to hear the like.' Another tourist describes the monarchical style of treatment enjoyed by the elected Doge on ceremonial occasions—he was preceded into the basilica by '14 minstrels, eight with silver bassoons from which hung gold cloths with the arms of St. Mark, and six pipers with trumpets also with rich hangings.' Giovanni Bellini's *Procession in St. Mark's Square*, 1496, is an exuberant and detailed record of such an event, in which the musicians and choir are clearly visible.

It was not only tourists and travellers who were drawn to Venice. Musicians thronged there from all over Europe seeking work or wanting to acquire volumes of music by renowned Venetian composers. Some even came wanting to have their own works published, since Venice was home of the earliest music printing house. In comparison with book printing, music printing was slow to develop. By the time Petrucci, a Venetian, won his printing monopoly in 1501, some nine million ordinary books had been published in Europe, all since Gutenberg's trial in 1439. The first Petrucci edition, *Harmonices Musices Odhecaton 1501*, using a method of double impression moveable type, was a collection of part songs which appealed to the new middle class enthusiasm for amateur music-making. Petrucci saw here a good source of profit, much as German printers earlier had exploited the market for popular devotional books.

It was another century before the cost of music printing could compete with a comparatively cheap manuscript copy, but Petrucci's efforts did establish Venice as a source of 'portable' music which began to circulate in different countries. English musical life of the period confirms this. Collections of Italian madrigals (part-songs with secular texts) were sung by professionals and amateurs alike, and had a great influence on Gibbon, Weelkes, Morley and others who, in turn, pioneered a distinctive English madrigal school. Later in the century, Morley was one of those musicians who travelled to Venice, bringing back lighter vocal ballets and conzonets which he published under the authority of his own printing monopoly. It is entertaining to speculate what part this privilege played in his oft-quoted dictum that if a gentleman could not sing at sight, it was a sign of a bad education.

English musicians also followed those from other northern countries to seek work in Venice. St. Mark's was a good source of employment. The post of organist was the most highly sought in Italy, and the choir one of the biggest in Europe, with at least thirty singers and twenty instrumentalists holding regular salaried posts. On civic occasions and holy days, those numbers were swelled, as the architect, Sansovino, points out in his

description of a Christmas Eve service:

> . . . The Doge comes into St. Mark's where the Dean joins him . . . Vespers are intoned with singing and the most sweet musical sounds of the salaried musicians of the church, to whom are added others to swell the numbers, since on this evening they sing in eight, ten, twelve and sixteen choruses, to the amazement and delight of everyone, and especially the foreigners who confess to never having heard music so rare or singular in any part of the world, and they tell the truth.
>
> *(Venetia Citta Nobilissima)*

Sansovino's account is important as more than a decorative inventory. It draws attention to the precise style of music which distinguished St. Mark's, a style which evolved not merely out of the opulence of Venetian culture, but out of the architecture of the basilica itself.

We have already observed some of the features which set St. Mark's in a category of its own, but there was an additional basic difference: St. Mark's was the only major religious building in Western Christendom to be based on the shape of a Greek cross, having transepts of almost equal length. More important for its music were the matching choir lofts and two organs which stood opposite one another, placed in the transept wings, a feature which offered composers new acoustical possibilities. When a choir is grouped together at one end of the nave in a conventional church of Latin cross design, as in England, the sound, too, is unified. The very design of St. Mark's meant the choir had to be split into two or more groups and to sing in opposing bodies of sound, known as *chori spezzati*—literally, broken choirs. The sound met somewhere in the 42-foot cupola where the transepts cross. It was this new 'polychoral' tradition for which St. Mark's was to become famous in the sixteenth century. Earlier Italian composers had experimented with the idea, but St. Mark's was its natural home.

The basilica's busy timetable assisted experiment, by enabling several combinations of musicians to perform in different services. A typical day might include a traditional polyphonic Mass with choir and organ, followed by Vespers sung by the *chori spezzati* with, say, four singers grouped in one pulpit, and the remainder of the choir in the large pulpit on the south side. When the Doge was present, additional instrumental pieces were performed, with musicians placed in the organ galleries at either side of the high altar for maximum effect. Several compositions of this nature were written by the two Gabrielis, Andrea and Giovanni, such as the latter's *Canzon Septimi Toni à 8* for brass. The effect was—and in performances today still is—a dramatic collision of sounds.

For a people who responded proudly to the experiments in colour of Titian or Veronese, these new musical opportunities of echo and contrast were a natural counterpart. Indeed, an essay in the Royal Academy's exhibition catalogue by John Steer entitled 'Titian and Venetian Colour' emphasises this natural alliance. He argues that a change in the use of colour was taking place in the mid-sixteenth century which was indigenous to Venice, exemplified by Schiavone's *Adoration of the Magi*, 1547:

> Here the intensity of individual hues is so muted that the drama and movement of the painting depends not on the colours but on the interplay of warm and

> cool hues to which the colours are subordinate, an interplay . . . which weaves like a knot of wreathing snakes over the whole surface of the painting. What we find almost universally in Venetian painting of the 1540s and 50s is a movement away from primary colours to the classic phase towards much more complex systems of harmonies and dissonances built from mixed hues.

This could act as an admirable starting point to describe the polychoral explorations of the two Gabrielis and their circle at St. Mark's. Even in the sixteenth century, it had become commonplace to remark that music was to the ear what painting was to the eye, and analogies with architecture were even closer. Buildings were described in musical language—harmony, discord, diapason—and one musical theorist was employed regularly to act as architectural consultant. The greatest of all Venetian architects of this period, Sansovino, even received a commission to design a church specifically to the requirements of the new musical style. His spacious loggias and dazzling facades already covered Venice, but with this request he found himself, at the end of his life, facing a challenge without precedent.

The church in question was for one of Venice's four state-run hospitals, the *Ospedale degli Incurabili*—coyly named but, in fact, the syphilis hospital. It had a church and orphanage choir attached. Services were attended by the rich and fashionable who sought an alternative setting to St. Mark's in which to hear the new music. Sansovino met the challenge by designing an oval shaped church with a flat wooden roof. This roof reflected the sound in the way that a musical instrument might, yet managed to avoid the excessive echo effects suffered by St. Mark's. Three raised galleries were placed either side of the nave and above the entrance. The result was highly successful, and although this particular church no longer stands, it set a model for many other Venetian churches where the authorities wanted their music to create a favourable impression on those with power and influence.

This implicit recognition that music could serve a purpose beyond its religious or state origin was gaining strength. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, musical theorists had started arguing about the function of music just as art theorists had about painting. The argument fell loosely into two parts: whether music was intended to serve God—a belief held, predictably, by traditionalists and the Church; or whether it should serve Man, to entertain him and to affect his emotions. This second view was defended by composers of the new style, who, for this reason, found the Venetian spirit of cultural and political freedom all the more attractive.

Rome, on the other hand, was crushing even the slightest token of progress. The Counter Reformation inspired a rigorous desire for music to be pure and severe, free from subversive emotional effects. In 1562, the Council of Trent launched a direct attack on the new polychoral style by insisting that the text of the Mass should be 'uttered clearly and perfectly, and sink quietly into the ears and hearts of the hearers' rather than obscure the sacred words with rash vocal embellishment. Such a liberty, it was feared, would inspire 'impious and lascivious thoughts.' (Veronese came under a similar attack from the Council of Trent for his

secular treatment of *The Last Supper.*) Palestrina has long been considered the epitome of this conservative Papal style, though close examination of his huge output shows that even he embraced aspects of the Venetian style, while yet maintaining a sufficient sobriety to satisfy his masters.

In Venice, worshippers thought nothing of hearing a brass band play at Vespers, while Protestant composers who spent time there embraced the new style with enthusiasm precisely because it differed from the orthodox Catholic model. Luther himself, in his treatise *In Praise of Music*, praised the very elements which the Council of Trent was to condemn:

> Is it not singular and admirable that one may sing a simple tune or tenor (as the *musici* call it) while three, four or five other voices, singing along, envelop this simple tune with exultation—playing and leaping around, and embellishing it wonderfully through craftsmanship, as though they were leading a celestial dance . . .

For Protestants, the sixteenth century had opened with the singing of simple, homophonic chorales. It closed with some of their greatest composers—Michael Praetorius, Sweelinck, Schütz—having spent time in Venice, returning to their motherlands with brilliant polyphonic techniques which they incorporated into the Lutheran chorale tradition. This combination of styles leads directly to the divided choirs and interspersed chorales of Bach's *St. Matthew Passion* nearly two hundred years later.

Discussion of the three *maestri di capella* who, between them, initiated this transformation in musical history must be limited, without recourse to full musical illustration. All three—the Franco-Flemish Willaert, and the two Venetian-born Gabrielis—well illustrate the 'job mobility' enjoyed by musicians of the period. Willaert (c. 1490-1562) was poached from the Burgundian court, having been heard by a Venetian ambassador, who declared him the best musician ever, and insisted that he come to Venice immediately. He arrived to take up the post of choirmaster at St. Mark's in 1527, the same year that Sansovino made the city his home, and set about transforming its physical appearance.

Though less well-known today than his two most famous pupils, it was Willaert who established St. Mark's as the indisputable centre for polychoral music with his *Salmi Spezzati 1550*, psalms for split choirs. In addition to his numerous Masses, motets, instrumental works and festival music, Willaert trained many composers, choristers and theorists from the rest of Italy and all over Europe, outstanding among whom were Andrea Gabrieli and his nephew, Giovanni.

Andrea Gabrieli (c.1510-1586), like his master, looked beyond Venice for his musical training. After a period as organist at the small Venetian church of Santa Lucia (no longer existing, but formerly the site where the station now stands), he crossed the Alps to work with the Flemish composer Orlandus Lassus in the Bavarian court in Munich, visiting Graz and Augsburg before his return to St. Mark's as organist in 1564. While in Bavaria, he became aware of the possibilities offered by uniting voices with instruments (rather than with an organ, or else unaccompanied). This technique he incorporated into some of his magnificent ceremonial music for which he is justly remembered. His polychoral music is consid-

erably richer in harmony and texture, and more elaborate, than the simple antiphony of Willaert. He exploits contrast to its utmost: solo voice against choir, low voices against high, blocked chords against intricate counterpart. His *Magnificat* exemplifies this. The three four-part choirs sing in high, medium and low register, in contrasting bodies of sound. Each group would have been positioned carefully in St. Mark's to achieve maximum impact.

Giovanni Gabrieli (c.1556-1612) took this style a stage further. He, too, went to Munich in his uncle's footsteps, before settling in Venice as organist at St. Mark's for the rest of his life. He shared a flair for ceremonial music, but as part-time organist at the School of San Rocco—where Tintoretto painted his massive series of fifty-six paintings—he had yet greater opportunity to explore the grand style. Whereas Andrea had stuck to the tradition that all instruments were interchangeable (which might mean a trombone having to swap parts with a viol), Giovanni began to experiment with the sound qualities of different instruments, and was one of the first composers to specify which particular instrument should be used. His instrumental collection *Symphoniae Sacrae 1597* was the earliest of its kind, as well as being one of the first examples of the word 'symphony' in its modern sense.

In many ways, Giovanni Gabrieli is the pivot between music of the Renaissance and the Baroque. In his handling of polychoral music, he transformed the practice of using equally proportioned blocks of alternating sound, to a more Baroque (and modern) notion of solo voices, choir, orchestra and continuo, achieving contrast within a unified sound. In instrumental music, this signalled the arrival of the concerto, which was to flourish a century later in the hands of Vivaldi.

When Gabrieli died in 1612, the post of organist fell to Monteverdi. It was he who almost single-handedly continued the revolution set in motion by his three predecessors at St. Mark's. In the preface to a book of madrigals twenty-five years later, he declared that music should express every human passion from love to anger to death. In his efforts to achieve this, Monteverdi cast aside the Renaissance restrictions of form and proportion in the search for a new freedom of expression in music, just as Titian in his *Flaying of Marsyas*—jewel of the Royal Academy's exhibition—sought to free painting. How he achieved this is another chapter in the history of Venetian genius, but one which was to have a yet more profound influence on musical history. As in painting, so in music: Venice was leading the way. Europe could only follow.

[Fiona Maddocks has lived and worked in northern Italy. For the past year she has worked as a producer at Channel Four Television.]

CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

by David Shipman

I HURRIED to see *Un Amour de Swann*, presuming that it is the movie most readers of *Contemporary Review* will be curious about. I was curious myself. Why film Proust in the first place? I suppose because, like Everest, it is there. Once you've read it—*A la Recherche du Temps Perdu*—you have only to hear any of the names—Guermantes, Verdurin, Saint-Loup, Albertine, Vinteuil—to fall into a reverie, of a world so completely realised on the printed page. I guess they are not so complete to a film-maker or, rather, he dreams not of them but of how they might be visualised. Visconti was going to concentrate on 'Sodome et Gomorrhe', but in view of his treatment of sexual aberration elsewhere we may not be sorry that he was diverted to another project; certainly the present director, Volker Schlöndorff, has a more successful record of literary adaptations than Joseph Losey, for whom the playwright Harold Pinter prepared a digest of the whole work.

Whether we shall now get other sections of it I don't know, but *Un Amour de Swann* is quite successful within its chosen limit—which is Swann's passion for the courtesan Odette (Ornella Muti). Reasonably, the Baron de Charlus (Alain Delon) is a third leading character and an evening with the Verdurins fits neatly into the narrative, but a couple of fleeting appearances by the Duchesse de Guermantes don't help much. Schlöndorff seems to have come to the reasonable assumption that if Swann's world is recreated (it is Swann's world, not Marcel's, for the book's narrator is entirely ignored; there is no Madeleine to be glimpsed, even on a side-table) it must be visually ravishing, and it is: there are suitably large credits for photography (Sven Nykvist), art direction (Jacques Saulnier) and costume design (Yvonne Sassinot de Nesle). But I'm less certain about some liberties with the text. Given the novel's revelations in such matters I do not object to Swann's demand to know whether Odette has had sexual relations with Mme de Verdurin; there is not the least suggestion that Swann sodomised his women, so I do object to that, though I have a feeling that Proust wouldn't have done. My chief reservations concern Jeremy Iron's Swann, which is indistinguishable from his performances in *Brideshead Revisited* and *The French Lieutenant's Woman*. It's a performance I liked the first time around and I still do, but it's not Swann. I know that we only saw him through Marcel's hero-worshipping eyes, but here he is lacking in self-confidence and robust charm. And far from being stretched on a wrack of passion he is melancholy.

I left the film in a state of satisfaction, but it has faded quickly from the mind. *Hanna K*, on the other hand, is a right old mess, but it is better value than most films to be found on London's screens—which this isn't, as I write, perhaps because it failed to attract the public in the US after dire reviews. Here is not the place to fulminate against America's film

critics, but few of them bothered to point out that *Hanna K*'s virtues far outweigh her vices. To take the latter first, she has an unconvincing love life. She, Hanna, played by a Jill Clayburgh who has improved miraculously since I last saw her, is an American-born Israeli lawyer, in court fighting the district attorney (Gabriel Byrne) and out of it in bed with him. Their chief professional bone of contention is a Palestinian terrorist whom she is defending; she comes to see his point of view, and eventually starts a relationship with him. Her French husband (Jean Yanne), from whom she is separated, comes to visit, and according to the director, Costa-Gavras, the three men reveal to Hanna aspects of herself. They are, however, uninteresting aspects. He has allowed himself to be misled by his screenwriter, Franco Solinas, who may have worked well with him in the past but he is also the man who wrote Losey's dreadful *Mr. Klein*—not that Costa-Gavras needs help in planting the wrong symbols, as he proved in his daft romantic drama, *Clair de Femme*. In his best films, *Z*, *Missing*, *Etat de Siege*, he proved himself able to blend action and his milieu in a vivid way: violence erupts, and you feel sickeningly unable to cope with it, being in some strange foreign town. Hanna's world—the fly-blown, overhot courtroom, the apartment she has tried to make attractive—are very real to us; I was reminded of *The Year of Living Dangerously*, in which other well-meaning people desperately wanted to help the local people whom they would never quite understand, no matter how hard they tried. That Hanna defends a Palestinian causes her to be an object of approbation, receiving threats on her life. The film should surely have developed her dilemma over this, instead of detailing her romantic complications. But as I've implied, this is overall a riveting, important film. Maybe it offended American critics by acknowledging that the Palestinians do have gigantic reasons for their hostility towards the Israelis. The Argentian Zionist Jacobo Timerman has recently published *The Longest War*, an attack on Begin and the traditional Israeli attitude to the Palestinians. According to Patrick Marnham in *The Spectator*, Timerman 'realises that the only hope for Israel's future lies in the acceptance of the Palestinians and their need for a country too.' Costa-Gavras does not believe that his political films can change things, but at least they may take us out of our complacency. Few movies do that.

Take, for instance, *Terms of Endearment*, which deals with a family coping with a terminal illness, among other matters. At the Oscar ceremony in Hollywood it took awards for Best Picture, Best Screenplay and Best Direction—not any true indication of artistic merit, but interesting in the way it's interesting to know which of the year's new models the automobile industry itself regards the most highly; but if I say that *Terms of Endearment* for all that is a trivial movie we should take into account that so are most films. I might risk the expression 'profoundly trivial' about this one were it not for its honesty. The men are mediocrities and the women monsters: having just come back from the States I'm certainly not going to disagree. As much as it has a theme—it tends to move in every which way direction for laughs, for some truths, admittedly,

about what makes us tick—it concerns a mother-daughter relationship. They don't really like each other, though they would never admit to it. The daughter (Debra Winger) marries a sad sap who becomes a college professor by, it would seem, default, and who is later unfaithful. The mother (Shirley MacLaine) is single (we assume widowed), given to wearing clothes far too young for her, snobbish, boastful of a distinctly dubious Renoir, self-righteous, prudish and opinionated. You might suspect the writer-director, James L. Brooks, of misogyny, except that a great many American women become like this in middle age; as I said, Brooks seems to admire his own sex no more, and he does allow this woman to have an affair, which somewhat humanises her—though even then she cannot forbear to criticise when the man eventually arrives in her bedroom. He is Jack Nicholson, a potbellied former astronaut who at first found her bearable only by teasing her or sending him up. She is scornful of his display of souvenirs of his career as a means to seduction, but as he says at his age he needs all the help he can get. Nicholson and MacLaine are both delightful, and they are given lines and situations which are often very funny. These have little to do with honesty, which is the concern of the daughter's side of the story, and I didn't care much for that at all.

Those Oscars may have helped a nice little film that flopped, *Tender Mercies*, which won a Best Actor award for Robert Duvall and a Best Original Screenplay for Horton Foote. Mr. Foote wasn't very ambitious. He imagined a Country & Western singer, Mac Sledge (Duvall), who has been on one bender too many; he offers to work to pay his motel bill and—there's a deal of connivance here—he's soon 'walking out' with the pretty young widow (Tess Harper) who owns it. The questions are whether he'll go back to show business, whether seeing his ex-wife and daughter will upset him—whether, indeed, he'll go back on the bottle. These are big questions for him, shown to us in such an understated way that we're concerned, but not unduly. After being away in a funk, he admits that he drove past the house several times; the new wife confesses that she went out to just stare at the road. Like *Terms of Endearment*, this movie is in the truth game, and winning at it, for which the director is as much responsible as Foote and the excellent Duvall. The director is Bruce Beresford, who has transplanted from Down Under very well.

His fellow countryman, Fred Schepisi, also made a splendid American debut with a film which failed to attract customers to the box-office. I must say that these Australian directors are a strong breed. They have failed to attract a cult following because they are not quirky, they aren't anxious to sprawl their own individuality over their work. Back home, their movies have—too often—script weaknesses—but as far as the actual direction is concerned they have confidence, freshness and a professionalism you won't find too often among their contemporaries in Britain or Hollywood. Or so it seemed to me as I watched another of the BBC's enterprising Australian cinema series. William D. Wittliff's script for *Barbarosa* is another of those which sacrifices credibility for jokiness,

and the public, I think, has *had* those; and I believe that we're all a little tired of movies telling the West as it never was in films; nor, to be honest, do I think that there is a vast public for a buddy-buddy movie when the buddies are Gary Busey as a greenhorn and Willie Nelson as an irreverent old hand—Barbarosa, a local legend because of his supposedly ruthless killings. Both actors are amiable, as is the film. Schepisi has put more menace and tension into it than *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid*, probably the best-known film of this kind—and the jokes are better. His Texas is not the Texas of Beresford's film, for his camera has lied; he has made it unreal. Whether or not those Oscars for *Tender Mercies* finds a public for it I'll guarantee you that by the time both films arrive on television they'll have a following, and it won't be a small one.

Speaking of direction, I didn't care for the way John Landis handled *Trading Places*. The first film that I saw of Landis's, *National Lampoon's Animal House*, was a lumpish thing, but his *An American Werewolf in London* had glimmerings of style. The screenplay would do anything for a laugh and so would Landis. The point is that the story is in the cruel satirical tradition of Preston Surges and Billy Wilder, to remind us that there was a certain suave manner of telling such tales, but as in the scene in the exclusive Philadelphia club, Landis adopts an Ealing comedy cosiness, which is not at all appropriate. And Dan Aykroyd simply isn't sufficiently accomplished—or sympathetic enough, even if he has to play a vain, tight-waisted stockbroker who is done in by his benefactors, Don Ameche and Ralph Bellamy. They are two aged men who for a dollar bet reduce Aykroyd to a traumatic, dangerous penury, elevating in his place a black vagabond, Eddie Murphy, whom they have snatched from the sidewalk. The plot is far-fetched, for Aykroyd in his shame finds *every* old friend turned against him, and even his valet has been bought; but you want to know what happens next and there are some chuckles to be had along the way.

In *Star 80* you know what has happened from the beginning, if you're at all sharp—or if you've read about the true life case that Bob Fosse, who also directed, has used for his script. Dorothy Stratten (in the film, Mariel Hemingway) was murdered by Paul Snider (Eric Roberts), who had discovered her waiting in a diner and promoted her to fame as a *Playboy* bunny. She married him out of gratitude, it would seem, and then grew away from him after being offered a role in a movie, with whose director she began an affair. In *Lenny* and *All That Jazz* Fosse seemed aghast at the perils and pitfalls of show business, but *Star 80* seems unnecessarily bland. Whether or not one admires *Playboy* or its founder, Hugh Hefner, there is a mystique about them—or so they would have us believe. It is my feeling that *Playboy*'s lawyers looked at the screenplay, not wrongly since Hefner is portrayed in the film (by Cliff Robertson), and that by the time they had made some suggestions Fosse lost interest in the project. The crucial role of Snider, a self-serving, ambitious little creep is seriously undercast, and that, curiously, was the major fault of a television movie on the same theme, *Death of a Centerfold*, shown recently on the BBC.

CORRESPONDENCE

SCIENTISTS AND WAR

Dear Madam,

On the cover of the *Observer* Magazine on 20 May 1983 were the following words: 'A single nuclear submarine sitting in the Irish Sea can destroy 324 towns in the USSR . . . '

What in my old age I have observed, deduced and experienced, is that if this or any other war-like destruction happened, neither the submarine crew, nor the brilliant scientists and engineers who made it possible, or anyone else, would, as a zoological fact, know personally who they killed, what for, how the 'kill' started, or why. Nor would they need to know or even want to know, in order to 'fight and kill.'

Now, if such observed zoological behaviour comes within the field of 'science,' can anyone please improve on my two explanations in answer to the question: 'Why do we (brilliant scientists, politicians, soldiers and our species generally) not need to know, want to know, or are incapable of knowing, why we kill each other (in war)? My answers are:

(1) Once the tool and weapon making parts of our brains evolved, and once our body size got bigger and so made us less vulnerable to predators that once ate our species, the neurones or whatever responds to fear in our minds, did not need to evolve further, and therefore did not evolve further.

This means that when information is fear-loaded (as in war), we process it with parts of our brains that have perhaps not evolved more than an ape's level of intelligence, or have not evolved in perhaps five million years.

(2) For most of our evolution as an animal, our species, like a defenceless rabbit, had to survive predators by living according to the following epigenetic rules: 'Resist needs unless forced to do otherwise' and 'where two fears exist simultaneously in a mind, the more personal fear is greater and therefore has priority.'

As a result of applying these rules, any who had to be away from safety who did not respond promptly to a danger signal or threat, any who showed curiosity and wondered 'what?' or 'why?', would be delayed by the act of thinking, and sooner or later would have been killed off by whatever caused the signal or threat (which is all we need in order to fight wars).

The survivors, therefore, were selected for the ability to understand what activated the fear processing neurones or whatever processes fear-loaded signals or threats; or, to put it another way, any who had the mental ability to try and understand a danger signal or threat (like whatever makes us fight a war) over the many millions of years it took our species to evolve bigger bodies and the ability to use weapons, would have been positively culled by predators, and so produced no descendants with the ability to understand by the time, quite recently in evolution, when life became safer.

Can anyone offer a better explanation, or is the question wrong in the first place? Or is the whole subject not new, but politically censored?

Yours faithfully,

Settle, Yorkshire. ROBERT D. LEAKEY

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

EDITORS, PRESS LORDS AND POLITICS

The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain. Volume Two: The Twentieth Century. Stephen Koss. Hamish Hamilton. £25.

The period covered in this second volume is from the end of the Boer War to the end of the Second World War, in fact to 1947—the year of the Royal Commission on the Press and after. The author is Stephen Koss, Professor of History at Columbia University, New York and recently a visiting Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. He is no stranger to Britain, indeed he has written the following books: *Haldane, Morley, Asquith* and, even more important for this volume, *A. G. Gardiner and the Daily News, Sir John Brunner, Radical Plutocrat* and also *Non-conformity in Modern British Politics.*

On the major issues his estimates of Spender, Scott, Garvin, Gardiner, Gwynne and Dawson as Editors, and of Northcliffe, Rothermere, Beaverbrook, Cadbury and Cowdray as Proprietors are illuminating and discerning.

The book itself is written with style and wit, embroidered with a series of apt and amusing quotations, culled from wide reading and prodigious research. I enjoyed reading the 700 pages, partly because they jogged memories of over a dozen books, reviewed previously in *The Contemporary* and partly because of the masterly arrangement of sources and also chapter-headings. The book includes a dozen illustrated cartoons from Low, Cummings, Matt, Max and Punch.

What then of the changes from Edwardian days? As Professor Koss himself says, 'Newspapers have substituted political dispositions for what had been party allegiances.' Parties in relation to the Press are changing. The range and popular appeal of *Parties* have jointly diminished. After fighting six elections and after seventeen years in Parliament, I would say that Political personality and leadership still count. Editors and leader-writers count for less, perhaps less than some outstanding columnists in press and media. But on such matters opinions always differ. Professor Koss is concerned mainly with the National Press, but he refers to the regional or provincial papers, especially when they have an impact on National Elections, as with the Manchester Guardian and Yorkshire Post. My own electoral experience in Scotland teaches me the supreme importance of a favourable *LOCAL* press. Again, by-elections and general elections are affected quite differently by press influence.

I think Professor Koss would agree that it is still difficult to estimate the relationship between newspaper circulation and actual voting, especially with the widening of the franchise. Radio and television, the cheap press and public opinion polls create a prevailing atmosphere at different times; parties and press tend to make less impact. Professor Koss has much to say about the Press Lords and their buying and selling of newspaper properties. There was little to choose between Conservatives and Liberals. Lloyd George plays an immense and mercurial role in this period. Professor Koss writes that by the end of World War I, Lloyd George 'helped to dispel the myth that editors were priests, newspapers pulpits and leading articles scripture'. But at the same time, Lloyd George was scared by the weekly moral attacks on him by A. G. Gardiner. He also writes: 'Northcliffe's removal from Fleet Street and Lloyd George's eviction from Downing Street rank as twin landmarks in newspaper history'. J. A. Spender, Asquith's alter-ego, actually said, 'A journalist qua

journalist, always prefers to have his party in opposition', though most politicians preferred to have *The Times* on their side.

Who then is to own the British Press? If parties as such have less power and if owners are businessmen first and foremost, can we rest satisfied today when the big three—Trafalgar House, Reed International and Murdoch's News International monopolise about 75 per cent of national daily sales and about 90 per cent of national Sunday sales? Professor Koss gives no answer but concludes with an apt quotation from Antony Crosland: 'The media have their dangers, though they are far less sinister than most of the hypnotised critics think. But all too often we make them a scapegoat for our deeper failings', then he added: 'The range and variety of independent newspapers are below the requirements of a healthy democracy' and this he found 'disquieting'.

KENNETH LINDSAY

SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS

Shakespeare's Sonnets: a Modern Edition with Prose Versions, Introduction and Notes. A. L. Rowse. Macmillan. £20 hard cover. £7.95 paperback.

Shakespeare's *Sonnets* which contain some of the finest poetry in the English language have continually exercised the minds of literary scholars, who have tried in vain to trace the story behind their composition. Shakespeare, it has been assumed, is as great an enigma in these poems as in any of his plays. Using the precise methods of an historian as well as the textual skills of a literary critic, A. L. Rowse has made it his business since the early 1960s to reveal, step by step, all he could discover about the Shakespeare-Southampton circle. His books themselves read like a series of detective stories: indeed, his intention has been to add to them an edition of the *Sonnets*, meant to be 'practical and commonsensible', so that they would be able to be read 'like a novel, but perhaps for the drama they reveal an additional play from the hand of Shakespeare, the drama of his own personal life in the decisive years of his career'. Hence, a prose version appears on the facing page of each of the sonnets with necessary notes on obscure phrases below.

It should at once be said that the present edition is one of three, each revealing a little more of the story in some essential particular. The discovery of the identity of Shakespeare's Dark Lady of the Sonnets has been Dr. Rowse's most notable contribution to Shakespearean scholarship. It is one of the high points in a long sequence of surprises—and the greatest pleasure of reading Rowse is that he conveys his own excitement in following the trail. His first edition of the *Sonnets* contained a long introduction telling the full story of his research into the background and provenance of the poems, up to the point where he was forced to admit that the identity of the mysterious lady was not and probably never would be known. His second edition relates how he came unexpectedly upon references to a dark-haired, capricious lady, Emilia Lanier (née Bassano), in the case-book of Simon Forman, a fashionable astrologer at Court and in society generally. Forman himself describes the lady in a way that provides strong similarities between her and Shakespeare's dark-complected, musical but highly unreliable mistress; and the conjunction between the woman of the Sonnets and Rosaline in *Loves Labour's Lost*, the early play which is a skit on the group of poets, lovers and scholars in Shakespeare's circle, would seem to confirm her identity. In the new, third edition comes a further discovery: that the lady herself wrote at least one long heroic poem and that this publication too seems to have gone unregarded if not actually suppressed shortly after 1609, the date of Mr. Thorp's first printing of

Shakespeare's *Sonnets*. Enumerated too amongst Rowse's confirmations are the fact that 'Mr. W.H.', 'the onlie begetter' named on the title sheet, could only have been the publisher's dedicatee and neither the poet nor his patron as is often supposed: and that the Rival Poet referred to in the sonnets was Christopher Marlowe. The mystery surrounding the virtual disappearance of both the *Sonnets* and Emilia's own book is, Rowse reflects, the one remaining insoluble problem. The three editions with continuously revised notes and separate introductions are themselves worth possessing as a *variorum* for their own sake, and certainly they will serve to bring to the reader a freshness and immediacy not often found in scholarly studies of Shakespeare.

It is unfortunate that a bad printer's error has gone uncorrected. Sonnet 137 has been omitted and 138 printed twice. An erratum slip would seem to be the least the publisher could provide by way of making amends to the author.

BETTY ABEL

MORE THOMAS HARDY LETTERS

The Collected Letters of Thomas Hardy: Ed. Richard Little Purdy & Michael Millgate. Vol. Four 1909-1913. Oxford University Press. £21.00.

So far from there being any flagging of interest as this monumental undertaking passes its halfway mark, it is happily the case that the more than seven hundred letters in the latest volume may well stand out as one of the richest sections when the whole work is completed. At the dawn of 1909 Hardy was enjoying the afterglow of his labours on *The Dynasts*, of which the final volume had been published in the previous February. During 1909 he was preparing the collection of poems which appeared at the end of that year as *Time's Laughingstocks* and emphatically endorsed his claim to be regarded as a major poet. Throughout these letters he is at pains to denigrate his prose-fiction in favour of what he regards as his essential work. To one correspondent he describes himself as a writer who 'if I had been able to follow my instincts, would probably never have written a line of prose'. To another he writes 'If you do honour me by reading anything of mine again don't read a novel, but "The Dynasts", or "Time's Laughingstocks"'; and he adds 'the novels seem immature to me'.

Socially, the last years of settled peace before the Great War were coloured with a mood of 'Harvest Home' for the author, who now was increasingly accepted as the G.O.M. of English literature and publicly honoured with the Order of Merit and university degrees. The performance at Covent Garden of an opera based on his *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* may not have captured the spirit of the book but it cast a reflected glory on its author which gave Hardy some satisfaction, as his letters show. He was still able to live in London during the 'season', as he liked to do—although his wife, Emma, as he wrote to the editor of *The Cornhill*, 'has grown to dislike housekeeping in London'.

As a letter-writer Hardy tends always towards a matter-of-fact reticence. He wrote a great many letters, usually in his own hand, and understandably limited himself to the purpose of his communication. One is constantly aware of a self-discipline which would not allow him to be drawn outside his declared limits. Those who tried to engage him in political matters made little progress; and the attempt by Clement Shorter to entrap Hardy into making an after-dinner speech earned a crushing rebuke. Beneath the gentle courtesy of Hardy's customary style lay a resolute will and a very clear pattern of conduct. With only a few intimate friends—Florence Henniker, Edmund Gosse, Edward Clodd and Agnes Grove—does he relax into a warmer and more confiding

mood. Most striking in this respect is his admission to Clodd that he feels hampered by 'my domestic circumstances which, between ourselves, make it embarrassing for me to return hospitalities received'. It is the only overt reference before Emma's death to the unhappiness of their marriage at this period.

What may be read between the lines is a different matter. Hardy's emotional role as romantic tutor had been played out during the nineties with Florence Henniker and Agnes Grove as pupils who had subsequentiy passed into enduring friendships. The new pupil, Florence Dugdale, destined to become the second Mrs. Hardy, occurs in these letters intermittently as 'my little cousin' or 'my young friend', with Clodd acting as Hardy's ever-ready accomplice in providing whatever discreet cover might be needed. At the same time London editors and publishers were liable to come under pressure to take an interest in Hardy's latest protégée.

The death of Emma in November 1912 is reflected here in the inevitable correspondence of condolence, much of it formal but some touchingly revealing, as in his reply to Florence Henniker's letter of sympathy—'In spite of the differences between us, which it would be affectation to deny, and certain painful delusions she suffered from at times, my life is intensely sad to me now without her'.

The intensity of that sadness was to be measured three months later when he made his extraordinary pilgrimage of expiation to the old haunts of his 'West of Wessex Girl' and proceeded to construct the unique mausoleum of verse for the dead Emma in that great surge of poetry which includes so much of his finest work. In a letter from Boscastle in what he called 'Lyonnesse', on March 9, 1913, Hardy wrote—

> The visit to this neighbourhood has been a very painful one to me, and I have said a dozen times I wish I had not come. What possessed me to do it! Looking back it has seemed such a cruel thing altogether that events which began so auspiciously should have turned out as they did.

For all future students of Hardy's life and work this immaculately edited collection will be indispensable.

DESMOND HAWKINS

A NEW STUDY ON EDMUND GOSSE

Edmund Gosse: A Literary Landscape 1849-1928. Ann Thwaite. Secker & Warburg. £15.

It is a sad comment—*O tempora! O mores!*—that the name of one who for generations was the veritable elegant embodiment of Eng. Lit. is today dinosaur dead. Acclaimed brother of flute and lute by Tennyson, Swinburne, Browning and Rossetti, Edmund Gosse wished to be remembered as a poet. Author of nearly fifty books, he is remembered, if at all, for a single prose work, *Father and Son*. For one who in life displayed a delicate palate for scandal, it was not without a certain poetic, literally in this case, justice, that after death he should himself have become the subject of whisper, nudge, insinuation and innuendo. Officially, of course, his rest was silence. After his stately barge put out upon the Styx, he was the recipient of one of those sepulchre-white tombstone biographies, a last service from the pen of his friend Evan Charteris. It was a burking shroud. Farewell, O mighty Gosse! Belletrist. Supreme practitioner of Mandarin pose. Best lay wreaths of non-remembrance over things past, where our dead man of letters had been so rudely unbuttoned by ragamuffinesque Churton Collins, the Great Castigator, scourge of the Great Sham. *He* came to a fitting end: suicide in a puddle of dirty water. So far had Gosse slipped

beyond human ken that he did not even find a respectable niche in the Agatean *Ego* Pantheon; just the odd one line stand—such as Gosse on Racine's verse: 'Poetry in silver chains', and 'Gosse (blast him for a snob!) once said that every book-lover had a Louvenjoul on his shelves'. Few have a Gosse on theirs.

As long ago as 1969, John Gross in his most engaging literary critical history without tears, *The Rise and Fall of the Man of Letters*, observed: 'Gosse would make a good subject for a new biography. Charteris's official life was necessarily circumspect . . .' Clearly, Mr. Gross required amplification of such passages as that perpetrated by Phyllis Grosskurth in *John Addington Symonds* (1964), 'With friends of similar inclinations he (Symonds) exchanged bundles of photographs of young male nudes (Gosse was driven to steal glances at a photograph Symonds had sent him, all through Browning's funeral service in Westminster Abbey)'. The concept of Gosse as a covert closet queen has persisted. It has been reinforced by what Mrs. Thwaite, in company with Leon Edel, regards as Phyllis Grosskurth's misinterpretation of a passage from Gosse's letter to Symonds of December 31, 1889. The fruit of the misinterpretation has been perpetuated in Robert Gittings' *The Older Hardy*, Ted Morgan's *Somerset Maugham*, and Jenni Calder's *RLS: A Life Study*. Mrs. Thwaite casts timely doubt upon Gosse's homosexuality. There is no denying that he had homosexual feelings. That he indulged them is highly dubious Gosse gossip. His love for Hamo Thornycroft is undeniable. Lytton Strachey, asked point-blank whether Gosse was a homosexual, replied, 'No, but he's Hamo-sexual'. Other Gosse glosses and legends are less neatly disposable. Silken Sir Edmund remains the artful literary politician; the prickly snob; a cat person. Claws in velvet paws. But he leaves the dock without a stain on his character in the matter of the Wise forgeries. Mrs. Thwaite has had the first Gosse dip into the Arthur Benson diaries, which contain interesting Gosseianna, but one feels that the underlinings are too heavily done with a paranoid pencil. As for Mrs. Thwaite's hefty tome, on the whole Sir Edmund emerges sprightly and knightly from this very fair, very careful, very readable and satisfactorily scholarly biography of a man and the age that begat and buried him.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

PRE-RAPHAELITES IN CONTEXT

Pre-Raphaelite Papers. Edited by Leslie Parris. The Tate Gallery/Allen Lane. £12.95.

Pre-Raphaelite Writing. Edited by Derek Stanford. Den (Everyman's Library). Paperback. £2.95.

William Morris: News from Nowhere and Selected Writings and Designs. Edited by Asa Briggs. Penguin. £2.50.

This year's highly successful exhibition at the Tate Gallery and the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the birth of William Morris have brought a rush of fresh publications on Pre-Raphaelitism, which has become a subject second only to Bloomsbury in present critical attention. *Pre-Raphaelite Papers* is a scholarly publication which will be of general interest. Fifteen leading authorities on the period have been asked to contribute essays, of their own choosing, on various aspects of the movement as a whole. These range from Alastair Grieve's admirable study of the early PRB drawings and Malcolm Warner's account of Millais's 1856 masterpiece *Autumn Leaves*, to Diana Holman-Hunt's entertaining recollection of her grandfather as a collector and Professor Quentin Bell's essay on the Pre-Rapahaelites and their critics which has some particularly illuminating things to say about the relationship of his

father, Clive Bell, and the young turks of art criticism at the beginning of the present century to Pre-Raphaelite standards. The breadth of sympathy and understanding in the pieces contained in this volume shows how far we have come since the days of Clive Bell, Strachey and Roger Fry in re-appreciation of what is one of the major British contributions to nineteenth century art. There are interesting items in it on lesser known figures in the movement like James Collinson and the brilliant but short-lived Walter Deverell, an intriguing version by the American art historian Stephanie Grilli of the influence of the early Victorian phrenologist George Combe, whose popularity was such that he was even consulted by the Queen herself about the education of the royal children, on the heads in the early pictures of Millais and Hunt, another on the effect of medieval illuminated manuscripts in particular on the second wave of Pre-Raphaelitism, with Morris and Burne-Jones and an illuminating examination by John Christian of the influence of Ruskin on the latter. Dr. Mary Bennett, the leading authority on Ford Madox Brown, contributes a background to the importance of that painter's remarkable *Work* in the development and sales of his work and Benedict Read, who is responsible for the sculpture section in the Tate exhibition, considers the question as to whether the achievements of Woolner, Tupper, Munro and others can justify their description as a Pre-Raphaelite school in this field. All in all, this is a book which will give considerable pleasure both to the specialist and the general reader and is an excellent complement to the Tate Gallery's already very stimulating catalogue.

Of particular interest to readers of *Contemporary Review* will be Judith Bronkhurst's essay on Holman Hunt's visit to the Dead Sea in November 1854 which resulted in his celebrated picture *The Scapegoat*. It so happened that in 1886, the editor of the Review was Harry Quilter, who was not only a leading writer on Pre-Raphaelite art but was also well-known as an antagonist of Whistler. His brother, the collector Cuthbert Quilter, was the owner of the larger version of *The Scapegoat*, now in the Lady Lever Art Gallery, and Quilter invited Holman Hunt among a series of articles which he wrote for the Review under the title 'The PRB: A Fight for Art' which appeared in the April-June numbers for 1886, to deal with origins of the painting in the context of his first visit to the Near East. These articles became, in turn, the basis for Hunt's further volume of reminiscences which was published in 1906 and is one of our major sources for the origins of the Pre-Raphaelite movement. Interestingly enough, there is an original photograph of the artist re-enacting the painting of *The Scapegoat* by the Dead Sea contained in Jeremy Maas' *The Victorian Art World in Photographs,* which has just been published by Barrie and Jenkins and which is on view in an exhibition of the same name presently at the National Portrait Gallery. As one contemporary critic has put it, if Hunt's appearance there is anything to go by, no wonder the scapegoat looks as frightened as it does.

The *Contemporary Review* also features extensively in Derek Stanford's anthology of Pre-Raphaelite writing, which is a useful source book of material both from a literary and an art-historical point of view. This includes the famous piece written by Robert Buchanan on 'Rossetti and the Fleshly School of Poetry' which was published in the issue for October, 1871 and provoked Dante Gabriel's reaction in *The Athenaeum* in December of that year and John Morley's attack on Swinburne which appeared in the *Saturday Review* in August 1866 together with the poet's rejoinder to this. *Pre-Raphaelite Writing* contains a good deal that the student of this period will find fascinating and it

is wonderfully good value at the price. It is a pity, however, that little appears to have been done to update this since its original appearance in the Everyman series in 1973, as the bibliography contains no reference to the important body of critical material which has been published during the last ten years and the reference to prices so far as Pre-Raphaelite pictures are concerned will raise a few nostalgic smiles in Bond Street and St. James's, where these are still tending to rocket upwards. Mr. Stanford's text also needs a certain amount of further elucidation; William Dyce, for example, is not a minor Pre-Raphaelite painter, but a major Victorian artist on his own account whose links were probably closer with the Nazarenes than they were to the PRB; and Ruskin's remark that the four leaders of Pre-Raphaelitism were Rossetti, Millais, Hunt and John Leavis makes no sense unless one appreciates that this last reference is to the orientalist J. F. Leavis who had nothing to do with the brotherhood as such, but Ruskin chose to include with them on purely and rather ill-founded stylistic grounds.

Morris, of course, was never a Pre-Raphaelite as such either, but from the time of his involvement with Rossetti and Burne-Jones in the Oxford Union murals in 1857 has rightly been considered as one of the three leading figures in the second wave of the movement.

Lord Briggs' volume contains a wide and varied selection of writings by this important figure in Victorian art and thought, including the entire text of his dotty but endearing utopian fantasy *News From Nowhere*. There is also a useful section with photographs and an excellent text by Graeme Shankland on Morris's role as a designer and as an influence on many aspects of taste.

ERNLE MONEY

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan (Methuen paperback. £4.50). John Fullerton is a young British journalist who covered the Russian invasion, and more particularly the resistance movement for two and a half years from Peshawar, for the Far Eastern Economic Review and the London Daily Telegraph. He had first hand knowledge of the struggle when accompanying the guerillas in their fighting on several occasions. In this well written and balanced account, he discusses the tactics and methods of the resistance. He estimates that in 1983 there were in Afghanistan itself upwards of 150,000 to 200,000 armed guerillas fighting their Holy War. On the other hand, 'ironically for the Afghan resistance to become decisive in military operations, the guerillas must destroy the very thing they have been instinctively fighting for—a traditional tribal order intensely individualistic, parochial and above all, independent'. There is also fear among politically conscious guerilla leaders that Pakistan may come to terms with Kabul, before the insurgents have a sufficiently integrated and strong military force to make the Russians think again. Mr. Fullerton discusses the attitude and impact of other Islamic countries, including especially Iran. He concludes his study with the thought that 'the war in Afghanistan may turn out to be merely a precursor of a drama in which Islam and the USSR edge towards confrontation'. The volume is well illustrated.

Far from the Madding Crowd (Dent £1.00.) Thomas Hardy's great early novel has been added to the Everyman Classics series. James Gibson has contributed an appreciative Introduction, with also Notes on the text.

HALF-YEARLY INDEX JANUARY-JUNE 1984

VOLUME 244

LS—Literary Supplement

ABEL, Betty: LS 166, 222, 276, 330.

ARCHER, Clive: Recent Developments in Nordic Security, 243.

ARSLANIAN, Artin H.: United States Policy in the Middle East: the Dilemma of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 113.

BIGGS-DAVISON, MP, Sir John: LS 52.

BRIDGES, Brian: Japan and Korea—Distant Neighbours?, 1.

CALVERT, Peter: Britain, Argentine and the Falklands, 62.

COOK, Don: The Great War and its Effect on Henry Williamson, 315.

COOK, Mark: LS 164.

CORBETT, Richard: The European Parliament and its Initiatives, 292.

CORRESPONDENCE: 104, 159, 210, 272, 328.

DALLAS, Roland: Chile's Problems of the Three Thirds, 125.

ELKIN, Roger: (Poem) Youth, 257.

ELLNER, Steve, Venezuelan Viewpoint, 258.

ELSOM, John: Mexico, 34; The Orwell in Suffolk, 138; The Glory of Whose Garden?, 261.

FINGLETON, David: Quarterly Record Review, 155.

FISCHER, Alfred Joachim: In the Stranglehold of Teheran's Mullah Regime, 190.

FRADON, Cyril: The Genius of Venice: 1500-1600 at the Royal Academy, London, 151.

FROST, Gerald: Presidential Campaign: the Death of the Liberal Dream, 169.

FUTRELL, Michael: Vladimir Bukovsky's Castle, 23.

GARFINKLE, Adam M.: The Nuclear Freeze and the Presidential Politics of 1984, 287.

GREGORY, Roy: Conservative Democracy and Trade Union Power: the Trade Union Bill 1983, 181.

HANNIG, Waltraud: The G.D.R.—a Country of Books and Readers, 43.

HATHERLEY, John: Malta, the Opposition Standpoint, 231.

HAWKINS, Desmond: LS 331.

HUGHES, Arnold: The Senegambia Confederation, 83.

HUMPHREYS, Geoffrey: Oberammeragau's 350th Anniversary, 240.

KIRTHISINGHE, Buddhadasa: The Buddha, his Democratic and Basic Human Rights, 145.

LAND, Thomas: Wastelands in Amazonia, 131.

LANDOR, Alfred: Private Enterprise in West Germany, 143.

LINDSAY, Kenneth: LS 163, 221, 329.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT: 49, 105, 161, 213, 273, 329.

LONGFORD, Lord: LS 49, 105, 161, 218, 273.

LORAINE, John: LS 52.

LOWENSTEIN, Ludwig: Glue-sniffing and Substance Abuse—a Tragic Social Phenomenon, 309.

LUXMOORE, Jonathan: The Kampuchean Deadlock, 16.

MADDOCKS, Fiona: Venetian Music in the Sixteenth Century, 318.

MATES, Leo: China and East-West Relations: The Third Point of the Compass, 73.

MENAUL, Stewart: Reflections on D-Day, 1944, 303.

MILNE, Alasdair: Public Service Broadcasting and the Arts, 193.

MONEY, Ernle: The Royalists at War, 39; A Very English Artist: the Retrospective Exhibition of the Work of John Piper, 89. LS 107, 333.

MORTON, James: LS 111.

MUNRO, Hugh: The New Ireland Forum, 68.

NEEDLER, Martin C.: The President of Ecuador, 57.

NUYOMA, Sam: Namibia: the Struggle for Independence, 314.

POEMS: 82, 257.

POOLE, K. P.: Metropolitan and District, 133.

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEWS: 45, 213.

QUARTERLY CINEMA REVIEWS: 100, 324.

QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW: 155.

ROSE, Paul: 'Grenada He Come From', 30; In Search of Europe, 234. LS 218.

ROWSE, A. L.: Shakespeare as Autobiographer, 240.

SHANKER, S. G.: Principles of Political Education, 94; The Enduring Role of Government, 266.

SHIPMAN, David: Quarterly Cinema Reviews, 100, 324.

SHLAM, Avi: The End of the Begin Era, 225.

SHORTER REVIEWS: 56, 112, 167, 223, 279, 335.

SPENCE, J. E.: Reform in South Africa—a Tangled Web, 6.

STAJNER, Hari: Cyprus, a Final Partition?, 120.

STYLE, Colin: Olive Schreiner Today, 204.

SWORD, Keith: Is Poland A Catholic Country?, 199.

TIBBS, Molliy: LS 110, 275, 277.

TONG, Raymond: (Poem) In Another Place, 82.

TOWLE, Philip: East-West Relations Since D-Day, June 1944, 281.

VAN DER KROEF, Justus M.: Kampuchea, Between Conflict and Compromise, 175.

WADE, Rosalind: Quarterly Fiction Reviews, 45, 213. LS 54.

WEISWEILLER, Rudi: The International Monetary Fund, 77. Hong Kong, 299.

WHITTINGTON-EGAN, Richard: LS 332.

WRIGHT, Esmond: LS 50, 53, 106, 162, 167, 220, 274.

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